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QUAESTIONES CONCERNING CHRIST
FROM THE FIRST HALF OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY:

III. QUAESTIONES FROM DOUAI MS. 434:
THE HYPOSTATIC UNION*

Walter H. Principe, C.S.B.

THE second article in our series began the edition and study of *quaestiones* concerning Christ found in manuscript 434 of the Bibliothèque de la Ville at Douai. This third article focuses on *quaestiones* in the same manuscript that discuss the Hypostatic Union in Christ.¹ There are four such questions: a short

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¹ The preceding articles in this series are:

Quaestiones-I : 'I. *Quaestiones* from the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris', *Mediaeval Studies* 39 (1977) 1-59.

Quaestiones-II : 'II. *Quaestiones* from Douai ms. 434: The Need of the Incarnation; The Defects Assumed by Christ', *ibid.* 42 (1980) 1-40.

My study, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century*, 4 vols. (Studies and Texts 7, 12, 19, 32; Toronto, 1963-75) will be cited as follows:

Hyp. Union 1 – William of Auxerre's *Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (1963)

Hyp. Union 2 – Alexander of Hales' *Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (1967)

Hyp. Union 3 – Hugh of Saint-Cher's *Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (1970)

Hyp. Union 4 – Philip the Chancellor's *Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (1975).

Other abbreviations are:

Alexander, *Glossa* – Magistri Alexandri de Hales *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 4 voll. (Quaracchi, 1951-57).

Alexander, *Quaestiones* – Magistri Alexandri de Hales *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 3 voll. (Quaracchi, 1960).

Breuning (for references to Roland of Cremona) – Wilhelm Breuning, *Die hypostatische Union in der Theologie Wilhelms von Auxerre, Hugos von St. Cher und Rolands von Cremona* (Trier, 1962).

Lombard, 3 *Sent.* – Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctis* 2.1: *Liber III et IV*, edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas, ed. 3^a (Grottaferrata [Roma], 1981), liber 3.

For other studies of the theology of Christ in the first half of the thirteenth century see *Quaestiones-I*, p. 1 n. 1, *Quaestiones-II*, p. 1 n. 1, and the bibliographies in *Hyp. Union* 1-4.

discussion by Stephen Langton of the unity or plurality of Christ; a longer question, given in two redactions, that analyzes certain issues related to the union in Christ; a question by Peter de Bar dealing with the familiar debate whether Christ was a man in the three days of his death and burial; a question examining certain names of Christ in ways that involve the doctrine of the Hypostatic Union.

I. THE *QUAESTIONES* EDITED AND ANALYZED HERE

Question 1 (no. 377) (Stephen Langton)

Our first question, which has been identified as Stephen Langton's,² is number 377 in Palémon Glorieux's presentation of the contents of the Douai manuscript and is written in hand *m*⁷ of his classification of hands.³ It is found in volume 2, fol. 39ra-b, and is one of a group of some forty-three questions by Langton numbered from 339 to 381 (fols. 13va to 42v).⁴ The *quaestio* begins by saying it will discuss the two natures, divinity and humanity, in Christ and will first ask whether Christ is one or two (1).⁵ But after this beginning the debate turns to properties of infinite terms in theology and deals more with predication about the Trinity than with Christ (10-19). Therefore we have given it the title 'De Christo et de terminis infinitis'.

Question 2-A (no. 489) and 2-B (no. 457) (Peter de Bar?)

This question is found in two redactions, the first (A) in volume 2, fols. 143va-144rb, the second (B) in volume 2, fol. 98ra-va. Redaction A, entitled 'De Incarnatione' by an alternate medieval hand, is number 489 in Glorieux's list and is written in hand *m*⁸ of his classification; Redaction B is number 457 and is written in hand *m*⁵ of his classification.⁶ Since neither is in the hand of the compiler of the manuscript (*m*), they are not his work but that of one or two authors whose questions have been transcribed by two different copyists.

Glorieux lists Redaction A as anonymous.⁷ On the basis of 'caractéristiques littéraires' or formulae he assigns Redaction B to Peter de Bar, a master who is named as author of fourteen questions in the manuscript and who may be, in

² See Odon Lottin, 'Quelques "Quaestiones" de maîtres parisiens aux environs de 1225-1235', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 5 (1933) 95.

³ 'Les 572 questions du manuscrit de Douai 434', *ibid.* 10 (1938) 227, 225.

⁴ *ibid.*, 227.

⁵ Numbers in parentheses refer to paragraph numbers of the questions edited here.

⁶ See Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions', 240, 239-40 n. 44 (for A), and 237, 230-31 n. 38 (for B).

⁷ *ibid.*, 265.

Glorieux's opinion, the author of a considerable number of other questions in this collection.⁸ Had Glorieux seen the close relationship between these two redactions, he would undoubtedly have assigned Redaction A to Peter de Bar as well.

With respect to Peter's authorship, it is true that Redaction B follows the formulae indicated by Glorieux quite closely, but it must also be remarked that in some of the questions attributed by name to Peter the formulae vary at times from this pattern. Moreover, Redaction A differs in its formulae from the pattern supposedly characteristic of Peter. This difference could be explained by the fact that Redaction B, as our analysis will show, is a *reportatio* much closer to the actual debate than is Redaction A, which reorganizes the material with greater clarity and order than is found in Redaction B. This reorganization and change of formulae could have been the work of the master himself or of someone else – possibly even the reporter of B – who took notes at the disputation and rewrote them later. Thus if one wished to argue on the rather uncertain basis of the method of formulae, the differences in formulae between A and B would not necessarily disprove Peter's authorship. Some positive indication of his being the master disputant of this question might be found from comparison with our question 3.⁹ This question is quite certainly Peter de Bar's, and there are several places in it where one has the impression of reading material similar to that in question 2. Hence, although one might be skeptical about use of the method of formulae, one could still see some reason for suggesting Peter de Bar as a possible author of our question 2. To indicate our hesitations, we have put a question mark after his name and have referred to him as 'the master' rather than as 'Peter'.

Question 3 (no. 404) (Peter de Bar)

This question about the state of Christ in the three days of his death and burial is found in volume 2, fols. 57rb-58ra. It is number 404 of Glorieux's list and is written in hand *m*⁸ of his classification, the same clear hand that wrote Redaction A of question 2.¹⁰ In the margin the same hand has written 'secundum magistrum de', but the margin has been cut at this point so that the

⁸ *ibid.*, 258. Glorieux assigns some thirty-five questions to Peter and suggests that 'un assez grand nombre d'autres questions pourraient encore appartenir à ce maître ...' (*ibid.*). The literary characteristics he sees as typical are the use of 'Queritur de ... 1° ... 2° ... Circa Ium sic proceditur ... Item ... Item ... Ad idem ... Contra ... Solutio ... Ad aliud dicendum ...' (*ibid.*).

⁹ See below, pp. 19-20.

¹⁰ Glorieux, 'Les 572 questions', 232, 231 n. 38. Glorieux wonders (231 n. 38) whether this *m*⁸ and *m*⁵ are really two different hands. My study and edition of these two redactions convince me that they are indeed different.

rest of the name is lacking.¹¹ Glorieux rightly assigns this to Peter de Bar.¹² The attribution seems quite certain since in the margins of nearby questions 401 (volume 2, fol. 55rb) and 406 (volume 2, fol. 58va) the same hand has written, using exactly the same form, 'secundum magistrum de bar'; moreover, in the margin of question 403 (volume 2, fol. 56vb), immediately preceding our question, the same hand has written 'secundum magistrum Petrum de bar'.¹³ There is no reason to doubt that question 404's rubric concluded with 'bar' so as to read exactly the same as those for questions 401 and 406.

Question 4 (no. 284) (Anonymous)

This question about the use of certain names for Christ and others is found in volume 1, fol. 119rb-vb. It is number 284 of Glorieux's list and is written in hand *m* of Glorieux's classification.¹⁴ The manuscript gives no indication of authorship nor have the contents revealed anything that would help identify some author of the period as the master who disputed it.

II. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTENTS OF THE QUESTIONS

Question 1: Concerning Christ and infinite terms (Stephen Langton)

As has already been indicated, this question has two quite distinct topics, the second of which deals with 'infinite terms', that is, terms expressive of no limitation. The examples used constantly are negative terms such as *non-homo* and *non-albus*, and the discussion is clearly meant to examine how the logical properties of such terms apply in theology to predication about the Trinity. Christ enters the discussion only in so far as one exchange about such terms is applied to him (10-11). Here we shall confine our analysis to the first part of the question dealing with the unity or plurality of Christ.¹⁵

¹¹ See *ibid.*, 232.

¹² On the possible force of 'secundum' in these attributions see *ibid.*, 263. Of the fourteen questions listed as Peter's, eight have 'secundum' and six have only Peter's initials or name. See the following note.

¹³ Fol. 56vb; see Glorieux, *ibid.*, 232. The other designations are as follows: 'secundum magistrum Petrum de barro' (no. 156; volume 1, fol. 86ra), 'secundum magistrum P. de bar' (no. 398 [volume 2, fol. 53ra]; no. 495 [volume 2, fol. 295ra]); 'M. P. de b' (no. 128; volume 1, fol. 76va) and 'secundum m. p. de b.' (no. 275; volume 2, fol. 115va); 'p. de b.' (no. 235 [volume 1, fol. 103ra]; no. 291 [volume 1, fol. 123ra]) and 'secundum p. de b.' (no. 236; volume 1, fol. 103rb); 'bar' (nos. 514-16; volume 2, fols. 314ra, 314rb, 319ra).

¹⁴ See Glorieux, *ibid.*, 148, 141 n. 29. On the importance of hand *m* in the manuscript see *ibid.*, 259-63, and Victorin Doucet, 'A travers le manuscrit 434 de Douai', *Antonianum* 27 (1952) 531-80.

¹⁵ For other discussions of the unity or plurality of Christ see *Hyp. Union* 1.68-70, 93-96, 99-103, 217-20, 256-58, 261-63; 2.133-41; 3.88-98, 208-209; 4.105-107, 177, 183-88; *Quaestiones-I*, pp. 11, 17-18, 39-40, 49-50; Breuning, pp. 224-30.

Is Christ one or more than one (*plura*)? An authoritative text speaking of him as a 'giant of twofold substance' seems to indicate that he is two substances and therefore *plura* (1). Moreover, since he is human nature and is divine nature and neither of these is the other, he is two things (*res*) and therefore *plura* (2). Again he is this (*haec*) with reference to his divine nature and this (*haec*) with reference to his human nature, and so he is this and this and therefore *plura* (3). Finally, the divinity makes him something (*quid*) and the humanity makes him something (*quid*), and so they make him two *quid*'s, that is, *quae*. Therefore they make him somethings (*aliqua*) and therefore he is more than one (4).

In his solution Langton remarks that some did not know how to reply to such arguments and so had concluded that Christ is more than one. But their opinion died out, he says, because it was contrary to authoritative texts and against the faith itself as expressed in the ('Quicumque' or Pseudo-Athanasian) Creed which says that God and man is one Christ (5).

He rejects the interpretation of Christ's 'twofold substance' made in the opening argument by saying it does not mean a twofold *nature*, divine and human, and so it does not follow that Christ is more than one (6). The next two replies use speculative grammar to refute the arguments. One cannot argue from two natures to two things (*res*) because *res* is an essential term and such an inference would mean that there were two substances in Christ (7): apparently Langton means two substances in the sense of two persons, which would be heretical. This becomes clearer in the next reply to the argument about *haec* and *haec*. Demonstrative pronouns such as *haec* and *istud*, he argues, denote essence rather than person, whereas demonstrative pronouns such as *ille* and *qui* denote person rather than essence. To say that Christ is *haec et haec* is, therefore, to denote the diversity of essences in him, but since the same *substance* is supposed, it is false, simply speaking, to say that Christ is more than one (8). Here the argument moves from the opposition of essence and person to the opposition of essence to substance; this shows that in these texts 'substance' for Langton is meant to be equivalent to 'person'.

The reply to the final argument about divinity and humanity each making Christ *quid* and therefore *quae* and more than one says that it is true that a *common* substantial form such as humanity does make something *quid*, but not *quem*, that is, a 'what' but not a 'who'. But a substantial form that is individual and singular, such as *Socracitas* or *Jesuitas*, always results in a *quem* and not a *quid*. Therefore the inference from *quid* and *quid* to a plurality in Christ is false (9). What Langton implies is that unity or plurality is in function of *quis* or person and not of quiddity or essence, so that two *quid*'s in Christ do not make him two. Langton, however, seems to imply further that *Jesuitas* makes Christ to be a person and one wonders how he sees this related to the divine person in Christ, the true source of unity. As will be seen in the next question, one

problem that was discussed was precisely whether *Jesuitas* in Christ produces a person.

Except for the final discussion, this question by Langton moves mainly within the field of speculative grammar and argues more from the implications of certain terms than from deeper metaphysical or theological bases. Langton, of course, would see terminology as deriving from such deeper bases, but he mentions them only in the final response and then with one statement that would need further clarification.

Question 2: On the Incarnation (Peter de Bar?)

The two redactions (A and B) of this question deal with several problems frequently discussed within the framework of the 'three opinions' on the Incarnation, that is, did the Son of God assume a man (*homo*)?; is Jesus a person by Jesus-ness (*Jesuitas*)?; is Christ two (*duo*)? (1,23,30;37) Redaction B formulates the second of these questions by asking whether a person (that is, the Son of God) assumed a person (that is, a human person supposedly effected by *Jesuitas*) (37). The division of materials is similar to that seen in question 5 of our first series of *quaestiones*, but the treatment often differs.¹⁶

(a) *Did the Son of God assume a man ('homo')?*¹⁷

Redaction A's opening argument quotes the psalm-verse, 'Beatus quem elegisti et assumpsisti', and argues that this means a man was assumed because it is man that is *beatus* (1): this implies that what is assumed is a human subject, also implied by the personal pronoun *quem*, who is the subject of being blessed. Arguments in both A and B hold that the body and soul of Christ were assumed precisely as united, and, since such a union produces a man, the Son of God assumed a man (2;38). Redaction A reenforces this position by an argument from principles of motion concluding that the assumption was instantaneous and that in that same instant the union of body and soul formed something one. Since this one reality was a man, a man was assumed (3). A final approach asks what was the subject of the human nature or humanity assumed. Redaction B's cryptic remarks (39) can be understood only from the expanded text of A: it argues that since the Son of God cannot be this subject, a man (*homo*) must be the subject. But since this *homo* as subject would be united to the divine person prior (in the order of nature) to the body and soul's being united to the person, the Son of God first assumed a man and then the body and soul (4;39). The

¹⁶ See *Quaestiones-I*, pp. 14-18, 45-50.

¹⁷ Cf. *Hyp. Union* 1.75-78, 87-89, 252-56; 2.97-98, 104-106; 3.59, 65-69, 188-93; 4.178-88; *Quaestiones-I*, pp. 15-16, 45-47; Breuning, pp. 230-34.

priority spoken of here and in many of the succeeding discussions is always meant to be a priority of nature and not of time, neither side wishing to posit that whatever was assumed existed in time prior to the actual assumption. A further argument in Redaction B emphasizes this point so as to avoid any idea that a human person was assumed even if a man was assumed: since neither soul nor body existed before the assumption, the man did not exist before the assumption and therefore no person was assumed when, according to its argument, a man was assumed (41).

Redaction A now gives the master's solution in an organized form that is much clearer than the loosely ordered series of arguments found in B. Redaction A first gives the solution and then adds two reasons supporting the solution. The Son of God did not assume a man. There are three unions involved, those of the divinity to the soul and to the flesh and that of the soul with the body. The divinity's union to soul and to flesh was prior by nature but not in time to the man's existence. Hence the Son of God is said to have assumed a body and soul but not a man (5). Redaction B's solution, given as a reply to the argument about the soul and body being assumed as united (2;38), is basically the same as A's but introduces certain nuances. The Son of God, uniting the soul and body to himself with no medium intervening, effected the union of body and soul. Thus by assuming he *produced* this union but did not *assume* it (the body and soul as united), for it was not the assumption but the conjoining of soul with body that produced the man. The body and soul were the matter of assumption, but their being joined together effected or produced the man (46).¹⁸

Redaction A now gives two reasons for the position taken. The first is a text from Alan of Lille with an appendage found, for example, in Alexander of Hales' *Glossa on the Sentences*. The text as it then circulated in the schools said that the one assuming and what is assumed differ from each other, whereas the one united and what is united do not.¹⁹ Redaction A argues on the basis of the first part of this text: the Son of God is man and man is the Son of God, that is,

¹⁸ Redaction B's saying that the union was 'sine medio' seems to correspond to A's statement that 'all those unions were produced by the cooperation of the Holy Spirit simultaneously and *impartibiliter*' (without parts or perhaps without temporal sequence) (5). Later B says that the body existed by nature prior to its being assumed, although in time its existence and being assumed were simultaneous (48); this differs slightly from A's statement on this point but it is basically the same idea.

¹⁹ See Alexander, *Glossa* 3.5.35(L) (Quaracchi 3.67): 'Item, dicit pro regula in libro *De hebdomadibus*: "Assumens non est assumptum", uniens tamen est unitum.' Cf. Alan of Lille, *Theologicae regulae* 101 (PL 210.675B): 'Sicut pars non potest esse totum, vel constituens constitutum, ita assumens non potest esse assumptum.' The phrase 'uniens est unitum' is not found here in Alan.

they do not differ; therefore the Son of God cannot be the one assuming and man that which is assumed (6). The second reason for its position is that 'to assume' means 'to take something else to oneself as a part of oneself', but since the man is identical with the Son of God, the man cannot be assumed as a part of the Son of God (7) and so cannot be assumed at all. In its solution, Redaction B argues that 'man' expresses something perfect, whereas what is assumable is imperfect and comes as a part (45): this seems to be a different expression of A's basic and clearer argument.

Redaction A now replies to the opening arguments. 'Blessed is he whom you have chosen and assumed' is interpreted to mean 'Blessed is he whose nature you have assumed' (8). The body and soul's being assumed as united does not mean a man is assumed because 'body' and 'soul' in this statement are taken materially (presumably as the material elements involved in the assumption) whereas to say that he assumed a man would be to understand 'man' formally. Hence there is a fallacy of accident in the argument (9). The same method of reply also solves the argument based on motion, A adds (9).

To the question what is the subject of humanity in Christ (4;39) A replies that this subject cannot be, as the argument held, a concrete man. Both A and B use the concept of 'composed hypostasis', familiar to all from Lombard's *Sentences* and further developed by some theologians, to deal with this question.²⁰ Redaction A says that the subject of the humanity is the person of the Son of God, whose person is composed 'in a certain way' by the body and soul materially assumed by the Son of God. In this way the union of soul and body to the divinity (which, it adds, is not a composition of human and divine nature, as some heretics held) is prior by nature to that person's being man. Hence it is not true to argue that the Son of God was man before having soul and body as parts of himself (10).

In its reply B introduces a distinction, similar to one used by Alexander of Hales, between the personal supposit of the moral order and the supposit of nature or of the natural order.²¹ The hypostasis of the Son, it says, is a supposit of the moral order or a person, whereas the *res naturae* of that man was a supposit of nature. Now follows the same argument as that in A: in the order of nature, the parts were united to the hypostasis of the Son of God before he was man. Hence he did not assume a man; in the hypostasis of the Son of God there was not a conjoining but only a composition. The property of filiation perfected the simple hypostasis (of the Son) before perfecting the composed hypostasis (of

²⁰ See Lombard, 3 *Sent.* 6.3.1-6 (Grottaferrata, 2.52-54), and *Hyp. Union* 1.87-93, 136; 2.123, 126-33; 3.73-78; 4.97-107, 183-88; cf. Breuning, pp. 262, 440-41.

²¹ For Alexander see *Hyp. Union* 2.60-61.

the Son with soul and body united to him) (47), that is, the Son was a simple divine hypostasis before having soul and body united to him as 'parts' in a 'composition'. The thrust of these complementary replies in A and B is that the person of the Son, as a composed hypostasis, received the body and soul as 'parts' of himself in such a way that they were united to him in the order of nature prior to their union to each other. Not being united to each other in this sense, they did not constitute a man to be assumed.

Redaction A now examines more thoroughly the authoritative text contrasting assumption and union. 'What is united', A holds, signifies something as a whole and as perfect, and a man, taken in himself, is perfect. Thus the Son of God is not said to differ from the man in so far as the man is united to him, and therefore we say that 'the one uniting does not differ from what is united'. Since, however, 'what is assumed' expresses only a part with respect to the one assuming and since a part is not identical with the whole, the one assuming is not identical with what is assumed and so it is said that they differ (11).²²

Redaction A now gives a fairly standard summary of the three opinions on the Incarnation, except that it changes the numbering of the opinions by calling Lombard's third opinion the second opinion and his second opinion the third opinion; this last opinion, it adds, is now the common opinion (12).²³ Each redaction seeks the origin of these opinions (12;42). Each says that they differ according to their understanding of 'individual'. An individual can be a moral individual (*individuum moris*): B says this is made perfect by some excellent property; A says simply that it is called *iste homo*. An individual can also be an individual of reason (*individuum rationis*): B says this individual is made such by its unique collection of accidents; A says simply that it is designated as *aliquis homo*. An individual can still further be an individual of nature (*individuum naturae*): B says that this individual is a subject in nature, whereas A calls it *aliquis homo* but differentiates it from the individual of reason (which it also called *aliquis homo*) by describing it as a vague or indeterminate individual (*individuum vagum*) not determining this or that person. After making these distinctions, B says it will explain elsewhere the relation of the three opinions to these three kinds of individual (49). Redaction A makes the

²² Redaction B gives a succinct reply in the same sense. 'What is assumed' indicates something as the term or object of the act (of assuming), whereas 'what is united' expresses the thing already existing and so as identical with the one uniting: 'what is united is identical with that which unites, for what is united is what is from these [that are united], not what is united to something else' (52).

²³ William of Auxerre interchanges the numbering of Lombard's first two opinions (*Hyp. Union* 1.72-73), as does Roland of Cremona (Breuning, pp. 224, 395); Godfrey of Poitiers and Stephen Langton number Lombard's second opinion as the third (*Hyp. Union* 1.244).

link here. The first opinion originates from the moral individual because it says the Son of God assumed a man as *iste homo*; the second opinion (in its numbering, the so-called 'Habitus-Theory' or Lombard's third opinion) derives itself in relation to the individual of reason: as reason posits a common nature (*communitas*) in a thing or in reality (*in re*), so this opinion posited a body and soul 'about' (*circa*) the person of the Son of God;²⁴ the third opinion (in its numbering, the so-called 'Subsistence-Theory' or Lombard's second opinion) is related to the individual of nature: it holds that the Son of God assumed the nature of man in the way that an individual of nature is 'vague and does not determine this person or that' (13). These analyses have affinities with, but also differences from, those found in Alexander of Hales' *Gloss*.²⁵

Redaction A now goes on to separate and join together materials that in B were interspersed with the preceding materials: here as elsewhere one senses that A is editing a more literal report. The question is whether the Son of God was sent by the Holy Spirit, as two scriptural texts seem to imply (14;43). Since sending or mission implies that the one sent on a mission is subject to the authority of the one sending, how can these texts speaking of the Holy Spirit as sending the Son be true when the Son is not under the authority of the Holy Spirit? (15;44)

The reply is that there are 'two termini of this mission, namely, the disposition of the constitution [of Christ in being] and the grace of redemption'; Christ had first to be constituted in being (first terminus) in order to achieve the second terminus, redemption or salvation (50; cf. 16). Both redactions quote a text from Ambrose in support, A's text adding personal comments and being supported by two further scriptural passages (16;50). Redaction B adds that if one considers the mission in relation to the term *a quo*, the sender is the Father, but if one considers the Incarnation as the term *ad quem* of the mission, the whole Trinity was the sender (51); Redaction A says this equivalently by distinguishing the principal reality signified (the Father as principle or source of the Son) from the reality connoted, the grace of the Incarnation. The Holy Spirit, the master says, has authority with respect to this second connoted reality but not with respect to the first (17).

With this reply the first section in B is completed, but A adds two other brief discussions. The first seems a bit out of place since it anticipates the second section and would seem to fit better there; indeed, the question, whether a person assumed a person, is one that B had announced as the second sub-

²⁴ Alexander of Hales links Lombard's third opinion with *esse rationale* and indicates that then one is speaking *secundum essentiam*; see *Hyp. Union* 2.60-62, 98-102, especially p. 101.

²⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 57-65, 98-99.

question (37). A first argument says that if Christ assumed 'an individual substance of a rational nature', which is the definition of a person, he assumed a person (18). Moreover, he assumed a substance that was not universal, but individual within a rational nature, and so he assumed a person (19). Redaction A meets both arguments by recalling the threefold distinction of individual taught by many authors of this period: the individual is not universal, is incommunicable, and has an excelling property.²⁶ The Son of God assumed an individual that was not universal and was incommunicable, but that individual lacked an excelling property and therefore a person was not assumed (21).

The second brief discussion in A at this point examines the unity of operation of the Trinity in relation to the Incarnation. Did not the whole Trinity, acting by its one nature, effect the Incarnation? If so, the Holy Spirit was incarnate as well as the Son, especially since to become incarnate pertains to goodness (20), the implication being that goodness is related to the Holy Spirit in a special way and so it would be fitting that the Holy Spirit be incarnate.²⁷ Redaction A gives the usual answer: only the Son effected that Incarnation in the sense of uniting the human nature to his own person. Since the Father or Holy Spirit did not do this, only the Son is said to be incarnate (22).²⁸

(b) *Is Jesus a person by Jesus-ness ('Jesuitas')?*²⁹

In this section the debate turns on a central issue of the Incarnation. Jesus is an individual substance of rational nature, perfected as such by Jesus-ness (*Jesuitas*). Is he not then a person by reason of his human form or perfection of Jesus-ness? Boethius' definition of person and texts from Anselm and John Damascene are quoted in favor of this position (23;53-55). It is not enough, argues the proponent of this position, for the master to quote a conciliar text saying that this person (constituted by Jesus-ness) was consumed by the person of the Son of God by reason of the Son's nobler property: if that were the case, how could the Holy Spirit be a person since the procession of the Holy Spirit is not a nobler property relative to a less noble one? (25;56) Again, if we ask 'who is that?', we are asking about a person and the appropriate response is a person's name, in this case 'Jesus', so that Jesus is a person (24;57).

²⁶ See *Hyp. Union* 1.46-47, 82-87, 275-77; 2.116-20; 3.46-47, 82-83, 216-19; 4.66-67, 95; for Roland of Cremona's distinctive views see Breuning, pp. 259-77, 439-44.

²⁷ Cf. *Quaestiones-I.7.2-3.8-9* (pp. 52-54) and 1.3.6,18 (pp. 27, 28, 30).

²⁸ Cf. *Quaestiones-I.7a* (pp. 53-55), and *Hyp. Union* 1.75-78, 117-19; 2.175-85; 3.111-24; 4.123-31.

²⁹ For the following discussion see *Hyp. Union* 1.80-87; 2.115-26; 3.111-24; 4.123-31; Breuning, pp. 261-66, 439-44. Our author is generally closer to William of Auxerre and Hugh of St. Cher than to the others.

Both redactions solve this problem by recourse to the three distinctions necessary for a person.³⁰ Redaction A's presentation, repeating what it had given a few paragraphs earlier, is clearer and more detailed than B's, which wanders off into a listing of Trinitarian properties, relations and notions and fails to apply its teaching to the question at hand (58). Three things are required for a person, says Redaction A, two of which are found in a created person and three in the person of the Son of God. In created persons, the distinction of 'universality' (called more correctly the distinction of 'singularity' by B) means that Abraham is distinguished from the universal; the distinction of incommunicability means that he does not communicate with anything else to make something other than himself, and in this respect he is called a person, whereas the human soul, lacking this second distinction, is not a person. Besides these two, belonging to the Son of God in so far as he is man, a third distinction is found: this is the distinction of a 'supereminent property', which prevents the Son of God's being a person in so far as he is man or in so far as he is Jesus. The Son of God is a person from eternity by reason of his property of filiation or sonship, and the dignity of that property prevents his being a person by reason of his humanity or Jesus-ness: Jesus precisely as Jesus is not a person (26).

A difference should be noted between the teachings of the two redactions. Redaction B says that both created and uncreated persons require the third distinction, which it calls the 'preeminence of an excelling property' (58); Redaction A seems to find the first two distinctions sufficient for created personality and sees the third in the Son of God by reason of his personal property of divine filiation, making it a special case and using it to explain why there is no human person in Christ. Most authors of the time would agree with Redaction B in saying that created persons have their own distinction of dignity whereas the individuated human nature of Christ lacks it so that there is no human person.³¹ It is undoubtedly the special case of Christ that fixes the attention of Redaction A on what it describes as the 'supereminent property' and whose role it sees as prevention of the emergence of a human person in Christ.

Redaction A uses this doctrine to reply to the opening arguments. Anselm's text saying that every individual is a person refers to the first two distinctions, but when Jesus is called an individual, the third distinction of excelling property is also implied, so that the text cannot be applied to him (27). Redaction B simply says that Anselm is speaking about a 'pure man' (60), that is, one who is

³⁰ See especially the sections in *Hyp. Union* 1 and 3 indicated above, n. 26.

³¹ See *Hyp. Union* 1.46-47, 81-83; 3.46, 83; for Roland of Cremona's different approach see Breuning, pp. 261-66, 439-44.

only a man. With respect to the Holy Spirit's not having a nobler or preeminent property (25;56), Redaction A says that the preeminence of the Son's property is a preeminence with respect to a created property, not to an uncreated property. The Holy Spirit is a person by his uncreated property alone (29); the implication is that one need not look for preeminence in his case since his property is not related to a created property as was that of the Son of God. In the parallel passage B adds an interesting point with respect to 'consumption' of the human person: if the 'more preeminent' property of the Son of God were not present, the humanity would make Jesus a person (63). This recalls a doctrine, held by Alexander of Hales and Hugh of St. Cher, that if the union in Christ were separated, a human person would emerge at once without anything further being added.³²

The replies of the two redactions also differ slightly regarding the question 'who is that?' in relation to Jesus. When 'Jesus' is answered, Redaction A says, this reply is made by reason of what it stands for (*ratione suppositi*), not by reason of what is signified (*ratione significati*): 'Jesus' does indeed signify Jesus-ness, but it stands for the uncreated person (28), that is, the Son of God. This reply indicates that 'Jesus' does not stand for a created person even though 'Jesus' does signify the individual human aspect or Jesus-ness.³³ Redaction B refers to the three kinds of individual already seen: moral, rational, and natural. It simply says that 'who?' is likewise threefold, so that the question 'who?' can be answered by any one of these three individuals (62). Redaction B's reply means that if one asked 'who?' about the moral individual or person, the answer would refer to the divine person and not to a human person, so that Jesus-ness would be excluded as well as a human person.

(c) *Is Christ two?*

Debates in the first part of the thirteenth century focused more and more on the question whether Christ is one or two. This question often reflected earlier authoritative teaching insisting that Christ as man is *aliquid*; such is the case with the final section of the question here.³⁴ Several arguments in both A and B begin from the twofold *aliquid* or *quid* in Christ, or from his being *unum et aliud*, or his being divine and human, and conclude that Christ is two (31,32;64,66-69).³⁵ Another argument seems to seek to eliminate the response

³² See *Hyp. Union* 2.120-22; 3.84-86.

³³ On the 'who (*quis*)' question see *ibid.* 1.274, 277; 3.83, 215, 217.

³⁴ On the unity-duality question see the references given above, n. 15. On Christ as *aliquid* in relation to this problem see *Hyp. Union* 1.67-74, 199-208; 2.97-104, 139-40; 3.60-62, 93-94.

³⁵ Another argument given by each redaction is that since in the Trinity one nature makes diverse persons to be one, in Christ two natures in the same person should make him two (20;65). For the reply see below, n. 37.

of earlier theologians saying that the humanity is quasi-accidental to the Son of God in the sense that it is beyond his *esse*.³⁶ In what seems to be an attempt to reduce this response to an embarrassing conclusion, the argument maintains that if the humanity were quasi-accidental, it would not make the Son to be a *quid*, and yet as man (so authoritative texts teach) he is *aliquid* (70). Redaction B will reply to this particular argument by saying that an accident can be understood either with respect to a subject or with respect to time: it is in the latter sense that the humanity is accidental (*accidit*) to the Son of God (77). This is Redaction B's way of showing that the union is not accidental even while asserting that there is an element of accidentality in the human nature's coming to the Son of God in time after not being united to him; it also allows the master to maintain that Christ as man is *aliquid*.

Redaction B's rather brief discussion of accidentality in the union becomes the main principle of Redaction A's solution to the question. Although in Christ human nature in truth is not an accident, Redaction A holds, human nature is present after the manner of an accident. The notion of an accident is 'that which can be present and absent', and the divine person can exist whether the human nature exists or not. Hence the divine nature has a certain principality or excellence in relation to the human nature, so that the latter does not make something other (*aliud*) with respect to the divine essence, but rather makes something of another mode (*alterius modi*). Not being strictly *aliud* but only *alterius modi*, it provides no basis for numbering such as to make a second in the divine person with respect to the divine nature (34). This denial that human nature is *aliud* with respect to the divine nature is meant to show that the human nature, although an *aliquid*, is not something other (*aliquid aliud*) than the divine essence, subject, or person, and so cannot constitute a basis for saying Christ is two.

Redaction B's solution of the central question is somewhat different from A's. Christ, B says, is neither two nor one-and-one as masculine (*unus et unus*) or as neuter (*unum et unum*). To be two, something must be a unit undivided in itself and divided from that with which it makes two. There is perfect duality only if there is an actual division of the two entities. But since in Christ there is an identical supposit (in the two natures), we cannot say *unum et unum* because *unum* expresses a composite from form and supposit (73).

To arguments saying there is a twofold *aliquid* in Christ Redaction B replies that there are not two *quid*'s but only one (*unum*) (75): this *unum* undoubtedly refers to the one supposit spoken of in its solution. Redaction A likewise says there are not two *aliquid*'s in Christ because 'this *aliquid* is that *aliquid*, for the

³⁶ On this approach to the problem see *Hyp. Union* 1.94-99, 136-37; 2.144-45; 3.86-87, 94, 100-103; 4.101-102, 198.

divine essence is man and man is the divine essence' (35). As it stands, this statement could perhaps be interpreted as implying that the natures are not distinct in Christ. But the following reply to an argument saying there is *unum et aliud* in Christ shows that this is not the master's intent. It is true, he says, that the divine essence is not the human essence, but it does not follow that the human essence is other (*aliud*) than the divine essence or God. He gives an example: humanity is other than animality, and yet man is not other than animal; rather, man is animal (36). This reply seems to make the same point as that in Redaction B: the subject or supposit in diverse forms, essences, or natures can be the same. As in a human being man and animal are not other but are the identical subject, so in Christ the person identical with the divine essence is the man and the man is that person. The implication throughout is that for this reason Christ remains one by reason of the one supposit or person.³⁷

Redaction B gives two further arguments and replies not found in A. According to his human nature the Son of God does not differ from himself as God in an accidental way and therefore must differ from himself substantially; hence he is more than one (*plura*) (72). Redaction B replies that the Son of God as *man* does differ from himself as *God* substantially, but he does not differ from *himself* substantially (80). The second argument tries to forestall use of the identity of the divine person with the divine essence as the principle of the solution. It says that the notions (*rationes*) of essence and person are diverse: the divine essence is communicable (to other persons in the Trinity), solitary, and unable to be multiplied, whereas person in God can be multiplied, is incommunicable, and is not solitary. Therefore the person and essence are diverse and are not identical (72). It would want to infer that one can use this diversity of person and essence in God to find a duality in Christ. Redaction B replies that although the notions of person and essence are diverse, person and nature are identical in nature, and predication is according to this identity in nature and not according to a diversity of notions (81). The identity of nature spoken of here may refer to identity in real existence, for often at this period the level of nature is the level of physical existence.³⁸

At this point in the actual disputation questions seem to have been raised from the audience. The master had announced only three topics, but Redaction

³⁷ The argument about the Trinity (see n. 35) fails to satisfy either redaction: in different terms each argues that the one nature makes the three persons one because the one divine nature is identical with each of the three persons and so makes the several persons one; in Christ, however, there is lack of identity between the person and the nature (34;75). Neither redaction explains clearly why this answer settles the argument. Redaction A continues by giving the solution already seen concerning accidentality, which is its way of saying why the two natures in Christ do not make him two (34).

³⁸ See *Hyp. Union* 1.20-30; 2.30-40, 60-65, 98, 100-102, 136-38; 3.31-37, 94-98; 4.32-44, 93-97, 208.

B's terminology (*respondebat* [83]; *a latere obiciebatur sic* [85]) evidently reflects the actual debate going beyond the planned topics. Redaction A omits the appended remarks in its reworking of the material.

One query was whether, if Jesus' name was given him from eternity, Jesus existed from eternity and so was a man from eternity (82). The master's first reply was that the name 'Jesus' was given him from eternity in the sense that it was foreseen from eternity that this name would be given him. But the questioner rejects this reply because the same could be said of any name (83). The master then replied that 'Jesus' means 'Savior', and just as it was eternally foreseen that the human race would be saved through him, so we say that it was eternally foreseen that this name should be given him (84). Thus, he implies, Jesus was not a man from eternity but was eternally foreseen to be the Savior of the human race, so that the name 'Jesus' was foreseen as his in a way that is not the case with other persons' names.

Another questioner asked about the devil's knowledge of the Incarnation. A text of the *Glossa ordinaria* says that lesser angels knew nothing about it, and yet another text of the *Glossa* speaks of the devil as knowing it beforehand (85). The master replies by summarizing Gregory's position: the devils did not know the Incarnation, but suspected it (86). This concludes B's additions to the question.

In its two redactions this question maintains the basic positions common to most if not all masters of the third and fourth decades of the thirteenth century: the Son of God assumed not a man but an individual human nature composed of a body and soul united to each other; the individual rational nature of Jesus was not the source of a human person because the Son of God's divine filiation was a property of preeminent and excelling dignity that excluded the presence of a human person; Christ is one and not two because he is one person and one supposit in two distinct natures, the divine and human: the human nature cannot be counted as a second unit because it has a certain mode of accidentality with respect to the divine person of the Son, who can exist whether the human nature is present or not. Both redactions also develop the theme of the 'composed hypostasis' of Christ in order to show he is one and not two.

The philosophy of the threefold distinction involved in personality is fairly common at this period, although Redaction A seems to give it a special twist. William of Auxerre's *Summa aurea* was undoubtedly influential at the time, as well as Alexander of Hales' *Gloss* and perhaps, depending on the exact date of the question, Hugh of St. Cher's *Commentary on the Sentences*.³⁹ There is a

³⁹ Hugh's *Commentary* is generally dated between 1230 and 1232; see *Hyp. Union* 3.14-15.

close affinity with Alexander of Hales' *Gloss* as to the three levels of being (moral, rational, physical or natural) involved in the three opinions on the union in Christ and in the three kinds of individual. The question may reflect Alexander's teaching or writing on these points. But in other areas there are differences and some originality; the author follows no one in a servile way.

Finally, if Redaction A appears to be a more polished and better ordered reworking of the material by comparison with Redaction B, there are elements in B that are missing in A which add to the discussion. If A reworked the actual text of B, the redactor may have decided to omit these elements. Or perhaps A and B are separate reporters of the same disputation, but A afterwards reordered the material he had copied and in the process left out materials retained by B in its closer report of the actual debate. Or, finally, Redaction A may be the work of an independent theologian composing his own *quaestio* with reliance on the debate reported in B but introducing personal modifications of certain aspects of the doctrine.

Question 3: On the state of Christ in the three days of his death and burial
(Peter de Bar)

Since distinctions 21 and 22 of book 3 of Peter Lombard's *Sentences* examine problems concerning the state of Christ in the three days of his death and burial, such problems recur frequently in later authors.⁴⁰ The present question moves explicitly within the framework of Lombard's investigation, first examining his opinion that Christ was at that time a man and then debating the common opinion of the thirteenth century that he was not. Two other sections ask about created properties in Christ at that time and whether he descended in his soul to 'the place of punishments'.

(a) *On the Master's opinion in the 'Sentences'*

Against the Lombard's opinion that Christ was a man in the three days of his death and burial it is argued that to be dead and to be a man cannot go together (3), that Christ was neither mortal nor immortal at that time and so was not a man (4), that he was not a man in either the grave or hell so that, not being a man anywhere, he was not a man (5), and that as man the Son of God was something created (*aliquid creatum*) whereas in his death Christ was nothing created (*nihil creatum*) and so was not a man (6). The first three arguments are

⁴⁰ See Lombard, 3 *Sent.* 21-22 (Grottaferrata, 2.130-40); A. M. Landgraf, 'Das Problem *Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo mortis*' in his *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik* 2.1 (Regensburg, 1953), pp. 273-319; *Hyp. Union* 1.89-92, 216-17, 293-302; 2.195-205; 3.231-33; 4.133, 176; *Quaestiones-I.6* (pp. 18-19, 50-52).

given by Lombard himself against his own position;⁴¹ the fourth reflects Alexander III's post-Lombardian condemnation of the *non-est-aliquid* opinion.⁴²

Peter de Bar now gives Lombard's position and his replies to the first three arguments. The union of the Son of God to the flesh and to the soul sufficed to make him a man even if the union of flesh to soul, which had made him alive, was severed in death. The Son of God had a soul and flesh, not a corpse, at that time, and this suffices to be a man (7). Among creatures the separation of soul from flesh results in a corpse, but the case of Christ was different. Therefore, although he was not a living man, he was a man, and it is false to argue from 'living man' to 'man' (8). The argument that he must be either mortal or immortal in order to be a man holds only for creatures and not for this special case (9).

As for the argument that Christ was not anywhere as a man, one may admit this: by reason of his body Christ was circumscriptively in place in the sepulchre, and by reason of his soul he was in place definitively in hell. But it does not follow that because he was not a man somewhere, he was not a man at that time (10).⁴³

The reply to the final argument about Christ not being *aliquid creatum* in the three days is likely fashioned by Peter himself or taken from some author later than Lombard. Pope Alexander III's condemnation of those who said Christ as man is not *aliquid* refers to Christ as a *living* man being *aliquid*, not to Christ as man (11). This means that one could agree that Christ is not *aliquid creatum* in the three days without falling under the anathema and at the same time one could maintain that, although not something created at that time, he was nevertheless a man.

(b) *On the common opinion*

Having presented Lombard's opinion and shown how he and others would defend it, Peter de Bar examines arguments against the common opinion, which held that during the three days Christ was not a man. Peter simply affirms that 'properly speaking, in the three days he was not a man' (14) and then replies to each of the arguments advanced against this position.

The first argument holds that since Christ is a priest forever and is a priest as man, he remained a man at that time. The one holding this position states and

⁴¹ The references to Lombard are given in the notes to the edition below, p. 45.

⁴² See *Hyp. Union* 1.67-70, 199-208.

⁴³ The author first gives a summary of Lombard's main answer but seems to prefer the one indicated here, which itself appears to develop a suggestion of Lombard. See 3 *Sent.* 22.2.1-3 (Grottaferrata, 2.137-38).

rejects the reply to the same argument already found in William of Auxerre: William's reply had been that Christ's priesthood is eternal in that no other priesthood would ever succeed it as his had succeeded Levi's.⁴⁴ The debater says simply that such a reply has no bearing on the priesthood of Christ in the three days of his death and burial (12).

In his reply Peter simply repeats William of Auxerre's response (14) but then, evidently aware that this would not satisfy the opponent, adds that Christ was a priest in the three days 'not by the showing forth of his office [of priesthood] but by the use of power'. He draws this reply from a parallel between Christ's priesthood and his being Redeemer in the three days of his death, for then he was 'Redeemer not by a showing forth of humility but by the use of power' (16). This phrase goes back to Lombard's *Sentences*, where Lombard had explained the name 'Redeemer' as applied to the *Father* and *Holy Spirit* as well as to the Son as God.⁴⁵ It was also used later to explain how *Christ* was Redeemer in the three days of his death and burial when he was not a man and could no longer redeem by acts of humility and obedience: at that time, so it was argued, he could still exercise his power of redeeming, presumably that active power which he shared as divine person with the Father and Holy Spirit.⁴⁶ Peter in this brief reply extends what was said about Christ as Redeemer in the three days to Christ as Priest in the three days. Ordinarily Christ's priesthood was linked to his human nature, and his office or function of priesthood would be seen as exhibited or shown forth in his humanity. Peter says, then, that this aspect of priesthood is lacking in the three days when Christ was not a man but that Christ still exercised the power of priesthood at that time. Since he elaborates nothing further, one must speculate as to whether he means that Christ continued to pray and mediate to the Father or whether he exercised active power with the Father and Holy Spirit in the priestly role of communicating benefits to humankind. Peter might also be thinking of Christ's freeing the just detained in limbo during his soul's visit there during the three days, a visit discussed in the last section of this question.

Another argument affirming that Christ was man in the three days appeals to a text of Augustine which states that the taking up (*susceptio*) was such as to make man God and God man: since this taking up (of body and soul) remained in the three days, he was a man at that time. Peter de Bar's first reply was one given by William of Auxerre: Augustine was not speaking about the 'precise cause' of God's becoming man or man's becoming God, for the union of body

⁴⁴ See William of Auxerre, *De statu Christi in triduo* 1.2, 9 (*Hyp. Union* 1.293, 295-96).

⁴⁵ See text below, q. 3, n. to line 76.

⁴⁶ See the text from Alexander, *Glossa*, *ibid*.

and soul was also needed.⁴⁷ The debater forcefully rejects this reply. It is unfitting to say that Augustine did not speak well and truly, and since he added nothing to his statement, it stands as it is; otherwise he would be lying, as one would lie who would say that the body suffices to be a man. Moreover, if anyone should say that the *united* flesh and soul were the matter of that taking up, one can reply that matter or the material is prior by nature to that of which it is matter or the material element. But the taking up of flesh and soul was prior by nature although not in time to their union with one another. Hence the flesh and soul as united were not the matter of that taking up (13), and Augustine's text means that the taking up of flesh and soul, which endured in the three days, made Christ a man at that time. In saying that 'that taking up was naturally prior to the union of the soul to the flesh, although they were simultaneous as to time', the author of this argument has cleverly taken an argument used by those denying that a man (*homo*) was assumed and has turned it against those saying Christ was not a man in the three days. It would be especially piquant if Peter de Bar, who is under attack here, were also the author of our question 2, where that argument had been used.⁴⁸

Against this present argument Peter de Bar replies that Augustine's reference to the taking up of soul and body was not to the precise and immediate cause but only to the first and remote cause. For the Son of God, in assuming flesh and soul, did not 'assume' man but rather 'co-assumed' man: his assuming man has regard to the union of soul to flesh. Therefore, Peter concludes, the taking up of soul and flesh was the first (and remote) cause making God man, but the union of soul and flesh in the one hypostasis was the 'perfection' or completion of God's becoming man (15), or, as he implies from his opening distinction, the precise and immediate cause. Peter de Bar thus elaborates William of Auxerre's reply by introducing a more detailed distinction of causes and by linking Augustine's 'taking up' with 'co-assumption', 'assumption' requiring the union of body and soul to each other.

A further argument and reply show an advance in the analysis of this question by examining the relation of the created and uncreated in the constitution of Christ as man and its consequences for the problem at hand. The created and uncreated are not ordered equally (*de pari*) to produce one effect, it is said. Now the union of soul and flesh in Christ was something created, but the union of each with the Son of God was something uncreated. Hence they were not equally ordered to one effect. Therefore these unions, one created and two uncreated, did not produce the one effect of making God man (17). This

⁴⁷ See William of Auxerre, *De statu Christi in triduo* 1.4, 11 (*Hyp. Union* 1.293-94, 296).

⁴⁸ See below, q. 2-A.5.

argument is meant to destroy the need of the three unions together to make Christ a man and so to allow him to be called a man when the union of soul and flesh was dissolved in death.

In a reply that may be related to Alexander of Hales' *Gloss*, Peter de Bar says that there was one who did the uniting and there were several things united, the one uniting being uncreated and the union of things united being something created.⁴⁹ Now it is perfectly possible that an uncreated uniter and a created united reality can be ordered to some one effect (18). This reply is directed against the statement that the unions of soul and flesh to the Son of God are uncreated; it holds that they are also created effects of the one divine uncreated agent, who can order them to the one effect of making the Son of God man since, as created, they are not acting *de pari* with the uncreated agent. Peter thus avoids the dilemma in which his opponent tried to place him.

The final argument and reply are not explicitly related to the question being discussed; they seem to be an appendix suggested by the discussion of union and of oneness. Since every union achieves something one, it is argued, the unions of flesh and of the soul to the Son of God was something one. But that one seems to be neither created nor uncreated because from the created and the uncreated there cannot come to be anything one, whether created or uncreated (19). Peter replies that the union attained something one in act (*unum actu*), that is, the composition of a person who before was simple as a person. It also produced something one by aptitude (*unum aptitudine*), that is, that the Son of God should be man (20).⁵⁰

(c) *Was there some created property in Christ in the three days?*

The influence of William of Auxerre and perhaps of Hugh of St. Cher is evident in this third section.⁵¹ The opening argument insists that there should be created properties in Christ, this in order to show that Christ was a man in the three days: since he lay in the tomb, descended to hell, and was dead, created properties such as ubiquity and place were present in him. But if these accidental properties were in him, there must have been a substantial property to support the accidental one: this would be rationality as to the soul and corporeity as to the body. Therefore Christ was rational, and, since he was neither soul nor angel, he must have been a man (21).

⁴⁹ Cf. Alexander, *Glossa* 3.21.4c (Quaracchi, 3.247): 'Dicendum quod dicuntur diversae uniones ratione alterius unitorum, sed una tamen est ratione unitivi, scilicet hypostasis Verbi.'

⁵⁰ Cf. *ibid.* 3.21.4b (Quaracchi, 3.246-47).

⁵¹ Cf. William of Auxerre, *De statu Christi in triduo* 1.5-7, 12-14 (*Hyp. Union* 1.294-95, 296-97), and Hugh of St. Cher, 3 *Sent.* 22.6-8, 20-22 (*Hyp. Union* 3.236, 239).

The next few paragraphs reflect the give and take of the actual debate. When the master replied (*respondebat*) that these accidental properties were in Christ by reason of a part that had been a part but now was not (22), the opponent says that this solves nothing. Do we not say that Christ descended to hell by reason of the part that existed then? So also we can say that by reason of the part that existed in the three days he was rational (23). He goes on to challenge Peter to name which created properties are said of Christ in the three days and which are not (24).

Peter de Bar replies by saying that the Son of God cannot be said to be rational in the three days because we do not say he *was* a soul but rather that he *had* a soul united to him. But rationality belonged to him by reason of the soul. Therefore just as one refuses to say that the Son of God is a soul, one must refuse to say that the Son of God is rational in the three days (25). After restating in his simple solution that the union of the Son of God to soul and flesh persisted in the three days but not the union of soul and flesh (with each other) in the hypostasis of the Son (28), he returns to the arguments and question of his opponents. There were no created properties *in* Christ at that time, he says. One must distinguish between properties that inhere and properties that are present exteriorly: the latter include properties such as place and position, which come from outside and are not present in the subject. Only exterior properties such as these – whether accidental or substantial – were said of Christ in the three days; no inhering properties were predicated of him (29). By this reply Peter seems to grant that one can speak in some way of Christ's created properties, but that these do not so inhere in him in the three days that one can speak of him as a man by reason of them.

Another argument in the debate maintained that the flesh and soul were parts of Christ in the three days. If this is granted, they produced some whole (*totum*) that could only be a man, so that Christ was a man. If this is denied, what of the 'composed hypostasis'? Although the Son of God was a simple person before the Incarnation, after it he was composed from three substances and two natures. But since this composition remained in the three days, the soul and flesh remained parts composing that person, and so the Son of God was a man (26).

Peter seems embarrassed by this argument. He appeals to the authority of Bernard and Hugh of St. Victor, who say that the composition in question was not from unworthy parts, and then says he can give no further answer than this: the flesh and soul were parts 'by aptitude' (*aptitudine*), so that it happens (*accidit*) that what befits parts is said of the Son of God (30). The authoritative text seems to mean for him that the composition was not a real composition of the uncreated with the created as parts making up a whole. But because soul and body through the union could be considered to be adapted or ac-

commodated to the Son of God,⁵² then by accidental as opposed to *per se* predication the properties of the parts could be predicated of the Son of God. One senses that Peter must have left the debate somewhat dissatisfied with his response to the argument.

Another brief argument maintained that the Son of God had the nature of man in the three days and so was a man (27). To this Peter replied that he had human nature materially, that is, he had flesh and soul, but he did not have it formally: he did not have the very humanity by which one is formally called man (31). No further explanation is given; Peter probably means that humanity or human nature formally requires not only the parts of human nature but also their union.

A final incidental question, perhaps reflecting the disorder of the actual debate, asks what effect was produced by the union of the flesh and of the soul to the Son of God. In a reply that has affinities with Alexander of Hales' *Glossa* and Hugh of St. Cher's *Commentary*, Peter replies that one effect was the composition of the person, another the body's being made incorruptible by the union, and a third the soul's being made omniscient (32).⁵³

(d) *Did Christ descend in his soul to the place of punishment?*

The final section of Peter de Bar's question asks about the place of Christ's descent and about the place where the ancient fathers awaited their redemption. Authoritative texts from Damascene, the *Glossa ordinaria*, and Augustine seem to imply that Christ descended to the hell which is a place of punishment (33-35).⁵⁴ Peter denies this, saying that Christ went down to the place where the ancient fathers awaited their redemption (37).

But if this place of the fathers was not the place of punishment, was it the 'shadowy place' where (unbaptized) children existed or some other place? (36) Peter first distinguishes between hell and limbo: in hell there is the penalty of damnation and the penalty of sense, but in limbo there is only the penalty of damnation (39). The place of punishment, hell, was totally dark and inflicted sensible pain; the place of condemned children was dark without any light but inflicted no sensible pain; the place of the ancient fathers, although dark, had some light and inflicted no pain (40). The lack of refreshment spoken of by the

⁵² The word *aptitudo* may signify an adaptation or an accommodation of the flesh and soul to the Son of God, or it may signify their potentiality to be united to the Son of God.

⁵³ Cf. Alexander, *Glossa* 3.22.3 (Quaracchi, 3.253) and 3.22.16(L) (Quaracchi, 3.258), and Hugh of St. Cher, 3 *Sent.* 22.2 (*Hyp. Union* 3.235). They mention incorruptibility of the body and knowledge of all things, but not the *compositio personae* that Peter speaks of.

⁵⁴ These same texts are quoted in Alexander, *Glossa* 3.22.6,9,13 (Quaracchi, 3.255, 256). Alexander's reply to the question is not followed by our author.

Glossa ordinaria (quoting Jerome) refers to the fathers' being deprived at that time of the actual vision of God (38).

This whole question by Peter de Bar maintains the common positions of earlier thirteenth-century masters, often using arguments similar to those found in William of Auxerre, the *Gloss* of Alexander of Hales and the *Commentary* of Hugh of St. Cher on the *Sentences*. Nevertheless, Peter is independent in several respects and makes a number of interesting replies to arguments raised. This question is clearly a *reportatio* reflecting the actual debate, including at one point the embarrassment of the master before an argument. A number of Peter's positions recall those seen in our question 2 and this shows at least the possibility that Peter is also the author of our question 2: no internal evidence argues against this possibility.

Question 4: On certain names of Christ (Anonymous)

This question has two main parts, the first comparing Christ's sonship with the adoptive sonship of Christians, the second asking why names such as 'door' and 'foundation' are restricted to Christ whereas the name 'shepherd' or 'pastor' is shared with others.

(a) *Is Christ an adopted son and a son of grace?*⁵⁵

Several texts from Lombard's *Gloss* are used to argue that if Christ is our brother and is established as heir by the Father, he must be an adopted son of God as well as son by nature (2-6). It is further argued that it does no good to reason that he cannot be son in another way than before (as he would be if he were adopted after being Son of God by nature): if Adam had not sinned, he would have been first a son of creation, then an adopted son, and so would have been son in another way than before; so in the case of Christ such a diversity of sonship is also possible (8-9). Jacob was adopted as heir even though by nature he was younger than Esau; this is another example showing that Christ, although son by nature, could also be adopted as son (10).

Cannot Christ also be called a 'son of grace' or 'son of the Holy Spirit'? An authoritative text says that 'the source (*fons*) of every spirit rested upon Christ'. Since this source is the Holy Spirit, it is argued, Christ should be called the son of the Holy Spirit through grace, and therefore he is a son of grace (11). Another argument again points to Christ as son of the Holy Spirit or even of the whole Trinity by reason of their informing him in his humanity with the

⁵⁵ Cf. *Hyp. Union* 1.105; 2.159-62; 3.107-108, 220-22; 4.115.

fulness of grace (14). Again, the whole Trinity made Christ to be born of the Virgin and therefore as man he can be called son of the Trinity (15). Moreover, if angels are sons of grace and Christ as man has the fulness of graces, he should be called a son of grace (12-13).

Several authoritative texts are now quoted on the other side of the argument. Ambrose, Augustine, and two texts of the *Glossa ordinaria* are used to show that Christ is not adopted, is not son of the Holy Spirit, and that even as man he is the son of God by nature (16-19). Moreover, there is one grace that gives being (*esse*), for example, the grace whereby Sarah brought forth a son, and another grace that gives well-being (*bene esse*), for example, the grace given to that son whom she brought forth, a grace by which man is called an adopted son. But Christ had being and well-being simultaneously without such a succession of graces (21), and so he is not an adopted son.

The master adds other arguments based on new authorities. Peter Lombard says in the *Sentences* that Christ is son twice whereas he would be son three times if he were an adopted son: he would be son by eternal generation from the Father, by birth in time from the Virgin, and by grace as son of the whole Trinity (22). Texts from the *Glossa ordinaria* or *Glossa interlinearis* compare ordinary humans' adoption by grace with his sonship by nature in such a way as to indicate he is son only by nature and not by grace (23). Augustine sees Christ's birth from the Virgin as prior to humankind's being born of God; thus before the Incarnation there was no adoptive sonship (24).

Having set the authorities and arguments against each other, the master now gives his solution. Since adoption would mean that Christ became a son after not being son, Christ was not an adopted son. Although we are predestined to be adopted sons, Christ is not: he is son by nature (25). Again, our adoption as sons is by faith, but since Christ had no faith, he was not an adopted son (26). The master's longest and perhaps most basic argument is that a son is called son according to what is most important (*potissimum*) in him as received from his begetter. By reason of his sonship a human son is not called a soul or body or grammarian or musician but a man because this is the most important reality he has received in being born. In spiritual generation, the most important reality he receives is his being conformed to God in justice or in faith. But this was not the most important effect of grace in Christ; rather, grace brought it about that 'he, existing as man, was son by nature of God the Father. Therefore Christ is not to be called adopted son or son of grace or son of the Holy Spirit; rather he, being a man united to the Word, is son by nature of God the Father' (27).

The master now takes up a few of the arguments on the other side. The phrase 'source of every spirit' (11) he interprets not of the Holy Spirit but of the Father who, he says, came down on Christ through an appearance (28). The fact that Christ was constituted heir does not mean, as was argued (5), that he is

adopted: the *Gloss* itself, which was quoted, says his being heir made him possessor of all creatures, and he possesses all things by the union itself, that is, in so far as he is a man united to the Word. Moreover, to receive an eternal inheritance is indeed what is best for others but not for Christ (30); in saying this, the master implies that the union itself by which Christ is son by nature is that which is greater.

One argument had maintained that Christ could very well be a son in one way before the Incarnation and in another way as adopted son after the Incarnation (9). The master replies that Christ is not son in another way after the Incarnation since both before and after he is only son by nature, existing in a different mode before and after but remaining the one and same son by nature (31).

(b) *Are certain names of Christ communicable to human persons?*

In this part of the discussion it was asked whether names such as 'son of God', 'foundation', and 'door', all taken in the singular form, are applicable to others besides Christ. Are not human persons called 'sons of God', so that each should be able to be called 'son of God'? (32) And Israel is called God's 'first-born', while Jesus quotes a text saying we are all 'gods', so that each justified person can be called son of God through grace (33). Again, although the *Gloss* restricts 'foundation' in the singular to Christ, why cannot this be used of others in the singular form since this is done with the name 'shepherd' or 'pastor'? (34-35) The name 'door' also seems to be applied to an ordinary man in a text from the *Canticum* of *Canticum* (36).

The master solves these problems by saying that when names such as 'sons of God' or 'gods' are used in the plural form, their mode of signifying differs from that of singular forms such as 'son of God' or 'God'. The plural form 'sons', said of the justified, indicates a sonship that is not substantial but accidental. This accidental sonship, a sonship by grace, is multiplied because, although there is but one substance of the whole Trinity (and so, he implies, only one sonship by nature), there are many graces flowing from the whole Trinity (and so there are many accidental sonships by grace). 'Son' in the singular denotes sonship by nature and therefore is applied only to Christ (37). The same principles apply to 'gods' and 'God': 'gods' indicates the multiple graces received from God so that the name can be applied to creatures in the plural by reason of the mode of signifying. It can even be applied in the singular provided it is qualified, as in the expression: 'I have appointed you the god of Pharaoh'. But one cannot say without qualification: 'I have appointed you God' (38).

As for the name 'foundation', the master first gives the solution of some who say there is a 'founding' foundation, and this is Christ, and there is a 'founded' foundation, and the apostles are this. But he rejects this solution because Christ,

although founding foundation as God, is only a founded foundation as man (39). His own reply is that Christ alone is 'foundation' because faith is the 'substance of things to be hoped for' and faith must rest on, or have its foundation on, no one but Christ (42).⁵⁶

Faith is again evoked regarding the name 'door': Christ alone is called 'door' because what is preached is faith in him and he is the one who is believed. One enters this door through faith because to believe that Christ is God and man is the way to enter the door (41). By contrast, 'shepherd' or 'pastor' indicates only an exterior act of leading sheep to pasture. Because many can perform this exterior act, the name 'shepherd', even in the singular, can be shared by many whereas the names 'door' and 'foundation' in the singular cannot be shared (42). A text quoted from the *Canticle* about 'door' is interpreted in the same sense; William of Auxerre may have transmitted this interpretation to the author.⁵⁷

Thus the author maintains throughout, whether by authoritative statements or dialectical arguments, the uniqueness of Christ, who is Son of God by nature such that he cannot be adopted son by grace or son of the Trinity or of the Holy Spirit. He also seeks to show why certain names are used exclusively of Christ and not of others even though through grace they can share in some gifts, roles, and names of Christ. By comparison with other authors of this period, the author of this question shows greater development and originality.

III. EDITION OF THE TEXTS

In the edition that follows the same principles have been used as in *Quaestiones-I* and *Quaestiones-II*. 'ms.' always refers to the hand of the original scribe.

In the references the following abbreviations will be used:

Alexander, *Glossa* (seu *Glossa Alexandri*) = *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 4 voll. (Quaracchi, 1951-57).

apud Lyranum = *Biblia sacra cum glossa ordinaria et glossa interlineari ... et postilla Nicolai Lyrani*, 7 voll. (1, 3, 6: Paris, 1590; 2: Venice, 1603; 4, 5: Lyons, 1545; 7: Lyons, 1590).

⁵⁶ Cf. Alexander, *Glossa* 3.19.41-III(L) (Quaracchi, 3.221): 'Fundamentum autem est in fide Christi secundum divinam et humanam naturam.'

⁵⁷ See below, q. 4, n. to line 191. William, however, does not accept this interpretation as valid and gives another solution.

Glossa Alexandri: vide Alexander, *Glossa* (supra).

Glossa Lombardi = Petrus Lombardus, *Commentarius in psalmos davidicos*, in PL 191.55A-1295B, et *Collectanea in omnes d. Pauli Apostoli epistolas*, in PL 191.1297A-1696C et PL 192.10B-520A.

Glossa ord. = *Glossa ordinaria*, in PL 113.67B-1315C et 114.9A-752B, et apud Lyranum (q.v.)

Hyp. Union = Walter H. Principe, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century*, 4 voll. (Toronto, 1963-75): vide supra, n. 1.

Lombardus, 3 *Sent.* = Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctis* 2.1: *Liber III et IV*, edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, ed. 3^a (Grottaferrata [Roma], 1981), liber 3.

< Quaestio 1 >

< Stephanus de Langton: *De Christo et de terminis infinitis* >

(a) < *Utrum Christus sit unum vel plura* >

1 < 39ra > Quaestio est de duabus naturis in Christo, scilicet de divinitate et humanitate. In primis igitur quaeratur utrum Christus sit unum vel plura.

5 Quod sit plura videtur probari in hunc modum: Dicit auctoritas quod est 'gigas geminae substantiae'. Ergo est duae substantiae; ergo plura.

2 Item, est humana natura. Est divina natura. < Divina natura > non est humana natura. Ergo est duae res; ergo plura.

3 Item, est haec, demonstrata divina natura. Est haec, demonstrata humana
10 natura. Ergo est haec et haec; ergo plura.

4 Item, divinitas facit quid. Ergo humanitas facit quid. Ergo divinitas et humanitas faciunt quae. Ergo faciunt aliqua; ergo plura.

5 Solutio: Ad hoc dixerunt quidam quod Christus est plura, nescientes resistere praedictis obiectionibus, sed haec opinio exspiravit quia contra
15 auctoritates faciebat et contra fidem, quia dicitur in Symbolo: 'Ita Deus et homo unus est Christus.' Ideo aliter dicimus, scilicet quod Christus est unum et non plura.

6 Et ad praeobiecta respondemus per ordinem. Ad primum [1] igitur dicimus: Cum dicitur 'Est gigas geminae substantiae', non est sensus locutionis:
20 'Habet geminam naturam', scilicet divinam et humanam, nec ideo sequitur quod sit plura.

7 Ad secundum [2] dicimus quod non valet argumentatio in qua infertur haec: 'ergo duae res', quia iste terminus 'res' essentialis est, et ex hoc sequeretur quod esset duae substantiae.

25 8 Ad tertium [3] dicendum quod non valet haec argumentatio: 'Est haec, demonstrata divina natura; est haec, demonstrata humana; ergo est haec et haec', quia quotiescumque loquimur de Trinitate per ista pronomina de-

22 secundum: hoc ms.

6 substantiae: Ambrosius, *Hymnus* 4.4 (PL 16.1474; *Analecta hymnica medii aevi* 50, edd. G. M. Dreves et C. Bluhme [Leipzig, 1907], p. 14). Vide etiam Ambrosium, *De Incarnationis dominicae sacramento* 5.35 (CSEL 79.240), Augustinum, *Contra sermonem Arianorum* 8.6 (PL 42.689), et eundem, *Contra Maximum* 2.10.2 (PL 42.765).

16 Christus!: *Symbolum 'Quicumque'* in H. Denzinger et A. Schönmetzer, edd., *Enchiridion symbolorum*, ed. 36^a (Barcelona, 1976), no. 76 (p. 42).

monstrativa 'haec', 'istud', sciendum quod talia pronomina semper habent pro essentia et numquam pro persona. E contrario dicimus de istis pronominibus
 30 'ille', 'qui': semper habent venire pro persona et numquam pro essentia. Ex hoc patet quod haec est falsa: 'Est haec et haec', quia cum haec dictio 'et' habeat notare diversitatem, vult ibi eam notare ratione diversarum essentiarum. Sed cum ibi eadem substantia supponatur, falsa est locutio simpliciter.

9 Ad quartum [4] dicimus quod divinitas facit quid, similiter humanitas, sed
 35 non valet: 'Ergo faciunt quae'; deberet enim sic inferri: 'Divinitas facit quid; humanitas facit aliud quid; ergo faciunt quae.' Sed media esset falsa, et notandum generaliter quod in Sacra Scriptura forma substantialis quae communis est, sicuti humanitas, semper habet facere quid et non quem. Forma autem substantialis quae individualis est et singularis, sicuti Socracitas vel
 40 Jesuitas, semper facit quem et non quid.

(b) <De terminis infinitis in theologia >

10 Item, divina essentia est < 39rb > iste homo, demonstrato Filio Dei. Item, divina essentia est hoc quod non est homo, demonstrato Patre. Ergo est aliquid quod non est homo. Ergo est non-homo. Item, est homo. Ergo est homo
 45 et non-homo. Ergo homo est non-homo, et ita finitum et infinitum de eodem.

11 Solutio: Haec est vera: 'Divina essentia est iste homo', demonstrato Filio Dei. Similiter, haec est vera: 'Divina essentia est non-homo' quia est Pater qui non est homo. Sed non valet: 'Ergo homo est non-homo.' – Instantia: Divina essentia est Filius. Divina essentia est Pater. Ergo Filius est Pater.

50 12 Item, divina essentia est non-generans. Sumatur haec dictio 'generans' substantive et in masculino genere. – Probatio: Divina essentia est non-generator quia est Filius. Ergo divina essentia est non-generans. – Contra: Est Pater. Ergo est generans. Ergo finitum de infinito praedicatur.

13 Item, divina essentia est generans et est non-generans. Ergo generans est
 55 non-generans. Ergo finitum de infinito praedicatur vel finitum et infinitum de eodem.

14 Item, quaeratur utrum iste terminus 'non-generans' supponat pro persona vel pro essentia. Si pro persona, non ergo pro essentia. – Contra: Supponit pro omni non-generanti. Ergo supponit pro qualibet re quae non generat, et divina
 60 essentia non generat. Ergo supponit pro divina essentia.

15 Solutio: In logica duplex est iudicium de adiectivis infinitatis: quidam enim concedunt hanc: 'Sortes est non-albus', posito quod sit grammaticus et albus, quia secundum eos nihil aliud exigitur nisi quod sit alterius modi quam albus. Alii autem illam negant, dicentes quod ex infinito termino semper

33 eadem substantia bis exh. ms.
 et est generans ms.

54 generans et est non-generans corr. ex non-generans

65 sequitur negatio. Nos autem in theologia duabus utimur regulis de terminis
 infinitis, quarum prima haec est: 'Semper finitum conformatur suo infinito', ut
 si finitum sit terminus essentialis, et infinitum essentialis, et si finitum
 personalis, et infinitum etiam personalis. Secunda haec est: 'Ex infinito sequitur
 negatio.' Secundum primam regulam patet quod haec est vera: 'Divina essentia
 70 est non-generans', quia divina essentia est Filius qui est non-generans, similiter
 Spiritus Sanctus qui est non-generans: cum enim iste terminus 'generans'
 supponit pro persona, scilicet pro Patre, et iste terminus 'non-generans'
 supponit pro persona quae non est Pater, et ita tam pro Filio quam pro Spiritu
 Sancto. Unde non valet haec argumentatio: 'Divina essentia est generans; divina
 75 essentia est non-generans; ergo generans est non-generans': instantia ut prius.

16 Item, contra primam regulam sic obicitur: Iste terminus 'notio' est
 terminus notionalis. Ergo iste terminus 'non-notio' est terminus non-notionalis.
 Ergo supponit pro notione, quod non potest esse.

17 Solutio: Sicut iste terminus 'res' infinitari non potest quia non esset pro
 80 quo supponeret, ita iste terminus 'notio', similiter iste terminus 'persona': tamen
 de eo posset dubitari.

18 Item, duae personae sunt non-Trinitas: haec est vera quia haec est falsa:
 'Duae personae sunt Trinitas'. — Contra: Iste terminus 'Trinitas' supponit pro
 tribus personis. Ergo, eadem ratione, iste terminus 'non-Trinitas' supponit pro
 85 tribus personis. Ergo prima est falsa cum duae personae non sint tres.

19 Solutio: Prima vera, nec oportet quod si finitum <supponat> pro
 tribus vel pro duobus, quod infinitum supponat pro totidem, sed si finitum et
 infinitum <supponant> pro pluribus, ut patet in his terminis 'populus', 'non-
 populus', et ideo non valet praedicta argumentatio.

68 etiam personalis: impersonalis ms.
 corr. ex non est generans ms.

infinito: infinitum ms.

70 est non-generans¹

< Quaestio 2: Redactio A >

De Incarnatione

(a) < *Utrum Filius Dei assumpsit hominem* >

1 < 143va > Quaeritur de Incarnatione Filii Dei. Primo, utrum Christus
 assumpsit hominem. Ad quod facit illa auctoritas Psalmi: *Beatus quem elegisti*
 5 *et assumpsisti*. Ergo assumpsit hominem, quia 'beatus' homo [= 37].

1 De Incarnatione in marg. secunda manus

5 assumpsisti: Ps 64: 5.

2 Item, assumpsit corpus et animam: aut coniuncta aut divisa; non divisa quia sic non faciunt unum; ergo coniuncta. Sed iuncta faciunt hominem. Ergo assumpsit hominem [= 38].

3 Praeterea, 'assumere' dicit motum, et omnis motus terminus est finis vel
10 instans. Ergo, cum illa assumptio instantanea fuit et non successiva, respectu instantis fit assumptio. Sed in illo instanti fuit iuncta anima cum corpore, alioquin non facerent unum. Ergo assumpsit illa ut unum; ergo hominem, quia ut sunt unum, idem sunt quod homo [= 38].

4 Forte dicit: 'Non assumpsit hominem, sed naturam hominis'. – Contra
15 quod quaeritur quid sit subiectum naturae hominis sive humanitatis. Si dicat 'persona Filii Dei', ergo, cum illi primo insit filiatio tamquam proprietas, deinde humanitas, erit illa persona coniuncta. Sicut album adveniens Sorti facit concretionem cum subiecto, ita humanitas <adveniens> Filio Dei facit concretionem in illa persona, et ita erit illa persona concreta, quod non dicitur.
20 Ergo persona Filii Dei non erit subiectum humanitatis. Si <dicat> 'homo', ergo naturaliter prius fuit homo unitus illi personae quam anima et corpus. Ergo prius habuit hominem quam haberet animam et corpus partes sui. Ergo potius dicendum quod primo assumpsit hominem, post corpus et animam [= 39].

25 5 Solutio: Dicendum quod non assumpsit hominem Filius Dei. Triplex enim fuit ibi unio. Prima fuit divinitatis ad animam, secunda divinitatis ad carnem; tertia fuit unio animae cum corpore. Et has tres quidam duplicant et dicunt sex esse uniones, duas animae ad divinitatem et divinitatis ad animam, duas divinitatis ad carnem et carnis ad divinitatem, et duas animae ad corpus et
30 corporis ad animam. Secundum quod patet quod prius iuncta est divinitas animae et carni quam anima carni, salvo tamen quod illae omnes uniones simul et impartibiliter cooperatione Spiritus Sancti factae sunt. Prius ergo naturaliter, etsi non secundum tempus, fuit animae et carni iuncta divinitas quam esset homo, et ideo dicitur quod assumpsit corpus et animam, non hominem [= 46,
35 48].

6 Et ad hoc duplex solet assignari ratio. Prima est: Differt assumens et assumptum, unde Augustinus in libro *De hebdomadibus* <dicat> quod 'differt assumens et assumptum, licet non differat uniens et unitum'. Unde cum homo

19 concreta *corr. in marg. ex concunta vel conconta* ms.
duplicant: triplicant ms.

27 post tres *del.* uniones ms.

38 unitum: Cf. Alanum de Insulis, *Theologicae regulae* 101 (PL 210.675B): 'Sicut pars non potest esse totum, vel constituens constitutum, ita assumens non potest esse assumptum', et *Glossam Alex.* 3.5.35(L) (3.67): 'Item, dicit pro regula in libro *De hebdomadibus*: "Assumens non est assumptum", uniens tamen est unitum.'

et Filius Dei non differant, quia Filius Dei est homo et e converso, non potest
40 dici quod Filius Dei assumpsit hominem.

7 Secunda ratio est quod 'assumere' dicit 'ad < se > aliud sumere tamquam partem sui'. Sed homo non potest assumi tamquam pars Filii Dei sed idem est, et ideo dicitur quod non potest assumpsisse hominem [= 45].

8 Ad auctoritatem Psalmi, *Beatus quem elegisti* etc. [1], responsio: 'Beatus
45 quem assump < 143vb > sisti', id est, cuius naturam assumpsisti, id est, corpus et animam.

9 Ad aliud quod dicit, 'Assumpsit corpus et animam coniuncta, ergo hominem' [2], per praedicta patet quod non valet quia corpus et anima ibi materialiter sumuntur, unde est fallacia accidentis, ac si diceretur: 'Cognoscis
50 choristum qui est veniens; ergo cognoscis venientem'. 'Assumpsit corpus et animam, ergo hominem': ibi enim 'corpus et animam' materialiter, 'hominem' autem sumit formaliter. Eodem modo solvit ad secundum argumentum [3] [= 46].

10 Ad illud quod quaeritur: 'Quid est subiectum humanitatis?' [4], dici
55 posset quod persona Filii Dei. Quod obicit: 'Ergo data est concretio', non est verum, sed est ibi compositio ineffabilis dignitatis, ut dicit Hilarius: quodammodo enim corpus et anima materialiter assumpta a Filio Dei componunt illam personam, ut possit dici composita ex corpore et anima, non ex natura humana et divina, ut volunt quidam haeretici, et secundum hoc
60 naturaliter praecedit unio animae et divinitatis et corporis et divinitatis quam illa persona sit homo, et secundum hoc non erit prius homo quam habeat illas partes, et sic non prius fuit homo quam haberet partes sui corpus et animam [= 47].

11 Iuxta hoc quaeritur quare dicit Augustinus: 'Differt assumens et
65 assumptum, et non uniens et unitum.' Ad quod dici potest quod 'unitum' rem suam significat ut totum et perfectum, non ut partem. Unde cum tale sit homo secundum se, sicut non dicimus quod differt Filius Dei et homo in quantum ei unitus est, ita non dicitur quod differat uniens et unitum, sed uniens est unitum. Sed 'assumptum' respectu assumptis dicit ut pars quia assumere idem est quod

51 animam²: anima ms.

57 quodammodo enim corr. ex quodam enim modo ms.

59 natura: materia ms.

67 post quod add. non ms.

56 dignitatis: Cf. Hilarius, *De Trinitate* 2.26 (PL 10.67B-68A): '... ut ne quid per imbecillitatem humani corporis dissideret, virtus Altissimi virginem obumbravit, infirmitatem ejus veluti per umbram circumfusa confirmans, ut ad sementivam ineuntis Spiritus efficaciam substantiam corporalem divinae virtutis inumbratio temperaret. Haec conceptionis est dignitas.' Cf. etiam ibid. 2.27 (68B): 'Ita potestatis dignitas non amittitur, dum carnis humilitas adoptatur.'

70 ad se tamquam partem capere. Sed pars non est idem quod totum. Ideo dicitur quod non est idem assumens et assumptum, et haec fuit ratio quare dicit Augustinus: 'Differt assumens et assumptum, non uniens et unitum' [= 42, 52].

12 Iuxta hoc etiam quaerebatur: Sicut dicunt magistri, triplex est opinio de assumptione: quaedam opinio dicit quod assumpsit hominem ita quod
75 secundum quod homo aliquid est vel est quid; secunda opinio dicit quod assumpsit hominem ut habitum, unde secundum quod homo non est quid vel aliquid sed aliquo modo se habens; tertia opinio, quae est communis, dicit quod non assumpsit hominem sed hominis naturam, id est, corpus et animam, et secundum quod homo est aliquid; quaeritur ergo ex quo habuerunt < ortum >
80 istae opiniones? [= 40]

13 Et ad hoc responderi solet quod individuum sumitur tripliciter: est enim individuum naturae, individuum rationis, individuum moris: individuum naturae, ut aliquis homo (vagum scilicet individuum); rationis, ut aliquis homo; moris, ut iste homo dicitur. Ergo, quod prima opinio ortum habuerit ab
85 individuo moris quia dicit assumpsisse hominem etiam prout est iste homo. Secunda opinio ortum habuit ab individuo rationis, unde sicut ratio communitatem ponit in re, ita ponebant corpus et animam circa personam Filii Dei. Tertia opinio respectum habuit ad individuum naturae, quae dicit quod assumpsit naturam hominis sicut individuum naturae est vagum et non
90 determinat hanc personam vel illam [= 49].

14 Item, Filius Dei fuit missus in carnem, sicut dicit Is: *Misit me Dominus et spiritus eius*, et alibi: *Spiritus Domini super me* etc., *evangelizare misit me*. Iuxta hoc quaeritur a quo et ad quid mittatur, sive qui sunt termini illius missionis [= 43].

95 15 Praeterea, 'missus' significat subauctoritatem respectu mittentis. Sed Filius Dei non se habet in subauctoritate respectu Spiritus Sancti. Ergo Filius Dei non mittitur a Spiritu Sancto. Quid est ergo quod dicit Is: *Misit me Dominus et spiritus eius*? [= 44]

16 Solutio: Dicimus quod, sicut dicit Ambrosius, 'missio haec est a termino
100 divinae dispositionis ad gratiam redemptionis', vel a paradiso usque ad inferni

77 aliquo: alio ms.

quae est corr. ex est quae ms.

86 ortum: respectum ms.

91 Is: Ysayas corr. in marg. ex Ysidor ms.

92 evangelizare: eugelizare ms.

79 aliquid: Vide Lombardum, 3 Sent. 6 (Grottaferrata, 2/1. 49-59).

92 eius: Is 48: 16. me²: Lc 4: 18; cf. Is 61: 1.

98 eius: Is 48: 16.

100 redemptionis: Cf. Ambrosium, *De Spiritu Sancto* 1.11.122 (CSEL 79.68; PL 16.763B): 'Venit autem [Spiritus Sanctus] non de loco ad locum, sed a dispositione constitutionis ad salutem redemptionis, a gratia vivificationis ad gratiam sanctificationis, ut de terris ad caelum, de iniuria

claustra ut suos educaret, vel ab invisibilitate ad visibilitatem. Unde Hab: *In terris visus est*, etc., et Joan: *Exivi a Patre et veni in mundum* [= 50].

17 Ad aliud [15] dicimus quod 'missus' significat subauctoritatem respectu Spiritus Sancti mittentis non gratiâ principalis significati, sed gratiâ connotati,
105 scilicet respectu gratiae Incarnationis [= 51].

18 Item, videtur quod Jesus <144ra> assumpsit personam: assumpsit enim 'substantiam individuum rationalis naturae', et haec est definitio personae. Ergo assumpsit personam.

19 Item, assumpsit substantiam, ergo universalem vel individuum; non
110 universalem, ergo individuum et rationalis naturae. Ergo assumpsit personam.

20 Iuxta hoc quaeritur: Sicut dicit Dionysius: 'Unius naturae indivisa est operatio.' Sed in Trinitate est una natura; ergo una operatio. Sed Incarnatio operatio est. Ergo est a tota Trinitate. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus incarnatur sicut Filius, vel dicatur quare non, cum incarnari bonitatis sit.

115 21 Ad hoc dicendum quod individuum tripliciter dicitur: individuum respectu universalitatis, vel individuum respectu incommunicabilitatis, vel individuum respectu excellentis proprietatis. Quod ergo dicit, 'Assumpsit individuum substantiam' [18], verum est individi respectu universalitatis vel incommunicabilitatis, non respectu excellentis proprietatis, ut post patebit, et
120 ideo non assumpsit personam. Per hoc patet solutio ad aliud argumentum [19].

22 Ad illud quod dicitur quod 'Incarnatio est operatio totius Trinitatis; ergo incarnatus fuit Spiritus Sanctus' [20], non sequitur quia Filius ita est operatus illam Incarnationem quod personae suae univit, non sic autem Pater vel

101 Hab: abacuc *corr. in marg. ex Baruch ms.*

107 naturae: creaturae ms.

ad gloriam, de servitio ad regnum transferat.' Cf. Ambrosium, *De fide* 5.7.99 (CSEL 78.251-52; PL 16.695C-D): 'Unde si sobrie de dei filio, quae digna sunt, opinemur, ideo missum intelligere debemus, quia ex illo inconpraehensibili inenarrabilique secreto maiestatis profundae dedit se conpraehendendum pro capto nostro mentibus nostris dei verbum, non solum cum "se exinanivit", sed etiam cum habitaret in nobis'

102 est: Immo Bar 3:38: '... Post haec in terris visus est et cum hominibus conversatus est.' mundum: Jn 16: 28.

107 personae: Cf. Boethium, *Contra Eutychen et Nestorium* 3, ed. E. K. Rand, ed. 2^a (Cambridge, Mass.-London, 1973), p. 84: '... reperta personae est definitio: "naturae rationabilis individua substantia"' et ibid., p. 92: '... persona vero rationabilis naturae individua substantia'.

112 operatio: Non est detectum. Cf. Pseudo-Dionysium, *De divinis nominibus* 2.1 (PG 3.637C; versio Joannis Scoti Eriugena, PL 122.1120C): '... Quaecumque sunt Patris et ipsius <Verbi> divino Spiritui communiter et unitim reponunt: divinas operationes, honorem, fontem, et non deficientem causam, et distributionem optimarum donationum. ... Divina omnia toti divinitati assunt secundum divinam perfectam rationem.' Cf. ibid. 2.5 (PG 3.644A; PL 122.1122C). Cf. etiam Alanum de Insulis, *Theologicae regulae* 61 (PL 210.650C): 'Opera Trinitatis indivisa sunt.'

Spiritus Sanctus, et sic non denominantur ab Incarnatione ut Filius, propter
 125 quod Filius est incarnatus, non Pater vel Spiritus Sanctus.

(b) < *Utrum Jesus Jesuitate sit persona* >

23 Circa secundum quaerebatur utrum Jesus Jesuitate sit persona. Quod sic, dicit Anselmus: 'Omnis homo individuus persona esse cognoscitur.' Sed Jesus est homo Jesuitate. Ergo Jesuitate est persona [= 53, 54].

130 24 Item, cum quaeritur 'Quis est?' quaeritur de persona. Ergo nomen quod competenter ei respondetur est 'persona'. Sed 'Jesus' competenter respondetur cum quaeritur 'Quis est iste?'. Ergo Jesus est persona [= 57].

25 Praeterea, Concilium dicit quod Filius Dei assumpsit personam, sed in assumptione consumpta est a digniori. Ergo si Filius Dei a Jesuitate non est
 135 persona, propter nihil aliud est nisi quia ibi est dignior proprietatis. Ergo, ut videtur, ad hoc quod sit persona exigitur praeeminentia excellentis proprietatis respectu indignioris proprietatis. Ergo ubi non erit reperire hoc, non erit persona. Sed in Spiritu Sancto non est excellens proprietatis respectu indignioris. Ergo in Spiritu Sancto non est persona [= 56].

140 26 Ad hoc dicendum quod ad hoc quod sit persona tria concurrunt, et duo reperiuntur in persona creata et tria in persona Filii Dei in quantum est homo. Est enim distinctio universalitatis < et > distinctio incommunicabilitatis, et haec duo sufficiunt in persona creata: Abraham enim in quantum iste homo distinguitur ab universalis; item, incommunicabilis est: non enim venit cum alio
 145 ut faciat aliquid aliud a se, et quantum ad hoc dicitur persona. Anima autem persona non est: licet primam habeat distinctionem, scilicet universalitatis, non tamen habet distinctionem incommunicabilitatis. In Filio autem Dei praeter illa duo in quantum est homo tertium invenitur, scilicet distinctio supereminentis proprietatis quae prohibet ne in quantum homo sit persona vel in quantum
 150 Jesus: cum enim sit persona ab aeterno proprietate quae est filiatio, dignitas illius proprietatis non permittit ut humanitate vel Jesuitate sit persona.

124 denominantur: denominatur ms.

136 praeeminentia: preminencia ms.

146 primam: primum ms.

128 cognoscitur: Cf. Anselmum, *Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi* 1 (ed. F. S. Schmitt, *S. Anselmi ... opera omnia* 2 [Rome, 1940], p. 10; PL 158.265C): 'Omnis enim individuus homo est persona.'

133 personam: Concilium Francofurtense (794), E.: *Epistola episcoporum Franciae* (MGH: *Leges* 3: Concilia II.1.150): 'Itaque in Deo et homine gemina substantia, sed non gemina persona est, quia persona personam consumere potest, substantia vero substantiam non potest, si quidem persona res iuris est, substantia res naturae.' Textus iste citatur a Concilio sub nomine Paschasii, sed est Fausti Reiensis, *De Spiritu Sancto* 2.4 (CSEL 21.139).

Secundum hoc potest dici quod Jesus in quantum Jesus non est persona [= 58, 59].

27 Ad illud quod dicit Anselmus, 'Omnis homo individuus persona esse
155 cognoscitur' [23], sumitur 'individuum' prout habet duas praemissas distinctio-
nes, scilicet universalitatis et incommunicabilitatis tantum, sed cum dicit 'Jesus
est individuus', non tantum sumitur distinctio respectu universalitatis vel
incommunicabilitatis, sed respectu excellentis proprietatis, et ideo non assumit
[= 60].

160 28 Ad illud quod quaerit quod quaestio facta per 'quis' quaerit de persona,
ergo ibi 'Jesus' significat personam [24], dicimus quod responsio fit ratione
suppositi, non ratione significati: 'Jesus' enim significat Jesuitatem sed supponit
personam increata[m] [= 62].

29 Ad tertium [25] dicimus quod eminentia excellentis proprietatis dicitur
165 esse respectu creatae proprietatis, non respectu increatae, unde non est obiectio
de Spiritu Sancto cum tantum proprietate increata sit persona [= 63].

(c) <Utrum Christus sit duo >

30 Post quaeritur utrum Christus sit duo, quod videtur: Una natura
diversas personas facit esse unum. Ergo duae naturae in eodem faciunt illud
170 esse plura, vel dicatur quare non. Sed duae naturae sunt in Christo. Ergo faciunt
esse duo humana et divina naturae [= 65].

31 Praeterea, Christus in quantum homo est aliquid; similiter in quantum
Deus est aliquid. Ergo est aliquid et aliquid; ergo duo [= 64].

32 Item, Christus in quantum homo est unum; similiter in quantum Deus
175 est aliud. – Probatio: Quia divina natura non est humana, ergo est unum et
aliud; ergo plura [= 66].

33 Si concedatur, contra: Christus est tantum una persona; ergo tantum
unum; non ergo duo.

34 Solutio: Christus est unum. Ad primum [30] dicimus quod una natura
180 plures personas facit esse <144rb> unum quia tota et perfecta salvatur in
unaquaque persona, nec aliud est in aliqua trium personarum quod
principalitatem vel excellentiam importat respectu divinae essentiae. Sed in
Christo humana natura per modum accidentis est (licet in veritate non sit
accidens, sed ideo < dicitur > quia illa divina persona esse potest sive humana
185 natura existente sive non, et ideo convenit ratio accidentis quae est 'potest

156 universalitatis: universitatis ms. 157 individuus: individuuns ms. universalita-
tis: universitatis ms. 158 post assumit fort. recte addendum est 160 quaestio facta
corr. in marg. ex quaestio facit ms. 166 proprietate ... persona corr. ex increata sit persona
proprietate ms. 171 humana et divina naturae: humanam et divinam naturam ms.

adesse et abesse' etc.), et ideo divina natura quodammodo principalitatem vel excellentiam importat respectu humanae naturae, et ideo non potest dici quod faciat aliud respectu divinae essentiae, sed quodammodo alterius modi, secundum quod solet dici: 'Venit ad nos calciata divinitas' etc., *non fuit dignus*
 190 *solvere corrigiam calceamenti*, id est, divinitatis, et ideo non facit numerum in illa persona respectu divinae naturae [= 74].

35 Ad aliud, scilicet quod Christus in quantum homo est aliquid, et in quantum Deus est aliquid seu aliud [31], verum est; non tamen sequitur quod duo quia hoc aliquid est illud aliquid, nam divina essentia est homo et homo est
 195 divina essentia [= 75].

36 Ad tertio obiectum, scilicet in quantum homo est unum, in quantum Deus aliud [32], falsum est. Si dicat: Immo, quia divina essentia non est humana, verum est, non tamen sequitur quod aliud sit quam divina essentia vel Deus, et est instantia: Aliud est humanitas quam animalitas, nec tamen est aliud
 200 homo quam animal, immo homo est animal [= 76].

< Quaestio 2: Redactio B >

< De Incarnatione >

37 < 98ra > Sequitur de Incarnatione, circa quam tria sunt quaesita. Primum est utrum Filius Dei assumpsit hominem; secundum, utrum persona assumpsit personam; tertium, utrum Christus fuerit duo [= 1].

205 (a) < *Utrum Filius Dei assumpsit hominem* >

38 Circa primum sic proceditur: Christus assumpsit humanam naturam, scilicet corpus et animam. Aut Christus haec assumpsit divisa aut coniuncta; divisa non, quia in instanti assumptionis coniuncta fuerunt; ergo coniuncta. Sed haec coniuncta faciunt hominem vel sunt homo. Ergo Christus assumpsit
 210 hominem [= 2, 3].

39 Item, Christus humanitate est homo. Cuiusne subiecti est illa humanitas? Si Filii Dei, ergo formaliter loquendo Filius Dei subiectum est illius

198 divina: dina ms. 204 Christus fuerit: Christo fiunt ms. 207 divisa corr. ex diversa ms. 208 coniuncta²: coniecta ms. 209 coniuncta faciunt: coniecta fuerunt ms.

186 abesse: Aristoteles, *Topica* 1.5 (102b4-7).

189 divinitas: Gregorius Magnus, *Homilia in evang.* 1.7.3 (PL 76.1101D); vide *Hyp. Union* 1.153 de historia textus illius.

190 calceamenti: Jn 1: 27.

humanitatis. Si hominis, sequitur quod prius fuerit homo quam haberet partes sui animam et corpus [= 4].

215 40 Item, unde habuerunt ortum tres opiniones assignatae in III libro *Sententiarum* ? [= 12]

41 Item, Filius Dei assumpsit corpus quod non fuit prius quam assumeretur, nec anima fuit prius quam assumpta. Ergo similiter concedendum est quod assumpsit hominem non prius existentem, et sic assumendo hominem

220 non assumpsit personam.

42 Item, Augustinus in libro *De hebdomadibus*: 'Non est idem assumens et assumptum, tamen idem est uniens et unitum.' Unde hic ? [= 11]

43 Item, cum dicitur: 'Si Spiritus missus est', quaeritur qui sunt termini huius missionis. Missio enim est ab aliquo in aliquid [= 14].

225 44 Praeterea, cum dico 'Filius Dei missus est in carnem a Patre et Spiritu Sancto', aut hoc est secundum divinitatem aut secundum humanitatem. Secundum divinitatem non, sed secundum humanitatem. – Contra: 'Missus' dicit subauctoritatem respectu mittentis, sed Filius Dei non comparatur ad Spiritum Sanctum per modum subauctoritatis [= 15].

230 45 Solutio: Filius Dei non assumpsit hominem, nam quod assumptibile est quasi imperfectum est et in parte veniens. Sed 'homo' dicit quid perfectum, et ita non assumpsit hominem, sed assumpsit humanam naturam secundum quod materialiter sumitur, scilicet corpus et animam [= 7].

46 Ad primo ergo obiectum [38] dicimus quod assumpsit corpus et animam
235 coniuncta, sed non sequitur: 'Assumpsit haec ut coniuncta, et haec coniuncta sunt homo; ergo assumpsit hominem'. Tres enim fuerunt ibi uniones in instanti: Filius Dei sibi uniens animam et corpus sine alio medio operatus est unionem corporis et animae: unde assumendo fecit hanc unionem, sed non assumpsit: assumptio enim non fecit hominem, sed coniunctio animae cum corpore. Unde
240 corpus et anima fuerunt materia assumptionis, coniunctio vero fuit eiusdem effectivus [= 5, 9].

47 Ad aliud [39] dicendum est quod duplex est suppositum, moris scilicet et naturae, personale scilicet et naturae. Hypostasis Filii < est > suppositum moris

213 Si hominis: Sed hoc ms. (Cf. l. 20.)	partes corr. ex partem ms.	218 assumpta:
assupta ms.	219 post assumpsit add. personam ms.	228 subauctoritatem:
subactoritatem ms.	229 subauctoritatis: subactoritatis ms.	232 assumpsit ² : assupsit ms.
234 assumpsit: assupsit ms.	235 coniuncta ¹⁻³ : coniecta ms.	assumpsit: adsupsit
ms.	239 coniunctio: coniectio ms.	240 coniunctio: coniectio ms.

216 *Sententiarum*: Vide q. 2-A, n. ad lin. 80.

222 unitum: Vide q. 2-A, n. ad lin. 38.

223 est: Cf. q. 2-A.14-15.

226 Sancto: Cf. ibid.

vel personae. Suppositum naturae fuit res naturae illius hominis. Prius autem
 245 naturaliter fuerunt partes unitae hypostasi Filii quam esset homo, et ideo non
 assumpsit hominem nec fuit coniunctio sed compositio in hypostasi Filii. Filia-
 tio autem fuit perfectivum prius hypostasis sim < 98rb > plicis quam composi-
 tae [= 10].

48 Ad aliud [41] dicendum est quod naturaliter prius fuit corpus quam
 250 assumeretur; tamen simul tempore fuit corpus et ipsum assumptum [= 5].

49 Ad aliud [42] dicendum est quod triplex est individuum: naturae,
 rationis, et moris: individuum naturae, quod subiectum est in natura;
 individuum rationis, quod individuatum est 'per collectionem accidentium
 quam impossibile est in aliquo < alio > reperire'; individuum moris, quod
 255 perfectum est ab aliqua excellenti proprietate. Ponentes ergo tres opiniones
 habuerunt respectum ad hoc triplex individuum, et quomodo alias dicitur
 [= 13].

50 Ad aliud [43] dicendum est quod Filius Dei missus est, et huius missionis
 sunt duo termini, scilicet dispositio constitutionis et gratia redemptionis: missus
 260 enim est a dispositione constitutionis ad gratiam redemptionis vel ad salutem.
 Ita determinat Ambrosius: 'Spiritus Sanctus similiter missus est a gratia
 vivificationis ad gratiam iustificationis' [= 16].

51 Ad aliud [44] dicimus quod considerando terminum a quo missus est
 Filius, dicendum quod a Patre missus est; considerando vero terminum in quem
 265 missus est, scilicet in carnem, dicendum est quod a tota Trinitate missus est
 [= 17].

52 Ad aliud [42] quod dicit Augustinus, scilicet quod 'non est idem
 assumens et assumptum' etc. [6], dicimus: 'Assumptum' dicit rem ut terminum
 actionis, sed 'unitum' dicit rem iam existentem. Ideo unitum idem est cum
 270 uniente: unitum enim est quod ex his est, non quod alii unitur [= 11].

(b) < *Utrum Jesus sit persona a Jesuitate* >

53 Secundo quaeritur utrum Jesus sit persona a Jesuitate quae ipsum
 perficit, et videtur quod sic. 'Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia'.

244 suppositum: positum ms.
 coniectio ms.

hypostasi: inpostasi ms.

245 hypostasi: inpostasi ms.

250 assumptum: assuptum ms.

246 coniunctio:
 263 aliud:

254 reperire: Cf. Porphyrium, *Isagoge*, ch. *Peri eidous*, trans. Boethii (ed. A. Busse, *Porphyrii introductio ... a Boethio translata* [Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca 4.1; Berlin, 1887], p. 33): 'individua ... dicuntur huiusmodi quoniam ex proprietatibus consistit unumquodque eorum, quarum collectio numquam in alio eadem erit.'

262 iustificationis: Vide q. 2-A, n. ad lin. 100.

273 substantia: Vide q. 2-A, n. ad lin. 107.

Sed talis est Jesus: est enim substantia individua rationalis naturae: substantia
275 enim est naturae rationalis et individua: non enim ex corpore ipsius et anima est
homo universalis, sed particularis [= 23].

54 Item, Anselmus in libro *De Incarnatione*: 'Omnis individuus persona
esse cognoscitur'. Sed talis est Jesus; ergo persona [= 23].

55 Item, Joannes Damascenus: 'Assumpsit Filius Dei in atomo humanam
280 naturam'.

56 Dicebat quod Jesus non est persona a Jesuitate quia secundum
Concilium 'persona consumpsit personam'. Sed consumptio accidentis fit
tripliciter, nam consumitur accidens per adventum contrarii, per defectum
subiecti, per defectum correlativi. Quo istorum modorum consumpsit persona
285 personam? Si dicat quod advenit contrarium in modo, videlicet proprietas
excellens quae exigitur ad esse personae, contra: Spiritus Sanctus est persona,
nec tamen processio < est proprietas excellens > [= 25].

57 Item, videtur quod Jesus a Jesuitate sit persona quia ad interrogationem
factam per 'quis' respondetur 'Jesus' [= 24].

290 58 Solutio: Ad esse personae creatae tria exiguntur: distinctio singularitatis,
discretio incommunicabilitatis, praeeminentia proprietatis excellentis. Ad esse
autem personae increatae exigitur personalis proprietas quae sit unius et ab
omni distinguens: tria enim in personis increatis invenimus: proprietates,
notiones, relationes. Proprietas dicitur in comparatione ad personam, persona
295 ad hypostasim, notio ad nos, relatio similiter ad personam. Tres sunt proprie-
tates personales a quibus personae sunt: paternitas, filiatio, processio. Quattuor
sunt relationes: tres praedictae cum communi spiratione; quinque vero
notiones: paternitas scilicet, filiatio, processio, communis spiratio, et innascibili-
tas. Proprietas ergo personalis exigitur universaliter ad esse personae tam crea-
300 tae quam increatae [= 26].

59 Ad aliud [53] dicimus quod Jesus non est substantia individua secundum
quod individua tria praedicta importat [= 26].

278 persona: primum ms. 282 Concilium: consilium ms. 287 processio: ibi essio
ms. 290 creatae: *hic et alibi* creatae, increatae etc. *abbreviantur ut* causatae, incausatae, etc.
in ms. 291 discretio: *fort.* distinctio *leg. est* 294 relationes: id est locutiones ms.

278 cognoscitur: Vide q. 2-A, n. ad lin. 128.

280 naturam: Cf. Joannem Damascenum, *De fide orthodoxa* 3.11 (PG 94.1024A; versio
Burgundionis, ed. E. M. Buytaert [St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955], pp. 203-204): 'Deus igitur
Verbum incarnatus, neque eam quae nuda contemplatione cogitatur naturam assumpsit, ... sed
eam quae in atomo.'

282 personam: Vide q. 2-A, n. ad lin. 133.

60 Ad illud quod dicit Anselmus [54], dicendum quod intelligit de homine puro [= 27].

305 61 Ad hoc quod dicit Joannes Damascenus [55], dicendum quod 'Filius Dei assumpsit in atomo humanam naturam' secundum esse naturae, non secundum esse moris.

62 Ad aliud [57] dicendum quod sicut triplex individuum: moris, rationis, et naturae, similiter triplex 'quis', ut ad eius interrogationem possit responderi
310 hoc individuum vel illud [= 28].

63 Ad aliud, scilicet quod persona consumpsit personam [56], dicendum quod sic intelligendum est: Nisi proprietas praeeminentior esset, illa humanitas faceret personam Jesum [= 29].

(c) < *Utrum Christus fuerit duo* >

315 64 Tertio quaeritur sic: Filius Dei secundum quod Deus est aliquid. Item, secundum quod homo est aliquid et non idem aliquid. Ergo Christus est duo [= 31].

65 Item, una natura < 98va > facit tres personas unum, ut patet in Trinitate increata. Ergo plures naturae facient unam personam plura [= 30].

320 66 Item, humanitas fecit Filium Dei quid; similiter divinitas facit Filium Dei quid. Ergo cum divinitas et humanitas sint diversa, et sua causata erunt diversa. Ergo hoc quid erit diversum ab illo quid. Ergo erit duo [= 32].

67 Item, esse aliquid et unum convertuntur. Sed Filius Dei secundum quod Deus est aliquid; similiter secundum quod homo est aliquid. Ergo Filius Dei est
325 unum et unum; ergo duo.

68 Item, Anselmus in libro *De Incarnatione*: 'Non est alius Deus, alius homo; aliud tamen Deus, aliud homo.' Ergo duo.

69 Item, Augustinus in expositione Symboli: 'Suscipiens quod non erat, sic manens quod erat.' Ergo iterum duo.

330 70 Item, Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid. – Contra: Humanitas est quasi accidens Filii Dei quia praeter esse eius est. Ergo humanitas non facit Filium esse quid.

311 consumpsit: assumpsit ms.

329 iterum duo corr. ex duo iterum ms.

327 homo²: Cf. Anselmum, *Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi* 11 (ed. F. S. Schmitt, *S. Anselmi ... opera omnia* 2 [Rome, 1940], p. 29; PL 158.278C).

329 erat: Cf. Augustinum, *In Joan.* 23.6 (CCL 36.236; PL 35.1585): 'Factus est ergo homo qui erat Deus, accipiendo quod non erat, non amittendo quod erat' Cf. etiam Augustinum, *Sermo* 291.2 (PL 38.1317): 'Verbum caro factum est, accipiendo quod non erat; non amittendo quod erat.' Vide etiam Augustinum, *Sermo* 121.5 (PL 38.680), *Sermo* 123.3.3 (PL 38.685), et *Sermo* 183 (PL 38.990).

71 Iuxta hoc quaerebatur: Filius Dei secundum humanam naturam differt a se Deo non accidentaliter; ergo substantialiter. Ergo de necessitate est plura.

335 72 Item, quorum rationes diversae sunt, et ipsa sunt diversa. Sed rationes essentiae et personae sunt diversae quia essentia est communicabilis, solitaria, et immultiplicabilis, persona autem est multiplicabilis, incommunicabilis, insolitaria. Ergo penitus sunt diversa persona et essentia. Ergo essentia non est persona.

73 Solutio: Christus non est duo, nec unus et unus vel unum et unum. Ad 340 hoc quod aliquid sit duo, oportet quod sit unum '<in> divisum in se et divisum ab illo' cum quo facit binarium. Sic autem non est ex hac parte: actualis enim divisio duarum unitatum est perfectio binarii. Ergo cum idem sit suppositum in Christo, non est dicere ibi unum et unum quia 'unum' dicit compositum ex forma et supposito vel quasi forma et quasi supposito.

345 74 Ad primum [65] ergo dicimus quod non sequitur 'Una natura facit tres personas esse unum' etc., nam 'unum' dictum de personis increatis dicit unitatem perfectam: natura enim divina ita est natura quod res naturae: ex parte enim divinitatis idem est natura quod res naturae. Ideo gratiâ termini una natura facit plures personas unum, et hoc est quia illae tres sunt una natura. Sed 350 Filius Dei, etsi sit res humanae naturae, non tamen est humanitas [=34].

75 Ad aliud [cf. 64, 66, 67] dicendum quod non sunt duo quid sed unum [=35].

76 Ad illud quod obicitur, 'Diversae sunt causae' etc. [cf. 66], dicendum quod illae causae unitae sunt in eodem supposito [=36].

355 77 Ad aliud [70] dicimus quod dupliciter est accipere accidens, vel secundum subiectum vel secundum tempus, et hoc ultimo modo dici potest quod humanitas accidit Filio Dei.

78 Ad illud quod obicit Anselmus [68], dicendum quod loquitur <im>proprie; unde sensus est: 'Aliud Deus, aliud homo', id est, alterius naturae.

360 79 Consimiliter respondendum est ad auctoritatem Augustini [69]: Filius enim Dei 'suscipiens' fuit naturam cuius 'non erat'.

80 Ad aliud [71] dicendum quod Filius Dei secundum quod homo differt a se Deo substantialiter, non tamen differt a se substantialiter, immo in tali argumentatione esset fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter: differre enim 365 substantialiter est non habere communitatem in substantiali.

333 Iuxta: iusta ms.

344 supposito¹: supposita ms.

349 illae: illi ms.

359 unde: unum ms.

364 fallacia: falsa ms.

341 illo: Cf. Aristotelem, *Metaph.* 9.9 (1054a23) et 9.2 (1052b16-17); cf. etiam *Glossam Alexandri* 3.6.34(L) (Quaracchi, 3.85) et 3.7.10 (Quaracchi, 3.93).

81 Ad aliud [72] dicendum est quod diversae sunt rationes personae et essentiae, nihilominus tamen persona est essentia quia non < est > praedicatio secundum diversitates rationum, sed secundum identitatem naturae.

(d) < *Quaestiones circa textus sacrae scripturae* >

370 82 Quarto quaerebantur duo. Primum est super illud: *Vocabis nomen eius Jesum*, *Glossa*: 'Ab aeterno impositum est.' Ergo ab aeterno est Jesus; ergo < ab aeterno est > homo.

83 Respondebat quod ab aeterno impositum est quia ab aeterno praevisum est imponi. — Sed haec non est solutio quia de quocumque nomine potest dici
375 quod tale nomen cuicumque est praevisum est imponi.

84 Solutio: 'Jesus' idem est quod 'Salvator'. Unde quia ab aeterno praevisum erat per ipsum salvari genus humanum, ideo dicitur quod ab aeterno praevisum fuit huic tale nomen imponi.

85 Item, a latere obieciatur sic: Ad Col 2, *Glossa*: 'Minores angeli de
380 Incarnatione nihil scierunt.' — Contra: Matt 1: *Judas genuit Phares*, *Glossa*: 'Praesagiens diabolus procreavit' etc.

86 Solutio: Dicit Gregorius: 'Non sunt credendi daemones novisse Incarnationem, sed suspicari.'

368 diversitates: diversitatens ms.
ms.

380 Phares: Phaares ms.

383 suspicari: suspirari

371 est¹: Non invenitur in *Glossa ord.* nec in *Glossa interlineari* apud Lyratum.

380 scierunt: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in 1 Cor 2: 8 (PL 191.1549A-B): 'Si enim daemones Deum factum hominem non intellexerunt, quanto magis homines? ... Sciebant enim ipsum esse qui promissus erat in lege, non tamen mysterium ejus quod Filius Dei erat, et ab aeterno; neque sciebant sacramentum incarnationis, passionis et redemptionis.'

381 procreavit: Non invenitur in *Glossa ord.* nec in *Glossa interlineari* apud Lyratum.

383 suspicari: Cf. Gregorium, *Moralia in Job* 2.24.43 (PL 75.576C-577A), 3.15.28 (PL 75.614A), 33.8.16 (PL 76.682A-B). Cf. autem ibid. 33.7.14 (PL 76.680C-D) et 33.9.17 (PL 76.682D), ubi Gregorius docet diabolum novisse incarnationem sed non modum redemptionis. Cf. etiam *Glossam Lombardi* in 1 Cor 2: 8 (PL 191.1549B): '... magis ex suspitione quam ex cognitione dixisse credendi sunt.'

< Quaestio 3 >

< De statu Christi in triduo >

Secundum magistrum de < bar >

1 < 57rb > Quaeritur utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo. Circa hoc duplex est opinio, una Magistri in *Sententiis*; alia opinio communis est illi
5 contraria.

2 Primo ergo obicitur contra opinionem Magistri, secundo contra communem opinionem, tertio, utrum aliqua proprietas creata infuerit Christo in triduo; quarto et ultimo, ad quem locum descendit secundum animam.

(a) < De opinione Magistri in 'Sententiis' >

10 3 Circa primum sic proceditur. Magister contra suam opinionem sic obicit: Christus in triduo fuit mortuus. Sed esse mortuum et esse hominem sunt impossibilia. Ergo in triduo Christus non fuit homo.

4 Item, si Christus in triduo fuit homo, ergo aut mortalis aut immortalis: non immortalis quia mortuus erat, nec mortalis quia amplius mori non poterat.

15 5 Item, Christus non fuit homo in sepulchro nec fuit homo in inferno nec alibi. Ergo non fuit alicubi homo. Ergo non fuit homo in triduo.

6 Ad idem: Filius Dei secundum quod homo est aliquid creatum. Sed in illo triduo Christus nihil creatum fuit. Ergo in illo triduo non fuit homo.

7 Si velimus hanc opinionem sustinere, dicimus cum Magistro quod in
20 triduo fuit homo, et unio Filii Dei ad carnem et eiusdem ad animam fecerunt ipsum hominem. Tertia autem unio, scilicet carnis ad animam cum aliis duabus fecit ipsum viventem. In triduo habuit Filius Dei carnem, non cadaver et animam. Unde homo fuit. Ostende mihi habentem veram carnem et animam et dicam quod homo est.

25 8 Quod primo obicitur in contrarium [3] dicimus quod hoc locum habet in creatura ubi caro et anima non possunt inveniri seiuncta, immo, separata anima a carne, remanet caro non caro sed cadaver. Fuit ergo in triduo homo sed non vivens, nec sequitur: 'Non fuit homo vivens; ergo non fuit homo'; immo est fallacia consequentis.

1 De ... triduo: De homine Christo in marg. manus moderna

3 Circa corr. ex Contra ms.

10 Circa corr. ex Contra ms.

4 *Sententiis*: Lombardus, 3 *Sent.* 22.1.3 (Grottaferrata, 2/1.136).

10 obicit: Pro isto et sequenti argumentis vide ibid. 22.1.2 (ibid.).

15 Item: Pro isto argumento vide ibid. 22.2.1 (Grottaferrata, 2/1.137).

19 Magistro: Pro isto argumento et illis in 8 et 9 vide ibid. 22.1.3 (Grottaferrata, 2/1.136).

30 9 Similiter dicendum est ad secundum [4] quod illa divisio 'aut mortalis aut immortalis' locum habet in creatura.

10 Ad tertium [5] dicendum est quod fuit homo in sepulchro et homo in inferno quia eadem unione et uniformi erat unitus hic et illic. – Vel dicendum, et melius, quod alicubi non erat homo: Christus enim in sepulchro ratione
35 corporis circumscriptive erat in loco, in inferno ratione animae definitive in loco erat, ita scilicet hic quod non alibi. Sed non sequitur: 'Non erat alicubi homo; ergo non erat homo.'

11 Ad quartum [6] dicimus quod Christus secundum quod homo vivens est aliquid creatum simpliciter, < 57va > non tamen secundum quod homo, et sic
40 intellexit Anastasius cum supposuit anathemati omnes qui dicerent Christum secundum quod hominem non esse aliquid.

(b) < *De opinione communi* >

12 Contra communem opinionem, quae magis consona est rationi, sic obicitur: *Tu es sacerdos in aeternum* etc. Ergo Christus est sacerdos aeternus.
45 Sed non fuit sacerdos secundum quod Deus, immo secundum quod homo. Ergo secundum quod homo fuit aeternus. Ergo in triduo fuit homo. – Et volunt respondere ad hoc quod Christus dicitur esse sacerdos in aeternum non ratione sui sed quia sacerdotium ipsius fuit in perpetuum duraturum, id est, nullum sacerdotium successit suo sicut sacerdotio Levi successit sacerdotium Christi.
50 Sed nihil est dictu quod in illo triduo sacerdotio Christi aliud non successerit.

13 Item, Augustinus: 'Talis fuit illa susceptio quae hominem faceret Deum et Deum hominem.' Sed illa susceptio mansit in triduo. Ergo in triduo fuit homo. – Ad hoc volebat respondere quod Augustinus non loquitur per causam praecisam quia cum illa susceptione exigebatur unio animae ad carnem ad hoc
55 ut esset Deus homo. – Contra: Aut loquitur bene et vere Augustinus aut non. Inconveniens autem est dicere quod bene non loquatur. Ergo bene et vere loquitur. Ergo illa susceptio sine aliquo alio fecit Deum hominem, cum nullam Augustinus additionem insinuet cum dicit 'Talis fuit illa susceptio'. Si enim aliquis diceret quod corpus sufficit ad esse hominis, mendax esset quia cum
60 corpore aliud exigitur. Si dicat quod caro et anima unita fuerunt materia illius susceptionis, obicitur quod materia vel materiale est naturâ prius quam illud

47 sacerdos in aeternum *corr. ex in aeternum sacerdos* ms.

61 *post prius add. est* ms.

33 illic: Vide ibid. 22.2.2 (Grottaferrata, 2/1.137).

37 homo²: Cf. ibid. 22.2.1 (ibid.).

41 aliquid: Alexander III, 'Quum Christus perfectus' (X, 5.7.7); vide *Hyp. Union* 1.201 n. 52.

44 aeternum: Ps 109: 4.

52 hominem: Cf. Augustinum, *De Trinitate* 1.13.28 (CCL 50.69; PL 42.840).

cuius materia vel materiale est. Sed naturaliter prior fuit illa susceptio quam unio animae ad carnem, licet simul fuerunt tempore. Ergo illa unita non fuerunt materia susceptionis illius.

65 14 Solutio: Proprie loquendo, in triduo non fuit homo. Unde ad primo obiectum [12] respondemus sicut prius quod ideo Christus dicitur esse sacerdos in aeternum eo quod suo sacerdotio nullum aliud successit, et ita istud non arguit quod fuerit homo in triduo.

15 Ad illud, 'Talis fuit illa assumptio' etc. [13], dicendum est quod non loquitur Augustinus per causam praecisam et immediatam sed per causam primam et remotam: Filius enim Dei assumendo carnem et animam coassumpsit hominem (non dico 'assumpsit'), unde assumptio illa consequenter respicit unionem animae ad carnem. Susceptio ergo illa fuit causa prima faciens Deum hominem, sed perfectio fuit unio animae et carnis in una hypostasi.

75 16 Aliter respondetur ad primum [12] quod sicut Christus fuit in triduo Redemptor 'non exhibitione humilitatis sed usu potestatis', sic sacerdos fuit in triduo non exhibitione officii sed usu potestatis.

17 Item, obicitur contra hanc opinionem: Creatum cum increato non ordinantur de pari ad aliquem unum effectum. Sed unio animae et carnis fuit 80 quid creatum, unio carnis cum Filio Dei et animae cum eodem fuit quid increatum. Ergo non sunt ad unum effectum. Ergo illae uniones non fecerunt Deum hominem.

18 Solutio: Unum fuit uniens et plura fuerunt unita. Ex parte ergo unitorum unio fuit quid creatum, ex parte unientis increatum. Unitum autem 85 creatum cum uniente increato bene sunt ad aliquem unum effectum.

19 Item, omnis unio est ad aliquid < 57vb > unum. Ergo unio quae fuit carnis ad Filium Dei et animae ad eundem fuit aliquid unum. Aut illud unum est creatum aut increatum, et videtur quod neutrum quia ex creato et increato non fit neque unum creatum simpliciter neque unum increatum.

90 20 Respondeo: Illa unio fuit ad aliquid unum actu, scilicet ad compositionem personae prius simplicis. Item, fuit ad aliquid unum aptitudine, ut scilicet Filius Dei esset homo.

(c) < *Utrum infuerit Christo in triduo aliqua proprietas creata* >

21 Tertio quaeritur utrum infuerit Christo in triduo aliqua proprietas 95 creata, et videtur quod sic quia dicitur: 'Christus iacebat in sepulchro',

76 potestatis: Cf. Lombardum, 3 *Sent.* 19.5 (Grottaferrata, 2/1.122): 'Sed mediator in Scriptura dicitur solus Filius; redemptor vero aliquando etiam Pater vel Spiritus Sanctus, sed hoc propter usum potestatis, non propter exhibitionem humilitatis et obedientiae.' Cf. etiam Alexandrum, *Glossa* 3.22.22c(L) (Quaracchi, 3.259): 'Respondeo: redemptor dicitur [Christus] vel habitu vel actu ...; vel usu potestatis, exhibitione motus obedientiae vel humilitatis. Fuit ergo ibi [apud inferos] redemptor usu potestatis.'

'descendit ad inferna', 'mortuus est'. Ergo quaedam accidentales proprietates Christo infuerunt sicut ubitas et situs et aliae proprietates. Ex hoc ulterius arguitur quod in Christo in triduo et infuerit substantialis proprietas quia accidentalis non inest nisi per substantialem. Si autem aliqua infuit, haec fuit
 100 rationalitas ex parte animae et corporeitas ex parte corporis. Ergo in triduo fuit rationalis; ergo homo vel anima vel angelus; non anima nec angelus; ergo homo.

22 Respondebat quod huiusmodi proprietates accidentales Christo in triduo conveniebant ratione partis quae fuit, non quae tunc pars esset.

105 23 Contra: Sicut ratione partis quae fuit dicitur Christus descendisse ad inferos, similiter ratione partis quae fuit potuit dici in triduo rationalis.

24 Item, quaedam creatae proprietates dicuntur de illo in triduo, quaedam non: unde hoc? Si dicat 'Illae de ipso dicuntur in triduo quae inveniuntur in Scripturis et valent ad expressionem nostrae fidei', non solvit quia adhuc
 110 quaeritur quae sunt illae proprietates quae ad hoc valent.

25 Si concederetur quod in triduo Filius Dei erat rationalis, contra: Non conceditur quod Filius Dei esset anima sed habens animam quae ei unita erat. Sed rationalitas ratione animae ei conveniebat. Ergo haec non erat concedenda: 'Filius Dei est rationalis in triduo', sicut nec haec: 'Filius Dei est anima'.

115 26 Praeterea, caro et anima aut erant in triduo partes aut non. Si partes, ergo faciebant aliquod totum, et non erit assignare quod nisi hominem. Ergo in triduo erat homo. Si non erant partes, contra: Ante Incarnationem Filii Dei erat persona simplex. Post Incarnationem fuit composita ex tribus substantiis et duabus naturis. Ergo cum in triduo mansit illa compositio, in triduo caro et
 120 anima fuerunt partes componentes personam illam. Ergo in triduo fuit homo.

27 Item, Filius Dei erat habens hominis naturam in triduo. Ergo in triduo erat homo.

28 Solutio: Sine praeiudicio, in triduo mansit duplex unio, scilicet Filii Dei ad carnem et unio eiusdem ad animam. Sed tertia unio, scilicet carnis et animae
 125 in hypostasi Filii, non fuit.

29 Ad illud quod quaerit utrum aliqua proprietas creata Christo infuerit [21-25], dico quod nulla infuit: aliud enim est inesse, aliud adesse: quaedam enim proprietates foris advenientes, sicut esse alicubi, esse situm, affuerunt sed non infuerunt. Nulla ergo inhaerens proprietas, sive accidentalis sive
 130 substantialis, de Christo dicebatur in triduo, sed proprietates adentes, id est, a foris advenientes.

98 et: ei ms.
 secunda manus

infuerit *corr. ex* infuerunt ms.

107 proprietates *corr. ex* proprietate ms.

128 alicubi *corr. ex* alicui ms.

100 corporeitas *corr. ex* corporitas

121 hominis s.s. secunda

situm *corr. ex* situ ms.

30 Ad aliud, scilicet utrum caro et anima fuerunt partes in triduo [26],
respondent beatus Bernardus et magister Hugo de sancto Victore dicentes quod
compositio illa non fuit ex partibus indignitatis. Si amplius quaeris, non sum
135 dignus ad huiusmodi quaestionis responsionem, et quia caro et anima < 58ra >
partes erant aptitudine, accidit quod illud quod convenit partibus dicitur de Filio
Dei.

31 Ad aliud [27] dicendum quod natura humana dicitur dupliciter:
materialiter et formaliter. Filius Dei in triduo fuit habens materialiter humanam
140 naturam, id est, carnem et animam, non tamen tunc habuit naturam humanam
formaliter. Formaliter humana natura est ipsa humanitas a qua homo formaliter
dicitur.

32 Si quaeratur quem effectum habuit unio carnis ad Filium Dei et animae
ad eundem, respondeo: Unus effectus fuit compositio personae; alius effectus
145 fuit quia corpus Christi imputribile fuit beneficio unionis; alius effectus fuit quia
beneficio unionis anima fuit omnisciens.

(d) < *Utrum Christus secundum animam descenderit ad locum poenarum* >

33 Quarto quaeritur de loco ad quem descendit Christus secundum
animam, utrum scilicet descenderit ad locum poenarum, et videtur quod sic.
150 Joannes Damascenus: 'Descendit ad inferna anima deificata, ut quemadmodum
his qui in terra sunt iustitiae ortus est sol, ita his qui sub terra *in tenebrosis et*
umbra mortis.'

34 Item, Zach 9: *Tu vero in sanguine testamenti* etc., Glossa: 'Sanguine
passionis tuae eos qui tenebantur in inferni carceribus, in quo nulla refrigerans
155 misericordia quam Dives quaerebat, tua liberasti misericordia.' Ergo Christus
descendit ad infernum inferius.

35 Item, Augustinus *ad Dardanum*: 'Non facile in Scripturis nomen
inferorum solet in bono inveniri.'

134 indignitatis: indignationis ms. post indignationis add. fuit ms. 138 dupliciter:
duplicitaer ms. 154 refrigerans corr. in marg. secunda manus

134 indignitatis: Non est detectum. Cf. autem Bernardum, *De consideratione* 5.10.22-23 (in J. Leclercq et H. Rochais, edd., *Sancti Bernardi opera* 3 [Rome, 1963], pp. 484-86; PL 182.801-802A), *In vigilia Nativitatis sermo* 3.8 (ed. cit. 4 [Rome, 1966], pp. 217-18; PL 183.98C-99A), et *In annuntiatione dominica sermo* 2.5 (ed. cit. 5 [Rome, 1968], p. 34). Cf. Hugonem de s. Victore, *De sacramentis* 2.11 (PL 176.401B-404B).

152 mortis: Cf. Joannem Damascenum, *De fide orthodoxa* 3.29 (PG 94.1101A; versio Burgundionis, ed. Buytaert, p. 276). in ... mortis: Cf. Lc 1: 79.

155 misericordia²: Cf. Glossam interlinearem in Zach 9: 11 (apud Lyranum 4.451v). Ex Hieronymo in Zach 9: 11 (PL 25.1485).

158 inveniri: Cf. Augustinum, *Epist.* 187: *Ad Dardanum, De praesentia Dei* 2.6 (PL 33.834). Cf. etiam Glossam Alexandri 3.22.6 (Quaracchi, 3.255).

36 Iuxta hoc quaerebatur utrum essent solum duo loci in inferno, locus
160 poenarum et locus in quo sunt parvuli, scilicet umbrosus, et si hoc, tunc
quaeritur in quo loco erant antiqui patres expectantes suam redemptionem.

37 Solutio: Christus non descendit ad locum poenarum sed ad locum ubi
erant expectantes patres redemptionem.

38 Ad illam glossam Zach [34] dicimus quod loquitur de refrigerio
165 quantum ad visionem Dei actuale qua privabantur patres.

39 Ad aliud [35] dicendum quod 'infernus' nominat poenalitatem damni vel
poenalitatem sensus, et est utraque poenalitas in loco poenarum, altera solum,
scilicet damni, in limbo.

40 Ad aliud [36] dicendum quod locus in quo fuerunt et sunt parvuli
170 damnati tenebrosus erat et nihil habens luminis, sed non erat afflictivus poena
sensibili. Locus in quo fuerunt antiqui patres tenebrosus erat, sed aliquid
habens luminis et non afflictivus; locus poenarum tenebrosus omnino et
afflictivus.

169 parvuli: pueri ms.

< Quaestio 4 >

< De aliquibus nominibus Christi >

1 < 119rb > Quaeritur utrum Christus < sit > filius adoptionis, deinde
< utrum > sit filius gratiae; tertio, quare conceditur hoc: 'Petrus et Paulus sunt
filii Dei' et non hoc: 'Paulus est filius Dei'. Et iuxta hoc quaeritur quare
5 communicatur hoc nomen 'pastor' aliis et non hoc nomen 'ostium' et
'fundamentum', sed solus Christus dicitur 'ostium' et 'fundamentum', licet in
plurali numero inveniatur quod apostoli sunt 'fundamentum'.

(a) < Utrum Christus sit filius adoptionis et filius gratiae >

2 Circa primum sic: Super illud Gal 4: *Ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus*,
10 dicit *Glossa*: 'Creatura enim sumus quam non genuit sed fecit, et ideo, ut fratres
Christi secundum nostrum modum nos faceret, adoptavit.' Sed fratres eius non
possumus esse secundum filiationem naturalem. Ergo vel non sumus eius
fratres vel secundum adoptionem eius fratres sumus. Ergo ipse est filius
adoptionis.

3 hoc: haec ms.

5 ostium: hostium *hic et aliquando alibi* ms.

9 Ut: Ubi ms.

11 adoptavit: *Glossa Lombardi* in Gal 4: 5 (PL 192.137D). Ex Augustino, *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 3.3 (PL 42.215).

15 3 Item, ibidem *Glossa*: 'Iste itaque modus quo nos Deus, cum iam essemus ab ipso non nati sed conditi et instituti Verbo suo, gratia sua genuit ut filii eius essemus, adoptio vocatur.' Ergo sumus filii per adoptionem. Ergo cum simus fratres eius, ipse erit filius per adoptionem.

4 Ad idem, *Glossa* ibidem: 'Ideo factus est de muliere ut adoptionem
20 *filiorum reciperemus*, id est, bona quae per gratiam dantur, per quae sunt filii.'

5 Item, Heb 1, super illud: in *Filio quem constituit haeredem universorum*,
Glossa: 'Quia quamvis cum Patre secundum divinitatem omnia possideat, tamen secundum humanitatem recte dicitur haeres constitutus secundum illud: *Dabo tibi gentes haereditatem tuam*.' Ergo secundum quod homo est haeres
25 constitutus. Ergo in quantum homo est filius non naturalis, ut videtur, quia in quantum homo non est de substantia Dei Patris. Ergo est filius adoptionis.

6 Praeterea, hoc videtur per hoc quod constituitur haeres: adoptio enim non facit hominem aptum vel gratum ad habendum quaelibet dona sed ad obtinendum haereditatem. Unde cum Deus Pater constituerit ipsum haeredem
30 universarum, magis debet dici filius adoptionis quam aliquis alius.

7 Dicet forte quod Christus non est filius adoptionis quia filius adoptionis est qui de non-filio factus est filius. Sed Christus semper fuit Filius Dei.

8 Praeterea, Christus est Filius Dei Patris naturalis. Si ergo diceretur filius adoptionis, alio modo esset filius quam prius.

35 9 Contra: Ponatur quod Adam non peccasset. Primo fuit filius creationis, post filius adoptionis, et sic alio modo filius quam prius. Ergo talis diversitas qua possit dici Christus filius adoptionis.

10 Praeterea, nonne sic erat in Veteri Lege quod filium naturalem minorem natum adoptabant in filium, id est, haeredem constituebant, quod bene apparuit
40 in Jacob et Esau? Ergo a simili, licet Christus sit Filius naturalis Dei Patris, nihilominus adoptari potest in filium.

11 Item, Hieronymus: 'In evangelio Nazaraeorum dicit quod *super eum*, id est, Christum, dicitur < 119va > requievisse *fons omnis spiritus*.' Sed quis est fons omnis spiritus nisi Spiritus Sanctus? In aliis enim non dicitur quievisse

37 qua: qui ms.

42 Nazaraeorum: Nazaraearum ms.

17 vocatur: *Glossa Lombardi*, ibid. Ex Augustino, *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 3.3 (PL 42.215-16).

20 filii: *Glossa Lombardi*, ibid. (PL 192.137C).

22-24 Quia ... tuam: *Glossa Lombardi* in Heb 1: 2 (PL 192.402C).

2: 8.

40 Esau: Cf. Gen 27: 1-40, Mal 1: 2-3, Rom 9: 10-13.

43 spiritus: Hieronymus, *Comment. in Isaiam* 4.11 (in Is 11: 1-3) (CCL 73.148; PL 24.148B): '... sed iuxta euangelium quod Hebraeo sermone conscriptum legunt Nazaraei: Descendet super eum omnis fons Spiritus sancti.'

24 Dabo ... tuam: Ps

45 Spiritus Sanctus, sed solum in Christo. Ergo debet dici filius Spiritus Sancti per gratiam qua aptatur Spiritui Sancto. Sic ergo Christus est filius gratiae.

12 Ad idem: Angeli sunt *filii Dei*, ut Job 1, non filii naturales sed filii gratiae. Ergo cum in Christo homine fuerit plenitudo gratiarum, debuit dici filius gratiae.

50 13 Quod autem angeli sint filii Dei per gratiam, etiam a principio suae creationis, patet per Augustinum et Hieronymum dicentes super 28 Ez: 'Simul largitus est eis naturam et gratiam.'

14 Item, in Ps: *Ego hodie genui te*, *Glossa*: 'Etsi posset accipi de die illa qua Christus secundum hominem natus est, tamen, quia "hodie" praesentiam significat et quod aeternum est semper est, de sempiterna generatione sapientiae Dei divinitus accipitur.' Sed qua ratione potest dici Christus Filius Dei Patris secundum hominem vel humanitatem, eadem ratione potest dici filius Spiritus Sancti per informationem plenitudinis gratiae, vel etiam totius Trinitatis.

15 Praeterea, super illud Matt 3: *Potens est Deus de lapidibus istis suscitare*
60 *filios Abrahae*, *Glossa*: 'In huius rei praesagium olim Deus de Sara genuit filium', scilicet fecit gigni. Ergo eadem ratione potest dici Christus in quantum homo filius Trinitatis quia Trinitas fecit illum nasci de Virgine: idem enim est effectus Trinitatis quia eadem natura.

16 Concesso quod Christus sit filius adoptivus, contra: Ambrosius: 'Legi et
65 relegi et filium Dei adoptivum non inveni.'

50 etiam s.s. ms.

61 gigni: ginni *corr.* ex gingni ms. (cf. ll. 127 et 128).

47 Job 1: v. 6.

52 gratiam: Cf. Augustinum, *De civitate Dei* 12.9.2 (CCL 48.364; PL 41.357): 'Et istam quis fecerat nisi ille, qui eos cum bona uoluntate, id est cum amore casto, quo illi adhaerent, creauit, simul eis et condens naturam et largiens gratiam?' Citatur ab Alexandro, *Glossa* 2.3.18a (Quaracchi, 2.34). Cf. Hieronymum, *Comment. in Ezechielem* 9.28 (CCL 75.396; PL 25.272C): 'Quodque sequitur: *Perfectus in uis tuis a die conditionis tuae ... , donec inuenta est iniquitas in te*, ostendit omnem creaturam bonam a Deo conditam et perfectam habuisse uirtutem, et per hoc principem quoque Tyri fuisse immaculatum, ut deinceps macula non naturae sit, sed voluntatis.' Cf. Alexandrum, *Glossa* 2.3.18b (Quaracchi, 2.34): 'Item, cum angelica natura facta fuerit ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, similitudo autem maxime secundum gratuita attenditur, sicut imago secundum naturalia, videtur quod creatus fuerit in gratuitis per illud Ezechielis: *Tu signaculum similitudinis*.'

56 accipitur: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Ps 2: 7 (PL 191.72D).

61 filium: *Glossa ord.* in Mt 3: 9 (PL 114.80D) (huius: cuius PL).

65 inveni: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Rom 1: 4 (PL 191.1310D-1311A): 'Dicit enim Ambrosius: "Volvi et revolvi divinam Scripturam, et Filium Dei nusquam adoptivum inveni."' Ut notant editores *Glossae Alexandri* (Quaracchi, 3.115.n.5), textus iste non inuenitur apud Ambrosium; citant autem Augustinum, *Contra Secundinum* 5 (PL 42.581): 'Lege itaque Scripturas, nusquam inuenies de Christo dictum quod adoptione sit Filius Dei.'

17 Ad illud Augustini, 2 *De Trinitate*, 10 cap.: 'Neque enim Jesus Spiritus Sancti filius et suus filius ratione credi vel intelligi potest.'

18 Praeterea, Joan 20, super illud: *Ascendo ad Patrem*, Glossa: 'Aliter "meum", aliter "vestrum": natura "meum", gratia "vestrum".' Ergo naturalis
70 filius est Christus in quantum homo quia non dicitur ascendisse ad Patrem in quantum Deus sed in quantum homo.

19 Item, Rom 1, super illud: *Qui praedestinatus est Filius Dei*, Glossa: 'Christus secundum quod homo est praedestinatus, id est, sola gratia praelectus ut ipse homo sit Filius Dei, non utique adoptivus ut nos sumus, sed in virtute, id
75 est, in eadem potentia cum Patre, non per gratiam adoptionis sed per unionem Verbi, id est, per gratiam qua eius humana natura est unita Verbo. Non ergo per adoptionem est Filius.'

20 Ad idem: Dupliciter adoptatur quis in filium, ut quando alienus in filium adoptatur vel quando non-carus adoptatur. Sed neutro modo Christus
80 potest dici adoptari in filium. – Sed ad hoc facilis est responsio quia Deus Pater de non-caro secundum humanitatem fecit sibi carum.

21 Item, quaedam gratia dat esse, quaedam bene esse. Verbi gratiâ, per gratiam Dei fuit productus Sarae filius, et ipso producto in esse gratia Dei contulit bene esse, et a gratia Dei conferente bene esse dicitur homo esse filius
85 adoptivus. Sed in Christo non fuit ista successio gratiarum, sed simul habuit esse et bene esse.

22 Praeterea, si Christus Filius Dei sit per gratiam sive filius gratiae, accidit quod ter erit filius, scilicet Filius Dei Patris per generationem aeternam, filius gloriosae Virginis per generationem temporalem, filius totius Trinitatis per
90 gratiam. Sed hoc est inconveniens quia in *Sententiis* dicitur quod bis est filius, non ter.

23 Item, super illud Joan 1: *Dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri*, Glossa: 'Per adoptionem quod ipse semper est per naturam'; et ibi alia glossa: 'Ut sint fratres

93 adoptionem: adtionem ms.

67 potest: Cf. Augustinum, *De Trin.* 2.10.18 (CCL 50.104; PL 42.857): '... neque enim Iesus etiam spiritus sancti filius aut etiam suus filius credi aut intelligi potest.'

69 vestrum²: Glossa *interlinearis* in Jn 20: 17 (apud Lyrannum 5.241v): 'Non ait communiter nostrum, sed meum et vestrum quia differunt.' Ex Augustino, *In Joan.* 121.3 (CCL 36.666; PL 35.1957): 'Non ait: Patrem nostrum; aliter ergo meum, aliter uestrum; natura meum, gratia uestrum.'

77 Filius: Glossa *Lombardi* in Rom 1: 4 (PL 191.1310D).

83 filius: Vide Gen 21: 1-2.

91 ter: Cf. Lombardum, 3 *Sent.* 8.2 (Grottaferrata, 2.68): 'Ex his manifeste apparet Christi duas esse nativitates eundemque bis natum fore.'

93 naturam: Non invenitur in Glossa *ord.*; cf. Glossam *interlinearem* in Jn 1: 12 (apud Lyrannum 5.187v), s.v. *filios*: 'adoptivos'.

eius et cohaeredes per gratiam sicut ipse Filius unigenitus per naturam.' Item, 95 super illud: *Ex Deo nati sunt*, *Glossa*: 'Ut secure credamus homines nasci ex Deo, subdit Deum nasci ex homine: ex hac enim susceptione infirmitatis sanata est nostra infirmitas ut possimus dii vel filii Dei fieri.' Ex his glossis innuitur quod nos sumus filii Dei per gratiam, Christus vero per naturam.

24 Item, Augustinus: 'Ut homines nascerentur ex Deo, prius natus est Dei 100 filius ex homine', id est, Virgine. Ergo ante incarnationem nullus fuit filius adoptionis.

25 Solutio: Christus non est filius adoptionis: non enim de non-filio factus est filius. Unde, Gal 4, super illud: *Ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus*, *Glossa*: 'Nos antequam essemus filii, praedestinati fuimus, sed Christus non fuit prae- 105 destinatus antequam esset Filius.' Ideo nos filii Dei adoptione sumus, Christus vero non adoptione sed natura.

26 Praeterea, nos sumus filii adoptionis per fidem. Sed Christus non habuit fidem: in ipso enim non fuit enigmatica visio. Et ideo Christus non fuit filius adoptionis.

110 27 Item, Christus non debuit dici filius gratiae quia filius dicitur filius secundum potissimum eius in quantum est a generatore suo. Verbi gratiâ, filius hominis filiatione sua non dicitur anima vel corpus seu grammaticus vel musicus, sed homo quia hoc est potissimum illius generationis sive huiusmodi generationis. Quid ante aliud potest gratia in puro homine quam conformare 115 hominem Deo in iustitia vel in fide?: hoc enim est potissimum secundum modum huiusmodi generationis spiritualis. Sed conformari Deo in iustitia vel in fide non fuit potissimum in Christo, immo potissimum quod fecit gratia in Christo fuit quod ipse existens homo esset Filius naturalis Dei Patris. Non est ergo Christus dicendus < filius > adoptionis vel filius gratiae seu filius Spiritus 120 Sancti, sed ipse ens homo unitus Verbo est Filius naturalis Dei Patris.

28 Quod obicit, 'Descendit fons omnis spiritus et requievit super eum' [11], dicendum quod loquitur Hieronymus de Patre, qui dicitur descendisse per apparentiam: ipse enim est qui est fons omnis spiritus.

98 nos: non ms.

103 adoptionem: adoptione ms.

110 quia: item ms.

94 naturam: *Glossa interlinearis* in Jn 1: 12 (apud Lyranum 5.187v).

97 fieri: *Glossa ord.* in Jn 1: 13 (apud Lyranum 5.187va).

100 homine: Cf. Augustinum, *In Joan.* 2.15 (CCL 36.18-19; PL 35.1395): 'Vt autem homines nascerentur ex Deo, primo ex ipsis natus est Deus. Christus enim Deus, et Christus natus ex hominibus.'

105 Filius: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Rom 1: 4 (PL 191.1311A): '... et ille quidem natura Filius est, nos vero adoptione; ille vero numquam Filius non fuit, nos, antequam essemus, praedestinati sumus, et tunc spiritum adoptionis accepimus, quando credidimus in Filium Dei.'

29 Ad illud Ps: *Ego hodie genui te* [14], dicendum quod Christus in
 125 quantum homo est Filius Dei Patris, ut li in quantum notet causam materiale
 sub hoc sensu: 'Christus ens homo est Filius Dei Patris.' Vel intelligitur hoc per
 effectum: *Ego hodie genui te*, id est, feci te gigni de Virgine sicut olim de Sara
 filium fecit gigni: genuit enim Deus effective de Sara filium, non materialiter.

30 Ad illud scilicet quod constitutus est haeres et sic adoptatus ad
 130 susceptionem haereditatis [5], respondeo per glossam ibi dicentem: *Quem
 constituit haeredem*, 'id est, possessorem omnium creaturarum': ipse enim ens
 homo unitus Verbo possessor est omnium, nec est optimum in eo quod
 constitutus est haeres, sed in aliis hominibus est optimum quod adoptantur ad
 susceptionem haereditatis aeternae.

135 31 Ad aliud dicendum quod alio modo non est filius ante Incarnationem et
 post ita ut prius diceretur filius naturalis, post Incarnationem filius adoptionis
 [9], immo tam ante quam post dicendus est filius naturalis, licet alio modo sit
 existens ante Incarnationem et alio modo post: tantum enim fuit filius naturalis
 post et ante.

140 (b) < *Utrum aliqua nomina Christi sint communicabilia aliis* >

32 Secundo quaeritur utrum valeat haec argumentatio: 'Isti, demonstratis
 Petro et Paulo, sunt filii Dei; ergo Petrus est filius Dei', et si sequitur hoc, tunc
 esse filium non erit incommunicabile sed pluribus communicabile.

33 Item, dicit Dominus ad Pharaonem per Moysen: *Dimitte primogenitum*
 145 *meum Israel*. Praeterea, Joan 10: *Ego dixi: Dii estis*. Ex his patet quod iustus
 dicitur filius Dei per gratiam.

34 Item, quaeritur utrum aliquis sanctus vel iustus deberet dici 'fundamen-
 tum'. Quod non videtur, super illud Ps: *Fundamenta eius* etc., *Glossa*: 'Ipso
 lapide autem Christo Jesu, qui solus est fundamentum quod nemo mutare
 150 potest.'

35 Item, 1 Cor 1, super illud: *Ego sum Cephae*, *Glossa*: 'Quod pastor est
 dedit', et idem habetur Joan 10 in *Glossa*. Quaestio ergo est quare communi-

127 gigni: ginni ms (cf. l. 61). 128 gigni: ginni ms. (cf. l. 61) 133 adoptantur *corr.*
 ex adoptatus ms. 147 deberet: deberat ms.

128 materialiter: Vide Gen 21: 1-2.

131 creaturarum: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Heb 1: 2 (PL 192.402B): '... id est, possessorem
 omnis creaturae.'

145 Israel: Cf. Ex 4: 22-23. estis: Jn 10: 34.

150 potest: *Glossa Lombardi* in Ps 86: 1 (PL 191.805D).

152 dedit: *Glossa Lombardi* in 1 Cor 1: 12 (PL 191.1537C). *Glossa*: Cf. *Glossam ord.* in
 Jn 10: 11 (apud Lyranum 5.215va): 'Quod pastor est communicat suis.' Ex Augustino, *In Joan.*
 47.3 (CCL 36.406; PL 35.1734): '... Quod pastor est, dedit et membris suis.'

catur hoc nomen 'pastor' in singulari numero aliis et non hoc nomen 'fundamentum'.

155 36 Quaeritur etiam de hoc nomine 'ostium', utrum sit communicabile in singulari numero aliis. Videtur quod sic per illud Cant ult.: *Si ostium est, compingamus illud tabulis cedrinis*, et loquitur de puro homine, tamen iusto.

37 Solutio: Haec recipitur: 'Iusti sunt filii Dei' vel 'Iusti sunt dii', non tamen haec: 'Iustus est filius Dei vel Deus', nam cum dico: 'Iusti sunt filii Dei', per hoc
160 nomen 'filii' multiplicatur filiatio non quantum ad substantiam sed potius quantum ad accidens, id est, quantum ad gratiam: una enim substantia totius Trinitatis, sed multae sunt gratiae influentes a tota Trinitate. Sed cum dicis: 'Iustus est filius Dei', per hoc nomen 'filius' intelligitur filiatio naturalis. Haec autem diversitas provenit a diverso modo significandi: alius enim est modus
165 significandi in plurali et alius in singulari.

38 Eodem modo recipienda est haec: 'Iusti sunt dii' non essentialiter seu naturaliter sed ratione multiplicium gratiarum sumptarum a Deo et ita hoc nomen 'Deus' vel 'dii' et hoc nomen 'filius' trahuntur ad creatum vel propter modum significandi vel propter adiunctionem aliquam, ut in Ex: *Constitui te*
170 *deum Pharaonis*, non sequitur: 'Ergo constitui te Deum.'

39 Ad aliud [34] solvunt quidam per distinctionem quod duplex est fundamentum, quoddam fundans, ut Christus, aliud fundatum, ut apostoli. — Sed haec solutio nulla quia etiam Christus in quantum Deus est fundamentum fundans et in quantum homo fundamentum fundatum tantum. Unde Matt 16:
175 *Tu es Petrus et super hanc petram aedificabo Ecclesiam meam*, id est, me petram.

40 Ad aliud [35] dicendum quod Christus est ostium, ut habetur Joan 10: *Ego sum ostium* etc.; alius autem a Christo non dicitur 'ostium' quia dicitur 'ostium' Christus eo quod eius fides praedicatur et ipse est in quem creditur.
180 Fides intrat in hoc ostium: credere enim Christum Deum et hominem ingressus est in ostium.

41 Similiter Christus dicitur 'fundamentum' et nullus <119vb> alius, nam Christus est super quo debet stare fides, quae est substantia rerum sperandarum etc. 'Pastor' autem non dicitur nisi propter actum exteriorem:
185 pastor enim est qui deducit oves ad pascua. Et quia iste actus communicabilis

167 multiplicium: multiplicium ms.

170 Pharaonis: Pharonis ms.

157 cedrinis: Cant 8: 9.

170 Pharaonis: Ex 7: 1.

175 meam: Mt 16: 18.

178 ostium¹: Jn 10: 7.

184 sperandarum: Heb 11: 1.

est multis, ideo hoc nomen 'pastor' in singulari numero est multis communicabile et non hoc nomen 'ostium' nec 'fundamentum'.

42 Sed nonne de sanctis potest dici quod sunt 'ostia' sicut et 'fundamenta'? Utique: unde 3 Reg 6 dicitur: *Fecit Deus duo ostia de lignis olivarum.*

190 43 Ad ultimum Cant [36] dicendum quod 'ostium' sumitur pro compacto ex asseribus.

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

189 olivarum: Cf. 3 Reg 6: 31-32.

191 asseribus: Cf. Gulielmum Altissiodorensem, *De statu Christi in triduo* 4.5 (*Hyp. Union* 1.301-302): 'Ad hoc dixerunt quidam quod "ostium" dupliciter dicitur, scilicet ipsa apertura, vel compactum ex asseribus. Primo modo dicitur Christus Ostium; secundo modo sancti dicuntur ostium, quoniam per claves quas habent, vel per doctrinam, quibusdam viam aperiunt, quae via est Christus, quibusdam vero claudunt. — Sed haec solutio videtur esse nulla'

TWO CONTINUATORS OF AQUINAS:
ROBERTUS DE VULGARZIA AND THOMAS SUTTON
ON THE *PERIHERMENEIAS* OF ARISTOTLE

P. Osmund Lewry, O.P.

AMONG the works of Aquinas left unfinished at his death in 1274 is a commentary on the *Perihermeneias* of Aristotle. Unlike earlier medieval commentators on this text, who had depended largely on the two expositions of Boethius, Aquinas was also able to profit by the ampler work of Ammonius, an older contemporary of Boethius, recently translated from the Greek. The Flemish Dominican, William of Moerbeke, completed his Latin translation at the papal court at Viterbo on 12 September 1268. Some time that year Aquinas, who had been living in the same community, left for Paris, and it was probably there, early in his second regency, around 1269-70, that he wrote his commentary at the request of the young provost of Louvain. It may not be without significance that one of the six surviving copies of Moerbeke's translation of Ammonius, now Vatican ms. Arch. S. Pietro H 6, but seemingly French in origin, ends with the exposition of the lemma of chapter 10, 'Haec quidem igitur, sicut in *Analyticis* dicitur, sic ordinata sunt' (19b31). Aquinas either stopped at the same point, corresponding to the end of the second *lectio* of the second book, or, as the witness of the Paris mss., Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 16101 and 16154, suggests, a few lines earlier with the lemma, 'Intelligimus vero quod dicitur ex his quae subscripta sunt' (19b27).¹ G. Verbeke, the editor of Moerbeke's translation, conjectures that Aquinas may have left Viterbo without a complete version of Ammonius, and that the Vatican manuscript is a copy reflecting the incomplete state of the version used by Aquinas.²

¹ See J. Isaac, *Le Peri Hermeneias en Occident de Boèce à saint Thomas* (Bibliothèque thomiste 29; Paris, 1953), pp. 111-12.

² Ammonius, *Commentaire sur le Peri Hermeneias d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, ed. G. Verbeke (Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum 2; Louvain-Paris, 1961), pp. xxxii-xxxv.

Whether or not Aquinas left his work unfinished because he lacked a complete version of Ammonius when he moved to Paris, the preoccupations of his later years, even after his return to Italy in 1272, gave him little opportunity to finish the work. But as with other unfinished works of Aquinas, the *Perihermeneias* commentary found its continuators. The Leonine editors print the continuation of Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan, completed in 1496, for the remainder of chapter 10 and chapters 11-14.³ The Venice incunable of 1495 has the continuation of the fourteenth-century Dominican, Gratiadeo of Ascoli. Three continuations are also known in manuscript, of which none has yet been edited. A fourteenth-century codex, formerly at the Dominican priory of San Marco in Florence and now in the Biblioteca Nazionale there, ms. Conv. soppr. J.X.27,⁴ continues after the authentic text (fol. 51ra): 'In figura, in cuius primo angulo, qui[d] sit *a*, ponatur affirmativa ...', and concludes (fol. 52rb): 'quia negatio preposita et postposita signo universali equipollet suo subalterno. Explicit frater Thomas ... quia preventu mortis opus complere non potuit.' Then, passing from chapter 10, 20a23 to 20a31, a supplement begins (fol. 52va): '*Ille vero secundum infinita*, etc. Superius Philosophus manifestavit quedam que poterant esse dubia circa enuntiationes ...', ending in chapter 14 (fol. 59va): '*Nam si ea que sunt in voce* (23a32). Hic pertractat dubitationem ... sicut contrarie aspiciendum est in opinionibus.'⁵ No indication is given of the author of this supplement.

The two continuations edited below are both from the thirteenth century: one is attributed in the later copy to 'Robertus de Vulgarbia Ordinis Predicatorum'; the other, there is good reason to suppose, is by another Dominican, Thomas Sutton.

I

The first occurs in the Vatican ms. Urb. lat. 214,⁶ the Leonine editors' 'Codex E'. This is a parchment manuscript of the fifteenth century, 358 × 258 mm.,

³ *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia iussu impensaue Leonis XIII P.M. edita* 1 (Rome, 1882), pp. 88-128.

⁴ See B. L. Ullman and P. A. Stadter, *The Public Library of Renaissance Florence* (Medioevo e umanesimo 10; Padua, 1972), p. 204, no. 705.

⁵ The manuscript, which also contains expositions of the *Isagoge* and *Praedicamenta* with a later, and incorrect, attribution to Aquinas, is described by H.-F. Dondaine and H.-V. Shooner, *Codices manuscripti operum Thomae de Aquino* 1 (Editores operum Sancti Thomae de Aquino 2; Rome, 1967), p. 366. Inscriptions of previous owners show that it was once in Franciscan hands. Square brackets and italics have been used above to indicate a conjectured emendation of the incipit given by Dondaine and Shooner.

⁶ Described by Cosimo Stornajolo, *Codices Urbinales latini* 1 (Rome, 1902), p. 205.

with fly-leaf and 242 folios. It is written in two columns by a Florentine scribe in a formal humanistic hand also found in mss. Urb. lat. 397 and 398 (*teste* A. C. de la Mare). The verso of the first folio is a title page for the first item: 'In hoc codice continetur Sanctus Thomas de Aquino Ordinis Predicatorum super *libro Politicorum* Aristotelis'. The title is surrounded by a laurel wreath with flowers and fruit. The arms and the inscription, 'F<riderici> Urbini D<ucis>', show that the manuscript once belonged to Frederick of Montefeltro, duke of Urbino from 1474 to 1482. The hand is consistent with a date in that period. The decorative features resemble those of mss. Urb. lat. 212 and 213, which contain the commentaries of Aquinas on Aristotle's *Ethica* and *Physica*. The first item in E (fols. 2ra-204ra) is the commentary of Aquinas on books 1 and 2 of Aristotle's *Politica*, followed without ascription by the continuation of Peter of Auvergne for books 3 to 8. The second item, the commentary on the *Perihermeneias*, begins on fol. 204ra. The text of the second *lectio* of book 2 ends (fol. 233rb) as in the Leonine edition: 'quod non differt in quibuscumque nominibus ponantur exempla'.⁷ It is followed immediately by a colophon and the continuation:

Huc usque scripsit sanctus Thomas de Aquino Ordinis Predicatorum.

Ea uero que secuntur scripsit frater Robertus de Uulgarbia Ordinis eorundem Predicatorum.

Similiter autem se habet, etc. (19b32) In hac parte multiplicat oppositionem in uniuersalibus

This text ends (fol. 241vb):

... sed uel de diuersis substanciis uel de eodem in diuersis tempore.
Laus tibi Christe.

Explicit expositio secundi libri *Periarmerias* sancti Thome de Aquino Ordinis Predicatorum. Sed finita fuit per magistrum Robertum de Vulgarbia Ordinis eorundem Predicatorum.

Finis.

The final folio (fol. 242) is blank.

A fragment of the same continuation is found in another Vatican manuscript, Vat. lat. 2115,⁸ the Leonine editors' 'Codex A'. This is a parchment manuscript from the end of the thirteenth century, 308 × 206 mm., with two fly-leaves and

⁷ p. 85b (15).

⁸ No published catalogue of this part of the Vatican latin *fondo* exists yet, but a description will be found in *Aristoteles latinus, Codices*, ed. George Lacombe, *pars posterior* (Cambridge, 1955), pp. 1225-26, no. 1857.

209 folios. It is written throughout in long lines. The first part (fols. 1r-43v) is in an Italian gothic hand, and comprises the texts of the old logic, *Isagoge*, *Praedicamenta*, *Liber sex principiorum* and *Perihermeneias*, in an order often followed in Italy, set out with generous margins and decorated initials. The second part (fols. 44r-48v) is written in a small Italian cursive hand, which has also supplied notes on modal propositions to the immediately preceding text (fols. 41v, 42r). The commentary of Aquinas on the *Perihermeneias* begins (fol. 44r) without title, the *epistola nuncupatoria* having apparently been added above the *prooemium* in shorter lines. The authentic text ends (fol. 48v):

Deinde cum dicit, *Intelligimus uero*, etc. (19b26), manifestat quod supra dictum est per quamdam figuralem de-(terminacionem *canc.*)-scripcionem. Dicit enim quod id, quod in supradictis dictum est, intelligi potest per subscriptam figuram.

This is probably the point at which Aquinas abandoned his commentary. The text in A continues without interruption: 'Tunc sequitur illa pars, *Quoniam uero contraria* (20a16), in qua uerificat quoddam circa uniuersales de subiecto finito' The lemma of Aristotle's text cited here only occurs in E on fol. 233vb, so some part of the continuation is omitted at the beginning of this fragment. After thirty-one lines the fragment ends, 'quia in hoc exemplo, simul cum transposicione uocali, modus intelligendi uariatur', completing the exposition of chapter 10 as on fol. 234vb of E. The lemma, 'At uero' (20b14), with which chapter 11 opens, has been written in at the end of the last line in A, but the remaining third of this verso has been left blank, and the following folio (fol. 49) is without writing.

The third part of A comprises the folios numbered '51' to '207', with the texts of the new logic, *Topica*, *Elenchi*, *Analytica priora* and *posteriora*, in a French hand and with French decorated initials. Although, as in the first part, the text has been supplied with generous margins, only the *Topica* is accompanied by extensive glosses. A continuous marginal gloss, in the same hand as the Aquinas commentary and its continuation, begins in the right-hand margin of the first page of the text of Aristotle (fol. 51rb):

In cuiuslibet libri principio quatuor cause requiruntur, scilicet que sit causa materialis, que formalis, que efficiens et que finalis. Causa autem materialis istius libri est sillogismus dyalecticus. Causa uero formalis consistit in modo agendi et ordinacio parcium doctrine. Ordinacio patebit in diuidendo librum, sed modus agendi duplex est, scilicet necessarius propter illam doctrinam, et iste triplex est, diffinitiuus, diuisiuus et collectiuus; et non necessarius nisi propter addiscentes est exemplorum suppositiuus, et hoc testatur Aristotiles in primo *Priorum*, dicens quod exempla ponimus ut sciant qui addiscunt. Causa finalis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet intra et extra, et causa finalis intra est idem cum formali; extra dicitur propinqua et remota: propinqua, artificialiter sillogizare ad utramque partem

cuiuscumque problematis; remota, tota philosophya et per consequens perfectio anime rationalis per uirtutem, ad quam finaliter ordinatur sciencia. Causa efficiens fuit Aristotiles. Titulus est 'Hic incipit liber *Topicorum* Aristotilis'. Dicuntur 'Topica' ad differentiam aliorum librorum; 'Aristotilis' ad differentiam *Topicorum* Boecii et Ciceronis et aliorum philosophorum qui *Topica* scripserunt. Hiis uisis ad literam ueniamus.

Propositum autem quidem negotii, etc. (100a18) Iste liber diuiditur in prohemium et tractatum, qui incipit ibi, *Primum ergo considerandum* (101b11). Item, prohemium diuiditur, quia primo dicit de quo intendit, secundo qualiter

The statement of the causes here with the account of the title is substantially the same as that in the exposition of the *Topica* attributed to 'Elyas' in another codex of the second half of the thirteenth century, ms. Vat. lat. 4883, fols. 56r-86r. This work was described by M. Grabmann, together with another copy in a thirteenth-century manuscript of the Biblioteca Comunale, Assisi, ms. 322.⁹ There it is attributed to Aquinas in a title by a more recent hand, but a scarcely legible ascription at the end describes it as the '<Trac>atus *Topicorum* Elye'.

The works that follow in the Assisi manuscript are also attributed to Aquinas. The first is in fact his *Analytica posteriora* commentary, but the second, an exposition of the *Analytica priora*, is not authentic. It begins (fol. 143r):

Cum omnis scientia sit veri inquisitiva et hoc per rationem et modum disserendi, loyca autem habeat modum inquirendi veritatem in aliis scientiis determinare, patet quod loyca rationem et modum disserendi habet determinare. Sed ratio disserendi secundum Boethium duas habet partes scilicet inventionem et iudicium¹⁰

This, as Grabmann correctly notes, is the beginning of Robert Kilwardby's exposition of the *Analytica priora*, of which fourteen other manuscripts are known, and early printed editions under the name of Aegidius Romanus, following the erroneous ascription found in the Venice ms., Biblioteca Marciana lat. VI. 220 (2533).¹¹ It is odd that in both the Assisi and Vatican manuscripts the *Topica* of Elyas has the same beginning as this work of Kilwardby. The Vatican version continues after the common text with that of Kilwardby already cited:

⁹ 'Ungedruckte lateinische Kommentare zur aristotelischen Topik aus dem 13. Jahrhundert' in Martin Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik* 3, ed. Ludwig Ott (Munich, 1956), pp. 142-57 (pp. 147-49).

¹⁰ Cited by Grabmann, *ibid.*, pp. 148-49.

¹¹ A list of manuscripts and editions of this work is given by Charles H. Lohr, 'Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Robertus-Wilgelmus', *Traditio* 29 (1973) 93-197 (111-12).

... Igitur loyca de utraque habet determinare, ut dicatur quedam pars loyce de arte inueniendi, quedam pars de arte iudicandi.

Set tunc dubitatur. Cum in omni sciencia sit inuencio et iudicium, secundum quod unaqueque sciencia differt, propter quod iste due partes magis loyce quam alii sciencie attribuuntur?

Et dicendum, quod omnis sciencia inueniat et iudicet. Tamen sola loyca artem et modum inueniendi et iudicandi determinat et ideo < iste > partes ei soli attribuuntur.¹²

Here again there is agreement with Kilwardby, and the *Topica* has reproduced the initial question of his *Analytica*.

Here, however, the Vatican text of Elyas' *Topica* diverges from Kilwardby:

... Alie questiones hic obmittende sunt.

Set hiis habitis de partibus inueniendi, quia de quadam (quedam ms.) parte eius, ut in *libro Topicorum* ad presens est intencio, accedamus ergo ad illam inquirendo de quo est ut de subiecto. Et patet quoniam de sillogismo dyalectico et hiis que nominantur in principio primi *Priorum*. Causa uero formalis consistit in modo agendi¹³

The text in ms. Vat. lat. 4883 then continues with the statement of the causes and title as in the anonymous marginal gloss discovered in ms. Vat. lat. 2115. The transition from the common text with Kilwardby has been made awkwardly: where Kilwardby has further questions before approaching the particular matter of the *Analytica priora*, here they are omitted, and a swift approach is made to the subject matter of the *Topica*. But the resemblances persist. Kilwardby continues after his initial questions on the parts of logic:

Hiis habitis de partibus artis disserendi, quia de quadam eius parte est presens intencio, accedendum est ad illam Ex hiis patet (f. 38vb) subiectum in proposito, scilicet in *libro Priorum*; est enim de sillogismo simpliciter Causa formalis consistit in modo agendi et ordinacione parcium doctrine. Ordinacio parcium patebit in diuisione libri. Modus enim agendi quidam necessarius propter ipsam doctrinam, et est triplex, scilicet diffinitiuus, diuisiuus et collectiuus; quidam autem non necessarius est propter ipsam doctrinam sed solum propter addiscentes, scilicet exemplorum positiuus. Causa finalis duplex est, scilicet intra, et est idem cum forma rei, et extra, et ista est triplex. Est autem finis proximus utilitas in cognicione determinatorum in hoc libro consistens; et eciam finis remocior, faciliior cognicio demonstracionis et tocius sciencie; est autem adhuc finis magis remotus et ultimus, scilicet perfectio anime rationalis in uirtutibus propter beatitudinem [quandam]

¹² Cited by Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* 3. 147. New paragraphs have been introduced to clarify the process of the argument, and the orthography and text have been revised from microfilm of the manuscript in this and the following excerpt.

¹³ Grabmann, *ibid*.

consequendam, ad hoc enim ordinatur omnis pars philosophie sicut ad finem ultimum. Causa efficiens est Aristotiles. Titulus est talis, 'Incipit liber Priorum analeticorum Dicitur autem 'Priorum' ad differentiam Posteriorum analeticorum'¹⁴

The resemblance to the commentary of Elyas on the *Topica* in the Vatican and Assisi manuscripts, known to Grabmann, and in the marginal gloss in A, under consideration here, is there in the approach to the particular matter of the *Analytica priora* and, even allowing for the stereotyped language of such statements, in the statement of the introductory causes, particularly the *causa finalis*, and title. The implications of this agreement must be reserved until a fuller study has been made of the work of Elyas and its relationship to that of Kilwardby. At present it may be enough to note that the fragment of unasccribed continuation of the *Perihermeneias* in A is in the same hand as a marginal gloss on the *Topica*, which elsewhere is ascribed to Elyas; that that work in the manuscripts known to Grabmann begins with a prologue which is initially the same as that of a work of Kilwardby, and that further resemblances are found as the work proceeds, which suggest a literary relationship between them which may be one of dependence of Elyas on Kilwardby.

Cardinal Zigliara, in the Leonine edition of Aquinas' *Perihermeneias* commentary, suggested that the 'Vulgarbia' of E might be intended for 'Kilwardby', a name which was especially prone to scribal corruption, particularly in Italy. If the continuation in E and A had been excerpted from a commentary by Kilwardby on the *Perihermeneias*, its authorship could be established by identifying that commentary and comparing the exposition of book 2 with that of the continuation. At that time, he said, although the commentary was listed in Bernard's seventeenth-century catalogue of manuscripts in England, Dominicans had sought it without success in English libraries.¹⁵ A substantial part of a commentary has now been identified in the

¹⁴ Merton College, Oxford ms. 280 (s. xiii), fol. 38va-b, with specified correction from ms. 289 (s. xiv), fol. 33va-b. These two manuscripts have been found to offer a generally reliable text of Kilwardby's *Analytica priora* commentary.

¹⁵ 'Robertus de Vulgarbia desideratur in diligentissimo Echardo. Attenta antiquitate huius supplementi (uti constat ex cod. A) posset quispiam rationabiliter dubitare num Robertus de Vulgarbia idem sit ac Robertus Kilwardbius, cuius agnomen incredibile est quantum fuerit a scriptoribus corruptum. Alii enim Bilibri, alii Canvilvertim, alii Ridverbium vocant, alii insuper Kiliurlih, Kulverbi, Kilibardby, De Valleverbi etc. eum nuncupant, ut videre est apud laudatum Echardum (*Scriptores ord. praed.* ad ann. 1279. tom. I. pag. 374 seqq.). Inter alia plurima Kilwardbius scripsit *Annotationes* in librum Aristotelis *De interpretatione*; sed utrum ex hisce annotationibus excerptum fuerit supplementum quod habetur in cod. E, et partim in cod. A, et consequenter utrum Kilwardbius sit idem ac De Vulgarbia, est quaestio definienda ab eruditiss. Opus Kilwardbii in librum *περί ἑρμηνείας* recensetur in catalogo mss. Angliae (Londini, 1699); sed a nostris Religiosis frustra hucusque praefatum opus in Angliae bibliothecis quaesitum est' (p. 84b [o]).

Peterhouse, Cambridge ms. 206 (P), fols. 65vb-79rb, covering the first ten chapters of Aristotle's text and the beginning of chapter 11, ending with the exposition of a lemma at 20b34. There it is only a later list of contents that links the work with Kilwardby. However, the same work has been found complete in the Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria ms. 73 (M), fols. 44ra-66va, where it is entitled '*Scriptum Roberti super librum Peryarmenias*', and in an unascrbed copy in the Venice, Biblioteca Marciana ms. lat. VI. 66 (2528) (V), fols. 1r-18v. It clearly forms part of a series of expositions of the *ars vetus*, *Isagoge*, *Praedicamenta*, *Perihermeneias*, *Liber sex principiorum* and *Liber divisionum Boethii*, in the order followed at Paris. Similarities of style to works of known attribution and doctrinal agreement, particularly between the *Perihermeneias* and Kilwardby's *Analytica priora* in the treatment of the infinitizing negative in expressions such as 'non homo' and 'non currit', have been adduced to argue Kilwardby's authorship of this series of works. His *Perihermeneias* commentary appears in the light of this discovery to form part of a course on the old logic taught at Paris around 1240.¹⁶ But neither this work nor others formerly thought to be by Kilwardby and found in the Peterhouse mss. 205 and 206, the Bodleian Library, Oxford ms. Canon. Misc. 403, and Corpus Christi College, Oxford ms. 119, when examined, reveal any common material with the continuation of Robertus de Vulgarbia. Cardinal Zigliara's suggestion is so far unverified, but in view of the connection between the Elyas material and Kilwardby, it may still be instructive to compare the Vulgarbia continuation with the newly identified work of Kilwardby. As Isaac recognised, it was implausible that Kilwardby, a critic of Aquinas in the Oxford condemnations of 1277, should become his continuator in the last years of his life, as archbishop of Canterbury, 1272-78, or cardinal in Italy, 1278-79, but it is not unlikely that an earlier commentary might have been drawn upon to supply a continuation, particularly in view of Kilwardby's celebrity in the Dominican Order.¹⁷ If it was not drawn upon by excerpting, the continuation may yet have emerged in a circle influenced by Kilwardby, and thus bear traits of his work.

¹⁶ This has been argued in the present writer's unpublished doctoral thesis, *Robert Kilwardby's Writings on the 'logica vetus' Studied with Regard to Their Teaching and Method* (Oxford, 1978). A notice of an earlier stage of the research is given by Charles H. Lohr, 'Problems of Authorship concerning Some Medieval Aristotle Commentaries', *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.)* 15 (1973) 131-36 and 'Robertus de Kilwardby, *Super logicam Aristotelis*', *ibid.*, 134-35. Although the attribution to Kilwardby of some twenty works on the old logic, formerly thought to be by him, has been discounted, and reasons have been advanced in the thesis for ascribing some of these to other writers, it is not yet clear which, if any, may be ascribed to the Robertus Anglicus, active around 1271 in Montpellier, and proposed as an alternative to Kilwardby in Lohr's notice.

¹⁷ *Le Peri Hermeneias en Occident*, pp. 111-12 n. 5.

II

The second continuation considered here is that found in the Paris ms., Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 16154, the Leonine editors' 'Codex B'. This is a parchment manuscript 292 × 220 mm., of 272 folios, formerly Sorbonne ms. 594, written in double columns in more than one hand of the end of the thirteenth or beginning of the fourteenth century. The first part of the manuscript (fols. 2r-257r) contains the commentaries of Aquinas on the *Physica* and *Analytica posteriora* and the *De caelo et mundo* with the continuation of Peter of Auvergne, followed by that of Aquinas' Augustinian disciple, Giles of Rome, on the *De generatione et corruptione*, Aquinas himself on the *De anima* and Giles on the *Elenchi*.¹⁸ Fol. 258 is blank, and Aquinas' commentary on the *Perihermeneias* begins on fol. 259ra in a late thirteenth-century English hand. The transition to the continuation is made on fol. 270vb, where the repetition of the final lemma of the authentic exposition is the only indication that material is being supplied from another source:

Deinde, cum dicit, *Intelligimus uero quod dicitur*, etc. (19b26), manifestat quoddam quod supra dictum est per quamdam figuralem discriptionem, dicens < *** > *Intelligimus uero quod dicitur*. Manifestat quod supra dictum est in quadam figurali discriptione, dicens quod illud quod supra dictum est possumus intelligere ex hiis que subscripta sunt in figura

This continuation fills another closely written folio, ending (fol. 271vb), 'Deinde, cum dicit, *Transposita uero nomina et uerba* (20b1), ostendit quod transposicio', in mid-sentence, with catchwords at the foot of the verso, 'nominum et uerborum non facit', to indicate how the exposition of chapter 10 would have continued. The final folio of the manuscript (fol. 272r) is blank apart from the inscription at the head: 'Iste liber est pauperum magistrorum de Sorbona, ex legato magistri Iacobi de Padua, doctoris in theologia, medicina et artibus, socii huius domus de Sorbona Parisiis.' James of Padua's legacy, which includes twenty-one other manuscripts now in the Latin *fonds* of the Bibliothèque Nationale, must have come to the Sorbonne soon after the 1338 catalogue of its library was compiled.¹⁹

Although this continuation is unascrbed in the sole manuscript and fragmentary, there is good reason to suppose that its author was the Oxford

¹⁸ The contents of this manuscript are described by L. Delisle, 'Inventaire des manuscrits latins de la Sorbonne, conservés à la Bibliothèque Impériale sous les numéros 15176-16718 du fonds latin', *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 31 (1870) 42.

¹⁹ See L. Delisle, *Le cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque nationale* 2 (Paris, 1874), p. 156.

Dominican and defender of Aquinas, Thomas Sutton.²⁰ The early fourteenth-century catalogue of Dominican writers from Stams has the entry:

16. Frater Thomas de Sutona, natione anglicus, magister in theologia, scripsit super praedicamenta, super sex principia; item complevit scriptum Thomae super perihermeneias²¹

Grabmann thought this witness was to be taken seriously, and mentioned in this connection that the continuation in B was distinct from that in E, and might be by Thomas Sutton.²² Sutton's style as a continuator of Aquinas may be studied at length in his completion of the exposition of the *De generatione et corruptione*, which has been edited from the Merton College, Oxford MS. 274.²³ There the continuation begins with the note: 'Hic terminatur expositio fratris Thome de Aquino et incipit expositio fratris Thome de Suthona.' It is a substantial work, covering chapters 6 to 10 of book 1 and the whole of book 2. Sutton makes the transition with the initial lemma of chapter 6 and the form, 'Postquam Philosophus determinavit... hic determinat', which marks the beginning of a new *lectio*. In B the transition is made with the form, 'Deinde, cum dicit', with which Sutton, like Aquinas, commonly marks stages of the exposition within a *lectio*. The *Perihermeneias* in B provides only one instance of the *lectio* opening, when the continuator begins (fol. 271rb):

Quoniam negacio contraria est ei, etc. (20a16) Postquam Philosophus distinxit enunciaciones et opposiciones earum et consequencias, in ista parte manifestat quedam que possunt esse dubia circa ea que dicta sunt, et diuiditur in 2 partes: in prima, primo manifestat quoddam prius dictum de ueritate quarundam enunciacionum; in secunda, manifestat quedam dubia circa transposicionem eorum que sunt in enunciacionibus, ibi, *Manifestum est autem quoniam et in singularibus*. (20a23-24)

Circa primum considerandum est Dicit ergo²⁴

²⁰ See A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500* 3 (Oxford, 1959), pp. 1824-25, 'Sutton, Thomas de'.

²¹ *Laurentii Pignon catalogi et chronica, accedunt catalogi Stamsensis et Upsalensis scriptorum O.P.*, ed. G. Meersseman (Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum historica 18; Rome, 1936), p. 60.

²² *Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin: eine literarhistorische Untersuchung und Einführung*, 3rd edition (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 22. 1-2; Münster, 1949), p. 273.

²³ *Expositionis d. Thomae Aquinatis in libros Aristotelis De generatione et corruptione continuatio per Thomam de Sutona*, ed. Francis E. Kelley (Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt 6; Munich, 1976).

²⁴ See below, pp. 122 (33)-123 (8).

This may be compared with Sutton beginning the *De generatione* continuation:

Quoniam autem primum oportet, etc. Postquam Philosophus determinavit de generatione et corruptione in communi, et de aliis motibus consequentibus, hic determinat de quibusdam que requiruntur ad generationem et ad alios motus; et diuiditur in duas partes: in prima ostendit necessitatem determinandi de eis; in secunda prosequitur determinationem intenti, ibi: *Principium autem accipiamus*, etc....

Circa primum intendit

Dicit ergo²⁵

Although there is probably conscious imitation of Aquinas in the 'Postquam Philosophus' and 'Circa primum', the form, 'in ista parte', is strange to Aquinas, who begins his statement of the matter of the current *lectio* with 'hic' or 'nunc', a form also used by Sutton for the *De generatione*. Aquinas' characteristic 'Et circa hoc duo/tria facit' and 'Circa primum duo facit', in the division of the text, although replaced here by what is less usual with him, 'et diuiditur in duas partes', occurs elsewhere in Sutton's continuation and that in B. The form, 'Dicit ergo primo', is occasionally used by Aquinas at the beginning of the expository section of a *lectio*; both Sutton and the continuator in B customarily say, 'Dicit ergo/igitur', at the point at which the content of the first division is paraphrased, seldom adding 'primo'.

With little variation the continuation in B introduces new lemmata with 'Deinde, cum dicit', as the exposition proceeds, on several occasions marking a subdivision with 'Secundo, cum dicit', where Aquinas would say, 'Secundo, ibi'; the same small difference of usage is observable in Sutton's expository passages. Aquinas sometimes introduces longer reflections arising out of the exposition of the text, using the form, 'Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est'; Sutton uses similar forms, but they are altogether lacking in B. There such sections begin, 'Attendendum est' or 'Considerandum est', forms not used by Aquinas, but similar to Sutton's 'Advertendum est', 'Addendum est', 'Sciendum est'. In a style which closely imitates that of Aquinas – more closely than that of Peter of Auvergne, whose continuations were widely copied for the *Politica* and *De caelo et mundo*, as witness E and B – the significant agreements and divergences are sufficiently consistent to recognise Sutton as the author of the *Perihermeneias* continuation in B, incomplete as it is.

²⁵ Ed. Kelley, p. 46.

III

With the continuation ascribed to Robertus de Vulgarbia there is a more marked divergence from the style of Aquinas, but this alone, as the example of Peter of Auvergne's style as a continuator may suggest, does not argue that the work in E and A was not composed as a continuation, though it is what one might expect of an excerpt from an existing work uninfluenced by the style of Aquinas. The continuation begins, 'In hac parte', and major sections are sometimes introduced with direct forms such as this, which make no reference to the preceding matter, 'Hic incipit', 'Hic docet', 'Hic ... mouet', or with a reference in forms such as 'Manifestavit ... hic docet', 'Determinata/Determinato ... hic determinat', 'Inquisita ... hic determinat'. These, or similar forms, are used by Robert Kilwardby in his philosophical works, but in his *Analytica* and *Priscianus minor* commentaries rather than in the course on the *ars vetus*. The syllogistic analysis of arguments found here, in which the major, minor and conclusion are identified, is an expository device which Kilwardby uses, though, in dividing the texts of the old logic. Where the E text of the continuation merely has 'Deinde' to mark a stage of the exposition, the A text, like Aquinas, has 'Deinde, cum dicit'. Frequent transitions in the E text with the form, 'Et sequitur illa pars', are also replaced in many instances with 'Deinde, cum dicit' in the A text. In this regard E is closer to Kilwardby in the textual division of the old logic, where division and exposition are not clearly separated and transitions are made within the division-exposition with 'Et sequitur pars'. 'Deinde' appears in his *Analytica posteriora* and *Priscianus minor* commentaries, but there the lemma of Aristotle or Priscian is found after its exposition and preceded by 'hoc est', and not, as here, before the exposition. Similarly although Kilwardby sometimes marks stages of the exposition with 'Consequenter' in these works, the lemma is then placed at the end, instead of following immediately as it does in Vulgarbia's continuation.

On five occasions short passages of *expositio litteralis* are introduced with 'Et debet littera sic legi' or 'Et legatur littera sic', to supplement the usual *expositio sententiae* in the continuation with a more detailed account of the way the sense is sustained by the words of the text.²⁶ Kilwardby also introduces brief expositions in this style in his *logica vetus* course, without regularly devoting a separate section to it, as some masters at Paris in the mid-thirteenth century were wont to do. Comments arising from the exposition are introduced with

²⁶ See below, pp. 101 (17-20), 106 (25-32), 107 (32)-108 (2), 109 (16-19), 111 (30-35). Examples of this technique are given by R.-A. Gauthier in his *praefatio* to the Leonine edition of Aquinas' *Sententia libri ethicorum: Opera omnia* 47.1 (Rome, 1969), pp. 244*-45*.

'Ad euidentialiam predictorum notandum', 'Ad cuius euidentialiam prenotandum est', 'Notandum', forms similar to those used by Kilwardby in his *Analytica posteriora* commentary, where comment replaces the questions found elsewhere. Altogether then, apart from the anomalous position of the lemmata in the expository sections, the style of this continuation is in many ways similar to that of Kilwardby. The way in which *expositio litteralis* is used may point to a date for this material earlier than the 1270s: even if the material has been edited in the form of a continuation after the death of Aquinas, this archaic feature suggests that in its original form the material derives from a work of the mid-century. The original form may have been better preserved in the E text, where the formulae are often closer to those of Kilwardby. This text has many obvious errors of sense, so that Zigliara says of this manuscript, 'Quamvis nitida scriptura exaratus, inscitiam oscitantiamque amanuensis passim prodit; et scriptus videtur non ad studium, sed ad solum ornamentum bibliothecae.'²⁷ Clearly A was written with more understanding of the content, and less as an ornament for a library. Zigliara places it first among the witnesses to Aquinas' commentary: '... codex caeteris, meo iudicio, praestantior. Quod si in ipso lacunas interdum ac saepe sphalmata offendimus, talia tamen haec sunt ut seipsa prodant.'²⁸ But a knowing scribe may make his own thoughtful improvements of the text, where one with less understanding may more faithfully preserve the traces of his exemplar even in his misreading of it. If the A text sometimes reads more like a continuation of Aquinas, the E text may stand closer to the source material and the arts faculty in Kilwardby's time.

The relationship of Robertus de Vulgarbia to Kilwardby may become more apparent from a detailed comparison of the continuation with Kilwardby's *Perihermeneias* commentary. Following the medieval distinction by which the text of this treatise was divided into two books, the second beginning with chapter 10, Kilwardby, like Aquinas, begins his second *lectio* of book 2 with the lemma, 'Quando autem "est" tertium adiacens' (19b20). His commentary covers the remainder of the book in a further five *lectiones*: *lectio* 3 begins with the lemma, 'In his vero' (20a4); *lectiones* 4 to 7 begin with the chapters 11 to 14. Robertus de Vulgarbia follows the same partition of the material except in chapter 13, where the treatment is divided, and a new *lectio* begins with 'Dubitabit autem' (22b29).²⁹ The distinctions are more obvious in Kilwardby's treatment, where a mixture of division and exposition is regularly followed in each *lectio* by a section devoted to *dubitabilia*. Although the continuation has

²⁷ *Opera omnia* 1. [3].

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ See below, p. 109 (23).

occasional points of inquiry arising from the exposition, these are not couched in the question form used by Kilwardby, and the major distinctions of the treatment are only marked by the beginning of a new major division of the text. While both works show some agreement in their overall articulation of the text, they diverge in the finer divisions.

Not only is the division of the material different at times, but there are also differences in its handling. The continuation begins with the comparison of opposition in universal and infinite propositions. Though a diagram is lacking in both E and A, reference is made to a figure in which four propositions are arranged with contraries or contradictories of finite predicate placed above, of infinite predicate below.³⁰ Kilwardby has a diagram here, with two alternative schemes based on contradictory and contrary opposites. Disregarding the slight differences of arrangement in the three manuscripts, the schemes have the following form:³¹

Omnis homo est iustus	disposicio	Non omnis homo est iustus
Non omnis homo est non iustus	penes	Omnis homo est non iustus
Non omnis homo est iniustus	contradictorias	Omnis homo est iniustus
Omnis homo est iustus	disposicio	Omnis homo non est iustus
Omnis homo non est non iustus	penes	Omnis homo est non iustus
Omnis homo non est iniustus	contrarias	Omnis homo est iniustus.

It may be, then, that the continuation has in mind a similar diagram, but without the privative forms with 'iniustus' which Kilwardby introduces. Kilwardby's scheme of contradictories probably derives from that of Boethius' second exposition,³² but the propositions have been reformulated, and the privative and infinite forms transposed.

As Kilwardby notes, with the contradictories, the 'angles' which can both be true are the diagonally opposite negative propositions; with the contraries equivalent propositions are placed in a subalternate position. The continuation says that one must carefully look at the diagram in order to see which angles can be true and which cannot. The phrase here, 'patebit diligenter inspicienti',³³ could be matched by similar expressions in Kilwardby's work. Kilwardby attaches no great importance to the adoption of one scheme rather than the other: there is a diversity of opinion on the matter and the manuscripts are at variance with one another:

³⁰ See below, p. 91 (10-12).

³¹ M 57ra, P 76vb, V 14r. Kilwardby's *Perihermeneias* commentary is cited here according to the author's forthcoming edition of the course on the *ars vetus*.

³² Boethius in *Periherm.*, 2a editio 4, ed. C. Meiser, 2 (Leipzig, 1870), p. 297.

³³ See below, p. 91 (9).

Que autem descripcionum fiat, non multum curandum, quia semper est similis modus consequendi ut in indiffinitis. Ponunt tamen quidam quod magis conueniens est descriptio penes contrarias, quia addendo 'omnis' ad istas, 'Homo est iustus', 'Homo non est iustus', fiunt contrarie; alii autem ponunt penes contradictorias, quia contradicchio est opposicio que per se hic queritur. Set in hoc non est multa uis, set est utraque descriptio satis bona, et fere nulli libri hic inueniuntur concordēs, set quidam habent sic, et quidam sic.³⁴

The continuation makes no reference to this diversity and variance, and without a diagram the sense of the alternatives envisaged is less clear than in Kilwardby.

In the next *lectio* a point of some doctrinal interest is touched on when the continuation discusses Aristotle's assertion that 'Omnis est homo non iustus', the universal affirmative of infinite predicate, follows from 'Nullus est homo iustus', the universal negative of finite predicate (20a21-22), and says:

... quia ex negatiua non sequitur affirmatiua nisi supponatur constancia subiecti, subiungit, *necesse est enim aliquem* (20a23); hoc est ad hoc quod ex negatiua sequatur affirmatiua, oportet ponere constanciam subiecti debitam. Et dico, 'debitam', quia si ex negatiua debuit inferre uniuersalis affirmatiua, oportet ponere constanciam subiecti cum tribus appellatis. Et hoc dixi, quia a littera quidam arguunt quod 'omnis' non exigit tria appellata.³⁵

The readings of A and E often diverge, but it is clear what is at issue. Kilwardby discusses the same point among his *dubitabilia*:

Dubitatur postea super hoc quod dicit quod affirmatiua de predicato infinito sequitur negatiuam de predicato finito, supposito quod aliquis homo sit, hoc modo: 'Nullus homo est iustus: ergo omnis homo est non iustus'. Ex hoc enim apparet quod hoc ipsum 'omne' possit addi termino habenti unicum appellatum.

Set intellige quod hoc non arguit illud, propter hoc quod cum dicit Aristotiles, *necesse est enim aliquem esse*, is est sensus, *necesse est constanciam subiecti esse*. Et sic cessat obieccio.

Utrum ergo 'omnis' exigit tria appellata aut non, non est hic determinandum. Credimus tamen quod non possit addi termino habenti unicum appellatum nisi locutio fuerit impropria. Et causa est quia hoc ipsum 'omnis' dicit quandam adiccionem supra naturam communem omnium adiectiuorum. Amplius, quia diuidencium est, et non habet quod diuidat. Utrum autem aliqua talis fuerit uera uel falsa non determinamus.³⁶

³⁴ M 57ra, P 76vb, V 14r.

³⁵ See below, p. 93 (7-13).

³⁶ M 58va, P 78rb, V 14v.

The continuation here goes further than Kilwardby, not only requiring the same subject in both propositions, to avoid the case when the negative is true because no man exists, but also settling the question whether 'omnis' supposes at least three individuals to which the subject term applies, in this case three men. Kilwardby, at this stage, believes that it cannot be used with propriety unless there is more than one, but declines to settle the question.

There is a celebrated treatment of the matter in the *Syncategoremata* of William of Sherwood, where it is maintained that when 'omnis' distributes numerically, it requires three actually existing subjects of the common term.³⁷ Grabmann described *sophismata* in the Erfurt ms., Amplon. Q. 328, which he thought might be those attributed to Kilwardby in the Stams catalogue.³⁸ The lengthy discussion there of the *sophisma*, 'Omnis fenix est', is ordered according to seven points of inquiry, of which the first is, '... utrum hoc signum uniuersale quod est "omnis", additum termino communi, exigit tria appellata ad minus in termino cui additur'.³⁹ After arguments for and against and discussion of the other points of inquiry, a reply is made in which two opinions are noted. The first is that it is always a solecism to add 'omnis' to a term designating one individual, and congruous usage requires that it should only be added to terms with several individuals; the second is that it may be added, whether the universal term has one individual or several, because all that is required is potential use for many. It is the second view that is adopted:

Et hoc concedimus quamuis famosorum posicio sit in contrarium. Vnde congrue dicitur, 'Omnis fenix est'. Et dico quod 'omnis' possit addi termino habenti unum suppositum, dummodo ille plura alia possit habere. Set si ille terminus, quamuis haberet formam communem, [si] tamen non possit diuidi in alia supposita, tali termino non potest addi 'omnis', sicut isti termino, 'sol', et 'luna'. Vnde iste sunt incongrue, 'omnis sol', 'omnis luna', secundum quod 'omnis' est syncathegoreuma. Set si dicam, 'Omnis luna deficit', tunc non est syncathegoreuma set cathegoreuma; tunc enim est idem quod perfectum, et tunc exigit tria necessario, quia perfectio uniuscuiusque fundatur super tria. Sic igitur concedimus quod 'omnis' possit addi termino communi habenti unum suppositum, dummodo possit habere plura alia, sicut uisum est. Et ideo concedende sunt rationes hoc

³⁷ '... cum distribuit pro partibus secundum numerum, requirit tria appellata actualiter entia, et cum pro partibus secundum speciem requirit tria habitualiter entia vel plura' ('The *Syncategoremata* of William of Sherwood', ed. J. Reginald O'Donnell, *Mediaeval Studies* 3 [1941] 49).

³⁸ M. Grabmann, *Die Sophismataliteratur des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts mit Textausgabe eines Sophisma des Boetius von Dacien* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 36.1; Münster, 1940), pp. 41-46.

³⁹ fol. 19rb. This manuscript has been studied in microfilm, for which the author acknowledges his indebtedness to the Wissenschaftliche Allgemeinbibliothek der Stadt Erfurt.

probantes, scilicet quod 'omnis' non exigit actu plura supposita in termino cui additur.⁴⁰

If this reply is by Kilwardby, it suggests a development of his thought in a different direction from the continuation. If the continuation were a redaction of his *Perihermeneias* commentary, there would have been a development from holding the incongruity of a use of 'omnis' with one individual, while leaving the requirement of three as an open question, to asserting that three were actually required. If the *sophisma* is also his work, the development from the commentary would be to asserting the congruity of a use with one, so long as the term was potentially applicable to others. The position adopted in the *sophisma* is that it would also be possible to say 'omnis' of less than three men, if that is all there are.⁴¹ Although, at first sight, the development from Kilwardby's *Perihermeneias* to the continuation is not implausible, the likelihood that such a development occurred is less in view of the fact that the position assumed in the *sophisma* is also that of Kilwardby in his *Priscianus minor* commentary, when he says, '... non exigit multa appellata actu esse sub termino signum distributivum, set sufficit quod multa potencia et intellectu'⁴² There must be some doubt, then, whether Kilwardby also held the position represented in the continuation.

However, the congruous use of 'omnis' is of secondary concern here; the primary interest is in *constantia subjecti* as a condition of valid inference in the case under discussion. This is reiterated a little later in regard to singular subjects, where the continuation has the following: '... si uerum est in singularibus interrogatum negare de predicato finito, et uerum est ipsum affirmare de predicato infinito cum constancia subiecti'⁴³ On that point the continuation is consistent with Kilwardby, a matter of some importance, as will be seen in connection with Thomas Sutton's work,⁴⁴ since the tenth and last among the theses in logic condemned by the Oxford masters at Kilwardby's instigation, in 1277, was 'Item quod ex negativa de predicato finito sequitur affirmativa de predicato infinito sine constantia subjecti'.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ fol. 23rb.

⁴¹ 'Posito enim quod non sint nisi duo homines et currant, possum dicere, "Omnis homo currit". Set quia sub illo termino sunt plura alia supposita, quod patet de se, et hoc signum, "omnis", sicut uisum est, non determinat sibi multitudinem, ideo de duobus uiris non possumus dicere, "omnes uiri"' (fol. 23va).

⁴² Oxford, Corpus Christi College ms. 119, fol. 34vb; cf. Cambridge, Peterhouse ms. 191, vol. 2, fol. 26vb.

⁴³ See below, p. 93 (22-24).

⁴⁴ See below, pp. 85-89.

⁴⁵ *Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. Denifle and É. Chatelain, 1 (Paris, 1889), p. 559, no. 474. The thesis is discussed in relation to Aquinas' *Perihermeneias* exposition by

With regard to the final section of chapter 10, where Aristotle discusses the effect of transposing nouns and verbs in statements, the continuation concludes with the note:

Et notandum quod cum dicit, *Transposita*, etc. (20b1), intelligendum est de nominibus et uerbis, et non de aduerbiis, scilicet quorum officium in preponendo et postponendo uariatur. Hoc dico propter negationem. Hoc autem quod dicit, *affirmatio et negatio* (20b12), intelligendum est de cathegoreumatibus et non de sincathegoreumatibus, quia in preponendo et postponendo dictiones sincathegoreumaticas multociens fit uariacio in enuntiacione. Et intelligendum est iterum de transpositione uocali secundum easdem habitudines, et non tamen uocali secundum constructionem. Intelligendum est uero de transpositione uocali et non de transpositione in modo intelligendi, et sic excluduntur omnes enuntiaciones secundum compositionem et diuisionem, et sic etiam excluditur hec instancia, quia bene dicitur, 'animal homo', secundum quosdam, nugatorie tamen, 'homo animal', quia in hoc exemplo simul cum transpositione uocali modus intelligendi uariatur.⁴⁶

In Kilwardby's *Perihermeneias* commentary the same passage is the subject of *dubitationes* towards the end of *lectio* 3 of book 2, where he has the following reply:

... dicendum quod transposicio quamuis immutet potestatem siue modum supponendi, non tamen significacionem. Propter hoc ergo non est obieccio de hoc quod dico, 'Omnium oppositorum, etc.', nec de hoc quod dico, 'Homo animal est', 'Animal homo est', quamuis una sit nugatoria, (M 58vb) reliqua non. Quamuis enim in tali transposicione mutetur proprietas terminorum, quia secundum talem ordinem prouenit nugacio ex superfluitate, secundum talem non, non tamen mutatur aliquid ex parte substance siue significacionis terminorum. Sumitur ergo hoc 'transposicio' ut transposicio est mutacio ordinis ex eadem parte (V 15r) composicionis

Super hoc intellige quod non est obieccio de 'omnis non' et 'non omnis': non enim dicit transposita nomina et aduerbia.

Et intelligendum est eciam hoc, ut dicit Boecius, de transposicione uocali tantum, et non de transposicione que est secundum construccionem, et hoc dico propter oraciones amphibolicas; nec de transposicione nominum et uerborum que modos intelligendi et composiciones intellectuum diuersificat, et hoc dico propter quasdam oraciones multiplicantes secundum composicionem et diuisionem.

Sciendum eciam est hoc quod quia preposiciones et coniuncciones et alie partes indeclinabiles, que denotant habitudines aliarum parcium, non sunt finite significa-

Isaac (*Le Peri Hermeneias en Occident*, p. 177), but only with reference to propositions with an indefinite subject like 'homo', and not with reference to those with universal subjects, which are in view here.

⁴⁶ See below, pp. 96 (22)-97 (9).

cionis, et ob hoc frequenter mutantur ad uim adiunctorum eis, propter hoc non similiter dicit de istis partibus quod *Transposita*, etc., sicut de nominibus et uerbis. Vnde dicit Boecius quod intelligendum est illud de nominibus et uerbis proprie dictis.⁴⁷

The continuation presents succinctly the same conclusions which Kilwardby draws out at length. The verbal similarities cannot simply be explained by a common dependence on Boethius, since Kilwardby's account reflects the teaching rather than the language of his source.⁴⁸ The continuation reads like a better ordered summary, and the points are made so concisely as to suppose some familiarity with the material treated.

The elliptical reference to a stock objection about the transposition of terms is of interest in view of the position which Kilwardby adopts here and elsewhere. The continuator knows that some hold that while 'animal homo' is acceptable, 'homo animal' is nugatory. Kilwardby may be intended here, since he says explicitly that the latter is nugatory, while the former is not. The continuation has more on this point with regard to chapter 11, where Aristotle excludes the expression, 'homo animal' (21a17):

Et sequitur illa pars, *Amplius nec* (21a16), in qua ponit secundam regulam: si aliqua 2^o, scilicet predicata, quorum unum in altero intelligitur, nec conuenit diuisa coniungere. Etiam hec regula dupliciter potest intelligi: uel uniuersaliter, quocumque modo ordinentur predicata, quorum unum in altero intelligitur, et secundum sic exponentes est hec nugatio, 'animal homo'; et sic e conuerso, quod multi concedunt, dicentes quandocumque unum in altero intelligitur actu ex ordinatione illorum ad inuicem, significat nugatio. Vnde, cum nomen generis actu in nomine speciei intelligitur, est hic nugacio, 'animal homo'. (E 235vb) Et hoc etiam dicit Commentator super vii *Prime philosophie*, ubi exponit Aristotilem loquentem de diffinitione accidencium. In hominis autem diffinitione non intelligitur nomen generis nisi potencialiter, ideo non est hec nugacio, 'animal rationale'.

Et aliter potest intelligi regula, si unum in altero intelligatur: si magis commune preponitur, bene conuenit coniungere, ut 'Est animal et est homo, ergo est animal homo'; si uero minus commune preponatur, non conuenit coniungere, sed est nugacio si dicam, 'homo animal'. Et sic exponendo, dicemus hic esse nugationem, 'homo animal', et non hic 'animal homo', quia nugatio si peccat in ordine. Vnde, cum ordo minus commune ad magis sit taliter quod magis commune preponatur, <conuenit coniungere>; unde, si minus commune preponitur, est peccatum in ordine. Et de hoc non modicam philosophiam perscrutant siue faciebant.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ M 58va-b, P 78va, V 14v-15r.

⁴⁸ See Boethius in *Periherm.*, 2a editio 5. 10 (ed. Meiser, 2. 343-51).

⁴⁹ See below, p. 99 (26)-100 (12).

Although Kilwardby touches on the same question in his *lectio* 4, the particular example is not taken up again there. His fuller treatment of the matter is to be found at the beginning of his grammatical *sophismata*, when he asks about the propriety of saying 'animal homo'. After a series of objections he answers:

Solutio: Ad hoc dicimus quod in huiusmodi construccione, 'homo animal', est nugacio manifesta ... et hoc est quia in specie intelligitur genus, et propter hoc in 'homine' intelligitur animal

Ista tamen, 'animal homo' et 'coloratum album', possunt sustineri. Dicendum tamen quod in huiusmodi orationibus est inproprietas, et dicitur ibi esse figura que appellatur 'apposicio' siue 'synthesis'. Vnde talis constructio dicitur esse appositiva. Et est figurativa 'animal homo' hac de causa, quia dictio substantiva significat rem suam ut per se stantem: unde uirtus eius est quod non ponit rem suam in alio. Set dictio adiectiva non significat rem suam ut per se stantem, set ponit rem suam in alio: unde ponit rem suam in adiacencia. Quia ergo unio aliquorum est propter dependenciam unius ad alterum, et una dictionum substantiarum non dependet ab altera, patet quod inter huiusmodi dicciones immediate adiunctas non est proprie unio. Et ideo cum dictio substantiva accipiat sicut apponens alii, recipit in illa ordinatione naturam contrariam sue proprie nature, et propter hoc huiusmodi constructio non est propria adeo sicut constructio substantiui cum adiectivo. ... sicut dictum est, 'animal homo' habet inproprietatem, quia li 'homo', quod est substantivum, significatur ut adiacens, et ponitur loco adiectivi, quod est contra suam naturam; hoc autem quod dico, 'animal', ponitur ut per se stans et in ratione substantiui, et hoc est ei proprium. Et sic hec, 'animal homo', habet aliquid proprietatis et aliquid inproprietatis.⁵⁰

Also, in his *Priscianus minor* commentary, Kilwardby says of 'animal homo', '... hoc causat predictum modum soloecismi. Excusatur tamen hec inproprietas per synthesim.'⁵¹ Consistently, then, he holds that while it is superfluous to say, 'homo animal', because the genus is understood in the species, it is a grammatical solecism to say, 'animal homo', because 'homo', a substantive, is used adjectivally, but this impropriety of speech is allowed by the figure called 'synthesis' or 'appositio'. The continuation is thus referring to a position, other than that of Kilwardby, held by the many who say that even 'animal homo' is nugatory, because the order is not of significance. But again Kilwardby may be

⁵⁰ This passage has been edited from six manuscripts: Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek Misc. Astr. 1 (HJ. V. 1), fol. 65rb-va; Basel, Universitätsbibliothek B.VIII.4, fol. 47rb; Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Allgemeinbibliothek Amplon. Q 220, fol. 1va and Amplon. O 10, fol. 50va; Sankt Florian, Augustiner-Chorherren Stift XI.632, fol. 64ra; Zwettl, Zisterzienserstift 338, fol. 135rb. See Jan Pinborg, *Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 42.2: Münster-Copenhagen, 1967), p. 326, 'Repertorium modalistischer Texte (Aq)'.

⁵¹ Oxford, Corpus Christi College ms. 119, fol. 79vb.

in view when *nugatio* is linked with putting the less common before the more common. However, if the continuation is also the work of Kilwardby, it is odd that the position which he elsewhere adopts with confidence in his own right should only be presented as one opinion which is currently held in the schools.

There are small differences of exposition which also distinguish the continuation from Kilwardby's commentary. When Aristotle says, 'ut homo est fortasse et animal et bipes et mansuetum' (20b17), the continuation explains the qualification, 'fortasse', by saying that unity of definition is properly the concern of the metaphysician rather than the logician: '... et dicit, *fortasse* (20b17), quia unitas diffinitionis ad primum philosophum pertinet, et non ad logicum pertinet.'⁵² Kilwardby, on the other hand, says:

Et dicit, *fortasse*, quia si dicam, 'Homo est animal mansuetum bipes', < aut > est ut fiat una affirmacio, < aut > est ut plures. Si enim continue proferantur, est una; si autem discontinue, ita scilicet quod hec predicata tria, 'animal', 'mansuetum', 'bipes', consequenter sint et non coniuncte, sunt affirmaciones plures.⁵³

It is characteristic of Kilwardby to be interested in differences which arise from the speech-act itself, and here he explains the qualification by the difference between continuous and interrupted utterance of the three predicates, rather than by reference to a difference of competence between the logician and metaphysician.

At the end of chapter 11 Aristotle says, 'Quod autem non est, quoniam opinabile est, non est verum dicere esse aliquid; opinatio enim eius non est quoniam est, sed quoniam non est.' (21a32-33) This passage occasions one of the rare instances in which Kilwardby resorts to the technique of verbal analysis known as 'expositio litteralis':

Legatur ergo littera sic: *autem* pro 'quia'; *non est uerum dicere aliquid esse quod non est, quoniam est opinabile; opinacio enim eius*, etc., *est*, scilicet quando aliquando potius ad non esse quam ad esse.⁵⁴

The continuation also has *expositio litteralis* at this point:

Et debet littera sic legi: quod non est uerum dicere ipsum esse, *quoniam est opinabile*, id est non possum dicere de non ente, quia est opinabile, < est >; non enim sequitur, 'Est opinabile, ergo, etc.'⁵⁵

⁵² See below, p. 97 (19-20).

⁵³ M 59ra, P 78vb, V 15r; cf. Albertus Magnus in 2 *Periherm.* 1. 5 (*Opera omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet, I [Paris, 1890], p. 435a).

⁵⁴ M 60rb, V 15v.

⁵⁵ See below, p. 101 (17-20).

Doubtless the intention is the same as in Kilwardby's commentary, but the expression is much clearer. In a note that follows the continuation distinguishes and subdistinguishes the various determinations of subjects by predicates, and offers rules of valid inference from the joined to the divided form with illustrations to accompany the distinctions.⁵⁶ Kilwardby treats the same point but according to a less comprehensive scheme and without illustrations, merely distinguishing between *differentia contrahens* and *distrahens*, and subdistinguishing the latter into *in adiecto* and *secundum accidens*.⁵⁷ The impression grows that the continuation, although it has some archaic features which make it unlikely that it is really in origin a completion of Aquinas' work, is still more developed in its treatment than Kilwardby's commentary.

With regard to chapter 12 the continuation compares and contrasts attributive and modal propositions:

In hoc ergo est similitudo inter illas de inesse et illas de modo, quod sicut in illis de inesse compositio ad subiectum (E 237rb) et ad predicatum apponitur [modus], sic in illis de modo ad compositionem additur. In hoc tamen est differentia, quia in illis de inesse subiectum et predicatum subiciuntur respectu compositionis et compositio apponitur; in illis autem de modo compositio supponitur respectu modi. Vnde sicut ad appositionem addenda est negatio in illis de inesse, sic ad modum in illis de modo

Ipsi autem modi sunt *appositiones*, id est determinationes apposite ad compositionem, dicentes qualiter ex inherencia predicatorum cum subiecto ueritas resultat. Nec est sibi exponendum, modi enim sunt appositiones, id est predicata; non enim modus predicatur, scilicet, quod propositio dicitur modalis.⁵⁸

Kilwardby has a long series of arguments on the same subject at the end of his fifth *lectio*. He concludes:

Ponimus ergo ad presens, sine preiudicio melioris sentencie, modos appositos, id est predicatorum, sicut uult Boetius, potentes determinare compositionem et denominare, determinantes ueritatem et falsitatem in illis de modo, sicut in illis de inesse esse et non esse, que quidem, sine dubio, in hiis sunt predicata; nec sunt aliter determinantes nisi sicut predicata, id est finito modo dicentes.⁵⁹

At this stage of his teaching, although he is open to correction on what is evidently a controverted question, Kilwardby follows Boethius in saying that modes are predicates.⁶⁰ If the continuation is also by Kilwardby, then, better

⁵⁶ See below, p. 101 (21-31).

⁵⁷ M 60vb, V 16r.

⁵⁸ See below, p. 104 (9-15), (24-28).

⁵⁹ M 62rb, V 16v.

⁶⁰ Boethius in *Periherm.*, 2a editio 5. 12 (ed. Meiser, 2. 405-10).

judgment has prevailed, and the arguments rehearsed in the *Perihermeneias* against modes being predicates have finally been accepted as convincing. In any case the treatment in the continuation probably represents a later development, and the final note to this chapter offers a neater handling of material which Kilwardby has treated earlier in his *lectio*, distinguishing modes which affect the composition of the proposition and those which qualify the sense of the verb.⁶¹

Kilwardby treats chapter 13 in a single *lectio*, his sixth on the second book, where the continuation has two *lectiones*, dividing the material. It may be of significance that both have recourse to brief passages of *expositio litteralis* again at the same point (22a32-34), though the actual expositions diverge.⁶² With regard to the necessity of being or not being, the continuation refers to a diagram in the text: 'Ad huius evidenciam < dat > sensibilem figuram in qua ille de "necessario" ponuntur.'⁶³ Kilwardby also refers to it towards the end of his exposition: 'Et dat modum per disposicionem in figura secundum quosdam libros, et secundum quosdam non: nec est multa uis in hoc. Et hoc est, *necesse est esse*, etc. (23a19)'⁶⁴ He shows more critical awareness, once again, about the differences in the manuscript tradition, and the possibility of the diagram being an interpolation in the text, as in fact it is, deriving from Boethius.⁶⁵

There is evidently a crux for the interpreters at the end of the chapter. Aristotle makes a threefold distinction of things which are actual without any potentiality, things which have both actuality and potentiality, and things which are purely potential (23a24-26). Of the second the continuation notes:

Hec littera multipliciter legitur. Vno modo sic: *que* (23a24), scilicet generabilia, sunt *natura priora* (23a24-25), in actu scilicet, et tempore posteriora sunt. Et hoc secundum intencionem nature intelligitur, quia natura per prius intendit actum uniuersalis. < Secundo modo sic >: *que*, scilicet generabilia existencia < in potencia >, sunt natura priora illis existentibus in actu. Et hoc intelligatur secundum processum nature in esse, quia sic precedit potencia actum; illa uero existencia actu sunt tempore posteriora illis existentibus in potencia. Tertio modo legatur, et tunc exponitur *que*, scilicet actus et potencia, ita ut [antequam] domus fabricata prius fuit in potencia antequam fabricaretur, et sic prius secundum tempus est potencia, postea uero actus; sed natura actus est ante potenciam, tempore uero posterior est actus potencia artificio; uel artifex prius in animo percipit formam domus, et sic

⁶¹ See below, p. 105 (15-30).

⁶² M 62va-b, V 16v-17r; see below, p. 106 (25-29).

⁶³ See below, p. 111 (35-36).

⁶⁴ M 63va, V 17v.

⁶⁵ Boethius in *Periherm.*, 2a editio 6. 13 (ed. Meiser, 2. 460).

natura prior est actus potencia, tempore uero posterior. Et hec est expositio Boetii.⁶⁶

Aristotle is understood as saying that things which come to be are prior by nature and posterior in time, either because in the order of intention what is actual is first intended by nature; or because of the order of realization, in which, in the process of nature, what actually exists follows on what is merely potential; or because, as Boethius expounds him, act is naturally prior to potency, and temporally potency is prior to act.

Kilwardby has a question on this passage:

Dubitarur postea super hoc quod dicit quod quedam sunt actu et potestate *que* sunt *natura priora et tempore posteriora*.

Et intelligit quod sint generabilia et corruptibilia, que sunt priora seipsis natura actu, scilicet secundum intencionem nature, quia actus primo intenditur; et sunt posteriora seipsis tempore potestate. Vel li *que* facit suam relacionem ad has dicciones, *actus* et *potencia*: utrumque enim est prius natura altero et posterius tempore. Quod sic patet: actus est prior natura potencie sicut perfectum imperfecto, et potestas est tempore posterius. In illis autem in quibus contingit et actus et potencia, prius natura est potencia, et posterius tempore est actus: sic ergo utrumque est prius natura alio, et tempore posterius. Et sic exponit Boecius. Vel sic: *que*, id est *que* generabilia et corruptibilia existencia potencia sunt priora natura illis existentibus actu; et existencia actu sunt tempore posteriora hiis existentibus in potencia. Et intelligatur in execucione nature. Vel sic: *que* generabilia et corruptibilia sunt priora natura corporibus supracelestibus, et eisdem tempore posteriora, ut dicitur alibi, incipiendum est a primis secundum naturam, id est a metis, secundum quod finis dicitur primum in intencione et prius natura.⁶⁷

Kilwardby appears, thus, to distinguish four interpretations rather than three: the first corresponds to the first of the continuation; the second, with the ascription to Boethius, to the third; the third to the second; the fourth, which explains the priority of things which come to be and pass away with reference to the heavenly bodies, has no counterpart here in the continuation. Although, then, there is a familiarity with the same three readings of the text, and even similarities of expression, there are elements proper to each. The continuation has the example of the house and its designer; Kilwardby places the reading of Boethius second, and has a fourth reading not represented in the continuation. With the commentary literature, in which so much expository and question material is adapted from one work to another, it is hazardous to argue that these agreements argue the direct dependence of one author on another, or the re-

⁶⁶ See below, p. 112 (9-21).

⁶⁷ M 64rb, V 17v.

editing by an author of his own work, but the affinity may still be significant, and suggest that the sources are not far removed from one another.

The continuation ends the treatment of chapter 13 with a discussion of the threefold division which Aristotle makes here, going further than a brief reply at the end of Kilwardby's sixth *lectio* in developing the metaphysics of act and potency in regard to the three orders of reality.⁶⁸ In the final chapter of the *Perihermeneias*, chapter 14, Aristotle says that it is false to judge that opinions are contrary because they are about contraries: to think that good is good, or that bad is bad, may be the same opinion and one that is true, whether more than one, or only one opinion (23b3-6). Expounding this passage, the continuation has the following:

Et tertio, *uera* (23b5), ne quis reprehenderet ipsum in hoc quod dixit quod eadem sunt opinio, corrigit se: dicit quod ad minus sunt *uera* opinio, scilicet similes in ueritate, siue sint eadem opinio, siue non. Vnde non intendit dicere quod sint eadem opinio nisi secundum quid, scilicet in hoc quod sunt similes in ueritate. Vnde litteram Aristotilis ignorant qui sic obuiunt, dicentes quod argumentum indu < c > it Aristotiles, sunt eadem specie, ergo sunt eadem.⁶⁹

Kilwardby has a question on this point in his seventh and final *lectio* of book 2:

Dubitatur postea de hac consequentia: sunt simul *uere*, ergo sunt *eedem*.

Set intellige quod opiniones similes in ueritate sunt *eedem* in specie. Diuiditur enim opinio in opinionem *ueram* et opinionem *falsam*. De duabus quidem opinionibus *ueris* possum dicere quod sunt *eedem* in hac specie opinionis que est opinio *uera*, non tamen *eedem* simpliciter, quia non sunt *eedem* numero. Et est exemplum de *ysoclele* et *scalenen* que sunt *eedem* figura, non tamen *idem* triangulus. Et ualeat consequentia quantum ad hoc quod intendit. Cum autem non accidat contraria esse *eedem* specie, scilicet in hac specie que est opinio *uera*, tum nunquam (M 66ra) contraria sint simul *uera*.⁷⁰

His argument turns on that specific sameness, illustrated here by the isosceles and scalene triangle, which the continuation says betrays ignorance of Aristotle's text. It strains credulity to suppose that the continuation represents Kilwardby rejecting his own earlier position, or that he has quietly adopted in the *Perihermeneias* commentary what he has discounted so strongly in the continuation.

Kilwardby's critical sense has already led him to observe upon the state of the manuscripts, and at 23b27 he notes another interpolation into the text:

⁶⁸ See below, pp. 112 (24)-113 (23); cf. M 64rb, V 17v.

⁶⁹ See below, p. 114 (27-33).

⁷⁰ M 65vb-66ra, V 18v.

Quod uero habetur in quibusdam libris post hanc litteram, hec littera, *Hiis igitur ita positis*, magis dicimus esse expositionem littere precedentis quam litteram in qua continetur aliquid aliud a prius dictis, et propter hoc non est de esse; etsi habeatur in aliquibus libris, est de bene esse.⁷¹

As the critical edition of the Latin Aristotle indicates, this addition to the text is in fact a gloss which draws on Boethius' second commentary.⁷² As with the interpolated diagrams, Kilwardby is alive to the accretions which Aristotle's text has acquired. There is nothing to match this critical awareness in the continuation, and the exposition of the passage, beginning with the lemma, *manifestum est* (23b24),⁷³ gives no indication of whether this Boethian gloss was read as part of the text.

Although some points of agreement have been noted between the continuation and Kilwardby's commentary in the course of this detailed comparison, there is sufficient difference between them to make it implausible that the continuation can simply be a redaction of material excerpted from that commentary. There are also difficulties about accepting it as his work at all. The style of thirteenth-century commentators is generally so impersonal that comparisons are not easy, but the continuation has more in common with Kilwardby's style than, say, with that of Aquinas or Sutton. Certain differences of form have become apparent, not only in the placing of the lemmata before rather than after the sections of the exposition, but also in the replacement of the *dubitaciones*, which are a major part of Kilwardby's treatment, as of much of the university literature of the period, with briefer reflections introduced as notes on the text, a form closer to that adopted by Kilwardby in his more cursory commentary on the *Analytica posteriora*. On minor points of exposition the works differ too, but the continuation shows knowledge of, and even adopts, the positions of Kilwardby in matters of more moment, though sometimes with indications that suggest they are derived from another. The cumulative evidence suggests that the continuation may be excerpted from material which is earlier in date than Aquinas' work, close in time perhaps to Kilwardby's Parisian teaching from around 1240, and influenced by his work.

The author, or editor, does not disclose much of his identity from his exposition, but the late attribution to 'Robertus de Vulgarbia' may preserve a memory of the influence of Kilwardby on his work. The fact that A has

⁷¹ M 65rb, V 18r.

⁷² *De interpretatione vel Periermenias, translatio Boethii*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Aristoteles latinus 2.1-2; Bruges-Paris, 1965), p. 36, *apparatus lectionum* to line 6.

⁷³ See below, p. 116 (18-24).

preserved a fragment of that work in the same hand as the continuous marginal gloss on the *Topica*, elsewhere associated with the name of Elyas, may mean that the two circulated together, and even that they are by the same author, or both come from writers influenced by Kilwardby. Grabmann hesitated over the identity of this Elyas, noting that two masters of this name are mentioned in the *Chartularium* of the University of Paris:⁷⁴ Elias Bruneti, or Brunet, of Bergerac is one of the two Dominicans mentioned in the statute of 2 September 1253 and the 'Helyas' whose name occurs in letters from and to Pope Alexander I in 1255 with regard to the dispute between the Dominicans and the university over the statutory oath;⁷⁵ a 'magister Helyas de Plembosc, rector ecclesie de Ne ... juxta Novum Castrum' is named among a list of masters from 22 May 1279.⁷⁶ The former is an attractive candidate, a Dominican who was lector in the priory of Montpellier in 1246-47 and regent in theology at Paris in 1248-56, where he followed Albertus Magnus in the chair for externs, and was himself followed by Aquinas.⁷⁷ If he had a career in arts at Paris, it may have been in the 1230s, when Kilwardby was already active there. Whether or not this identity can be sustained will depend on a fuller study of the 'Elyas' material, which is beyond the scope of this inquiry. It is quite intelligible that even if he did not compose a continuation of Aquinas' work, earlier material by the master under whom Aquinas incepted might have been drawn upon to complete the exposition of his more distinguished pupil. It is not difficult to appreciate too that in Dominican circles, where Kilwardby's Parisian teaching in arts might be particularly valued, a confusion might arise over the attribution of material from his time, and be attributed to him because of his greater celebrity. The problem his name presented to Italian scribes is all that is then needed to explain the appearance of a 'continuation' of Aquinas ascribed to 'Robertus de Vulgarbia' in the fifteenth century, and the work of Elyas circulated in Italy too.

IV

By contrast, the work of Thomas Sutton, like its author, has a clearly marked identity of its own, despite the conscious imitation of the style of Aquinas. Although it is a fragment, enough has survived to recognise its distinctive

⁷⁴ *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* 3. 149 n. 21.

⁷⁵ *Chart. univ. Paris.*, ed. Denifle and Chatelain, 1. 242 (no. 219), 280 (no. 247), 285 (no. 248), 286 (no. 249), 292 (no. 256).

⁷⁶ *ibid.*, p. 574, no. 489.

⁷⁷ See Thomas Kaeppli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum medii aevi* 1 (Rome, 1970), p. 363 for bio-bibliographical information on this master.

features. From the outset Sutton attaches more importance to the word order of the examples than Kilwardby, so that where, for instance, Kilwardby will reformulate Aristotle's example as 'Homo est iustus',⁷⁸ Sutton preserves the order of the text with 'Est iustus homo'.⁷⁹ He insists on this order, and rejects the analysis of the example which makes 'homo' subject and 'iustus' predicate, supporting his argument not only with the authority of Boethius, but also with Ammonius, a source available to him in compiling his continuation after 1268.⁸⁰ With universal subjects the only opposition he considers is that of contradictories, the universal affirmative of finite predicate being opposed to its contradictory, that of infinite predicate to its contradictory.⁸¹ Arranged in this way, the negatives that can both be true are diagonally opposed to one another.⁸²

Sutton begins a fresh *lectio* with the lemma, 'Quoniam negacio contraria est ei' (20a16).⁸³ Here the assertion that 'Omnis homo est non iustus' can follow from 'Nullus homo est iustus' leads to a lengthy discussion, which is the most interesting part of the fragment. It is first argued that Aristotle is inconsistent, even if he is talking in chapter 7 about indefinite propositions and here, in chapter 10, about universal and singular propositions; also that the inference is invalid, and involves the *fallacia consequentis*.⁸⁴ He then says:

Et totum hoc quidam concesserunt, aliter exponentes literam Aristotilis sic, quod non intendit absolute asserere hanc consequenciam, set solum cum constancia subiecti, ita scilicet quod subiectum accipiatur pro existentibus tantum, et ad hoc denotandum dicens *quod necesse est aliquem esse* (20a23); absolute autem neganda est consequencia, propter hoc quod subiectum in negatiua stat pro pluribus quam in affirmatiua. Et sic locutus est Aristotiles prius, ubi negauit consequenciam affirmatiue de predicato infinito ad negatiuam de predicato finito.⁸⁵

Among those who expound the text of Aristotle in another way, admitting these arguments and invoking a *constantia subiecti* are Kilwardby and the author of the material attributed to Robertus de Vulgarbia. But Sutton goes on to reject their position with some vigour: 'Set si quis inspiciat illud, est penitus impossibile, et ad ipsum multa inconueniencia sequantur.'⁸⁶ It is clear, how-

⁷⁸ M 56vb, P 76vb, V 14v.

⁷⁹ See below, p. 118 (6, 12).

⁸⁰ See below, p. 118 (20-27).

⁸¹ See below, p. 119 (4-12).

⁸² See below, p. 119 (31-37).

⁸³ See below, p. 122 (33).

⁸⁴ See below, pp. 123 (26)-124 (9).

⁸⁵ See below, p. 124 (10-17).

⁸⁶ See below, p. 124 (18-19).

ever, from the arguments which follow that other works are also in view, since the position that is being refuted turns on saying that the subject in a negative proposition stands for more than in an affirmative proposition, and this is not a point which is developed in either Kilwardby's exposition of the *Perihermeneias* or the material attributed to Robertus de Vulgarbia.

Roger Bacon, whose work shows at times the influence of Kilwardby, and who may well have been in Paris with him, refers in his *Sumule dialectices* to the many who say that 'terminus in negativa stat pro ente et non-ente'.⁸⁷ Evidently he approves, and shares the view of Kilwardby rejected by Sutton, since he says:

Patet ergo quod non sequitur ex predicato negato predicatum privatum vel infinitum, quia predicatum negatum est commune enti et non-enti, set alia solum enti. Hoc dico de predicato infinito non de se, cum posset esse commune enti et non-enti, set propter esse affirmatiuum cui apponitur. 'Non esse justum' potest enunciari de vivo et mortuo; possum enim dicere 'Sor non est justus', ponatur quod sit injustus, et possum dicere quod 'Sor mortuus non est justus', set non possum vere dicere quod Sor mortuus est injustus vel non-justus, immo solum de ente predicantur, sic 'Sor est non-justus' 'homo est injustus'; bene dico 'de ente', quia 'Sor' et 'Sor ens' convertuntur, et sic 'homo est injustus', et sic de omnibus aliis.⁸⁸

In the *Summa de sophismatibus et distinctionibus* Bacon discusses whether 'omnis' requires three individuals, and has the following argument and response:

Item, in libro *Peryarmenias* dicit <Aristoteles> quod ad universalem negativam de predicato finito sequitur universalis affirmativa de predicato infinito, posito quod 'aliquis homo sit', set ad existenciam alicujus non sequuntur tria, ergo etc. ... Ad aliud, dicendum est quod per nomen 'hominem' intendit constantiam subjecti, quod quidem sufficit ad retinendum singnum universale supra se.⁸⁹

No exposition of the *Perihermeneias* by Bacon has yet been found, but it is clear from this reply that he would read this passage in the same way as Kilwardby and Robertus de Vulgarbia as implying a *constantia subjecti*.

⁸⁷ *Sumule dialectices magistri Rogeri Bacon*, ed. Robert Steele, *Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi* 15 (Oxford, 1940), p. 283.

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, p. 285.

⁸⁹ *Summa de sophismatibus et distinctionibus*, ed. Steele, *Opera* ... 14 (Oxford, 1937), pp. 144, 145. Bacon's long discussion of whether 'omnis' requires three individuals (pp. 143-49) leads first to the conclusion that it does, but this conclusion is qualified by further questions which lead to the conclusion that taken syncategorematically the three need not be actual. He holds that 'Omnis fenix est' is incongruous because it would suppose three individuals actually existing at present, when there is only one.

In his *Compendium studii theologiae* of 1292 Bacon returned to this question:

Item Aristoteles dicit in libro *Peryermenias* quod a predicato priuatiuo vel a nomine infinito sequitur nomen negatiuum, ut 'est iniustum vel non iniustum, ergo non est <iustum>', licet non e converso Racionalis vero est hec objectio, quam cum sequente inveni ante quadraginta <annos> quando difficultates huiusmodi ventilauit. Dicendum est igitur quod duplici de causa potest intelligi quod non sequitur a negatiuo predicato ad infinitum vel priuatiuum; aut quia terminus subiectus tali predicato negatiuo sumitur commune enti et non enti vniuoce, et hoc est falsum; vel quod subiectum potest equiuoce significare ens & non ens, siue quod subiectus terminus potest esse ens vel non ens; quod in idem redit, quia predicatum est commune enti et non enti propter negacionem esse sub tali predicato, quia negacio plus tollit quam affirmacio affirmet, ut 'non esse iustum'. Propter quod potest dici de Socrate existente quod non est iustus si est iniustus, et de Socrate mortuo quod non est iustus, sed non quod sit iustus. Similiter de homine viuo potest dici quod non sit iustus, si est iniustus; et de homine mortuo quod non est iustus: et ideo si hoc nomen 'homo' vel 'Socrates' sumatur equiuoce pro homine ente et non ente vel Socrates, oracio est multiplex, pro ente et non ente, non vniuoce nec vnica inpositione. Quoniam predicatum necessarium potest verificari de subiecto aliquo ente et de aliquo non ente, nunquam tamen sequitur ex hoc, quod de eodem subiecto et uniuoco predicetur quod sit vniuoce commune enti et non enti, set equiuoce.⁹⁰

More than forty years after his earlier discussion of the matter, Bacon qualifies his position with the insistence that the subject is taken equivocally for what exists and does not exist, but he is still maintaining that negation takes away more than affirmation affirms: negation of the predicate, 'just', may have as its cause not only the lack of that attribute in a subject which exists, but also the non-existence of a subject of that attribute.

At about the same time, two Oxford masters, William Bonkes and John Stycborn, in their questions on the *Perihermeneias* both contend that a negative proposition posits nothing. Bonkes requires as a condition of valid inference from the negative of finite predicate to the affirmative of infinite predicate that there should be *constantia subiecti*, so that the consequent should be less than the antecedent and not greater; Stycborn says it is customary to say that any negative has two causes, an affirmative only one.⁹¹ More than a decade after the

⁹⁰ *Fratri Rogeri Bacon Compendium studii theologiae* 2. 4, ed. H. Rashdall (British Society for Franciscan Studies 3; Aberdeen, 1911, rpt. Farnborough, 1966), pp. 57-58. Rashdall's text has been corrected against microfilm of London, British Library ms. Royal 7.F.vii, fol. 82ra.

⁹¹ 'Si autem sunt tales termini ubi ... non ponitur constantia subiecti in negatiua ... non potest consequentia tenere Solebat dici quod negatiua de sua forma nichil <ponit> Cum consequens debet esse in minus, et non in plus, dico quod non ad omnem negatiuam sequitur affirmatiuam' (Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College ms. 344/540, fol. 189ra-b); '... negatiua nichil ponit; affirmatiua aliquid ponit. Ideo solebat dici quod negatiua propositio quilibet habet duas

Oxford condemnations of 1277, these writers like Bacon are aligned with Kilwardby on the matter at issue in the tenth thesis in logic.

But Sutton rejects the view of those who say that the subject in a negative proposition stands both for what exists and what does not exist, while in an affirmative it stands only for what exists. He maintains himself that it stands for the same in both the negative and the affirmative, whether the predicate is finite or infinite, so that 'iustus' is being denied in 'Nullus homo est iustus' of those of whom it is being affirmed in 'Omnis homo est non iustus' that they are 'non iustus'; to deny one is to affirm the other, so the inference holds. He explains the apparent inconsistency in Aristotle by saying that in one case he is talking about composite, in the other about simple predicates. The contrast, then, that features in his continuation from the beginning between the composite predication, 'est homo iustus', and the simple 'est iustus', becomes crucial for his solution of this crux. Not being a just man does have a wider application than being a man who is not just, because it applies to non-humans as well as humans; not being just has the same application as being not just. He also thinks that 'Omnis homo est non iustus', equally with 'Nullus homo est iustus', has the non-existence of men as a possible cause of its truth. In that case, however, he does not wish to say that the term, 'homo', applies to men who do not exist, but only to those who exist.⁹²

Sutton's commitment to this position is so tenacious that he returns to the matter again in connection with 20a28-30:

Est autem et hic attendendum quod hanc, 'Omnis homo qui est, est non sapiens', affirmatiuam de predicato infinito, Aristotiles uocat contrariam huic, 'Omnis homo est sapiens'; quod non faceret nisi ualet ista, 'Nullus homo est sapiens'. Et ita oportet quod inter istas duas que sunt 'Omnis homo est < non > sapiens', 'Nullus homo est sapiens', sit mutua consequentia, sicut supra exposita est.⁹³

And almost at the end of the fragment, he takes his stand again:

Attendendum est autem quod hic dicit Aristotiles expresse quod idem significat affirmatiua de predicato infinito cum negatiua de predicato finito. Ex quo patet quod contra mentem eius est quod quidam dixerunt, talem negatiuam non inferre talem affirmatiuam.⁹⁴

causas: affirmatiua tantum unam. Ideo consequentia non ualet de forma negatiua in istis terminis 3, "Non est homo, igitur est non homo" (fol. 213rb). See Osmund Lewry, 'The Oxford Condemnations of 1277 in Grammar and Logic' in *Acts of the Fourth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Leiden and Nijmegen, 23-27 April, 1979* (Nijmegen, 1981), forthcoming.

⁹² See below, pp. 125 (32)-127 (23).

⁹³ See below, p. 129 (1-6).

⁹⁴ See below, p. 130 (6-9).

If this was written before 1277, one may have to look no further for the reason for Kilwardby's condemnation of the tenth thesis in logic, and it is among the protagonists of Aquinas among the Oxford Dominicans, such as Sutton, that one would expect to find proponents of the condemned positions. If it was written after 1277, then Sutton shows more temerity than Bonkes and Stycborn, who at the turn of the century still accept the orthodoxy of Kilwardby on this matter. Unless a more complete version of his continuation is found, we shall not know what Sutton held on the other points at issue in the second book of the *Perihermeneias*, whether, for instance, he held 'homo animal' to be nugatory and 'animal homo' a permissible apposition of terms, how he would resolve the question whether 'omnis' requires three individuals. Enough has been found to suggest that in the Oxford condemnations of 1277, besides positions of Aquinas in natural philosophy, those of one of his chief English protagonists may also have been in view among the theses in logic.

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The present edition of the continuation ascribed to Robertus de Vulgarbia has been made from microfilm of the two manuscripts at the Vatican Film Library of Saint Louis University:⁹⁵

Vatican, Urb. lat. 214 (= E), fols. 233rb-241vb

—, Vat. lat. 2115 (= A), fol. 48v.

Since the common text is so short, the orthography of E has been followed. Neither E nor A provides a reliable text: E is often defective in sense, and subject to omissions, and although the stereotyped formulae of the original may have been better preserved there, attempts may have been made at times to improve the Latinity; while A generally offers a more intelligent text, there too there are mistakes and lacunae, and perhaps knowing departures from the form of the original, seemingly in an effort to harmonize the material with the work of Aquinas. In editing this text some of the frequently repeated errors of E, such as 'oportet' for 'probat' and 'oppositio' for 'opinio', have only been noted in the earlier instances of their occurrence, but a fuller apparatus of variants than is usual has been given for the common text, where divergence is sometimes considerable and there was little guidance in choosing readings. The main concern there was to provide an intelligible text, and this has meant some trans-

⁹⁵ Work at the Vatican Film Library was made possible by a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. This study was brought to completion while holding a Research Associate-ship at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto.

position to give a better order to the material, as has been indicated in the apparatus. Although the editor hesitated before attempting to conciliate E and A in the part of the text which is common to both, the attempt has been made, since, despite their divergence at many points, their separate witness is often complementary in a way which might not have been apparent from a presentation of parallel texts.

Thomas Sutton's continuation has been edited from microfilm of the sole manuscript from the same source:

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 16154 (= B), fols. 270vb-271vb.

The orthography of the manuscript has been followed. The slender apparatus attests the superior quality of this text. Capitalization and punctuation have been freely used to point the sense in both editions, and inverted commas have been employed to mark expressions which are adduced by way of example, while lemmata and titles of works have been italicised, and reference made to the text of Aristotle by Bekker numbers. Both continuators use the translation of Boethius rather than that of William of Moerbeke. Sparing emendations have been made to the lemmata in E, where the forms have no support from the critical edition of the *De interpretatione vel Periermeneias*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Aristoteles latinus 2.1-2; Bruges-Paris, 1965) or its apparatus of variants. However, as this edition was not designed to give the vulgate text of thirteenth-century Paris, some allowance has been made for this in emending. In emending, angle brackets have been used to indicate additions to the text made by the editor, square brackets to indicate omissions.

Both editions have profited from personal inspection of the manuscripts themselves. While the text of Robertus de Vulgarbia in E was perfectly legible, that in A was at times obscured by paper patches at points where the parchment had worn thin. By the kindness of Mgr. José Ruyschaert, Vice-Prefect of the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, these patches were removed so that a fuller study of the text could be made under ultra-violet light. Some readings in the edition of Thomas Sutton from B were improved after consulting the manuscript at the Bibliothèque Nationale.

ROBERTI DE VULGARBARIA

< CONTINVACIO EXPOSICIONIS SECVNDI LIBRI PERIARMENIAS ARISTOTILIS >

rb *Similiter autem se habet*, etc. (19b32). In hac parte multiplicat oppositionem
in uniuersalibus, et primo dicit in quo conueniunt uniuersales cum infinitis,
5 quia in multitudine oppositionum. In 2°, *Sed [tantum] non similiter* (19b35),
docet in quo differunt ab infinitis, quia in compossibilitate angulorum et
ordinatarum in figura secundum uniuersale, quia non similiter sunt angulares
uere in uniuersalibus sicut < in > infinitis. Alique tamen angulares simul
va 10 possunt esse uere; et que non, patebit diligenter inspicienti propositiones sub
secunda figura / dispositas. Et debet figura fieri ex quatuor propositionibus,
quarum due superiores sint contrarie uel contradictorie de predicato finito; due
inferiores sint due contrarie uel contradictorie de predicato infinito.

Deinde, *Hee igitur* (19b37), recapitulat, concludens duas esse oppositiones,
quarum una est in uniuersalibus et alia in infinitis, uel quarum una est de
15 predicato finito, alia de predicato infinito.

Sequitur illa pars, *alie uero* (19b37), in qua multiplicat oppositionem et in hiis
in quibus sumitur subiectum < in > finitum et predicatum infinitum. Dicit ergo
quod alie enuntiationes a predictis habent aliquid additum ut predicatum ad id
quod [non] est 'non homo', quasi ad subiectum; hoc est alie de subiecto infinito.
20 Et dicit, *quasi ad subiectum* (19b37), quia nomen infinitum non est uere
subiectum in potissima enuntiatione et prima.

Deinde, ne reprehenderetur ex insufficiencia oppositionum, subiungit, *Magis
autem*, etc. (20a1).

Deinde, *hee autem extra illas* (20a1-2), comparat enuntiationes de subiecto
25 finito, dicens quod hee sunt extra illas quantum ad consequentiam et
oppositionem; inter se tamen habent consequentiam, ut inferius declarabitur.

In his uero in quibus, etc. (20a3). Hic incipit multiplicare oppositionem in hiis
in quibus sumitur aliud uerbum ab hoc uerbo, 'est', et diuiditur in duo. In prima
dicit quod similiter oppositio multiplicatur si aliud uerbum ab hoc uerbo, 'est',

1-2 Huc usque scripsit sanctus Thomas de Aquino Ordinis Predicatorum. Ea uero que
secuntur scripsit frater Robertus de Uulgarbia Ordinis eorundem Predicatorum. *rubr.* E
5 similiter] uniuersaliter E 7 uniuersale] -sali E similiter] simpliciter E sunt] non
E 9 propositiones] -nem E 11 predicato] predicamento E 13 Hee igitur] igitur
hee E recapitulat] -lant E 28 aliud] ad E 29 aliud] aliquid E

in enuntiatione ponatur, et explicat per exempla. In secunda, *non enim dicendum* (20a7), quia aliquis diceret plures esse oppositiones penes hoc quod signum posset infinitari, quasi responso quod signum non debet infinitari, dicit quod negacio non est addenda ad signum. Quod probat cum dicit, '*omnis*' enim
 5 *non uniuersaliter* (20a9): quod significat rem secundum modum rei, debet infinitari; sed '*omnis*' <non> est huiusmodi, quia significat quoniam /
 E 233vb *uniuersaliter*, ergo, etc. Huius rationis primo ponit minorem. Secundo, *manifestum est autem* (20a10), probat, ostendens quod solum significat uniuersaliter, sic: iste [iste] due propositiones, '*Homo currit*', '*Homo non currit*',
 10 *non differunt ab istis*, '*Omnis homo currit*', '*Nullus homo currit*', nisi in eo quod est uniuersaliter; sed differunt per signum: ergo signum significat quoniam uniuersaliter. Huius rationis primo ponit maiorem obscure; secundo, *hee enim* (20a12), ponit medium sue rationis; 3°, *quare 'omnis'*, etc. (20a12), concludit; quarto, *ergo et cetera* (20a14), concludit correlarium, sic: ita non
 15 differunt predictae propositiones nisi in eo quod est uniuersaliter, ergo omnia alia a signo oportet esse eadem.

A 48v Et sequitur illa pars, *Quoniam uero contraria* (20a16), in qua uerificat quedam circa uniuersales de subiecto finito, et diuiditur in duas partes. In prima uerificat quoddam quantum ad oppositionem. In secunda, cum dicit, *Sequitur*
 20 *uero eam* (20a20), uerificat aliud quantum ad consequentiam. Quia ergo dictum est superius quod non similiter contingit angulares uerificari in uniuersalibus et in indefinitis, ad huius uerificationem docet que possunt simul esse uere et que non. Dicit enim quod contrarie non possunt simul esse uere, et ideo dictum est superius, angulares non contingit simul esse ueras, scilicet contrarias, sub-
 25 contrarie possunt simul esse uere aliquando; et dicit, *aliquando* (20a19), quia in naturali materia non possunt, nec in remota.

Vel potest hec pars continuari ad id quod immediate antecedit, quia supra aliquantulum fecit mentionem de uniuersalibus et de indefinitis, dicens quod non differunt nisi in signo. Set ut ne crederetur quod non differrent in ueritate,

20-22 19b35-36

23-24 19b35-36

27-29 20a12

5 non uniuersaliter] nichil E	10 differunt] -fert E	17 Et] tunc A	contraria]
-riam E	qua] quantum E	18 quedam] quoddam A	finito] finite E
partes] duo E	19 quoddam] quandam E	cum dicit om. E	20 aliud] quoddam
add. A: ad E	ergo om. A	21 contingit] sunt A	uerificari] uere A
22 indefinitis] definitis E, corr. A	huius] hoc E	esse simul E	23 Dicit enim quod
om. E	post contrarie add. enim E	simul esse uere om. E	24 contingit om. E
scilicet contrarias om. E	26 nec in remota] simul esse uere A	27 Vel potest] posset	
autem E	ad id] ei E	27-28 supra ... fecit] immediate facit E	28 de ² om. A
29 Set ... crederetur] crederet aliquis E		post ueritate add. et E	

hoc remouet dicens quod contrarie non possunt simul esse uere, set contrarie bene possunt simul esse uere.

<Secundo,> *Sequitur uero eam* (20a20), <***> et quia non dixerat superius de consequentia siue conueniencia istarum enuntiationum, nunc uero
 5 docet consequentiam illarum, dicens quod ad negatiuam de predicato finito sequitur affirmatiua de predicato infinito, et ad oppositum antecedentis sequitur
 10 / oppositum consequentis. Et quia ex negatiua non sequitur affirmatiua nisi supponatur constancia subiecti, subiungit, *necesse est enim aliquem* (20a23); hoc est ad hoc quod ex negatiua sequatur affirmatiua, oportet ponere constan-
 15 ciam subiecti debitam. Et dico, 'debitam', quia si ex negatiua debuit inferre uniuersalis affirmatiua, oportet ponere constanciam subiecti cum tribus appellatis. Et hoc dixi, quia a littera quidam arguunt quod 'omnis' non exigit tria appellata.

Et sequitur illa pars, *Manifestum est autem quoniam* (20a23-24), in qua
 15 remouet quosdam errores qui possunt incidere ex predictis, et diuiditur in quatuor partes penes quatuor errores: in prima remouet primum; in secunda, secundum; et sic deinceps. Et primus error qui posset incidere est ex ordina-
 20 tione negationis negantis, quia posset aliquis credere quod similiter ordinatur negatio in uniuersalibus sicut et in singularibus. Posset aliquis credere quod similiter posset respondere ad interrogacionem uniuersalem sicut ad interroga-
 cionem singularem. Vnde hoc remouet, dicens quod non eodem modo respondetur ad uniuersale sicut et ad particulare. Vnde dicit quod si uerum est in singularibus interrogatum negare de predicato finito, et uerum est ipsum affirmare de predicato infinito cum constancia subiecti, ut 'Putasne Socrates

1 hoc] hic E dicens] dubium E set om. E 2 bene om. E simul esse uere]
 et contrarie add. A: om. E 3 Sequitur uero eam transp. infra A: om. E et om. A non
 dixerat] nichil dixit E 4 siue conueniencia istarum om. E enuntiationum]
 uniuersalium E nunc uero om. E 5 consequentiam] causam A illarum om. A
 dicens] dicit E 6 sequitur ... infinito om. A oppositum] oppositionem E 7 Et om.
 A 7-8 nisi supponatur] nisi non supponeretur E 8 subiecti om. A post subiungit
 add. dicens A est] et E enim om. A aliquem om. E 9 quod es negatiua] ut ad
 negatiuam E affirmatiua] affirmacio E oportet ponere] supponere E
 10 debuit inferre] sequatur A 11 subiecti om. E 11-12 cum tribus appellatis] ut tribus
 appellatis E: et appellacionem A 12 quia ... quidam] quia ... quidem E: ita A arguunt]
 dicunt E 13 appellata]-latiua E 14 Et om. A sequitur om. E est om. E
 autem om. A quoniam] *** Sequitur uero eam tunc add. A: om. E in qua om. A
 15 quosdam om. E qui possunt] potentes E incidere] incedere A et] cum E
 16 partes om. E 16-17 in prima ... deinceps om. A 17 post Et del. primum A Et
 primus error] primum errorem E qui ... incidere] qui ... incedere (post incedere del. penes)
 A: om. E est] quod E 18 negationis] -tione E negantis om. A posset] sic
 incidere add. E aliquis credere] crederet aliquis E 18-19 ordinatur negatio]
 ordinaretur necessario E 19 uniuersalibus ... singularibus] singularibus et uniuersalibus
 differenter E post aliquis del. responso A 19-22 Posset ... Vnde om. E 22 dicit]
 igitur add. E quod corr. A 22-23 si ... negare] in singularibus si uerum est negare
 interrogatum E 23 de predicato finito om. A et uerum] manifestum E est]
 quoniam corr. A ipsum] est corr. A: om. E 24 de ... subiecti om. A 24-p. 94, l.
 6 'Putasne ... est] si

sapiens est?', et respondatur, 'Non', uerum erat affirmare quoniam Socrates sapiens non est. Quod non est uerum in uniuersalibus, quia si in uniuersalibus uerum est interrogatum negare, non propter hoc est uerum ipsum affirmare; quia si queratur, 'Putasne omnis homo sapiens est?', uerum est negare quoniam
 5 non, igitur non erat uerum ipsum negatiuum affirmare, ut dicatur, 'Ergo omnis homo non sapiens est'.

In uniuersalibus uero (20a26). Hic docet qualiter se habeat negatio in uniuersalibus, dicens quod si uerum est interrogatum negare de predicato finito, non propter hoc uerum est affirmare de predicato infinito, uel non propter hoc est
 10 postponenda sed opponenda, et tunc equipollet contradictorie negatiue, ut si queratur, 'Estne omnis homo sapiens?', et dicatur, 'Non', non propter hoc contingit inferre, 'Ergo omnis homo non est sapiens', sed potius inferenda est contradictoria, scilicet, 'Non omnis homo est sapiens'. Ex quo patet quod differt preponere et postponere negationem in uniuersalibus, et ita etiam differunt in
 15 singularibus preponere et postponere negationem. Et causa huius est quod singulare est indiuisibile dicte artis, que fit per partes subiectiuas, quamuis sit diuisibile per partes integrales; et quod est indiuisibile uno solo modo potest negari, scilicet secundum totum, eo quod non habet partes: et ideo non differt, etc. Vniuersale uero, eo quod est diuisibile, potest destrui uel secundum totum
 20 uel secundum partem, et hoc per negationem prepositam et postpositam: et ideo in hiis differt preponere, etc.

Et sequitur illa pars, *Ille uero secundum infinita* (20a31), in qua remouet quemdam errorem qui posset incidere ex negatione infinitante. Et primo ponit errorem, dicens quod ille dictiones contraiacentes, que sunt infinita nomina et
 25 uerba, uidebuntur esse negatiue enuntiationes sine uerbo appposito, eo quod aliquid ab aliquo uidetur remoueri in talibus. Et dicit, *contraiacentes* (20a31), quia non sunt uere et complete contradicentes.

uerum est dicere quod Sortes non est sapiens, uerum est dicere quod non est sapiens, et ita etiam differunt in singularibus, etc., ut infra, p. 14-21 E post Putasne del. Sor.sa. A 7 uero] uere A Hic om. E 9 uerum om. A infinito uel non propter hoc haud leg. A 9-10 est ... negatiue] danda (E 234rb) negacio contraria, negationem postponendo, sed contradictoria, negationem preponendo E 11 non propter hoc om. E 12 post Ergo add. non A omnis ... potius haud leg. A potius inferenda] post inferendo E 13 est sapiens] sapiens est A differt] -fertur E 14 preponere] proponere A 14-21 et ita ... etc.] transp. supra (uide app. p. 93 [24] E: om. A 15 huius] hoc E 16 dicte] dictis E subiectiuas] subiectas E 21 differt] -fertur E 22 Et ... pars] deinde cum dicit A Ille] illa A secundum infinita om. E 22-23 in ... errorem haud leg. A 23 quemdam] patet E qui posset] potentem E Et primo] Primo ergo E 24 dictiones] enuntiationes A contraiacentes] contradicentes E et] uel E 25 sine] scilicet non nomine et A appposito eo] respondeo A 26 ab] de E uidetur om. E remoueri] remouere A dicit] dicitur E contraiacentes] contradicentes E 27 uere et om. E contradicentes corr. ex contraiacentes A

Deinde, cum dicit, *sed non sunt* (20a33-34), remouet istum errorem, ostendens quod nomina infinita non sunt negatiue enuntiaciones hac ratione: omnis negacio est uera uel falsa de aliquo; sed qui dicit, 'non homo', si non aliquid addat, non est uerus uel falsus sensus de aliquo, quia nec de homine, nec
 5 de aliquo alio: sed minus est uerus de homine quam de alio, quia hominem destruit, igitur nomen infinitum non est negatio. Huius rationis primo ponit conclusionem; secundo adiungit maiorem, cum dicit, *semper enim* (20a34); tercio uero ponit minorem, cum dicit, *qui uero dixit* (20a35).

Et sequitur pars tertia, *Significat autem 'est omnis'* (20a37), in qua remouet
 10 tertium errorem qui posset incidere ex comparatione enuntiationum de subiecto infinito ad illas que sunt de subiecto finito, et in hoc exponitur illud uerbum superius dictum, *hee uero extra illas*, etc. (20a1-2). Dicit ergo quod enuntiatio de subiecto infinito, ut 'Non homo est iustus', non significat idem, hoc est nec antecedit nec consequitur ad illam de subiecto finito. Enuntiaciones
 15 tamen de subiecto infinito inter se habent consequentiam, quia ista, 'Omnis non homo est / non iustus', significat idem cum hac, 'Nullus non homo est iustus',
 a et antecedit ad illam et consequitur cum constancia subiecti.

Et sequitur pars, *Transposita uero nomina* (20b1), in qua remouet quartum errorem, qui posset incidere ex diuersa uariacione nominum uel uerborum, sic:
 20 crederetur ab aliquo quod nominum transposicio parat diuersas enuntiaciones sicut diuersa negationis ordinatio in uniuersalibus. Vnde hoc remouet, dicens quod nomina et uerba transposita non faciunt diuersas enuntiaciones sicut diuersa ordinatio negationis. Vnde uerba uel nomina transposita idem significant, nec diuersificant enuntiaciones.

25 Deinde, *nam si hoc non est* (20b3), quod iam apposuit ostendit, ducens ex eius opposito ad inconueniens, sic: transposito nomine diuersificatur enuntiatio;

1 cum dicit *om. E* 1-2 istum ... ostendens *haud leg. A* 2 hac] huius *E* 3 de aliquo *sed om. E* 4 uerus ... quia] uerum uel falsum de aliquo in dicendo *E* 5 aliquo *om. E* post alio¹ *add. alia manu* affirmat uel negat *A* uerus] uerum *E* 7 adiungit ... enim] semper enim adiungit maiorem *E* 8 uero ponit ... dixit] qui uero dixit ponit minorem *E* 9 Et ... tertia] consequenter cum dicit *A* est omnis *om. E* in qua *om. A* 10 qui posset] potentem *E* enuntiationum] negationum *E* 11 que sunt *om. A* exponitur] exponit *E* 12 etc. *om. A* 13 enuntiatio] -ciones *A* homo *om. E* 14 hoc est *om. A* consequitur] sequitur *E* illam] nullam *A* de *om. E* Enuntiaciones *om. A* 15 de subiecto infinito *om. A* non *om. A* 16 est?] non *add. A* 17 et ... illam *om. A* consequitur] sequitur *E* 18 Et sequitur pars] deinde cum dicit *A* nomina] etc. *E* in qua *om. A* 19 posset ... uerborum] ex ordinatione terminorum posset incidere *E* 19-21 sic ... uniuersalibus *om. A* 21 negationis ordinatio] negationis ordinationis *E* Vnde hoc] hic *E* 21-22 dicens ... et *haud leg. A* 22-23 non ... transposita *om. E* 23 uel *corr. ex et A* 24 diuersificant enuntiationes] enuntiationes diuersificant *E* 25 Deinde *om. A* est] hic declarat *add. A* ostendit ducens] dicens *A*: dicens ostendit *E* 26 opposito] -tione *E* ad inconueniens] *** *A* transposito nomine diuersificatur enuntiatio] transpositio nominum diuersificat enuntiationes *E*

unius affirmacionis erunt plures negationes. Sed consequens est falsum, ut ostensum est in primo libro, igitur antecedens. Primo ponit conditionalem; secundo, *sed ostensum est* (20b4), destruit consequentem; 3°, *eius enim* (20b4), uerificat suam probacionem, scilicet quod unius enuntiacionis non sint plures 5 negationes.

Dicit ergo quod ista est una affirmacio, 'Est albus homo', cuius negatio est ista, 'Non est albus homo'; et hec est alia affirmacio secundum aduersarios, 'Est homo albus': aut igitur eadem est negatio istius affirmationis et precedentis, aut est alia. Si est eadem, tunc illa negatio est duarum affirmationum, quod non 10 conuenit. Si autem est alia negatio, aut ergo erit ista, 'Non homo non est albus', aut, 'Non est homo albus'. Non prima, quia illa est negacio istius, 'Non homo est albus', sed secunda, scilicet, 'Non est homo albus', est negatio prime affirmationis, scilicet, 'Est albus homo'. Et hanc supponit, sed in hoc uidetur petere principium; non tamen petitur, quia iste negationes, 'Non est albus homo', 'Non 15 est homo albus', idem predicant de eodem subiecto negatiue, quare eius cuius est una negatio et altera, et est quasi una negatio. Et ita sic dicte negationes sunt due, et sic unius affirmationis due erunt negationes, quod est impossibile: E 234vb / quare ille negationes non sunt diuerse, ergo nec affirmationes erunt diuerse propter nominum transpositionem. Vnde solutio argumenti est ista: negationes 20 sunt eedem, ergo et affirmationes.

Deinde, cum dicit, *Quoniam igitur transposito* (20b10-11), concludit conclusionem suam. Et notandum quod cum dicit, *Transposita*, etc. (20b1), intelligendum est de nominibus et uerbis, et non de aduerbiis, scilicet quorum officium in preponendo et postponendo uariatur. Hoc dico propter negationem. 25 Hoc autem quod dicit, *affirmatio et negatio* (20b12), intelligendum est de

1-2 c. 7, 17b37

1 consequens] hoc A 2 ostensum ... libro] patet ex dictis principio libri E igitur] cum E antecedens] etc. A 2-3 Primo ... 3° om. A 3 consequentem] consequens E enim] hic add. A 4 uerificat suam probacionem *haud leg. A* 4-6 suam ... ista] consequentiam sic hec E 7 hec om. E aduersarios] aduersarium E 8 albus ... igitur *haud leg. A* precedentis] scilicet add. A 9 est^{1,2} om. E illa negatio] una non E 10 ergo] igitur E erit] est E 11 illa om. A 12 scilicet] hoc add. E est³] et E 13 Et hanc supponit om. A sed] et E 14 principium A (add. *alia manus*) petitur] petit E homo om. A 15 predicant] predicatum E eodem] eo E negatiue] negant E 15-16 quare ... altera om. A 16 et est ... negatio om. E ita om. A 17 sic] si E erunt negationes] negationes erunt unius affirmationis E est om. A 19-20 Vnde ... affirmationes om. E 20 eedem] eadem A 21 cum dicit om. E transposito] -sita A: om. E concludit] -clutit E 22 suam om. E notandum] nondum E etc. om. A 23 de'] idem A uerbis] uniuersalibus E et non de aduerbiis om. A scilicet om. E 24 preponendo] supponendo A uariatur] -atum A Hoc ... negationem om. A 25 Hoc autem ... negatio om. E est] autem add. E

cathegoreumatibus et non de sincathegoreumatibus, quia in preponendo et postponendo dictiones sincathegoreumaticas multociens fit uariacio in enuntiacione. Et intelligendum est iterum de transpositione uocali secundum easdem habitudines, et non tamen uocali secundum constructionem. Intelligendum est
 5 uero de transpositione uocali et non de transpositione in modo intelligendi, et sic excluduntur omnes enuntiaciones secundum compositionem et diuisionem, et sic etiam excluditur hec instancia, quia bene dicitur, 'animal homo', secundum quosdam, nugatorie tamen, 'homo animal', quia in hoc exemplo simul cum transpositione uocali modus intelligendi uariatur.

10 *At uero unum de pluribus*, etc. (c. 11, 20b12-13). Manifestauit oppositionem et consequentiam in enuntiationibus que sunt une; hic docet consequentiam in enuntiationibus que sunt plures, et diuiditur in duas. In prima docet que est enunciacio plures: dicit quod in affirmando unum de pluribus et plura de uno, ex quibus pluribus non fit unum, non est enunciacio una. Et hoc declarat cum
 15 dicit, *Dico autem* (20b15), declarans ex quibus pluribus fit enuntiacio plures, et ex quibus non fit. Si non sit unum nomen impositum, nec etiam ex pluribus fiat unum, tunc non est enuntiacio una, siue de istis aliquid enuncietur, siue etiam
 ra ista de aliquo predicantur. Si autem / ex pluribus fiat unum, ut ex homine et animali et mansueto, fit unum fortasse, et dicit, *fortasse* (20b17), quia unitas
 20 diffinitionis ad primum philosophum pertinet, et non ad logicum pertinet.

In secunda parte, *Si igitur dialetica* (20b22), concludit duas conclusiones capitales ex predictis; quia neque ex iam predictis patet que est interrogacio plures, probat que interrogacio dyaletica plures duabus rationibus. Prima est talis: dyaletica interrogacio est peticio unius responsionis; sed interrogacio
 25 plures non est peticio unius responsionis, igitur, etc. Huius rationis primo ponit maiorem, et declarat eam cum dicit, *uel propositionis* (20b23), sic: dialetica interrogacio est peticio proposicionis, id est affirmationis, uel alterius partis contradictionis, id est negationis, que contradictionem complet; sed peticio est unius proposicionis in hac contradictione una, ergo dialetica interrogacio est
 30 peticio unius responsionis.

1 cathegoreumatibus] propositionibus *add. A* 1-2 preponendo ... dictiones] propositione
 et postpositione dictionum *E* 2 sincathegoreumaticas] sincathegoreumaticarum *E*: *om. A*
 2-3 enuntiacione] oratione *E* 3 Et *om. E* secundum] solum *E* 3-4 easdem
 habitudines *om. E* 4 non ... constructionem] sic excluduntur orationes in quibus est trans-
 posicio uocalis et etiam 2^m conclusionem *E* 4-5 Intelligendum est uero de] *haud leg. A*: et
 est intelligendum est uerum de *E* 5 non *om. E* 6 omnes enuntiaciones] orationes *E*
 et] uel *A* 7 et] set *A* quia] que *E* 7-8 secundum quosdam *om. A* homo
 ... quia *haud leg. A* homo] hoc *E* 10 unum de pluribus *om. A* etc.] *hic desinit A*
 16 fit] sit *E* 21 concludit *corr. ex* concluditur *E* 22 capitales] corporale *E*
 23 probat que] oportet quod *E* 28 peticio] proposicio *E* 29 proposicionis] -sio *E*
 hac contradictione] hoc contradictio *E*

Deinde, *nec interrogacio* (20b25), adiungit minorem principalem, concludit *At uero unum* (20b12), <et> ponit aliam rationem ad idem, talem: dyaletica interrogacio <non> est una sub interrogacione plures; quamuis modo sit uera, non una, ut dictum est in [2^o] *Thopicis* (20b26), hoc est in 2^o *Elenchorum*.
 5 Huius rationis solum ponit minorem.

Et sequitur illa pars, *Similiter autem manifestum est* (20b26), in qua aliam conclusionem concludit. Quia iam ostensum quod interrogatio plures non est interrogacio dyaletica, ideo incidenter probat quod questio, 'Quid?', non est questio dyaletica hac ratione: dyaletica interrogacio utramque partem contra-
 10 dictionis querit, et causa huius est quia dyaleticus habet argumenta ad contraria, et in tali questione debet respondens eligere utramque uelut contradictionis partem; non sic autem est in questione, 'Quid?', ergo questio, 'Quid est?', non est questio dyaletica. Huius rationis primo ponit conclusionem; deinde, *oportet enim* (20b27), ponit maiorem.

E 235rb 15 Et sequitur / illa pars, *Quoniam uero hec* (20b31), in qua docet consequentiam enuntiationum plurium. Et non docet earum oppositionem, quia oppositio non est proprie nisi inter eas que sunt une. Docet autem consequentiam unius ex pluribus et plurium ex uno, et non plurium ex pluribus, quia per se intendit in hoc libro de enuntiatione una: ideo omnis
 20 consequentia quam docet uel est unius enuntiationis, uel in comparatione ad unam.

Diuiditur ergo hec pars in duas: in prima docet ex quibus diuisis contingit inferre coniunctum, sic docens consequentiam unius ex pluribus; in 2^a, *uerum autem est dicere* (21a18-19), ex quibus coniunctis conuenit inferre diuisim, sic
 25 docens plurimi ex uno. Prima in duas: in prima probat quod non ex omnibus diuisis conuenit inferre coniunctum; in 2^a, *quoniam alterutrum* (20b36), docet ex quibus conuenit, et ex quibus non. Primum probat per exemplum, proponens diuisionem hanc, *eorum que predicantur extra* (20b32), id est diuisim, quedam predicantur coniunctim, quedam non, et quedam differentia
 30 inter sic et sic predicantur ex diuidendis.

Deinde, *De homine enim*, etc. (20b33), explanat <que> diuiduntur, docens que diuisa predicantur coniunctim per duo exempla; et etiam que diuisa non predicantur coniunctim docet cum dicit, *sed non sequitur si*, etc. (20b35).

4 Arist., *De soph. elench.* 175b40-176a6

1 nec] hec E	2 At] aut E	unum] unam E	3 interrogacione] -gacio E
modo sit] modi suprascripti (?) E	4 hoc] hec E	Elenchorum] ergo etc. E	6 autem
... est] manifestum autem est corr. ex manifestum est autem E			8 probat] oportet E
10 huius] hec E	12 Quid!] quidem E	18 uno] non E	19 pluribus] -rium E
23 consequentiam] -cia E	25 probat] oportet E (et sic passim !)		ex ²] est E
26 quoniam alterutrum] quare ad autem E	30 predicantur] -cata E		31 explanat]
-neant E			

Consequenter, *Si enim, quoniam* (20b36), probat idem per rationem, scilicet quod non ex omnibus diuisis conuenit inferre coniunctum, dicens quod si omnia diuisa conuenit coniungere, multa sequatur inconueniencia, scilicet infinitas ex parte rei et nugatio ex parte sermonis.

- 5 Deinde, *De homine albo uerum est dicere et 'hominem'* (20b37-38), ducit ad inconuenienciam, et primo ad infinitatem sic: si aliquid est homo et albus, est homo albus, et hoc bene tenet; sed si ex omnibus diuisis conuenit inferre
 5va coniuncta, de homine possum dicere, quoniam est homo / et est albus, et sic est homo albus, quod et sic <in> infinitum. Et ponit aliud exemplum, *et rursus*,
 10 etc. (20b40), quod non differt nisi in multitudine terminorum, quia in hoc sunt tres termini, in priori autem duo.

- Deinde, *hec eadem* (21a1), innuit deducendo ad nugationem, et primo ad explicitam, scilicet quando uocaliter bis idem ponitur. 2º, *Amplius si* (21a2), ducit ad nugationem implicitam sic: si Socrates est homo et bipes, est homo [et]
 15 bipes per predictam ypothesim, et hec est nugatio implicita, quia bipes intelligitur in homine. Deinde concludit, *Quoniam ergo, si quis* (21a5).

- Et sequitur illa pars in qua probat ex quibus diuisis conuenit inferre unum coniunctum, et ex quibus non, et diuiditur in duas penes duas regulas. Secundam ponit ibi, *Amplius uero nec* (21a16). Prima talis est: quandocumque
 20 duo predicata predicantur de tercio accidentaliter, nisi unum sit materiale respectu alterius, uel si unum predicatum predicatur accidentaliter de altero, non conuenit a diuisis ad <con> iuncta procedere. Primo ponit istam regulam; 2º, *ut homo est albus* (21a10), declarat primam partem; 3º, *Nec si album* (21a12), declarat 2ªm; quarto, *Quocirca nec conuenit* (21a14), exemplificat
 25 regulam que diuisa possunt [que talis est] coniungi [non], et que non.

- Et sequitur illa pars, *Amplius nec* (21a16), in qua ponit secundam regulam: si aliqua 2º, scilicet predicata, quorum unum in altero intelligitur, nec conuenit diuisa coniungere. Etiam hec regula dupliciter potest intelligi: uel uniuersaliter, quocumque modo ordinentur predicata, quorum unum in altero intelligitur, et
 30 secundum sic exponentes est hec nugatio, 'animal homo'; et sic e conuerso, quod multi concedunt, dicentes quandocumque unum in altero intelligitur actu ex ordinatione illorum ad inuicem, significat nugatio. Vnde, cum nomen
 5vb generis actu in nomine speciei intelligitur, est hic nugatio, 'animal homo'. / Et hoc etiam dicit Commentator super vii *Prime philosophie*, ubi exponit

34 Averroes in 7 Met. (1030b28-1031a1), c. 4 text. 18 (Venice, 1574), 8. 167H.

1 quoniam] quantum E	3 inconueniencia] in consequencia E	6 inconuenienciam]
-cia E	et²] est E	8 quoniam] quantum E
10 differt] -fertur E	14 Socrates]	
lapis E	15 ypothesim] ypostasim E	24-25 exemplificat regulam] ex regula E
27 altero] alterum E	33 intelligitur] -guntur E	34 etiam dicit] exedit E

Aristotilem loquentem de diffinitione accidencium. In hominis autem diffinitione non intelligitur nomen generis nisi potencialiter, ideo non est hec nugacio, 'animal rationale'.

Et aliter potest intelligi regula, si unum in altero intelligatur: si magis commune preponitur, bene conuenit coniungere, ut 'Est animal et est homo, ergo est animal homo'; si uero minus commune preponatur, non conuenit coniungere, sed est nugacio si dicam, 'homo animal'. Et sic exponendo, dicemus hic esse nugationem, 'homo animal', et non hic, 'animal homo', quia nugatio si peccat in ordine. Vnde, cum ordo minus commune ad magis sit taliter quod magis commune preponatur, < conuenit coniungere >; unde, si minus commune preponitur, est peccatum in ordine. Et de hoc non modicam philosophiam perscrutant siue faciebant. In hac regula sic procedit: primo ponit; secundo, *quare neque album* (21a16), per illam regulam docet uitare predictum exemplum.

Ad euidenciam predictorum notandum quod quando duo predicantur de tertio diuisim, aut ergo utrumque est substancialie, aut utrumque accidentale, aut unum substancialie et aliud accidentale. Si utrumque substancialie, aut ergo sunt in eque, et tunc, quia unum in altero intelligitur, non conuenit diuisa coniungere; aut unum est amplius, reliquum in minus, et hoc dupliciter, quia aut magis commune preponitur, et tunc non conuenit diuisa coniungere, aut minus commune preponitur, et tunc non conuenit, per secundam regulam in littera. Si autem utrumque sit accidentale, aut ergo unum est materiale respectu alterius, aut non. Si primo modo, conuenit, ut 'Est quantum, et est quale, ergo est quantum quale'; si secundo modo, non conuenit diuisa coniungere. Si autem unum essenziale et aliud accidentale, tunc conuenit diuisa coniungere.

Et / sequitur illa pars, *Verum est autem dicere* (21a18-19), in qua docet ex quibus coniunctis conuenit ad diuisa procedere, et diuiditur in duas. In prima docet quod ex aliquibus conuenit, et ex aliquibus non, dicens quod uerum est dicere de aliquo simpliciter et diuisim quod prius dictum est coniunctim, sed non semper. In secunda, *sed quando in adiecto* (21a21), docet quando sic et quando non, et diuiditur in duas penes duas regulas. Prima talis est: in quocumque opposito adiectum habet oppositionem uel contradictionem cum eo cui addicitur, non conuenit a coniuncto ad diuisa procedere. Illam regulam primo ponit; deinde, *ut hominem mortuum* (21a23), exemplificariter declarat

1 hominis] nomine E 2 diffinitione] dicere E potencialiter] potest E
 5 preponitur] proponitur E 9 si] sicut E 12 philosophiam perscrutant] philosophie
 per scrutatore E sic] si E 13 ponit] potest E 13-14 uitare predictum exemplum]
 iurare predictam existenciam E 20 post aut² del. alicam E 23 aut] ut E
 29 coniunctim] -tum E 30 In] si E 33 a coniuncto] adiuncta E
 34 exemplificariter] ex naturaliter E

eam, adiungens quod quando non est talis oppositio, conuenit sic procedere, aliquando conuenit quando uero non est.

Ponit 2^{am} regulam, que talis est quod quodcumque predicatum est coniunctum ex aliquo sumpto secundum accidens, uel ex aliqua differencia
5 diminuenta uel indifferenter se habente, non contingit a coniuncto ad diuisa procedere. Hanc regulam primo ponit, et < 2^o > eam declarat.

Deinde, *Quare in quantiscumque* (21a29), resumit uirtutem utriusque oppinando, et dicit quod in quibuscumque predicamentis nulla est oppositio adiecti cum eo cui addicitur, conuenit a coniunctis ad diuisa procedere. Et dat
10 artem ad cognoscendum, dicens, *si diffinitiones pro nominibus reddantur* (21a29-30), patebit si aliqua fuerit contrarietas in nominibus, quia diffinitio dicit explicite quod nomen dicit implicite. Et adiungit uirtutem secunde regule, dicens quod si predicatum predicatur secundum se de subiecto – hoc est simpliciter – quoniam est, et non secundum accidens – hoc est secundum quid
15 – tunc conuenit a coniuncto ad diuisa procedere. Et quia dicit hanc determinationem, ut poetam, esse determinationem / secundum quid, hoc exempli < ific > at cum dicit, *Quod autem non est* (21a32). Et debet littera sic legi: quod non est uerum dicere ipsum esse, *quoniam est opinabile*, id est non possum dicere de non ente, quia est opinabile, < est > ; non enim sequitur, 'Est
20 opinabile, ergo, etc.'

Ad euidenciam hic determinatorum notandum quod omnis determinatio uel est distrahens, uel est contrahens, uel indifferens. Si distrahens, non conuenit a coniuncto ad diuisa procedere; unde non sequitur, 'Est homo mortuus, ergo est homo'. Si autem sit contrahens, aut ergo ad partem subiecti < iu > am, aut ad
25 partem integram. Si ad subiecti < iu > am, tunc conuenit, ut, 'Est homo albus, ergo est homo'. Si autem sit contrahens ad partem integram, aut ergo contrahit ad potentem denominare totum, aut non. Si primo modo, conuenit coniuncta diuidere, ut, 'Est crispus caput, ergo est crispus'. Si secundo modo, non conuenit; non enim sequitur, 'Si est albus pedis, ergo est albus'. Si autem sit
30 differentia indifferens, tunc non conuenit coniuncta diuidere; ymmo non sequitur, 'Homerus est aliquid, ut poeta, ergo est'.

His uero determinatis, etc. (c. 12, 21a34). Determinata oppositione et consequentia enuntiationum de inesse, hic determinat oppositionem et consequentiam enuntiationum de modo, et diuiditur in duas. In prima
35 determinat oppositionem, docens ad quid debeat referri negatio in hiis. In 2^a, *Consequentie uero*, etc. (c. 13, 22a14), determinat ipsam consequentiam. Et

5 a coniuncto] adiuncto E
22 indifferens] differens E

8 predicamentis] predictis E
27 aut] autem E

15 a coniuncto] adiuncta E

quia ex oppositione nascitur consequentia, prius determinat de oppositione quam de consequentia, et etiam quia de oppositione per se intellecta, prius de oppositione determinat.

E 236va 5 Prima in duas. In prima dat intencionem continuando se, dicens, determinatis his – hoc est oppositione et consequentia enuntiationum / de inesse – determinandum est qualiter ordinanda sit negatio in hiis de modo, an ad modum, uel ad compositionem, ex qua ordinanda causatur oppositio. Et causam intentam assignans, dicit, *habet enim*, etc. In secunda, *Nam si eorum* (21a38), prosequitur de intento, et hec in duas: in prima ponit persuasionem
10 dyalecticam, ostendentem quod uidetur ibidem negacio addenda ad uerbum; in secunda, *Videtur autem idem* (21b12), ostendit quod non est addenda ad uerbum sed potius ad modum.

Et primum sic ostenditur: in enuntiationibus de inesse sumenda est oppositio per additionem negationis ad uerbum; sed similiter est in illis de inesse et in illis
15 de modo, addenda est negacio ad uerbum. In hac ratione sic procedit: primo ponit maiorem, dicens quod in hiis que complectuntur hoc in illis de inesse, sumenda est oppositio per additionem negationis ad uerbum, et hoc declarat per exemplum in eius que est; secundo, *si enim de omnibus* (21b3-4), probat ipsam, scilicet maiorem, ostendens quod iste due sunt oppositae, 'esse album hominem'
20 et 'non esse album hominem', et non iste due, 'esse album hominem' et 'esse non album hominem'. Sunt enim uere de eodem, quia de ligno, ergo non sunt contradictorie. Ex quo patet quod ad oppositionem faciendam, addenda est negatio ad uerbum. Et quia aliquis crederet quod diuersimode esset in hiis in quibus ponitur 'est' et aliud uerbum, dicit quod non; siue ponatur 'est', siue
25 aliud uerbum, semper est addenda negacio ad uerbum. Et hoc est, *quod si hoc modo* (21b5). Concludit, *Quare si hoc modo* (21b10): cum maiore probata, < minorem > assumit, et concludit negationem debere addi in hiis de modo.

E 236vb Et sequitur illa pars, *Videtur autem* (21b12), in qua ostendit quod negatio non est addenda ad uerbum sed potius ad modum, et hoc duabus / rationibus, et
30 penes hoc diuiditur pars hec in duas: in prima ponit primam; secundo, *contingit enim* (21b19-20), ponit secundam. Prima talis est: impossibile est contradictorias de eodem simul esse ueras; sed iste due, 'possibile est esse', 'possibile est non esse', possunt simul esse uere: ergo non sunt contradictorie, et ita non est addenda [est] negacio ad uerbum. Huius rationis primo ponit minorem,
35 dicens, *Videtur autem* (21b12), et dicit, uidetur autem, quia nondum probata est minor. Secundo, *omne enim quod est possibile* (21b13), declarat minorem,

8 intentam] -tati E

21 uere] secunde E

27 concludit] conuenit E

10 ibidem] idem E

26 Concludit] conuenit E

28 qua] quo E

11 Videtur autem] autem uidetur E

probata] approbata E

dicens quod omne quod est possibile ambulare, possibile est < non > ambulare. Et rationem huius assignat, dicens quod omne quod sit, est possibile, scilicet, ut se habeat ad esse et ad non esse, non semper est in actu, sed aliquando non est, et ita potest non esse: et sic patet quod idem possibile est esse
 5 et non esse. 3º, *At uero impossibile* (21b17), ponit maiorem; quarto, *non igitur conuenit* (21b19), < conclusionem > .

Et sequitur illa < pars > , *contingit enim* (21b19-20), in qua ponit 2^{am} rationem ad idem, que talis est: aut contradictorie erunt simul, aut contradictio non fiet per appositionem ad uerbum; sed primum est impossibile, ergo
 10 secundum est magis [est magis est] eligendum. Et si hoc constat, negatio addenda est ad modum. In hac ratione sic procedit: primo ponit maiorem; secundo, *Si ergo* (21b22), ponit minorem, adiungens conclusionem cum dicit, *hoc magis* (21b22); 3º, *Ergo negatio eius* (21b23), concludit ulterius quod negacio est addenda ad modum, hoc exemplificans in singularibus enuntiatio-
 15 nibus de modo inductiue.

Et hec 3^a pars diuiditur in duas partes: in prima facit quod dictum est: in secunda, *Et uniuersaliter* (22a8), < *** > . Et diuidatur prima in duas. In prima docet sumere negationem in hiis enuntiationibus < *** > ab hiis que sunt de
 37ra 20 acceduntur ad illas de / inesse; non sic autem ille de contingenti et possibili. Prima in duas: in prima docet sumere negationem in hiis in quibus est dictum affirmatum; in secunda, *Eius uero que est* (21b33), docet idem in hiis in quibus est dictum negatum. Prima istarum in duas. In prima concludit quod negatio istius, 'possibile est esse', est ista, 'non possibile est esse', et ita est in aliis,
 25 semper est addenda negacio ad modum. Secundo, *Fiunt autem* (21b26), antequam doceat idem facere in hiis in quibus est dictum negatum solum, < dat > rationem per quam uidebatur que negacio addenda esset ad uerbum; et quia ratio [non] fuit a simili, dat similitudinem et dissimilitudinem in illis de inesse et in illis de modo.

30 Ad cuius euidetiam prenotandum est quod duplex est operatio intellectus: operatio una est que apprehendit simplicia, et dicitur 'informacio'; alia est que componit simplicia apprehensa, et dicitur 'composicio' uel 'apprehensorum collatio'. Intellectus ergo prius apprehendit intencionem subiecti et predicati, deinde componit, et hoc uel asserendo, et sic fit affirmatio, uel destruendo, et sic
 35 fit negatio. Ex quo patet quod sicut est in homine quod anima est forma

1,2 ambulare] ampulare E

3 esse²] adesse E

5 At uero] uero aut E

13 concludit] conuenit E

17 diuidatur] -dat E

19 impossibili¹] -bilis E

20 acceduntur] -ditur E

22 que est] in marg. E

in hiis idem E

23 concludit]

conuenit E

33 prius] primus E

34 destruendo] de asserendo E

corporis et actus que cum corpore hominem constituit, alia est autem forma compositi ipsius et competens compositio, ut humanitas, et sic est in enuntiatione de inesse quod predicatum est forma respectu subiecti de quo dicitur; tamen tam subiectum quam predicatum respectu compositionis
 5 subicitur et est subiectum, cum compositio accipitur in hiis tanquam forma cum materia. In illis autem de modo super compositionem additur modus; < modus qui > superadditur in hiis de modo determinat ueritatem sicut compositio in hiis de inesse ueritatem determinat.

In hoc ergo est similitudo inter illas de inesse et illas de modo, quod sicut in
 E 237rb 10 illis de inesse compositio ad subiectum / et ad predicatum apponitur, modus sic in illis de modo ad compositionem additur. In hoc tamen est differentia, quia in illis de inesse subiectum et predicatum subiciuntur respectu compositionis et compositio apponitur; in illis autem de modo compositio supponitur respectu modi. Vnde sicut ad appositionem addenda est negatio in illis de inesse, sic ad
 15 modum in illis de modo.

Dicit ergo Aristotiles quod [sic] sicut in illis de inesse, 'esse' hoc, compositio sub assertionem, et 'non esse', id est compositio sub destructionem, fiunt, scilicet mediante intellectu componente uel diuidente, apponens respectu subiecti et respectu predicati, et termini, id est subiectum et predicatum, fiunt subiecta,
 20 scilicet respectu compositionis, et exempli < fi > cat hoc quod dixit, *res* (21b28), dicens uero hoc quidem album, quantum ad predicatum, illud uero homo, quantum ad subiectum: sic in *hoc loco*, hoc est in illis de modo, 'esse' et 'non esse', hoc est affirmacio et negacio, fiunt subiectum, scilicet non respectu predicati sed respectu modi. Ipsi autem modi sunt *appositiones*, id est
 25 determinationes apposite ad compositionem, dicentes qualiter ex inherencia predicati cum subiecto ueritas resultat. Nec est sibi exponendum, modi enim sunt appositiones, id est predicata; non enim modus predicatur, scilicet, quod propositio dicitur modalis. Et hoc est, *Fiant autem* (21b26).

Et consequenter docet sumere negationem in hiis in quibus est dictum
 30 negatum, dicens quod in hiis est addenda negacio ad modum et non ad uerbum. Si enim ad uerbum adderetur, non esset contradictio, et [quod] possunt simul stare. Et hoc < est >, *Eius uero*, etc. (21b34).

Consequenter docet idem in hiis que sunt de necessario et possibili, cum dicit, *Similiter autem*, etc. (22a3), et ibi patet inductiue quod negatio est addenda ad
 35 modum. Vt autem sane intelligatur, notandum quod sicut in uniuersali propositione, si debent sumi contradictoria, addenda est negatio ad signum, non

1 alia] anima E	3 respectu in marg. E	5 accipitur] additur E	13 supponitur]
-posita E	17 destructionem] de assertionem E	19 termini] -nus E	21 uero'] non E
quidem] quod E	illud] idem E	22 sic] sicut E	23 fiunt] sunt E
debent] fidebant E			36 si

37va quia sistat negacio / in signo, sed terminatur ad uerbum, ita tamen quod
 signum cadet sub illa negatione, et similiter est in illis de modo, quod negacio
 est addenda ad modum, non quia sistat in modo, sed ulterius terminatur ad
 compositionem formalem, in quam modus negetur. Et quia principalis negacio
 5 in enuntiacione modali ex parte modi <est>, ideo dicit negacionem addi ad
 modum.

Consequenter, *Et uniuersaliter* (22a8), epilogat, dicens quod oportet ponere
 'esse' et 'non esse' subiecta, scilicet res huiusmodi, quemadmodum dictum est
 prius. Et hoc facientes, imponentes 'esse', 'non esse' subiecta, oportet ponere
 10 negationem ad unum tantum, id est ad modum. Et dicende sunt ille
 contradictorie que habent negationem appositam ad modum. Et exemplificat
 cum dicit, '*possibile*' et '*non possibile*' (22a11-12); et inter modos exem-
 pli <fi> cat de uero, quia consimilem habet oppositionem ut ceteri modi; quia
 tamen non est modus complete, eo posito, non <est> danda consequentia.

15 Ad sciendum autem quis modus facit propositionem, et quis non, sciendum
 quod determinacio aut determinat uerbum, igitur causat rem uerbi, aut causat
 compositionem. Si causat rem uerbi, quamuis in ea res que predicatur sit forma
 subiecti, non tamen est forma tocus propositionis, et ideo talis [est] determinatio
 propositionem non denominat. Si autem determinatio causat compositionem,
 20 quia compositio est forma propositionis, talis determinatio denominat
 propositionem. Talis autem determinacio aut aliquid addit supra composi-
 tionem, aut nichil, sed pocius priuat. Si priuat, tunc non est modus, ut patet de
 negatione. Si autem aliquid addit, aut ergo secundum rem, aut secundum
 rationem. Sequitur enim, 'Si inest, uere inest', et e conuerso, sicut innuit
 25 Aristotiles in principio vi libri *Topicorum*: et ideo 'uerum' non modus complete.
 Quia tamen determinat compositionem et aliquid addit secundum rationem, ut
 37vb certi- / tudinem, ideo habet naturam modi. Si autem aliquid addit secundum
 rem, tunc est complete modus, ut patet de eo quod est 'necessarium'. Quod
 autem 'necessarium' aliquid addat, hoc patet: non enim sequitur, 'Si inest, ergo
 30 necessario inest'.

Consequencie uero fiunt, etc. (c. 13, 22a14). Determinata de oppositione
 modalium, hic determinat de consequentia, et diuiditur in duas: in prima

25 Arist., *Top.* 6. 1 (139b1-3)

4 quam] quem <i>E</i>	modus] -dum <i>E</i>	7 Consequenter] continentur <i>E</i>	13 habet]
-bent <i>E</i>	14 eo posito] eius poemata <i>E</i>	consequentia] -tiam <i>E</i>	16,17,19 causat]
causa <i>E</i>	16 uerbij] uerba <i>E</i>	17 ea] eo <i>E</i>	que] quod <i>E</i>
-num <i>E</i>	determinatio] denuntiant <i>E</i>	20 denominat] denotat <i>E</i>	19 propositionem]
<i>E</i>	31 Determinata] -natio <i>E</i>		24 innuit] inducit

disponit secundum opinionem <aliorum>; in secunda, *Ergo 'impossibile'* (22a32), secundum opinionem propriam. Prima diuiditur in duas: in prima disponit consequentiam; in secunda, *Consideretur autem eam* (22a22), manifestat per sensibilem figuram.

- 5 Videbantur autem aliis <disponi> duabus regulis, per quarum primam formabant duos primos ordines. Et fuit talis: cuicumque attribuitur 'possibile', eidem attribuitur 'contingens', et ab eodem remouetur 'impossibile', et similiter 'necessarium'. Per hanc regulam in dicto affirmato fecerunt primum ordinem; et in dicto negato, secundum ordinem. Et in hac regula peccabant quantum ad
- 10 dispositionem 'necessarii'. Secunda regula fuit talis: a quocumque remouetur 'possibile', ab eodem remouetur 'contingens', et eidem attribuitur 'necesse'. Et hec regula in dicto affirmato perficit tertium ordinem; in dicto uero negato perficit quartum. Et in hac regula non peccabant: unde consequentie tertii et quarti ordinis recte ordinabantur.
- 15 Et sequitur illa pars, *Ergo 'impossibile'* (22a32), in qua disponitur consequentia secundum propriam opinionem, docens in quo bene dixerunt, et in quo peccauerunt predicto modo opinantes. Et diuiditur in duas: in prima docet quod bene disponebant omnes alias ab illis [et] de necessario in primo et 2º ordine; <***>. Dicit ergo in prima parte quod contradictoria de 'impossibili',
- E 238ra 20 scilicet '<non> impossibile', conuertibiliter sequitur ad 'possibile' et ad 'contingens', et contradictoria 'non impossibilis', / scilicet 'impossibile', conuertibiliter sequitur ad 'non possibile' et ad 'non contingens'. Et hoc modo disponebant predicti, quare <bene> disponebant omnes alias ab illis de 'necessario'. Huius rationis primo ponit maiorem.
- 25 Et debet littera sic legi: *Ergo* legatur interemptiue; 'impossibile' sequitur contradictorie, *sed conuersim* (22a34), id quod est 'possibile' et 'contingens', id est contradictoria 'impossibilis' conuertitur cum eo quod est 'possibile' et 'contingens'; et 'non impossibile' sequitur contradictorie, *sed conuersim*, 'non contingens' et 'non possibile'. Et ideo ad affirmationem 'possibilis' sequitur
- 30 negacio 'impossibilis', et e conuerso. Vnde cum dicit, *negationem*, etc. (22a35), sic legatur: negationem, scilicet 'possibilis', sequitur affirmatio, scilicet 'impossibilis'.

Et sequitur illa pars, '*Necessarium*' uero (22a38), in qua docet qualiter male disponebant illas de 'necessario', et diuiditur in duas: in prima dat intencionem,

35 et patet; in secunda, *Manifestum est enim* (22a38), prosequitur de intento. Et diuiditur in duas: in prima, quia ipsi dixerunt quod ad 'possibile esse'

1,2 opinionem] oppositionem E (et sic passim)	4 manifestat] in tria E	5 aliis] alii E
6 formabant] -bat E	13 consequentie] -tiam E	16 consequentia] -tiam E
20 impossibile] -bili E	conuertibiliter] -tibili E	25 interemptiue] -tio E

sequebatur 'non necesse est', et similiter disponentes propositiones de 'impossibili' et de 'necesse', probat similiter quod non hoc < modo > debent disponi; < *** >. Prima in duas: in prima docet quod non similiter disponende sunt; in secunda, *Causa autem* (22b3), probat causam quare non similiter sunt
5 disponende.

Dicit ergo in prima parte quod non eodem modo sunt disponende ille de 'necessario' sicut ille de 'impossibili', ita quod a quocumque remoueat
'impossibile' et 'necesse', sicut predicti disponebant in primo ordine remouentes
tam 'impossibile' quam 'necesse' a dicto affirmato; in secundo autem, a dicto
10 negato. Et ne crederetur quod omnes propositiones de 'necesse' male essent
disposite, dicit quod non; sed contrarie, hoc est ille de 'necesse', que habent
negationem additam ad uerbum solum, ut 'necesse est esse', 'necesse est non
esse', sequuntur, id est recte disponuntur secundum consequentiam; sed contra-
8rb dictorie istarum, in quibus additur negatio ad / modum, ut 'non necesse est
15 esse', 'non necesse est non esse', sunt *extra*, id est non recte ordinantur
secundum consequentiam.

Et hoc declarat cum dicit, *Non est enim negatio* (22a39-b1) sic: illa de
'necessario' que est in primo ordine, debet esse negacio illius que est in tertio
ordine; sed secundum predictos non est sic, quia ista, 'non necesse est esse', que
20 est in primo ordine secundum illos, non est negacio istius, 'necesse est non esse',
que est in tertio ordine, quia possunt simul esse uere, 'hominem non esse
asinum' et 'non necesse est hominem esse asinum'.

Et sequitur illa pars, *Causa autem* (22b3), in qua assignat causam quare non
sint sic disposite ille de 'necessario' et ille de 'impossibili', et est: illa,
25 'necessarium' sumptum contrarie, equipollet ei quod est 'impossibile', et ideo
'non necesse' est si 'impossibile' remouetur ab eo cui attribuitur 'possibile', quia
'necesse' remoueat ab eodem. Sed potius, 'necessarium' sumptum contrarie
debet remoueri ab eo a quo 'impossibile' remouetur, et ita, scilicet, quod
possibile est esse, non impossibile est esse; quod possibile est esse, non necesse
30 est non esse. Et sic patet quod contrarie secuntur; contradictorie autem illarum
consequentiarum non consequuntur, ut ipsi dixerunt.

Et legatur littera sic: bene dixi quod non eodem modo secuntur ille de
'necessario'; *causa autem cur non sequatur similiter in ceteris* (22b3-4), hoc est
cur non sequuntur ille de 'necessario' sicut et alia, est quoniam sunt *contrarie*
35 (22b4), id est illa de 'necessario' contrarie, hic sumpta *contrarie* ut 'necesse est
non esse' redditur idem ualens 'impossibili', hoc est equipollet ei quod est
'impossibile', ut declarat per exemplum cum dicit, *nam si impossibile* (22b6-7);

11 disposite] disponenter E 17 sic] si E 19 est¹] esse E 25 impossibile]
necesse E 26 post necesse del. sit E 33 causa autem] aut tam E 37 impossibile²]
possibile E

exemplificat qualiter 'impossibile' sumptum contrarie equipollet ei quod est 'necesse'.

Notandum igitur quod ex hac littera patet qualiter contrarie recte secuntur, et contradictorie non, quia ex hoc quod 'necessarium' sumptum contrarie idem
 5 ualeat cum 'impossibili', patet quod in eodem ordine debent poni iste, 'impossibile est esse', 'necesse / est non esse'; et si 'impossibile' sumptum
 E 238va contrarie idem ualeat quod 'necesse', in eodem ordine debent poni iste, 'necesse est' et 'impossibile est non esse'; et iterum si 'necesse est non esse' equipollet ei
 quod est 'impossibile', a quocumque remoueatur unum et reliquum. Vnde in
 10 primo ordine debent poni iste, 'non impossibile est esse', 'non necesse est non esse'. Solum ergo peccabant in prima regula quam ponebant in hoc quod
 dixerunt quod ab eodem remouetur 'impossibile' et etiam 'necesse'. Sed debent
 dicere, cui attribuitur 'possibile', ab eodem remouetur 'impossibile', et ab eius
 contradictorie opposito remouetur 'necesse'. Et hoc designat Aristotiles in hoc
 15 quod dicit, *hoc necessarium <est> esse* (22b7).

Et sequitur illa pars, *At certe* (22b10), in qua docet qualiter disponi debent
 propositiones de 'necessario', et diuiditur in duas: in prima docet que propositio
 de 'necessario' in quo ordine debet poni; in 2^a, *Quare quoniam uniuersale*
 (23a16-17), quasi correlarie docet quo ordine debet disponi. Et prima in duas: in
 20 prima probat quod [quod] hoc, 'non necesse est non esse', debet sequi ad
 'possibile est esse'; in secunda, *Dubitabit autem aliquis* (22b29), mouet
 dubitationem supra dicta. Prima in duas penes rationes duas. Prima talis est:
 <sunt> quatuor propositiones de 'necessario', quarum una sequitur ad
 'possibile est'; sed nulla trium sequitur, ergo quarta sequetur, scilicet 'non
 25 necesse est non esse'.

In hac ratione sic procedit: primo dicit quod quamuis contrarie de
 'necessario' recte sint disposite, tamen contradictiones, id est ille enuntiationes
 in quibus ponitur negatio ad modum, non sic possunt poni, nisi hoc, 'non
 necesse est', que ponitur in primo ordine secundum illos, ponatur in secundo;
 30 secundo, *Nam quod necesse est esse* (22b11), ponit suam rationem, ostendens ad
 'impossibile est esse' non sequitur 'necesse est esse'; 3^o, *At uero neque*
'necessarium' (22b17), probat quod alie de necessario sequantur; quarto,
 E 238vb *Relinquitur ergo* (22b22), concludit / quod quarta debet sequi.

Quod autem ad 'possibile est esse' non sequatur 'non necesse est esse' probat
 35 ducens ad inconueniens sic: ad 'necesse esse' sequitur 'possibile esse', quod
 patet, quia si non, oppositum 'possibilis', scilicet 'impossibile', posset stare cum
 'necessario', quod esset inconueniens; 'possibile' ergo sequitur ad 'necesse'.

Ergo si ad 'possibile esse' sequitur 'non necesse esse', ad 'necesse est esse' sequitur 'non necesse est esse', quod est inconueniens: quare ad 'impossibile' non sequitur 'non necesse'.

Deinde, *At uero* (22b17), probat quod nec alie due secuntur, scilicet 'necesse esse', 'necesse non esse', sic: quod 'possibile est esse' se habet ad esse et non esse; sed quod 'necesse est esse' uel 'non esse' non se habet ad esse uel non esse, ergo, etc. Huius rationis primo ponit conclusionem; secundo, *illi enim*, etc. (22b18), ponit maiorem; 3^o, *horum autem* (22b19), ponit minorem; 4^o, *simul enim* (22b20), declarat maiorem; V^o, *si autem necesse* (22b21), declarat
10 minorem.

Et sequitur illa pars, *hoc enim uerum* (22b23), in qua ponit aliam rationem ad idem, scilicet quod 'necesse est non esse' debeat sequi ad 'possibile', et est talis: ad 'impossibile esse' sequitur 'necesse est non esse'. Hanc rationem primo ponit; deinde, *Sequuntur igitur* (22b26-27), concludit rectam dispositionem omnium
15 illarum de modo.

Et legatur littera sic: bene dico quod ad 'possibile esse' sequitur 'non necesse est non esse'; *enim* (22b23) pro 'quia'; quia *hoc* (22b23), id est consequentia hec est uera de 'necessario non esse', id est in comparatione ad illam que ponitur in tertio ordine. Et hoc declarat cum dicit, *Hec enim* (22b24), dicens quod 'non
20 necesse est non esse' est negatio istius, 'necesse < est > non esse', que sequitur ad illam, 'non impossibile est esse'. Et plana est littera intuenti, si bene intendat, etc.

Dubitabit autem, etc. (22b29). Hic ex quibusdam predictis mouet dubitationem: quia dixit superius quod ad 'necesse' sequitur 'possibile esse', / hic mouet
39ra dubitationem et soluit. Et diuiditur hec pars in duas: in prima mouet dubitationem, et eam disputat; in secunda, *Manifestum est autem* (22b36), eam soluit. Prima in duas: in prima ponit dubitationem, dicens quod dubitacio est utrum ad 'necesse' sequatur 'possibile esse', uel non; deinde, *Nam si non* (22b30), disputat dubitationem, ostendens primo quod ad 'necesse' sequitur
30 'possibile' hoc argumento, si a 'de necesse' non sequitur 'possibile', ergo oppositum consequentis, scilicet 'non possibile', potest stare cum antecedente, quod est inconueniens. Istam rationem primo ponit; deinde, *et si quis*, etc. (22b31), remouet cauillationem, '< necesse > est esse' non esset contradictoria istius, 'possibile est esse', sed potius ista, 'possibile est non esse'. Hoc destruit
35 per hoc quod ille possunt simul esse false, 'possibile est esse', 'possibile est non esse', et ita non sunt contradictorie.

5 habet] -bent E
cum E

8 horum] quorum E
33 cauillationem] -latam E

20 que] qui E

31 post potest del. faceret

Consequenter, *At uero rursus* (22b33), probat quod 'necesse esse' non sequitur 'possibile esse' sic: quod possibile est esse, possibile est non esse, ergo si ad 'necesse esse' sequitur 'possibile esse', quod necesse est esse, possibile est non esse quia quod sequitur ex consequente sequitur ex antecedente. Huius rationis 5 primo ponit premissam, et declarat; secundo, *quare*, etc. (22b35), concludit.

Et sequitur illa pars, *Manifestum est autem* (22b36), in qua soluit dubitationem, concedens quod ad 'necesse esse' sequitur 'possibile esse'. Et soluit rationem ad oppositum ductum per diuisionem 'possibilis' sic: possibile quoddam ualet ad opposita, quoddam non; illud possibile quod non se habet ad 10 opposita, sequitur ad necessarium, et aliud non. Et sic non debet sequi quod necesse est esse, possibile est non esse. Et intellige potenciam ualere ad opposita, non quia potencia una ordinetur ad actus contrarios, sed quia cum potencia E 239rb ordinata est in actu, potest impediri ne in / actum prorumpat.

Diuiditur autem hec pars in duas: in prima ponit substanciam solutionis, 15 dicens quod non omnis potencia ualet ad opposita, sed in aliquibus sic, in aliquibus non; in secunda, *et primum quidem* (22b38), confirmat solutionem per diuisionem potestatis. Et hec 2^a diuiditur in duas: in prima dat unam diuisionem; in secunda, *Quedam uero* (23a6), dat aliam solutionem. Intendit ergo in prima parte hanc diuisionem: potestas quedam est rationalis, hoc est a 20 proposito et a uoluntate procedens, quedam est irrationalis et non a proposito procedens potestas; ergo rationalis, quia uoluntas se habet ad opposita. Irrationalis autem quedam est actiua, scilicet quod ignis habet potenciam ad calefaciendum, et hoc non ualet ad opposita – non enim potest ignis non calefacere nisi corrumpatur – quedam uero est passiuua, cuius est potencia 25 materie receptiua, et hec se habet ad opposita.

Diuiditur ergo hec pars prima in duas: in prima, in hanc diuisionem potestatis per rationale et irrationale, preponens primum membrum, et concludens alterum cum dicit, *ergo secundum rationem* (22b39), per locum a contrariis sic, scilicet irrationale non ualet ad opposita, ergo per oppositum, 30 rationale ualet ad oppositum. In secunda, *irrationabiles uero* (23a1), innuit subdiviisionem potencie per actiuam et passiuam, dicens quod non omnes irrationales potestates sic se habent quod non ualent ad opposita, sed potencia ignis que calefacit, hec est potencia actiua, non se habet ad opposita; alia tamen, ut potencia passiuua, ualet ad opposita. Ne crederetur quod uellet has potencias 35 pertractare, quasi dicto quod non, subiungit, *sed hoc idcirco* (23a4-5).

1 *At uero rursus*] *autem rursus uero* E

3 *est*²] *et* E

12 *potencia*²] *ponit* E

13 *prorumpat*] *-ruptat* E

15 *potencia*] *ponit* E

16 *quidem*] *quod* E

18 *Quedam*]

quan- E

19-20,20 a proposito] *apposito* E

24 *passiua*] *pessima* E

35 *dicto*] *-tio*

E

Et sequitur illa pars, *Quedam uero potestates*, etc. (23a6-7), in qua dat aliam diuisionem potestatis, que talis est: potencia quedam est ante actum, secundum quod dicitur quod ille qui non currit, potest currere; alia est potencia cum actu, secundum quod / dicitur quod ille potest currere. 'Possibile' ergo que ante
 5 actum non sequitur ad 'necesse'; 'possibile' autem cum actu, quod non se habet ad opposita, sequitur ad 'necesse'. In hac diuisione sic procedit: primo dicit quod 'possibile' multipliciter dicitur; deinde [enim] dat multipliciter, proponens diuisionem bimembrem. Cum primum membrum primo ponit, deinde, *id uero*, etc. (23a10), secundo ponit alterum, dicens quod illud est
 10 possibile quod forsitan agit. Et dicit, *forsitan* (23a11), quia in singularibus et futuris non est determinata ueritas.

Consequenter, *Et hoc in solis mobilibus* (23a11-12), diuidencia ad inuicem <comparat>, dicens quod potencia ante actum <est> in generabilibus solum; potencia tamen cum actu et <in> generabilibus et ingenerabilibus.
 15 Deinde, *in utrisque uero* (23a13), quia iam dedit differentiam diuidencium, dat eorum consequentiam in comparatione ad diuisum, dicens quod 'non impossibile' siue 'possibile' de utroque dicitur.

Ultimo, *Hoc igitur 'possibile'* (23a15), adaptat hanc diuisionem ad propositum, dicens quod 'possibile' ante actum non est uerum de 'necessario', sed
 20 'possibile' cum actu est uerum de eodem, et ista 'necessaria' in actu.

Et sequitur illa pars, *Quare quoniam uniuersale* (23a16-17), in qua quasi correlarie concludit qualiter debent ordinari propositiones de modo. Et probat quod ille de 'necessario' debent preponi per duas rationes. Prima talis est: uniuersale sequitur ad partem subiecti <iu> am; sed 'possibile' est uniuersale ad
 25 'necessarium', ergo 'possibile' sequitur ad 'necessarium', et ita ille de 'necessario' debent preponi.

Deinde, *Et est fortasse* (23a18), ponit aliam rationem ad idem, que talis est: que sunt in actu potenciora sunt [in] hiis que sunt potencia; sed necessaria sunt in actu, et possibilia sunt potestate, igitur necessaria debent precedere. In hac
 30 ratione sic procedit: primo ponit conclusionem; et debet littera sic legi, quod est 'necessarium esse' uel 'non esse', hoc est enunciatio de / 'necessario', est principium *omnium* (23a19), hoc est enuntiationum aliarum de modo, et oportet considerare *alia* (23a20), hoc <est> alias enuntiationes de modo, *quemadmodum consequentia horum* (23a20), id est sicut consequentes ad illas
 35 de 'necessario'. Ad huius euidentiam <dat> sensibilem figuram in qua ille de 'necessario' ponuntur.

4 Possibile] primo E 6 primo] prima E 10 forsitan^{1,2} -tam E 13,14 generabilibus] -ralibus E
 14 ingenerabilibus] in generalibus E 15 diuidencium] -ciam E
 20 ista] ota (?) E 22 correlarie corr. E concludit] conuenit E 23 preponi] poni E
 24 uniuersale¹ corr. ex uniuersalis (?) E 32 aliarum] alia E

Deinde, *Manifestum est autem* (23a21), ponit minorem sue rationis, dicens quod manifestum est ex predictis, scilicet ex hoc quod 'possibile' cum actu sequitur ad 'necessarium', quod necessaria sunt in actu. 3^o, *quare si priora* (23a22), adiungit maiorem. Quarto, *Et hoc sine potestate* (23a23), ad declarationem minoris ponit trimembrem diuisionem rerum, dicens quod quedam sunt actu sine potestate ante actum, ut sunt angeli et intelligencie; quedam autem sunt actu in quo potestas precessit actum, cuius sunt generabilia, que natura priora sunt, tempore posteriora.

Hec littera multipliciter legitur. Vno modo sic: *que* (23a24), scilicet generabilia, sunt *natura priora* (23a24-25), in actu scilicet, et tempore posteriora sunt. Et hoc secundum intencionem nature intelligatur, quia natura per prius intendit actum uniuersalis. <Secundo modo sic>: *que*, scilicet generabilia existencia <in potencia>, sunt natura priora illis existentibus in actu. Et hoc intelligatur secundum processum nature in esse, quia sic precedit potencia actum; illa uero existencia actu sunt tempore posteriora illis existentibus in potencia. Tertio modo legatur, et tunc exponitur *que*, scilicet actus et potencia, ita ut [antequam] domus fabricata prius fuit in potencia antequam fabricaretur, et sic prius secundum tempus est potencia, postea uero actus; sed natura actus est ante potenciam, tempore uero posterior est actus potencia artificio; uel artifex prius in animo percipit formam domus, et sic natura prior est actus potencia, tempore uero posterior. Et hec est expositio Boetii.

E 240ra Deinde adiungit tertium membrum diuisionis, / dicens quod quedam sunt *potestate solum* (23a26), ut patet in infinito et continuis <et> discretis.

Circa primam partem istius diuisionis notandum quod substantie perpetue non habent potentiam precedentem actu, sed quam cito poterant esse, fuerunt. Si uero ex hoc arguatur, sed poterant ab eterno, ergo fuerunt ab eterno, diuidenda est in potenciam efficientis et [est] potenciam ipsius effecti. Cum ergo dicit, quam cito poterant esse, fuerunt, hoc uerum est de potencia propria. Hanc autem non habebant ab eterno, quia cum create sint ex nichilo, antequam fuerunt create, nichil fuerunt, et ita potenciam non habuerunt. Cum autem dicitur, poterant esse ab eterno, <hoc est, Deus potuisset ab eterno> creasse angelos, non tamen creauit, quia sue prouidencie non competeat, nec si ab eterno angelos creasset, uideretur creatura creatori esse coequa. In rebus autem generabilibus, quia ex nichilo non sunt create, sed ex preexistenti materia, ideo quam <cito> essent in actu, fuerunt in potencia.

21 Boethius in *Periherm.*, 1a ed. 2. 13 (ed. Meiser, 1. 206-207)

1 minorem] iiii E 3 priora] ponatur E 12 generabilia] -ralia E 27 diuidenda]
-dendo E potenciam²] -cia E 29 habebant] -bat E 30 non potenciam E
34 generabilibus] -ralibus E 35 essent] esset E

Circa secundum membrum notandum quod actus et potencia aut sunt in eodem, aut in diuersis. Si in eodem, aut ergo considerantur secundum intencionem nature, et hoc modo actus precedit potenciam, quia [uel] omne quod educitur de potencia in actum deducitur per aliquod actu existens; aut
 5 secundum processum in esse, et hoc modo potencia precedit actum. Si autem sunt in diuersis, aut ergo illa duo habent ordinem inter se, aut non. Si sic, tunc actus precedit potenciam, et hoc modo actus est ante potenciam, et sic intelligendum quod dicit Aristotiles in *Prima philosophia*, quod perfectum est ante imperfectum, ut homo est ante semen, et gallina est ante ouum. Si autem
 10 diuersa non habeant ordinem, tunc inter actum et potenciam non cadit ordo. Et ex hac diuisione patet / exposicio illius uerbi quod dicit Aristotiles in 2° *De anima*, ubi dicit quod actus primi sunt potencia.

Circa tertium membrum notandum quod quamuis sint quedam potestate tantum, non tamen sequitur quod aliqua potencia sit frustra, quia potest reduci
 15 in actum, sed non tota simul, sed pars post partem, ita tamen quod aliquis semper remanet. Et in hoc differt potencia successiuorum et permanencium, quia potencia permanencium tota simul reducitur ad effectum; potencia autem successiuorum non tota simul, sed pars post partem, ut patet de die, cuius esse non est tota simul. Similiter est de infinito: unde dicit Aristotiles in 3°
 20 *Phisicorum* quod infinitum est sicut dies <et> ago<n>. In hoc ergo infinitum conuenit cum successiuo, quia non reducuntur in actum simul; in hoc autem disconuenit, quia semper remanet aliquid de potencia quando pars infiniti reducitur in actum; non sic autem est de die.

Utrum autem, etc. (c. 14, 23a27). Inquisita oppositione absolute, hic de-
 25 terminat de oppositione aliquo modo comparata. Inquirat hanc questionem, an illa contraria sint que contrario modo enuntiant, ut quando una affirmat et alia negat de eodem subiecto et predicato, uel de contrariis. Et diuiditur in duas: in prima dat interrogatum, et patet; in secunda, *Nam si ea* (23a32), prosequitur dictam questionem. Et hec secunda diuiditur in duas: in prima probat quod
 30 considerandum que sunt in opinione ad solutionem dicte questionis; in secunda, *nam arbitrari* (23b3) incipit ad opinionem considerare.

In prima ergo parte unicam ponit rationem, que talis est: que sunt in uoce sunt note passionum que sunt in anima; sicut ergo est in opinione, ita est in uoce. Quare si sic / est in opinione quod illa opinio est contraria que contrario

8-9 Arist., *Met.* 9. 8 (1050a3-6)
Phys. 3. 6 (206a22, b14)

11-12 Arist., *De anima* 2. 1 (412a28)

19-20 Arist.,

1 aut] autem E	14 tamen] tantum E	16 differt] -tur E	19 tota] totum E
25 Inquirat] In quibus E	31 arbitrari] -rii E	considerare] -rari E	32 post parte
del. uniuoce sunt note passionum que E			

modo opinatur, sic est in uoce, quia illa esset contraria que contrario modo enuntiat; si autem in opinione illa est contraria que contrarium opinatur, et sic est in uoce. Igitur ad uidendum que sunt contraria in uoce oportet considerare ad opinionem, ut uideamus que opinio cui opinioni sit contraria, ac utraque, 5 scilicet que contrarium opinatur et contrario modo, aut altera [enim] tantum. Et si altera, que illarum sit contraria oportet considerare. Primo ergo ponit substanciam sue rationis; secundo, *Quare considerandum* (23a38), ponit conclusionem.

Et sequitur illa pars, *nam arbitrari* (23b3), in qua docet ad opinionem 10 considerare. Et diuiditur in tres partes: in prima docet considerare ad opinionem; in secunda, *Quare si in opinione* (24b1), adaptat considerationem suam ad propositionem; in 3^a, *Manifestum est autem* (24b6), ponit quoddam incidens. Prima in duas: in prima ponit quod illa non est contraria que contrarium opinatur; in secunda, *sed in quibusdam* (23b13), probat quod illa est 15 contraria que contrario modo opinatur. Et quia opiniones opinantes contrarium possunt esse dupliciter, aut quia < de contrario subiecto et predicato, aut quia > de contrario predicato tantum, diuiditur prima in duas: in prima probat quod illa non est contraria que est de contrario subiecto et predicato; in secunda, *Si ergo boni* (23b7), probat quod illa non est contraria que est de contrario 20 predicato tantum.

In secunda parte ponit unam talem rationem: opiniones contrarie non sunt eedem, uel ad minus similes in ueritate; ergo non sunt contrarie. Huius rationis primo ponit conclusionem; secundo, *boni enim quoniam boni* (23b4), ponit minorem, dicens quod opinio boni quoniam bonum est eadem et opinio mali 240vb 25 quoniam malum est, hoc est, similes in / ueritate. Et dicit, *fortasse* (23b5), non quia dubitat, sed quia uno modo sunt eadem opinio, alio modo non; sunt enim eadem opinio in specie, et non eadem in numero. Et tertio, *uera* (23b5), ne quis reprehenderet ipsum in hoc quod dixit quod eadem sunt opinio, corrigit se: dicit quod ad minus sunt uera opinio, scilicet similes in ueritate, siue sint eadem 30 opinio, siue non. Vnde non intendit dicere quod sint eadem opinio nisi secundum quid, scilicet in hoc quod sunt similes in ueritate. Vnde litteram Aristotilis ignorant qui sic obuiunt, dicentes quod argumentum indu<c> it Aristotiles, sunt eadem specie, ergo sunt eadem. Et quia dixit dictas opiniones, scilicet boni quoniam bonum est, etc. esse contrariorum, hoc confirmans, 35 subiungit, *sunt autem ista contraria* (23b6), scilicet bonum et malum. Et confirmat conclusionem dicens, *sed non ideo contrariorum* (23b6).

2 contrarium] contrario modo E

22 eedem] eodem E

24 opinio¹] opposicioni E

28 reprehenderet] -dent E

35 sunt autem ista contraria] nunc at in omnia E

Concludit, *Si ergo boni*, etc. (23b7), dicens quod ille non sunt contrarie que de contrario predicato. <Dat> solum hoc argumentum: infinite non contrariantur uni; sed infinite sunt opiniones opinantes bonum esse quod non est, ut bonum est inhonestum, bonum est inutile, et ita de aliis; ergo hee non sunt
 5 contrarie illi qui dicit quoniam bonum est bonum. Huius rationis primo ponit conclusionem, dicens quod cum sit una opinio boni quoniam bonum est, et alia, quoniam non est bonum, nulla aliarum ab hac, bonum non est bonum, ponenda contraria est huius, bonum est bonum, nec illa que opinatur quoniam bonum est [est] quod non est, ut bonum est malum, nec illa que opinatur
 10 quoniam bonum non est, quod est alia ab ista, bonum non est bonum, ut est ista, bonum non est suaue, bonum non est utile. Deinde, *infinite enim* (23b11), ponit minorem propositionem.

Et sequitur illa pars, *sed in quibus est fallacia* (23b13), in qua probat quod illa
 41ra est contraria que / contrario modo opinatur, et diuiditur in duas: in prima
 15 ostendit hoc in <in> finitis; in secunda, *Manifestum autem* (24a3), ostendit idem in uniuersalibus. Prima in duas: in prima probat hoc per rationem sumptam a causa; in secunda, *Amplius si in aliis* (23b27), ostendit idem quasi per signum. Prima in duas penes duas rationes.

Et prima ratio talis est: ille sunt [sunt] primo contrarie ueris, in quibus est
 20 prima falsitas; set in hiis que contrario modo opinantur est prima falsitas, ergo ille sunt primo contrarie ueris. Huius rationis primo ponit maiorem uel minorem, dicens quod ille contrarie ueris in quibus reperitur prima falsitas; secundo, *hee autem ex hiis* (23b13), probat eam sic, eadem sunt ex quibus fiunt generationes, et in quibus fit prima fallacia, sed generationes fiunt ex oppositis,
 25 ergo prima falsitas est in oppositis, ita ille sunt opposite in quibus reperitur prima falsitas. Huius sillogismi primo ponit maiorem, dicens quod hec, id est falsitas prima, ex hiis ex quibus fiunt generationes. Deinde, *ex oppositis uero* (23b14), ponit minorem, que sic habet intelligi: inter ens et non ens est generatio; ex non ente enim generatur ens, non ex non ente simpliciter, sed ex
 30 non ente tali, ut ex eo quod non est ignis, est tamen aliquid quo posito fit ignis. Et hoc dico quare creatio simpliciter ex non ente procedit; generacio autem ex non ente tali. 3^o, *quare etiam fallacia* (23b14-15), adiungit conclusionem sillogismi.

Que est maior principalis sillogismi concludit signo, quoniam bonum est.
 35 Probat minorem principalis sillogismi, scilicet quod in hiis est prima falsitas per accidens; sed que contrario modo opinatur uero, est falsa per se, que autem

1 Concludit] conuenit E	Si] sic E	dicens] Dicit E	4 hee] huius E	9 nec]
nisi E	10 ut] est E	13 fallacia] similia E	15 hoc] huius E	23 hee] hoc E
ex ¹] est in E	24 fallacia] similia E	27 fiunt] fuit E	30 quo posito fit] quod	
posita sit E	31 creatio] oratio E	32 etiam fallacia] est similia E	36 uero] uere E	

- opinatur contrarium, est falsa per accidens: ergo que contrario modo opinatur est prima falsa. 2^o <ponitur> conclusio primi sillogismi. Primo probat maiorem sic: opinio boni quoniam bonum est uera per se, opinio boni quoniam <non> malum non est uera <nisi> per accidens, qua accidit / bono malum non esse. Sed magis et prius est uera que uera per se, quam que uera est per accidens: ergo magis est falsa que est falsa per se, quam que est falsa per accidens. Deinde, *quare magis* (23b20), ponit conclusionem primi sillogismi, adiungens quod <dam> ad eius declarationem cum dicit, *Falsus autem* (23b21).
- 10 Et sequitur illa pars, *Contraria sunt enim* (23b22-23), in qua ponit aliam rationem principalem, que talis est: contraria sunt que plurimum circa idem differunt; si ergo illa que contrario modo differunt opinantur, magis differunt, magis sunt contraria. Istius rationis primo ponit maiorem. Secundo, *Quod si horum* (23b23-24), ponit minorem, dicens quod si altera illarum, 'Bonum non est bonum', 'Bonum non est malum', est contraria huius, 'Bonum est bonum', et illa que est contradictionis, hoc est, que contrario modo opinatur, magis est contraria, hoc est magis distat.

Deinde ex hoc concludit et dicit, *manifestum est* (23b24), dicens quod hec est contraria que contrario modo opinatur. Et ad huius declarationem subiungit quod illa que contrarium opinatur, ut hoc, 'Bonum est malum', est implicita, hoc est implicans hanc, 'Bonum non est bonum', et ideo non est in ipsa prima falsitas, et ideo qui opinatur bonum est malum, de necessitate prius opinabatur quoniam bonum non est bonum: ex quo patet quod illa est contraria que contrario modo opinatur.

- 25 Et sequitur illa pars, *Amplius, si in aliis* (23b27), in qua probat idem per signum, et diuiditur in duas: in prima ponit unum argumentum a simili; in secunda, *Amplius similiter* (23b33), ponit aliud per locum a proportionem. Primum est tale: sicut est in uno, ita est in omnibus, quia aut ubique est illa contraria que contrario modo opinatur, aut nusquam, quia qua ratione in uno sic est in omnibus; sed in aliquibus est contraria [est] que contrario modo opinatur et non illa que contrarium opinatur, ut in substantiis quibus nichil est contrarium, / ergo in omnibus est illa contraria que est contradictionis, hoc est que contrario modo opinatur. Huius rationis primo ponit maiorem, et eam declarat; secundo, *quibus uero* (23b29), ponit minorem, et eam declarat; tertio, *Si ergo hec* (23b31-32), adiungit conclusionem.

Consequenter, *Amplius similiter* (23b33), ponit argumentum a proportionem, quod sic debet fieri: sumantur quatuor propositiones; prima sit hec, 'Bonum est bonum'; secunda, ista, 'Non bonum non est bonum'; 3^a, ista, 'Bonum non est bonum'; quarta, ista, 'Non bonum est bonum'. Arguit ergo sic: sicut se habet

7 primi] pro E
27 similiter] sibi E

13 sunt] est E
31 et] ut E

17 distat] distant E

26 simili] sillogismi E

prima opinio ad secundam, ita se habet tertia ad quartam, ita se habet prima ad 3^{am}; sed quarta secunde est contraria, ergo [prime] tertia prime est contraria, et ita sunt contrarie que contrario modo opinantur.

In hac ratione sic procedit: primo ponit maximam propositionem; 2^o ostendit 5 quod quarta contrariatur secunde sic, huic opinioni que est, 'Non bonum non est bonum', aut est hec contraria, 'Non bonum est malum', aut hec, 'Non bonum non est malum', aut hec, 'Non bonum est bonum'; sed illa, 'Non bonum est malum', non est illi contraria, quia simul possunt esse uere, eo quod aliquod non bonum, quod non est bonum, est malum; nec similiter illa, 'Non bonum 10 non est malum', quia possunt simul esse uere, quia de iactu lapidis frustrato a fine, cadente super terram, et uerum est dicere quoniam non est bonum, nec etiam malum.

Deinde, *Relinquitur ergo* (23b40), concludit quod quarta secunde est contraria, et ex hoc ulterius infert 3^{am} contrariari prime, cum dicit, *Quare enim 15 que est* (24a2).

Et sequitur illa pars, *Manifestum est ergo* (24a3), in qua docet idem in uniuersalibus, scilicet quod illa est contraria que contrario modo opinatur, dicens quod nichil differt siue sumantur uniuersales siue infinite quantum ad hoc quod utrobique est illa contraria que contrario modo opinatur, et iterum 1vb 20 inter uniuersales / et indefinitas nulla differentia inter < eas > in essentiali materia. Et super hoc ponit exempla, ut patet.

Et sequitur illa pars, *Quare si in opinione* (24b1), in qua adaptat suam considerationem ad propositionem, dicens quod ex quo illa propositio est contraria que contrario modo opinatur, et similiter est in uoce sicut in opinione, 25 sic erit in uoce quod illa est contraria que contrario < modo > enuntiat, sicut exemplificat cum dicit, *ut ei que est* (24b4).

Et sequitur illa pars, *Manifestum est autem* (24b6), que incidit. Quia in precedentibus multociens suppositum, ueram uere non posse contrariari, ideo hoc ostendit hoc argumento: que sunt opposita contraria, ideo non possunt 30 simul esse uere; sed contraria sunt huiusmodi, ergo, etc. Huius rationis primo ponit conclusionem, dicens quod nec opinio, quantum ad ea que sunt in anima, nec contradictio, quantum ad ea que sunt in uoce, potest uera uere contrariari. 2^o, *contraria enim* (24b7), ponit minorem. Tertio, *circa idem* (24b8), docet qualiter intelligenda est conclusio, dicens quod contingit uere dicere contraria 35 de eodem. Hoc autem non est uerum simul et de eodem subiecto, sed uel de diuersis substantiis, uel de eodem in diuerso tempore.

4 propositionem] -tionis E

13 Relinquitur] -quatur E

18 differt] -tur E

23 considerationem] compositionem E

26 ei] enim E

30 huiusmodi] habetur E

31 post in del. uoce E

33 enim] cui E

36 diuerso] -sis E


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tibi Christe. Explicit expositio secundi libri *Periarmenias* sancti Thome de Aquino Ordinis Predicatorum. Sed finita fuit per magistrum Robertum de Vulgarbia Ordinis eorundem Predicatorum. Finis. E

< THOME DE SVTTON >

< CONTINVACIO EXPOSICIONIS SECVNDI LIBRI *PERIARMENIAS* ARISTOTILIS >

B 270vb *Intelligimus uero quod dicitur* (19b26). Manifestat quod supra dictum est in quadam figurali discriptione, dicens quod illud quod supra dictum est
 5 possumus intelligere ex hiis que subscripta sunt in figura. Et proponit primo affirmatiuam simplicem, que est 'Est iustus homo'; cuius negacio est 'Non est iustus homo', que ponenda est in eadem linea cum prima. Deinde proponit affirmatiuam infinitam, que collocanda est sub premissa negatiua simplici, hanc scilicet, 'Est non iustus homo'; cuius negacionem subiungit, que est 'Non est
 10 non iustus homo', que in eadem linea ponetur sub affirmatiua simplici. Et erit figura talis:



B 271ra Non est non iustus homo Est non iustus homo. /

In hac figura manifestum est quod sunt 4^{or} enunciaciones, in quarum duabus
 15 affirmatiuis hoc uerbum, 'est', affirmatum [est affirmatum] adiacet 'iusto' et 'non iusto'; in aliis autem negatiuis hoc ipsum, 'est', negatum adiacet eisdem. Et sunt disposite in figura sicut dictum est in *Resolutoriis* (19b31), scilicet in fine primi *Priorum*, ubi Aristotiles disponit hanc figuram, et ostendit quod ad unam affirmacionem sequitur alterius negacio, et non conuertitur.

20 Considerandum est autem quod in conuenienciis harum enunciacionum ad inuicem, quarum quasdam asserit Aristotiles, quasdam autem negat, non est intelligendum quod in enunciacionibus illis 'homo' sit subiectum, 'iustum' autem et 'non iustum' predicatum; sic enim non solum ad unam affirmacionem sequeretur alterius negacio, set e conuerso, sicut in figura patebit, quod tamen
 25 negat hic Aristotiles; set quod contra, enunciacio locum predcati habeat respectu alicuius subiecti, quod accipi potest sicut exposuit hunc locum Ammonius et similiter Boicius, quia sicut dictum est, enunciacio alica uirtute se habet ad illud de quo totum quod in ipsa figura uere enunciari potest. Et istam sententiam manifeste ponit Aristotiles in fine primi *Priorum*. In hoc autem loco
 30 dicit se habere eandem sententiam quam ibi.

17-18 Arist., *Anal. priora* 1. 46 (51b37-39) 27 Ammonius in *Periherm.* 10 (ed. Verbeke, p. 301) Boethius in *Periherm.*, 2a ed. 4.10 (ed. Meiser, 2. 272-74) 29 Arist., *Anal. priora* 1. 46 (51b37-39)

Deinde, cum dicit, *Similiter autem se habent*, etc. (19b32), agit de enunciacionibus in quibus subicitur nomen finitum uniuersaliter sumptum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ponit conuenienciam istarum ad illas de quibus iam ultimo dictum est; 2^o, differenciam, ibi, *Set non similiter* (19b35). Dicit ergo primo
 5 quod si sit uniuersalis affirmacio *nominis* (19b32), id est de nomine finito, quod proprie est nomen, tales enunciaciones se habent similiter secundum dispositionem figuralem et eciam secundum consequenciam illis de quibus iam dictum est: ut si accipiantur iste 4, 'Omnis homo est iustus', affirmatiua simplex, et eius negacio, que est 'Non omnis homo est iustus', similiter affirmatiua
 10 infinita, que est 'Omnis homo est non iustus', et eius negacio, que est 'Non omnis homo est non iustus', ad affirmacionem unam sequitur alterius negacio ex utraque parte, et non conuertitur, sicut patet intuenti. Similem uero habitudinem ponebat iam inter alias in quibus subiectum accipiendum est, uel accipiebatur, non uniuersaliter.

15 Attendendum est autem quod iste enunciaciones in consequendo sibi inuicem non optinent locum unius extremi tantum, scilicet predicati, sicut de precedentibus dictum est, cum signum uniuersale non sit addendum ad predicatum, sicut in primo huius dictum est; sed iste terminus, 'homo', est subiectum, 'iustum' uero et 'non iustum' predicatum.

20 Deinde, cum dicit, *Set non similiter angulares* (19b35), ostendit differenciam istarum ad predictas, dicens quod licet conueniant cum eis secundum habitudinem communem, tamen non similiter est in istis et illis quantum ad ueritatem: in illis enim contingit angulares semper simul esse ueras in contingenti materia, quia se habent ad inuicem ut subcontrarie; set in istis, licet
 25 contingat aliquando alicas angulares simul esse ueras, ut in contingenti materia, non tamen omnes, sicut in aliis. Et hoc est quia in istis quedam angulares sunt uniuersales, et se habent sicut contrarie.

Considerandum est autem quod enunciaciones in figura disposite plerumque nominantur ab earum situ quem tenent in discripcione figurali: ille enim
 30 dicuntur 'subalterne' quarum <una> sub altera ponitur, et 'subcontrarie' dicuntur que ponuntur sub enunciacionibus contrariis. Secundum hoc igitur dicuntur 'angulares', que non respiciunt se directe secundum sub et supra, set indirecte secundum angulos dyametri oppositos. Et secundum hoc patet que sunt angulares in proposito, supposita figura hic sicut prius de aliis dictum est.
 35 Iste enim sunt angulares, 'Omnis homo est iustus', 'Omnis homo est non iustus', et non possunt simul esse uere; similiter iste sunt angulares, 'Non omnis homo est iustus', 'Non omnis homo est non iustus', que sunt simul uere.

Quia uero subiecto uniuersaliter sumpto due fiunt oppositiones ex istis 4^{or} enunciacionibus, concludit ex dictis quod *hee* (19b37), scilicet enunciaciones quatuor, sunt *due opposite*, id est constituunt duas oppositiones, quarum una est cum predicato finito in affirmatiua et negatiua, alia est predicato utrobique
5 existente nomine infinito.

Deinde, cum dicit, *alie autem ad 'non homo'* (19b37), agit de enunciacionibus in quibus subicitur nomen infinitum, predicato se habente sicut in predictis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit oppositiones talium, dicens quod alie due oppositiones erunt si nomen finitum uel infinitum ex parte predicati additum
10 fuerit ad nomen infinitum, cuius est 'non homo', ut ad subiectum. Sic enim erunt 4^{or} enunciaciones et due oppositiones. Et exemplificat ponens 4^{or} enunciaciones, que sunt, 'Non homo est iustus', 'Non homo non est iustus', 'Non homo est non iustus', 'Non homo non est non iustus', in quibus manifeste sunt due oppositiones. Et quia iam distinxit omnes modos enunciacionum in
15 quibus predicatur hoc uerbum, 'est', ideo subiungit quod non possunt esse plures oppositiones enunciacionum in quibus ponitur hoc uerbum, 'est', quam iste que dicte sunt. Dictum est enim quod quando hoc uerbum, 'est', predicatur per se, due sunt oppositiones ex hoc quod subiectum potest accipi nomen finitum uel infinitum. Si autem predicatur 3^m adiacens, fiunt 4^{or} oppositiones:
20 aut enim utrumque extremum est finitum, et sic est una opposicio; aut utrumque infinita, et sic est [et sic est] secunda; aut subiectum finitum, predicatum infinitum, <et sic> est 3^a; aut e conuerso, et sic est quarta.

Pluribus autem modis non conuenit uariari enunciaciones ex parte extremorum in se. Vnde relinquitur quod tantum sint sex oppositiones
25 enunciacionum, de quibus dictum est; uerum est tamen quod in qualibet oppositione subiectum enunciacionum potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet uniuersaliter et non uniuersaliter, et sic duplicantur iste oppositiones, et fiunt xii. Ex parte uero predicati non multiplicantur per hoc quod predicatum sumitur uniuersaliter uel non uniuersaliter, quia signum uniuersale non est addendum
30 ad predicatum, sicut in primo huius dictum est.

Secundo, ibi, *he uero extra illas* (20a1-2), ostendit qualiter se habent iste enunciaciones que sunt de subiecto infinito ad alias que sunt de subiecto finito, dicens quod iste que utuntur eo quod est 'non homo' loco subiecti sunt extra
illas que sunt de subiecto finito, quia non communicant cum eis quantum ad
35 consequenciam, set sunt per se, quasi relictæ extra consorcium aliarum

29-30 c. 7, 17b15

19 oppositiones corr. in marg. ex enunciaciones B
infinito B sed del. in-

35 relictæ] relicarie B

29 non²] ideo B

32 finito]

quantum ad habitudinem communem: non potest enim esse alia habitudo inter duas enunciaciones que de rebus disparatis enunciant; tales autem sunt ille que enunciant de homine et non homine, et ideo hee sunt extra illas. Verum est tamen quod iste enunciaciones, scilicet de subiecto infinito, habent inter se
5 habitudinem, sicut in figura dicit.

71rb Deinde, cum dicit, *In hiis uero in quibus / 'est' non conuenit*, etc. (20a3), posita distincione enunciacionum in quibus predicatur expresse hoc uerbum, 'est', quod est primum et simplicissimum uerborum, ponit illas in quibus predicantur alia uerba. Et primo tangit earum oppositionem, dicens quod in
10 illis enunciacionibus in quibus hoc uerbum, 'est', non expresse ponitur ad predicatum, sed quedam alia uerba, ut 'currit' uel 'ambulat', idem faciunt quantum ad oppositionem illa alia uerba ac si adderetur hoc ipsum, 'est'. Et hoc ideo est, quia hoc ipsum, 'est', includitur in quolibet uerbo, una cum participio illius uerbi; idem enim est secundum rem, 'Homo currit' et 'Homo est currens'.
15 Et ita hoc ipsum, 'est', est in talibus secundum ueritatem uel uirtutem, et sensus uoce non exprimitur. Vnde necesse est quod similiter sit opposicio cum talibus uerbis in quibus uirtualiter est hoc uerbum, 'est', et cum illis in quibus exprimitur cum quodam adiecto. Et exemplificat, ut 'Omnis homo currit', 'Non omnis homo currit', que sunt affirmacio et negacio opposite de subiecto finito;
20 similiter, 'Currit omnis non homo', 'Non currit omnis non homo', que opponuntur de subiecto infinito. Iste enunciaciones heedem sunt illis in quibus predicatur hoc uerbum, 'est', adiacens huic predicato, 'currens', et ideo eodem modo opponuntur.

Attendendum est autem quod iste enunciaciones non multiplicantur propter
25 diuersitatem alicam ex parte predicati; non enim potest tale predicatum uariari per finitum et infinitum: negacio enim addita uerbo in enunciacione non constituit uerbum infinitum, set compositionem negat, ut sic remaneat enunciacio simpliciter negatiua ex hoc.

Et attendendum est quod cum talibus uerbis non possunt esse nisi 4^{or}
30 oppositiones, et per consequens viii enunciaciones.

Uterius patet quod in istis enunciacionibus non attenditur consequencia omnino sicut inter alias prius positas quarum predicata uariantur per finitum et infinitum. Istarum enim enunciacionum quelibet due accepte uel sunt opposite sicut affirmacio et negacio, sicut sunt ille due quarum utraque est de subiecto
35 finito uel ille quarum utraque est de subiecto infinito; uel sunt de disparatis subiectis, ut si una accipiatur de subiecto finito, et altera de subiecto infinito. Nunc neque potest esse consequencia inter oppositas, neque inter illas que sunt de disparatis subiectis. Vnde inter istas nulla habitudo potest inueniri.

Secundo, cum dicit, *non enim dicendum est*, etc. (20a7-8), reddit causam quare in illa que enunciat de nomine infinito magis posuit nomen infinitum hoc quod dico, 'non homo', quam hoc quod dico, 'non omnis'. Cum tamen utrumque sit nomen, et hoc ipsum, 'homo', et hoc ipsum, 'omnis', et dicit quod
 5 ideo dictum est in enunciacione de subiecto infinito, 'omnis non homo', quia non est dicendum, 'non omnis homo', ita quod hoc ipsum, 'non omnis', sit terminus infinitus; set nota negacionis infinitantis, que est 'non', addenda est ad illud quod est 'homo'.

Et hoc probatur dupliciter. Primo, per hoc quod hec diccio, 'omnis', non
 10 significat uniuersale, cum sit determinacio termini uniuersalis, et non sit terminus, set significat quoniam uniuersaliter accipitur suum determinabile quod est terminus subiectus. Set 'homo' est terminus uniuersalis; negacio autem infinitans est negacio termini uniuersalis: oportet igitur quod ad ipsum addatur negacio infinitans, et non ad hoc quod dico, 'omnis'. Secundo probat hoc ex
 15 differentia quam habent indiffinitas ad uniuersales, dicens quod hoc est magis manifestum inspiciendo ad istas indiffinitas, 'Currit homo', 'Non currit homo', 'Currit non homo', 'Non currit non homo'. Iste enim indiffinitas differunt ab uniuersalibus solum in hoc quod cum in uniuersalibus enunciacionibus uniuersalia sint accepta uniuersaliter, scilicet pro omnibus contentis, in
 20 indiffinitis non sunt accepta uniuersaliter propter carenciam huius quod dico, 'omnis' uel 'nullus', que significant talem modum accipiendi circa subiectum. In alico, uerò, nullo differunt ab eis, eo quod de eodem subiecto fit enunciacio utrobique, et idem predicatum enunciat de ipso. Ex quo manifestum est quod 'omnis' uel 'nullus' nichil aliud significant in istis enunciacionibus nisi talem
 25 modum accipiendi circa hominem, scilicet quoniam uniuersaliter de ipso sermo affirmat uel negat. Oportet ergo quod omnia alia ab istis determinacionibus ponantur in indiffinitis sicut in uniuersalibus ut subiecto. In hoc solo sit differentia, et hec differentia obseruetur et maneat: oportet quod ad hoc quod dico, 'omnis', non addatur negacio; si enim adderetur, non significaretur
 30 predicatum inesse subiecto uniuersaliter, set remoueretur modus uniuersalitatis per negacionem, et per consequens tolleretur per dictam differentiam que est uniuersalium ad indiffinitas.

Quoniam negacio contraria est ei, etc. (20a16). Postquam Philosophus distinxit enunciaciones et oppositiones earum et consequencias, in ista parte
 35 manifestat quedam que possunt esse dubia circa ea que dicta sunt, et diuiditur in 2 partes: in prima, primo manifestat quoddam prius dictum de ueritate quarundam enunciacionum; in secunda, manifestat quedam dubia circa transposicionem eorum que sunt in enunciacionibus, ibi, *Manifestum est autem quoniam et in singularibus* (20a23-24).

Circa primum considerandum est quod cum dixerit prius Aristotiles quod in
 uniuersalibus non contingit semper angulares simul esse ueras, set contingit
aliquando (19b37), non manifestauit que angulares sunt uere et qualiter, et que
 non possunt esse uere. Ideo ne hoc sub dubio relinquat, manifestat quod iste
 5 angulares uniuersales non possunt simul esse uere, 'Omnis homo est iustus',
 'Omnis homo est non iustus'; et quod iste angulares particulares possunt simul
 esse uere, 'Non omnis homo est iustus', 'Non omnis homo est non iustus'. Dicit
 ergo quod cum illi affirmatiue que est 'Omne animal est iustum' sit contraria illa
 negatiua que est 'Nullum animal est iustum', contrarie autem non possunt esse
 10 simul uere, sicut in primo dictum est, manifestum est quod iste nunquam erunt
 simul uere. Set oppositae istis possunt simul esse uere, ut 'Aliquod animal est
 iustum', 'Non omne animal est iustum'. Ut sibi utamur in exemplo hoc
 termino, 'homo', sicut prius dictum est, manifestum est quod iste non possunt
 simul esse uere, 'Omnis homo est iustus', 'Nullus homo est iustus'. Ad istam
 15 uero que est 'Nullus homo est iustus' sequitur illa que est 'Omnis homo est non
 iustus', que non differt realiter ab ea. Ex quo patet quod nec iste possunt simul
 esse uere, 'Omnis homo est iustus', 'Omnis homo est non iustus', quas prius
 uocauit *angulares* (19b36). Sic igitur angulares uniuersales non possunt simul
 esse uere, et eodem modo manifestat quod angulares earum conuenit simul esse
 20 ueras, cum non dictum sit quod iste possunt esse simul uere, 'Aliquis homo est
 iustus', 'Non omnis < homo > est iustus'. Ad hanc uero que est 'Aliquis homo
 est iustus' sequitur ista, 'Non omnis homo est non iustus', que non differt ab ea
 realiter; *necesse est enim aliquem esse* (20a23), scilicet necessario si 'Non omnis
 homo est non iustus': et ista consequentia se conuertitur.
 25 Manifestum est ex hoc quod iste possunt simul esse uere, 'Non omnis homo
 est iustus', 'Non omnis homo est non iustus'. / Set quod hic dicitur quod ad
 illam que est 'Nullus homo est iustus' sequitur illa que est 'Omnis homo est non
 iustus', dubium uidetur. Primo enim uidetur esse contra illud quod Aristotiles
 primo determinauit, scilicet quod licet ad affirmatiuam de predicato infinito
 30 sequatur negatiua simplex, non tamen conuertitur, ut ad negationem de
 predicato finito sequatur affirmacio de predicato infinito. Negat igitur ibi,
Videtur (c. 7, 17b34), consequentiam quam hic concedit. Nec ualet si ad hoc
 dicatur quod ibi negat talem consequentiam in indiffinitis; hic autem concedit
 in uniuersalibus et in singularibus. Illud enim non excusat, quia sicut se habet
 35 uniuersalis ad uniuersalem, sic indiffinita ad indiffinitam, cum indiffinite non
 differunt ab uniuersalibus nisi per carenciam singni. Singnum autem non potest

9-10 c. 7, 17b23

23-26 *necesse ... iustus² in marg. B*

esse causa talis consequencie. Vana igitur est ratio quare ista consequencia debeat concedi et illa negari.

Secundo, uidetur quod hec consequencia non teneat, quia hec negatiua, 'Nullus homo est iustus', sicut et alie negatiue, habet duas causas ueritatis: aut
5 quia nullus homo est; aut quia omnis homo est, set tamen est non iustus. Ista autem que est 'Omnis homo est non iustus' non uidetur habere primam causam ueritatis set secundam, cum in affirmatiua subiectum stet tantum pro hiis que sunt. Est ergo hic processus ab illa que habet plures causas ueritatis ad unam illarum, et ita fallacia consequentis.

10 Et totum hoc quidam concesserunt, aliter exponentes literam Aristotilis sic, quod non intendit absolute asserere hanc consequenciam, set solum cum constancia subiecti, ita scilicet quod subiectum accipiat pro existentibus tantum, et ad hoc denotandum dicens quod *necesse est aliquem esse* (20a23); absolute autem neganda est consequencia, propter hoc quod subiectum in
15 negatiua stat pro pluribus quam in affirmatiua. Et sic locutus est Aristotiles prius, ubi negauit consequenciam affirmatiue de predicato infinito ad negatiuam de predicato finito.

Set si quis inspiciat illud, est penitus impossibile, et ad ipsum multa inconueniencia sequantur. Si enim pro pluribus stat terminus in negatiua quam
20 in affirmatiua, enunciaciones contradictorie simul erunt uere, ut iste, 'Omnis homo est animal', que est uera pro entibus, et 'Aliquis homo non est animal', que est uera pro non entibus. Propterea, si ita esset quod particularis negatiua posset conuerti, eo quod non inueniretur instanti ubi ex uero sequeretur falsum, propterea uni affirmationi essent [essent] plures negaciones opposite. Illa enim
25 affirmatiua que tantum enunciat de hiis que sunt, non opponitur sufficienter negatiue que enunciat tam de hiis que non sunt, quam de hiis que sunt. Et ita requiritur alica affirmatiua que cum ipsa opponatur sibi.

Istas uero deducciones quidam conantur euadere, dicentes ad duas primas quod hec est falsa, 'Aliquis homo non est animal'; non tamen propter hoc quod
30 iste terminus, 'homo', stet solum pro homine qui est, set propter hoc quod ab alico homine, siue ente, siue non ente, remouetur animal, tam pro animalibus que sunt, quam pro hiis que non sunt. Et hinc est quod particularis negatiua non conuertitur, quia hac existente uera, 'Aliquod animal non est homo', hec est falsa, 'Aliquis homo non est animal', et similiter est de aliis.

35 Ad 3^{am} uero dicunt quod non obstante quod in negatiua subiectum supponit pro hiis que sunt et pro hiis que non sunt, sibi tamen opponitur tantum una

15-17 19b22-26

10 *post concesserunt del. Aristotilis B*

affirmatiua, illa scilicet, in qua implicatur subiectum accipi pro eiisdem, ut ista negacio, 'Aliquis homo non est animal', contradicit hanc, 'Omnis homo qui est uel qui non est, est animal'. Vel aliter dicunt quod negatiua dupliciter potest considerari: uel pro <eo> quod negatiua est, et sic subiectum in ea potest
5 supponere pro hiis que non sunt, et pro hiis que sunt; aut secundum quod opponitur affirmatiue, et sic solum pro eis que sunt.

Set ista sunt omnino friuola. Cum enim dicitur ad primum quod predicatum remouetur a subiecto, tam pro hiis que sunt, quam pro hiis que non sunt, aut hoc est copulatiue pro omnibus simul, aut disiunctiue, ita ut habeantur diuerse
10 cause ueritatis pro hiis que sunt et pro hiis que non sunt. Et si isto secundo modo, ista erit uera, 'Aliquis homo non est animal', et consimiles pro alica causa: et per consequens, priores rationes necessario concludebant. Si autem secundo modo respondeatur quod tales propositiones sint false, 'Hoc album non est nigrum', 'Hoc calidum non est frigidum', 'Cesar non est homo', et sic de
15 aliis huiusmodi, eadem ratione qua hec ponitur esse falsa, 'Aliquis homo non est animal', et per consequens iste erunt uere, 'Hoc album est nigrum', 'Hoc calidum est frigidum': quod est absurdum. Et propterea, secundum hoc hec consequencia esset concedenda, 'Nullus homo est iustus, ergo omnis homo est non iustus'; consequens enim includeretur in antecedente. Si enim neque homo
20 qui est, neque qui non est, sit iustus, sequitur quod nullus homo qui est, sit iustus, et per consequens quod omnis homo qui est, est non iustus. Ergo a primo ad ultimum, sequitur absolute, 'Nullus homo est iustus, ergo omnis homo est non iustus'. In hoc ergo quod negant hanc consequenciam, et cum hoc dicunt negacionem negare, tam pro hiis que sunt, quam pro hiis que non
25 sunt, dicunt repugnancia.

Similiter ea que dicunt ad secundam deduccionem uane sunt. Ex primo enim dicto sequitur quod non est possibile in duabus oppositis affirmare aliquid et negare de eodem sub eadem uoce significata; set quod necesse sit quod in una accipiatur subiectum sine implicacione addita, quod in altera cum implicacione
30 quadam proferatur: quod est contra naturam contradiccionis et contrarietatis, et contra omnes auctores.

Aliud eciam quod dicunt stare non potest, quia negatiua, secundum quod negatiua est, opponitur affirmatiue: ergo eius subiectum pro eiisdem et equalibus supponit secundum quod opponitur affirmatiue, et secundum quod
35 negatiua est. Propterea in enunciacione terminus respicit contenta pro quibus supponit, existens que sunt intrinseca enunciacioni, siue hoc sit per significacionem termini, siue per aliquod adiunctum termino; set comparacio unius enunciacionis ad aliam, ut negatiue ad affirmatiuam cui opponitur, non est

intrinsicam enunciacioni, nec etiam quod consideratur secundum quod negatiua est: ergo terminus non supponit pro paucioribus uel pluribus propter talem consideracionem uel comparacionem, set qualitercumque consideratur, necesse est terminum stare pro eisdem et equalibus numero, dummodo ipsa enunciacio
5 in se non uariatur.

Remanent igitur inconueniencia ad que deducebantur ex hoc quod dicunt terminum pro pluribus stare in negatiua quam in affirmatiua; et etiam multa alia sequuntur, que longum esset pertractare, propter quod dicendum quod pro tot et eisdem supponit terminus in affirmatiua et in negatiua que sibi opponitur,
10 et etiam in negatiua de predicato finito, et etiam in affirmatiua de predicato infinito. Vnde in istis duabus, 'Nullus homo est iustus', 'Omnis homo est non iustus', de eisdem negatur esse iustum in una, quibus attribuitur esse non iustum in alia. Ex quo patet quod necesse est consequencia utriusque ad aliam. Cum enim esse iustum et esse non iustum dicantur de omnibus – nam esse non
15 iustum dicitur de quolibet de quo non dicitur 'iustum', siue sit ens siue non ens – oportet quod ad remocionem iusti ab omnibus hominibus, sequatur attribucio non iusti eisdem, et e conuerso. Sequitur ergo, 'Nullus homo est iustus, ergo omnis homo est non iustus', et e conuerso; immo illud idem quod significat una, significat et altera, diuersimode tamen quantum ad aliquid. Et illud totum
20 est de mente Boecii.

Quod autem obicitur primo, quod hoc sit contra illud quod Aristotiles prius dixit: dicendum quod non, quia prius quando negauit affirmatiuam de predicato infinito sequi ad negatiuam de predicato finito, fiebat sermo de enunciacionibus cum predicato composito ex duabus dictionibus, cuius est ista, 'Est homo
25 iustus', 'Est homo non iustus'. Hic autem loquitur de enunciacionibus habentibus simplicia predicata, cuius sunt esse iustum et esse non iustum. Vnde alia est illa consequencia quam ibi negat, ab ista quam hic concedit. Causa autem quare illa est neganda, hec autem concedenda, est ista: predicatum compositum finitum negatiuum in plus est quam predicatum compositum cum
30 altero termino infinito affirmatum; in plus enim est non esse hominem iustum, quod conuenit non solum hominibus iniustis, set etiam omnibus aliis ab homine, ut equo et lapidi, quam esse hominem non iustum, quod tantum conuenit hominibus iniustis. Si igitur procedebatur a tali predicato, negato de alico subiecto, ad talem predicatum, affirmatum de eodem, fit fallacia
35 consequentis, a pluribus causis ueritatis ad unam illarum, sicut si argueretur sic: 'Non est homo, ergo est asinus'. Set hoc predicatum simplex negatum, non

20 Cf. Boethius in *Periherm.*, 2a ed. 4. 10 (ed. Meiser, 2. 327-31)

10 negatiua] affirmatiua B

esse iustum, non est in plus quam predicatum infinitum quod est esse non iustum, set est ei conuertibile. Et ideo necesse est sequi, si omnis homo non est iustus, quod neque ualet 'Nullus homo est iustus', neque 'Omnis homo est non iustus'. /

5 Ad secundum, dicendum quod sicut hec, 'Nullus homo est iustus', habet istam causam ueritatis, 'Nullus homo est', ita ista, 'Omnis homo est non iustus', habet eandem. Sequitur enim, 'Si nullus homo est, omnis homo est non iustus', cum 'non iustus' uere dicatur de quolibet non ente: unde non est ibi fallacia consequentis. Set intelligendum est quod licet ista, 'Nullus homo est', sit causa
10 ueritatis utriusque, non tamen oportet quod in illis iste terminus, 'homo', supponat pro homine qui non est, sicut patet in simile, licet sequatur, 'Asinus qui currit est homo, ergo aliquis homo currit'. Iste terminus, 'homo', in consequente non supponit pro asino; non enim oportet terminum in consequente supponere pro eo quod false denotatur per antecedens, set pro eo pro
15 quo supponit in antecedente ipso uere, ratione cuius tenet consequentia. Vnde si in ipso antecedente, 'Asinus qui currit est homo', iste terminus, 'homo' [homo], supponeret pro asino, sicut supponeret si uerum esset, tunc in consequente iste terminus, 'homo', supponeret pro asino: et similiter in proposito, scilicet in ista, 'Nullus homo est', iste terminus, 'homo', supponeret
20 pro homine qui non est, sicut contingeret si esset sicut sermo significat. Similiter in ista que est 'Nullus homo est iustus', supponeret pro homine qui non est, et similiter in ista, 'Omnis homo est non iustus'. Set ita non est, quia in ista, 'Nullus homo est', subiectum supponit tantum pro entibus.

Deinde, cum dicit, *Manifestum est autem quoniam*, etc. (20a23-24), manifestat quedam que possent esse dubia circa dicciones positas in predictis enunciacionibus. Est autem considerandum quod tantum duo posita sunt in eis, scilicet nomina et uerba, signa uniuersalia et nota negacionis que est 'non'. Secundum hoc igitur hec pars diuiditur in duas partes: in quarum prima manifestat quedam circa negacionem, ex cuius transposicione accidit diuersitas
30 in enunciacione; in secunda ostendit quod ex transposicione nominum et uerborum nulla accidit diuersitas, *Transposita uero nomina et uerba* (20b1). Que autem diuersitas accidit ex signis dictum est supra. Prima diuiditur in duas: in prima manifestat quandam diuersitatem circa negacionem secundum quod facit enunciacionem negatiuam uel equipollentem negatiue; secundo, manifestat quedam circa negacionem termini subiecti, *Ille uero secundum infinita*
35 (20a31).

32 20a9-15

2-4 Et ... iustus in marg. B 3 neque²] ergo B 14 false] falso B 14-17 pro quo ... asino in marg. B 26 duo] tria B

Dicit quod in enunciacionibus singularibus manifestum est quod cum interrogatur aliquod predicatum simplex, affirmat tamen de alico singulari. Si uerum sit negare illud, uerum est et illud affirmare cum predicato infinito: uerbi gracia, si queratur 'Putasne Socrates sapiens est?', et uere respondendo dicatur
 5 'Non', uere poterit inferri hec affirmatiua de predicato infinito, 'Ergo Socrates est non sapiens'. In uniuersalibus igitur enunciacionibus, licet uere negetur interrogatum tale, non tamen uera erit affirmacio de predicato infinito. Si inferatur negatiua in qua preponitur negacio, tota illa uera erit, ut si queratur 'Putasne omnis homo sapiens est?', quamuis uere respondeatur 'Non', tamen
 10 falsum erit concludere ipsam conclusionem, 'Omnis homo est non sapiens', qua ostendit contrariam interrogati, hanc scilicet, 'Nullus homo sapiens est', sicut supra dictum est. Set uere potest inferri hec, 'Ergo non omnis homo sapiens est', que contradictorie opponitur interrogato. Et sic patet quod in uniuersalibus uariatur opposicio et consequencia ex diuerso situ negacionis, non autem in
 15 singularibus.

Causa autem huius diuersitatis est quod uniuersalis affirmatiua habet duas enunciaciones sibi oppositas, quarum utraque instat, scilicet, et negat eam. Quia enim in eius subiecto inportatur multitudo suppositorum, quibus omnibus denotatur conuenire predicatum, opponitur igitur una enunciacio in qua
 20 denotatur predicatum remoueri ab omnibus illis, et est eius contraria, et alica eciam in qua denotatur predicatum remoueri a subiecto pro alica parte sue multitudinis, et est eius contradictoria. Si autem negetur uniuersalis affirmatiua, non sequitur ex hoc quod concedi debeat sua contraria, eo quod contrarie possunt simul esse false; set necesse est concedere suam contradictoriam, eo
 25 quod in contradictoriis, si una est falsa, relicta est uera. Et propter hoc quando interrogatur uniuersalis affirmatiua, et negatur a respondente, manifestum est quod non potest inferri uniuersalis negatiua que est eius contraria, nec per consequens affirmatiua uniuersalis de predicato infinito, que sibi equipollet, set particularis negatiua, que est eius contradictoria. Singularis autem enunciacio
 30 affirmatiua non habet nisi unam sibi oppositam, propter carenciam multitudinis in subiecto quod est singulare. Qualitercumque enim transponitur negacio, siue ante subiectum, siue post, siue ad predicatum relinquendo ipsum infinitum, propter illud penitus significatur. Et cum de una et eadem secundum numerum non possunt simul affirmacio et negacio opposite esse false, oportet quod ad
 35 negacionem unius altera concedatur. Istam igitur causam Aristotiles tangit in litera cum dicit, *hec autem opposita, illa uero contraria* (20a30).

10-12 20a21

4 uere] uerus *B*

10 ipsam conclusionem *corr.* ex ipsum conclusio *B*

Est autem et hic attendendum quod hanc, 'Omnis homo qui est, est non sapiens', affirmatiuam de predicato infinito, Aristotiles uocat contrariam huic, 'Omnis homo est sapiens'; quod non faceret nisi ualeat ista, 'Nullus homo est sapiens'. Et ita oportet quod inter istas duas que sunt 'Omnis homo est < non > sapiens', 'Nullus homo est sapiens', sit mutua consequentia, sicut supra expositum est.

Deinde, cum dicit, *Illa uero secundum infinita* (20a31), manifestat quedam circa negacionem infinitantem subiectum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo, ostendit quod talis negacio non constituit oracionem simpliciter negatiuam, ita quod nomina infinita uel uerba sint simpliciter negaciones, dicens quod ille dicciones que contraponuntur nominibus finitis et uerbis per hoc quod fiunt infinite, ut 'non homo', 'non iustus', 'non currit', licet uideantur esse negaciones eorum et facere oppositionem cum eis sine nomine uel uerbo, ita scilicet quod nomen infinitum sine uerbo uidetur opponi nomini finito, et uerbum infinitum sine nomine uerbo finito, tamen non sunt uere negaciones. Et hoc manifestum est ex hoc quod propter < ea > necesse est omnem negacionem esse ueram uel falsam; illa uero infinita neque significant uerum, neque falsum, si non aliquid aliud additur. Qui enim dicit, 'non homo', nichil dicit de homine, ita quod ab eo aliquid negat, ut si dicat uerum complexum uel falsum, magis quam diceret, 'homo'. Set potius minus uerum significat 'non homo' quam 'homo', accipiendo uerum incomplexum, et hoc ideo quia nomen finitum, ut 'homo', significat quendam conceptum finitum; infinitum uero nomen, ut 'non homo', omnes alias species ab homine indifferenter dat intelligere, naturam tamen earum finite significat: immo infinite se habet ad ens et non ens, propter quod ex eius prolacione minus quiescit animus audientis quam ex prolacione nominis finiti.

Secundo, autem, cum dicit, *Significat autem* (20a37), manifestat quedam circa enunciaciones habentes subiectum infinitum per comparacionem ad illas que sunt de subiecto finito. Quia enim dictum est prius quod ille que sunt de predicato infinito idem significant aliquando cum illis que sunt de predicato finito, et inter eas est consequentia, ne credatur talis esse comparacio inter aliquas que habent subiectum infinitum et illas que habent subiectum finitum, ostendit quod non, dicens quod illa que est 'Omnis non homo est iustus' non significat idem cum aliquo illarum que sunt de subiecto finito, siue sint affirmatiue, siue negatiue; similiter nec sua opposita, que est 'Non omnis non homo est iustus': et huius ratio est quia illa de quibus enunciatum predicatum in istis et in illis sunt penitus diuersa, propter quod non est consequentia unius ad

29-31 19b36

1 qui] que B

post est² del. non B

34 finito] infinito B

alterum, sicut nec inter duas enunciaciones quarum una enunciat de homine, et alia de asino. Verumptamen, due enunciaciones quarum utraque habet subiectum infinitum possunt idem significare, et inter eas potest esse consequencia; illa enim que est 'Omnis non homo est non iustus' idem significat
 5 cum ista, 'Nullus non homo est iustus'.

Attendendum est autem quod hic dicit Aristotiles expresse quod idem significat affirmatiua de predicato infinito cum negatiua de predicato finito. Ex quo patet quod contra mentem eius est quod quidam dixerunt, talem negatiuam non inferre talem affirmatiuam.

- 10 Deinde, cum dicit, *Transposita uero nomina et uerba* (20b1), ostendit quod transposicio nominum et uerborum non facit

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11 nominum ... facit in marg. et hic desinit B

FOUR MIDDLE ENGLISH RELIGIOUS LYRICS FROM THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY*

Thomas J. Heffernan

ALTHOUGH much Middle English verse has been published to date, there still remains important unedited material¹ that represents more than the odd scribal 'scraps and scribbles', rhymed couplets or 'tags' appearing in manuscript margins – as is evident from the four Middle English lyrics published here for the first time. The lyrics are from Cambridge University Library Additional ms. 2585 (b). It is a misnomer, however, to refer to 2585 as a manuscript; rather it is a heterogeneous unbound collection consisting of ten distinct English fragments from the late thirteenth to the early nineteenth century, the contents including such pieces as the present lyrics, a fragment from the *Vita B sancti Oswaldi* from the 'South English Legendary', a sixteenth-century account of wages, a note on the history of Communion under both species, etc.²

The four lyrics edited below are written on a single vellum bifolium (167 × 130 mm.) of the late thirteenth/early fourteenth century. For clarity I shall refer to the four sides of the bifolium as if they were two distinct folios, thus fols. 1r, 1v, 2r, and 2v. From the evidence of the pricking at the top and bottom center of the bifolium it appears that it may once have served as part of a bookbinding. Indeed, this supposition is strengthened on closer observation of the smudging of the bifolium. Such smudging might well have resulted from glue or damp while the bifolium was part of a binding or pastedown. The exposure has been so deleterious, especially in the case of fol. 2v, as to make the writing very difficult to read even with the aid of an ultra-violet lamp.

* I would like to thank the Syndics of Cambridge University Library for permission to publish the text. A special note of thanks is due to Mrs. J. Cook and the staff of the Cambridge University Library manuscript room who were at all times courteous and helpful. I would also like to thank Professors A. G. Rigg and George Kane for their most helpful suggestions. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the American Philosophical Society and the John C. Hodges Better English Fund for their support which was instrumental in carrying out this work.

¹ R. H. Robbins, 'Middle English Lyrics: Handlist of New Texts', *Anglia* 83 (1965) 35-45.

² Mrs. J. Cook is presently engaged in preparing a complete description of medieval Additional Manuscripts.

With the exception of a small excision of the upper and lower right-hand corners of fol. 1r (19 × 6 mm./35 × 15 mm.), the bifolium is intact. The leaves were not lined in preparation for copying. From the evidence of the marginal pricking and the width of the margins above and below the texts (16 × 8 mm.), it appears certain that this is the original size of the bifolium. It is difficult to speculate about the use or the ownership of the original manuscript on the basis of a single fragment, but if we assume that the present bifolium was the outside leaves in a quire contained in a manuscript of this size or in a fascicle written as an independent unit,³ we may deduce that the manuscript was easily portable. Codices of approximately this size with similar edifying lyrics were not uncommon in the late thirteenth/early fourteenth century: some examples are Trinity College, Cambridge B. 14. 39 (185 × 135 mm.), Jesus College, Oxford 29 (185 × 140 mm.), London, British Library Harley 913 (170 × 135 mm.). The portability of the manuscript, then, combined with the homiletic tone of the verse, suggests that our fragment was part of a longer text written by or for a mendicant. Some parallels are evident in the Franciscan John of Grimestone's Preaching Book.⁴

³ For a discussion of collaborative scribal effort and the production and binding of fascicles of similar content in volumes for the private patron, see *The Auchinleck Manuscript. National Library of Scotland Advocates' ms. 19.2.1*, with an introduction by Derek Pearsall and I. C. Cunningham (Ilkley, Yorks., 1977), pp. vii-ix; L. H. Loomis observes that the Auchinleck ms. was the product of several collaborators and was copied in a London bookshop; see 'The Auchinleck Manuscript and a Possible London Bookshop of 1330-1340', *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* 57 (1942) 595-627. E. J. Hathaway, P. T. Ricketts, C. A. Robson, and A. D. Wilshire, eds., *Fouke le Fitz Waryn* (ANTS 26-28; Oxford, 1975), p. xlv note that London, British Library Royal 12.C.xii was produced originally as eight independent units, each of which contained from one to four quires which they call 'booklets'. See also A. G. Rigg, 'Medieval Latin Poetic Anthologies (I)', *Mediaeval Studies* 39 (1977) 287-93; A. G. Little and F. Pelster, *Oxford Theology and Theologians 1282-1302* (Oxford, 1934), pp. 56-64 ('The Pecia and Some Characteristics of Oxford Scholastic Manuscripts'); H. S. Bennett, 'Medieval English Manuscripts and Contemporary Taste', *Edinburgh Bibliographical Society Transactions* 2 (1938-45) 382-83; P. R. Robinson, *A Study of Some Aspects of the Transmission of English Verse Texts in Late Medieval Manuscripts* (unpublished B. Litt. thesis, Oxford, 1972), especially chap. 2 'Nugae palaeographicae' (pp. 17-40); G. Pollard, 'The pecia System in the Medieval Universities' in *Medieval Scribes, Manuscripts and Libraries: Essays Presented to N. R. Ker*, ed. M. B. Parkes and Andrew G. Watson (London, 1978), pp. 145-61.

⁴ Edward Wilson, *A Descriptive Index of the English Lyrics in John of Grimestone's Preaching Book* (Medium aevum Monographs, N. S. 2; Oxford, 1973). Wilson gives the size of ms. Advocates' Library 18.7.21 as 6.9 × 4.7 inches. This similarity of size, the presence of the 'certus/incertus' *sententia* (p. 26, no. 125), and the fact that Grimestone was a Franciscan are all very interesting parallels to both the text and contents of Additional ms. 2585 (b). Portable manuscripts containing aphoristic and proverbial verses from the period c. 1275-1375 often were either the products of the mendicants or used by them; cf. G. L. Brook, ed., *The Harley Lyrics: The Middle English Lyrics of ms. Harley 2253*, 4th edition (Manchester, 1968), especially nos. 12, 14, and 23. See *Religiöse Dichtung im englischen Hochmittelalter*, ed. Karl Reichl (Munich, 1973), p. 14 for a discussion of Trinity College, Cambridge B. 14. 39; for Jesus College,

The bifolium is interesting from a palaeographic point of view, for it was copied by two skilled hands. The script of the first hand (fol. 1r-v) is primarily a Textura with some Anglicana features, while that of the second (fol. 2r-v), though also a Textura, shows a greater reliance on Anglicana. Salient features of both hands suggest a date as early as the late thirteenth century.⁵

It is necessary to examine in more detail my assumption that the present bifolium was the outside leaves in a quire. The evidence that this bifolium is indeed from a distinct quire, and not a *pecia* or membrane from a roll, rests chiefly (but not solely) on the presence of arabic numerals in the bifolium.⁶ The bifolium contains 168 lines;⁷ the first, second and last lyric are numbered '1',

Oxford 29, see *The Proverbs of Alfred*, ed. O. Arngart, 2 vols. (Lund, 1955), 2. 35-38. N. R. Ker, in his introduction to the facsimile of *The Owl and the Nightingale* (EETS 251; Oxford, 1963), p. xii, suggests that the leaves of Jesus ms. 29 'have been cut down by the binder to measure 185 × 140 mm.'; he does not estimate the original size before cutting, but the amount excised is not apt to have been great. R. H. Robbins, 'Signs of Death in Middle English', *Mediaeval Studies* 32 (1970) 291, identifies the Jesus codex as a Franciscan ms. of c. 1275. Earlier, in his 'Authors of Middle English Lyrics', *Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 39 (1940) 230-38, Robbins states that Harley 913 and Oxford, Bodleian Library Digby 86 are Franciscan while Trinity College, Cambridge B. 14. 29-30 (323) is Dominican (following Brown); and Pembroke College, Cambridge 258 is a 'parish priest's book', while Harley 2253 is a monastic collection. See also J. B. Monda, "'The Sayings of Saint Bernard" from MS Bodleian Additional E 6', *Mediaeval Studies* 32 (1970) 300. For a discussion of the penitential lyric see F. A. Patterson, *The Middle English Penitential Lyric: A Study and Collection of Early Religious Verse* (New York, 1911), especially pp. 1-45.

⁵ As we might expect in careful Textura hands of this period (s. xiii ex./xiv in.) and locale, the differences in letter formation are not very great. The hands differ mainly in the manner in which they articulate slight variations within basic letter formation. In both can be seen the presence of the headless *a*, common in Textura bookhands; the biting present in *de* and *bo*; the shaft in *t* only infrequently pierces the headstroke; *t* and *c* are not distinguished; *u* and *n* are not carefully distinguished; the 2 form of the *r* is consistently used after *o*; both long *s* and the round form of *s* are present but with the latter occurring more frequently as the majuscule in hand 1, and more mixed usage in hand 2 (this round majuscule *S* has been labeled a mumpsimus by C. Revard with a *terminus ad quem* of 1300). The second hand shows 'horns' on the tops of the ascenders of *l*, *b*, and *h*; contraction is rather infrequent in both hands with the exception of the characteristic English abbreviation of *er* at the end of the word; the Tironian note for *and* does not occur; the *i* receives an oblique stroke when it appears with other minims; the graph *g* has the characteristic angularity of the small 'gothic' bookhands of this period; the second hand makes occasional use of serifs; *p* is used throughout for *th* with the exception of a few instances in the second hand; *w* is used throughout; *j* never occurs; new stanzas are indicated by rubricated paragraph notations in the margin.

⁶ For a discussion of arabic numerals and their appearance in English manuscripts of the twelfth century see L. C. Hector, *The Handwriting of English Documents* (London, 1958), pp. 42-43, 122; N. Denholm-Young, *Handwriting in England and Wales* (Cardiff, 1954), p. 79. Dr. Carter Revard kindly reviewed my photographs of the bifolium and informed me that the arabic numeral 9 over the last item has a shape similar to the arabic numeral 9 in ms. Digby 86, a Worcestershire collection copied in the last third of the thirteenth century.

⁷ In arriving at the line totals for fols. 1r-2v, I have counted the long line (those lines bisected by medial rhyme) as the equivalent of two lines and also counted the tail rhymes. My point in

'2', and '9'; the third lyric, unnumbered, is acephalous and was presumably originally No. 8; the second lyric ends incomplete at the foot of fol. 1v. The missing text between fols. 1v and 2r must have contained the end of poem 2, Nos. 3-7, and the beginning of No. 8; these may have occupied one, two, or three bifolia. The last lyric, No. 4 (originally No. 9), may be incomplete: if so, this putative quire may have been followed by another quire or a single leaf.⁸ If my assumption is accurate, we may infer that gatherings of English religious and/or secular verses similar to those in the famous London, British Library Harley 2253 (c. 1340) were being collected and circulated at least half a century before the Harley scribe began his collection.⁹ Further, as the linguistic provenance of Cambridge University Library Add. ms. 2585 (b) points to the northeast midlands (perhaps central Lincolnshire, see below) it is reasonable to conclude that the west midlands, the area believed chiefly responsible for such alliterative religious lyrics, was not alone in the composition of the lyrics at this early date.

The first lyric, 'Bird us neure blipe be', seventy-two lines in six 12-line stanzas, is a meditation on the inevitability of death and the Christian's place in a transient universe.¹⁰ The first 6 lines of this lyric are a version of the popular brief penitential mnemonic piece 'Three Sorrowful Things',¹¹ extant in seventeen manuscripts (see *Index*, nos. 695, 1615, 3711-13, 3969, and *Supplement*, nos. 550.5, 738.5 and 3199.5). Robbins describes our poem as 'Recollections of mortality [in] six 6-line tailrhyme stanzas'.¹² This remark needs some emendation. First, the poem appears in the Cambridge bifolium as six carefully written stanzas – each stanza being clearly marked, in the first instance with a majuscule *B* in red and thereafter by five rubricated paragraph marks for each of the five stanzas. The paragraph marks regularly occur at every ninth line. Second, the four lines (3, 6, 9, and 12 written to the right of the pairs of lines) comprising the tail-rhyme are clearly linked by a faint red line (written to the far right in the margin) which indicates quite unambiguously that the four are part of the stanza unit, and in each stanza all four lines rhyme on one sound,

doing this was to estimate the total line space available to, and likely to have been used by, the copyist.

⁸ The last item in the bifolium occurs here in two stanzas but is also found in the Harley Lyrics (no. 29) where it has seven stanzas. See *Facsimile of British Museum ms. Harley 2253*, with an introduction by N. R. Ker (EETS 255; Oxford, 1965), fol. 106r, arts. 73 and 74.

⁹ See R. H. Robbins' thorough discussion of this idea in his review of Theo Stemmler's *Die englischen Liebesgedichte des ms. Harley 2253* (Bonn, 1962) in *Anglia* 82 (1964) 509.

¹⁰ R. H. Robbins and J. Cutler, eds., *Supplement to the Index of Middle English Verse* (Lexington, Ky., 1965), pp. 62, 86, 354; Robbins, 'Handlist of New Texts', 41.

¹¹ C. Brown, ed., *English Lyrics of the XIIIth Century* (Oxford, 1922), pp. 18-19.

¹² Robbins, 'Handlist of New Texts', 41.

producing a pattern *aabccbddbeeb*. Third, the eight lines which comprise three fourths of each stanza, i.e., the *aa*, *cc*, *dd*, *ee* lines, are also linked with faint red lines to the four tail-rhyme lines; once again this indicates clearly that the scribe was intent on copying a lyric of six 12-line stanzas and not six 6-line tail-rhyme stanzas. Finally, Robbins' description accounts for only the first 36 lines and ignores the last 36 lines of the poem, which might lead us to believe, erroneously, that the last 36 lines comprise an entirely new and unrecorded Middle English lyric.

Each of the six stanzas is arranged on the page as four couplets down the left portion of the leaf and with a corresponding series of four monorhyme lines written directly to the right of these couplets; each monorhyme-quatrain is integral to the 8-line stanzas. This is a common way of arranging such a tail-line stanza in manuscripts. I have rearranged the form below so that we have six 12-line stanzas rhyming *aabccbddbeeb*. Each line has four stresses, usually in trochaic metre.

The question as to whether the entire poem is an expansion of the opening and well-known 'Three Sorrowful Things' or whether the first 6 lines represent an abbreviation is difficult to answer with certainty. To be sure, expansion of this type of penitential verse is not uncommon. For example, a popular *memento mori* 'Erthe upon Erthe' occupies four lines in Harley ms. 2253, eighty-four lines in Harley ms. 913, and, by the mid-fifteenth century in Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Rawl. poet. 32, it is 132 lines long.¹³

The first 6 lines of the poem have a rich, complex history which bears on the enormous popularity of these proverbial lyrics in England during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In this instance two traditions, classical and early medieval, at first apparently independent, merge only to reappear in the mid-twelfth century as the archetype of the present proverbial moralizations on death.¹⁴

¹³ Hilda M. R. Murray, ed., *Erthe upon Erthe* (EETS OS 141; London, 1911), pp. 1-4, 20-23.

¹⁴ The motif of the 'Three Sorrowful Things' appears to have had considerable popularity from antiquity through the Middle Ages. For a comparison of various versions see André Wilmart, *Auteurs spirituels et textes dévots du moyen âge latin* (Paris, 1932; rpt. 1971), pp. 173-79. For variants not in Wilmart see Hellmut Rosenfeld, *Der mittelalterliche Totentanz: Entstehung, Entwicklung, Bedeutung* (Beihefte zum Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 3; Münster, 1954), p. 323, no. 3; Stephan Kozáky, *Die Todesdidaktik der Vortotentanzzeit* (Budapest, 1944), pp. 156-60; B. J. Whiting and H. W. Whiting, *Proverbs, Sentences and Proverbial Phrases from English Writings Mainly before 1500* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 121-22, D96; Rosemary Woolf, *The English Religious Lyric in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 85-87, and especially her informative n. 2 on p. 86; C. Horstmann, ed., *Yorkshire Writers: Richard Rolle of Hampole*, 2 vols. (London, 1895), 2. 128; R. Morris, ed., *The Pricke of Conscience: Stimulus conscientiae* (Berlin, 1863), p. 54.

The central theme of 'Bird us neure blipe be' is the fact of death. Following hard upon this are two important and disturbing corollaries: the moment of our death is unknown to us, and we can have no certain knowledge whether we shall be saved or damned. Death, ignorance of the future, and divine judgment, then, comprise the 'three sorrowful things' of the lyric.

The poem moves from the enunciation of the sorrowful truths of human existence to the final emancipation of the faithful Christian from these sorrows through the redemptive message of Christ. The first stanza presents the three sorrowful things to the congregation, but not as simply an enumeration of life's frailty in triplet. What it does give to the penitent Christian is a supportive, albeit fledgling, response to the flux of life: life's miseries can be borne through an understanding of Christian counsel/'rede'. This 'rede' is accessible through the mediation of the Church; the precepts of 'rede' present the faithful with a design for living the good life. Stanza 2 picks up the *sic transit gloria mundi* theme of the first stanza with its opening line 'Sipen we wit þat we sal fare [die]'. The point is an obvious one: since we have a conscious certainty of our death, such certainty ought to lead us inevitably to live the 'rede' alluded to in stanza 1. The 'rede' is spelled out in stanza 2 and is admonitory: the faithful Christian ought to be prepared for death and not be caught by Satan in sin. Preparation for death involves abstinence from sin through 'syryft', belief in the dogma of the Church, and the practice of Christian charity.

In stanza 3 the nature of this charity is made clear: 'Luue þi lath and liþer lete'. The message is baldly stated, but its simplicity underscores for the author and congregation the radicalness involved in the application of the message. The opening line of the third stanza 'Wel we wit þat we sal wende' contains a deliberate 'echo' of line 6 in stanza 1 ('Ne wider þat we sal winde'; cf. also ll. 60 and 61), which, while not a formal structural pattern in the poem, does at least serve the practical purpose of keeping the theme before the listener. There seems little reason to doubt that the lyric was read aloud. Its tone throughout, relying on the first person plural pronoun in situations of direct address, has the ring of the penitential sermon. And, of course, verbal echoes or parallels would iterate the theme, a practice sanctioned in the *artes praedicandi*.

The initial line in stanza 4, unlike the preceding three stanzas' initial lines (ll. 1, 13 and 25), does not use the first person plural of address. The focus here is on God and not man. Thematically the narrative moves from an articulation of life's brevity and the means at our disposal for achieving salvation to praise of God for making salvation possible. This salvation is the result of God's effulgent and spontaneous love for his creation. The last line in stanza 4 portrays God as a healer who binds the wounds caused by sin and as one who fills mankind's most profound yearnings. The image of a God who heals our wounds (MED *bīnden* v. 2. 1 (b)) and fills our spiritual hunger (MED *bēten* v.

(2) 1. (b)) carries with it, by virtue of the choice of verbs, a subtle, but nevertheless felt, sense of security. We may ask if the abrupt change in tone and address contributes to the structure of the poem. The poem is seventy-two lines long (six 12-line stanzas), and the first line of stanza 4 marks the exact center of the poem. Hence the first direct address to God, the creator of the universe – the center and ground of creation – is embedded in the very middle of the lyric. Possibly this is coincidence, but when we compare the positioning with the rest of the poetic craft shown in the lyric, it is reasonable to assume that it was intended.

Stanza 5, perhaps the most touching in the poem, is a dramatic address to the Virgin Mary traditionally depicted here as *mediatrix nostra*; it is she who will present our prayers to the Father. What is unusual in the stanza is the poet's conspicuous reminder to Mary that she received her exalted state because of humanity's need for salvation; because of sin Mary is our unblemished *mediatrix*. The lyric boldly notes that it is her duty to help mankind: 'For þorgh þair wo þi wele bigan'.

In the final stanza we return to the themes stated in the opening lines of stanzas 1-3, that is, the emphasis is on what mankind can do to merit salvation. There is also a return to the pattern of direct address in the use of the plural personal pronoun. The lyric is resolved in the language of paradox: eternal life, the only life worth striving for, awaits those who do God's will on earth. An understanding of God's will consists in an understanding of a series of antithetical, albeit familiar, propositions: the world is transitory, heaven eternal. Humanity, the most singular creation on earth, must renounce earth in order to gain heaven, and to achieve true wealth and liberty must give away all worldly riches. The thesis is a familiar one, as old as the Beatitudes, and the prominence given to this ideal of *contemptus mundi* as mankind's *arta via quae ducit ad vitam* (Mt 7:14) is appropriate in a thirteenth-century religious lyric.

The second lyric in the bifolium, 'I wote a boure so bricht', is a 5-line fragment. Robbins thought it to be either a secular song or a religious love poem.¹⁵ Although it is difficult to say with certainty what would have been the exact nature of the complete poem on the basis of such meager evidence, the context of the other poems argues for a religious theme.

The third poem, 'Godes boure als tu gane bilde', is acephalous. It consists of three lines and then eight 9-line stanzas. It is impossible to estimate how many verses have been lost, but at least six lines from the present initial stanza are gone, since this fragmentary first stanza contains only the last three lines. The

¹⁵ Robbins, 'Handlist of New Texts', 36, no. 1393. 5; stanza 2 beginning 'Ichot a burde in boure bryht' in Brown and Robbins, *Index of Middle English Verse*, p. 220, no. 1395. Cf. Brown, *XIIIth Century*, pp. 148-50, 230-31, no. 83 and Brook, *Harley Lyrics*, pp. 48-50, 82, no. 14.

stanzas are written in three long lines with a regularly occurring internal rhyme marked with regular scribal dots. The internal rhyme clearly indicates that the three long lines are to be read as six half lines of alternating rhyme (*ababab*). The last half line is a 2-stress line while the other preceding lines are 4-stress. Furthermore, the last half line forms a 'bob' to a 'wheel' consisting of four 3-stress lines, the first two of which are a rhymed couplet and the third rhyming with the line directly preceding the rhymed couplet. Rearranged in a more typical stanza form we have a 9-line stanza, rhyming *abababaab*. This separation into 9-line stanzas appears to be indicated as well by the scribe's placement of two small parallel lines one above the other (like = signs) to the left of the initial line of each stanza; they are his notation for the paragraph mark.

Robbins has identified our third poem as 'a prayer to the Virgin'.¹⁶ The first 3 stanzas are addressed to the Virgin as is line 27 in stanza 4, and Mary is depicted again as the blessed *mediatrix* chosen to aid fallen mankind (see above). The emphasis, however, changes in stanza 4 where there is a vivid depiction of the events necessary for salvation: Christ's passion, death, resurrection and harrowing of hell. The brief, tableau-like manner of presenting these events, so central to medieval *Heilsgeschichte*, turns them into a kind of literary icon that is two-dimensional and static. They are meant to stimulate the listener and/or reader to spiritual contemplation.

The fourth and last poem in the bifolium, 'Vr lauerd pat alle michtes may', is written in two stanzas of four long lines.¹⁷ However, as in the case of the third poem, the long line is regularly bisected by an internal rhyme which indicates that the unit is the half line. Once again, the understanding of line division is reinforced by the presence of scribal dots which indicate the break at the point of the internal rhyme. Rubricated paragraph marks indicate both the first and second stanzas; rearranged to reflect this reading, the poem consists of two stanzas of eight lines rhyming *abababab*. The poem is a penitential piece designed to illustrate the all-encompassing mercy of God and man's repeated opportunity for salvation.

The lines in all four lyrics show considerable metrical variety. To recap briefly: the first item uses 4-stress rhymed couplets alternating with a 3-stress tail line; No. 2 has four 3-stress lines and a 2-stress tail line; No. 3 has a pattern of five 4-stress lines followed by a 2-stress 'bob' followed by a 4-stress tail line

¹⁶ Robbins, 'Handlist of New Texts', 38, no. *995.2.

¹⁷ Cf. E. Meyer-Raven, *Die mittenglische religiöse Lyrik des ms. Harley 2253* (Diss. Regensburg, 1973), p. 381; for another version of 'God, pat Al þis Mythes May', see Brook, *Harley Lyrics*, p. 87; see also T. Stemmler, 'Interpretation des mittenglischen Gedichts "God pat al þis mythes may"', *Anglia* 82 (1964) 58-75. Brown, *XIIIth Century*, pp. 156-60 prints the 7-stanza variant in the Pratt ms., Ryston Hall, Downham, Norfolk.

linked by rhymes with the 'bob'; No. 4 is the 8-line *abababab* double quatrain and shows stanza linking by repetition of the last two words in stanza 1 'to ga' as the first two words in stanza 2. This last metrical device is identical to the stanza-linking technique found in the *Pearl*.¹⁸ Each line can have a varying number of unstressed syllables. Oakden suggests that the 4-stress line developed from the early Middle English alliterative long line's lack of medial rhyme and its sometime adoption of end rhyme probably taken over from the medieval Latin septenary.¹⁹ Such a metrical form was favored in the northeast midlands and is found there as early as c. 1200 ('On God Orison of Our Lady').

Like the Harley Lyrics copied half a century later, our lyrics make use of varied stanzaic forms, of regular functional alliterative patterns (see lexicographical notes on pp. 142-50 below for examples of alliterative phrases) which in some instances serve to link consecutive lines (as in No. 1, ll. 25-26), and of extensive internal and end rhyme. The recent studies of Turville-Petre, Fifield, and Osberg emphasize the similarity between alliterative prose and verse and point to the Old English alliterative prose tradition as the probable ancestry for the incorporation of structural alliteration in rhymed lyrics of the thirteenth century.²⁰ The major structural unit of the two longest poems, Nos. 1 and 3, and indeed, I believe, of the fragmentary No. 2 (rhyme scheme *aabaa*) is the tail rhyme alliterative stanza.²¹ Although the form of No. 2 cannot be reconstructed, obviously, with certainty, its five lines do share some similarity with such prominent lyrics of the late thirteenth/early fourteenth century as 'Annot and John' and other Harley Lyrics (Nos. 12, 14, and 23).²²

The language of our lyrics is of interest.²³ In the main I believe it to be the language of an area in which both northern and midland features occurred;

¹⁸ T. Turville-Petre, *The Alliterative Revival* (Cambridge, 1977), p. 67 identified the Harley Lyrics as the earliest ancestor of the *Pearl*'s stanzaic pattern. The present lyric makes such an identification untenable: cf. D. Casling and V. J. Scattergood, 'One Aspect of Stanza-linking', *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* 75 (1974) 80 who suggest that stanza-linking was 'already well established' by the time of the composition of the Harley Lyrics.

¹⁹ J. P. Oakden, *Alliterative Poetry in Middle English: The Dialectal and Metrical Survey*, 2 vols. (Manchester, 1930), I, 215, 242-44; see also M. Kaluza, *Englische Metrik in historischer Entwicklung* (Berlin, 1909), pp. 119-24.

²⁰ Turville-Petre, *The Alliterative Revival*, pp. 1-25; Merle Fifield, 'Thirteenth-Century Lyrics and the Alliterative Tradition', *Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 62 (1963) 111-18; Richard H. Osberg, 'The Alliterative Lyric and Thirteenth-Century Devotional Prose', *ibid.* 76 (1977) 40-54.

²¹ Cf. Urs Dürmüller, *Narrative Possibilities of the Tail-Rime Romance* (Swiss Studies in English 83; Bern, 1975).

²² Brook, *Harley Lyrics*, pp. 31, 44, 49.

²³ A. McIntosh, 'A New Approach to Middle English Dialectology', *English Studies* 44 (1963) 1-11.

such a region as central Lincolnshire, perhaps the vicinity of Lindsey, might not be too wide of the mark. Some of the dialect features worth noting briefly are: the northern and east midlands spellings of *sal* for *shal* (No. 1, ll. 4, 15, 25, 42, 65), *suld(e)* for *shold(e)* (No. 1, ll. 20, 25), *mikel* for *much* (Nos. 1, ll. 47, 69 and 3, ll. 9, 68);²⁴ OE *ā* before /nd/ and /ng/ as in *strang* (No. 1, l. 42), *handes* (No. 1, l. 24), *fand* (No. 1, l. 72); OE *ā* in *stane* (No. 3, l. 41), *rase* (No. 1, l. 56), *wate* (No. 1, l. 57), *lare* (No. 3, l. 10), *wate* (No. 3, l. 3), and *ras* (No. 3, l. 50).²⁵

The third person singular present indicative of the verb 'to be' is *es* throughout as in *it es* (No. 1, ll. 7, 14, 22, 45), and in '... his luue *es* on þe ...' (No. 3, l. 7); note also the northern form of the second person *ert* from the ON-*ert* (No. 3, ll. 12, 63). The third person singular preterite indicative of the verb 'to be' is *wer* and *war*, the later example deriving perhaps from the ON pl. *várom* (No. 3, ll. 45, 48, 49); the third person singular of present indicative verbs is *-es* as in *yeyes*, *bihoues* (Nos. 1, ll. 23, 62 and 3, l. 70) and never *-eth*; the third person plural of present indicative verbs also ends in *es* with at least two instances of the northeast midlands *en* (No. 1, l. 55), but this plural form of the verb also regularly ends in *e*, an east midlands and somewhat less common northern feature, when the subject of the verb is a personal pronoun which either directly preceded or followed the verb as in *draghe we* (No. 1, ll. 11, 12, 29, 66); the uninflected northern plural form is also present as in *we wit* (No. 1, l. 25).²⁶

OE *ā* was rounded to lax *ō* but retained the *ā* in areas as far south as north Lincolnshire. There seems to be a confluence of mixed forms here in this instance: the scribe uses both *wate* and *wote* for the first person of the verb *wite(n)* (Nos. 1, l. 57 and 2, l. 1).²⁷ Is a similar situation behind the varying orthography of the relative pronoun *wa* and *wo* (No. 1, ll. 61, 67), that is, do we

²⁴ S. Moore, S. B. Meech, and H. Whitehall, *Middle English Dialect Characteristics and Dialect Boundaries* (Essays and Studies in English and Comparative Literature 13; Ann Arbor, 1935) have assigned a southernmost limit of south Lincolnshire and central east midlands to both *sal* and *suld(e)* respectively; see their map 1, line c. For a lucid summary and updating of their findings, consult A. H. Marckwardt's revision of S. Moore, *Historical Outlines of English Sounds and Inflections* (Ann Arbor, 1951), map on p. 112.

²⁵ In the example of *stane* for the maintenance of OE *ā*, Gillis Kristensson, *A Survey of Middle English Dialects 1290-1350: The Six Northern Counties and Lincolnshire* (Lund Studies in English 35; Lund, 1967) records the highest frequency of occurrence in the area around Lindsey in Lincolnshire following the east bank of the river Ancholme (map 15, p. 281).

²⁶ Karl Brunner, *An Outline of Middle English Grammar*, trans. Grahame Johnston (Oxford, 1970), p. 70.

²⁷ Such usage does not appear to be uncommon as both forms appear, for example, in 'The Owl and the Nightingale', ed. J. A. W. Bennett and G. V. Smithers, with a glossary by Norman Davis in *Early Middle English Verse and Prose*, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1974), ll. 143, 740; see also the excellent introduction in this volume, pp. xi-lxi.

have the retention of the OE *ā* in the first instance and the lax *ō* in the second? If so, we should be looking for a linguistic provenance where such forms might have overlapped. The scribe does not use the medial voiceless spirant /h/ prevocally as seen above in the case of the relative pronoun. The plural form of nouns regularly ends in *es* as in *gates* (No. 1, l. 28) and *handes* (No. 3, l. 24).

To sum up: the text does appear to have a certain mixture of northern and northeast midland features. One area which lends itself to this confluence of forms is Lincolnshire. It is difficult to localize any further under the best of situations, but using certain of the dialect maps of Kristensson and Moore, Meech and Whitehall, the area around Lindsey and to the north and east of this locale seems a likely place of origin for the language of our lyrics.

Little is known of the history of the bifolium other than that it was bequeathed to the University Library in 1923 by Mr. F. J. H. Jenkinson, a former librarian. As far as I have been able to determine with the help of the archivists in the University Library manuscript reading room, Mr. Jenkinson left no indication as to where he came upon the bifolium.

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In the edition below I have silently expanded contractions, transcribed dotted *y* as *p* on the few occasions where it occurred, inserted punctuation wherever necessary to clarify meaning, and rearranged the texts from their tail-rhyme appearance in the ms. to generally accepted modern stanzaic convention. Editorial emendations and letters supplied where the text is damaged are in square brackets: if no comment is made in the notes, the reader can assume that the text is damaged.

The notes accompanying the text are chiefly lexicographical. I have cited other Middle English texts when they share similar lexical usage with the present poems. These citations serve to illuminate lexical meaning and point to a common poetic lexicon within the alliterative tradition.

In the notes the following additional short titles will be used:

Bosworth and Toller = Joseph Bosworth and T. Northcote Toller, *An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary* (Oxford, 1882).

Cursor mundi = *Cursor mundi*, ed. Richard Morris (EETS OS 62; London, 1874).

Early Middle English = *Early Middle English Verse and Prose*, ed. J. A. W. Bennett and G. V. Smithers, with a glossary by Norman Davis, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1974).

Guy of Warwick = *The Romance of Guy of Warwick*, ed. Julius Zupitza (EETS ES 25, 26; London, 1875-76).

Lazamon = *Lazamon: Brut*, ed. G. L. Brook and R. F. Leslie (EETS OS 250, 277; London, 1963-78).

Siþen we wit þat we sal fare
 Bettre es busk and bene al yare
 Ogain þat we sal ride; 15
 In syrift es best to bide and be
 And holde us chaste in ch[al]rite
 Ar þat tene us tide;
 Be faiþeful til eueri man
 And wirk his werkes þat us wan 20
 Wiþ wo and wndes wide;
 To lait help it es ful late
 Wen det him yeyes atte yate
 And soghe in ilk ay side;

¹⁴ *busk*: prepare; MED *busken* v. 1 (a). *bene*: to be; MED *bēn* v. 709-710. *yare*: make ready, prepare; OED *yare* v. (OE *gearwian*). All citations in the OED are northern and northeast midlands. See also J. B. Bessinger, *A Short Dictionary of Anglo-Saxon Poetry* (Toronto, 1960), pp. 26-27.

¹⁵ *ogain*: against; OED *again* B 2, C 2. Sense: 'against [the time] that we shall die'. *ride*: ride, go, depart (OE *ridan* v.).

¹⁶ *syrift*: shrift; note the less common initial /sy/ for the more familiar /sc/ as in *scriuen* (from OE *scrifan* v.), or /sch/ as in *schrift* n. Cf. also poem No. 3, line 2, 'syame sylde'.

²⁰ Cf. *Ormulum*, p. 216, l. 6244, 'Forr ziff þe33 wirrkenn zunnkerr weorrc'; *Lazamon*, p. 40, l. 775, 'þane he wule on scheapen, scaðe-werc wrchen'; *The Romance of Otuel*, ed. Sidney J. Herrtage (EETS ES 39; London, 1882), p. 76, l. 390, 'Godes werkes for to werche'.

²¹ *wndes*: wounds; OED *wound* (OE *wund*). Cf. *Guy of Warwick*, l. 1084, 'Blody be þy wowndys wyde'; *Sir Ferumbras*, ed. Sidney J. Herrtage (EETS ES 34; London, 1879), l. 887, 'Summe he smyþeþ in-to þe brayn, & summe 3af woundes wyde'; 'A Disputacion bytwene the Bodi and the Soule', ed. Thomas Wright, *The Latin Poems Commonly Attributed to Walter Mapes* (Camden Society Publications 16; London, 1841), p. 345, col. 1, l. 11, 'And maden on him woundes wyde'.

²³ *yeyes*: cries, shouts; OE **giezan*. The ON *geyja* has the sense of bark. If the English word had still retained something of this connotation, it would contribute nicely to an image of death as bestial. See R. Cleasby and G. Vigfusson, eds., *An Icelandic-English Dictionary*, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1957), p. 198. See also R. J. Menner, 'The Man in the Moon and Hedging', *Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 48 (1949) 2 and W. E. Rogers, 'Image and Abstraction'. Six Middle English Religious Lyrics', *Anglistica* 23 (1972) 53-54; cf. *Purity, A Middle English Poem*, ed. Robert J. Menner (Yale Studies in English 61; New Haven, 1920), p. 33, l. 846, 'What! þay 3e3ed and 3olped of 3estande sor3e.' *yate*: gate; MED *gate* n. (1) 2. (f). Cf. *The Pricke of Conscience*, ed. Richard Morris (Berlin, 1863), ll. 2000-2001, 'For when þe dede es at þe yhate, / þan es he warned over late'. See also Job 38:17 and Pss 9:14-15, 106:17.

²⁴ *soghe*: a difficult word to interpret precisely in this context. The most likely possibilities are (1) *soghe*: sigh, OED *sough* sigh (OE *swógan*). Sense: 'and express one's concern by sighing in every direction (or) wherever one turns'. *Swógan* occurs as both verb and substantive in ME in the extended sense of sighing leading to swooning. See *Lazamon*, l. 1535, 'mid þere wraeððe he wes isweued. þat he feol iswowen' and l. 2254, 'Still he wes iswo3en. on his kine-stole', and 'Iwaine and Gawaine', ed. Joseph Ritson, *Ancient English Metrical Romances* (Edinburgh, 1884), l. 824, 'and ful oft fel sho down in swogh'. (2) *soghe* = *sorghe*: sorrow; sense: 'and sorrowing in every direction'. (3) *soghe* = *soghte*: sought; sense: 'and sought in'

Wel we wit þat we sal wende 25
 And we ne wit wer in londe at lend:
 Ur louerd Crist us lere
 Þe graiþe gates til heuen at go.
 Helle pine þu holde us fro
 Þat stiþes toppe and stere; 30
 Luue þi lath and liþer lete
 If otht be broken brapely bete
 Ar þu be brocht on bere;
 And þen may þu ful siker be
 In heuen to won a riche see 35
 Wiþ angels alle in fere;

 Merci godde þat maked man
 Merci fader þat first bigan
 Us til help and het[e];
 Merci macheful þat al may 40
 Merci on þat mikel day
 Þar alle men sal me[te];

²⁶ *at*: to; MED *at* adv. with infinitive (OE *aet*). Although this is the usual northern and north-east midlands infinitive sign, verbs taking this prefix are not uncommon in the southwest up to c. 1300. *lend*: go, move, journey; MED *lenden*. The phrase 'at lend' may mean 'to journey towards' as this prefix with a verb of motion usually indicates motion towards or away.

²⁸ *at go*: to go. See line 26, *lend*.

³⁰ *þat stiþes toppe and stere*: both *toppe* and *stere* present problems. If the line were read so that the initial /t/ in *toppe* was the final consonant in *stiþes/t/*, the line would read 'who [i.e., Christ] makest firm hope and guidance'. See OED *stith* v.; cf. various theological senses of *hope* n. (1) in MED, sense 2, OED *steer* sb. (2). Although not a common form for ME *steorre*, *stere* does occur in a lyric in Edinburgh, Advocates' Library ms. 18.7.21; see *Religious Lyrics*, p. 73, l. 70, 'Be leding of a stere'. An alternative reading, assuming no conflation of the initial consonant in *toppe* to *stiþes*, would be 'who established (created) the top and the bottom'. Here *stere* is read as referring to the lowest orders of fixed stars and hence 'the bottom'.

³¹ *luue*: love; MED *loven* v. (OE *lufian*). *lath*: enemy; MED *loth* n. (OE *lāþ*) 3 (a). The sense of this first phrase *luue þi lath* is 'love your enemy'. *liþer*: evil, sin; MED *lithere* n. 2 (b). *lete*: give up, abandon; MED *lēten* v. (OE *lāten*) 1 (c), 6 (a). The sense of the second phrase is 'abandon evil'. Hence the line reads 'love thy enemy and abandon evil'.

³⁵ *won*: gain, attain; inhabit (OE *gewinnan* v.); see Bosworth and Toller, *see*: seat, throne; (OF *sē*); OED *See*. *riche*: precious, excellent; *Early Middle English*, *rich(e)*, adj.

³⁹ *het[e]*: inspire, inflame; MED, a figurative use of *hēten* v. (OE *hātan*) 2 (a). Sense: 'us to help and inspire'.

⁴⁰ *macheful*: either a corruption for *matheful*, temperate, moderate (MED *methful*) or *machtful*, powerful; the latter usage is more in keeping with the sense of the immediately preceding lines. Sense: 'mercy, powerful one, who can do everything'.

f. 1v	<p>Be i dempt als ic haue done Al þis werld me wondred one Nay bettre es wonges wete; Louerd min sinnes I wil forsake And to þi mikel merci take Þat al may bind and bete;</p>	45
	<p>Merci Mari maiden clene Sai vr erand þat it be sene Ful hardiliche on hete; Þe birs pray for sinful man For þorgh þair wo þi wele bigan Lussum þing in lete. To saluen us þen socht he þe He þat richwis rase on tre, I wate he wil us yete; Sin þu wan blisse þurpoute ur bale Traystli birs þe telle ur tale Til treuest king in sete;</p>	50 55 60
	<p>Wa wil in heuen ha[f] heye sete In erbe bihoues him suink and suete</p>	

⁴³ *dempt*: judged; MED *dēmen* v. 6.

⁴⁴ *one*: alone; see Stratmann, p. 23. *ān* adv. *wondred*: wonder. The sense of lines 43 and 44 is: 'if I am judged as I have done/all the world would marvel at me'.

⁴⁵ wonges wete: cf. *Lazamon*, p. 790, l. 15106, 'and þe king awoc of slepen, wete weoren his wongen'; *Cursor mundi*, p. 1048, l. 18308, 'And spak til him, wit wonges wete'.

⁴⁷ *mikel; milkel* MS.

⁵⁰ *erand*: petition or prayer; MED *ěrend(e)* n. 2.

⁵¹ *hardiliche*: bravely, quickly, assuredly (see MED *hardili* adv.). *hete*: hurry, haste; MED *hēte* 6 (a) (OE *hættu*).

⁵⁷ *yete*: yet, at some (future) time; *Early Middle English*, *zet(e)* (OE *gīet*).

⁵⁸ *bale*: sorrow, pain; MED *bale* n. (OE *bealo*). Sense: 'since you won bliss because of our sorrow'.

⁵⁹ *traysiti*: faithfully; see Stratmann, *trüsten* v., p. 622, OED *traistly*, and also *Religious Lyrics*, pp. 355-56. *telle ur tale*: tell our story/history. Cf. *Lazamon*, p. 702, l. 13417, 'and talden al heore tale'; *Pe Liflade of St. Juliana*, ed. O. Cockayne and Edmund Brock (EETS OS 51; London, 1872), p. 55, l. 7, '... þai tu ne telest na tale ...'; *The Romance of Sir Beues of Hamtoun*, ed. Eugen Kölbing (EETS ES 46; London, 1885), p. 110, l. 2254, 'I can nouȝt telle þe riȝte tale'. Sense: 'it behooves you to tell our tale faithfully [to Christ]'.

⁶¹ *haf: has* MS.

⁶² Cf. *Piers Plowman* A. vii. 121, 'For we mowe nouthur swynke ne swete ...'; *Ormulum*, p. 53, l. 1616, 'Wipp fassting, & wipp swinn & swät'.

And oft suyme and suelle;
 Wo wil be ful of heuenes fille
 Sal fast *in* werld ogain his wille 65
 Als treue men us telle;
 Wo wil be þare glad her sal grete
 Scrift take *and* sinnes lete
 Ful mikel þar omelle;
 Wo wil be riche glalli giue 70
 Þen may siker be to liue
 In heuen *and* neuer in helle.

2

[I] wote a boure so bricht
 Es kidde with kaiser *and* knicht
 Als hende mun here;
 Þar inne er leuedies licht
 Þurgh mirpes of miche micht. 5

.....

3

.....

f. 2r Godes boure als tu gane bilde
 Vs fra sinne and syame sylde
 For wate I me no better wane;

⁶³ *suyme and suelle*: a very difficult phrase to construe. However, if we read *suyme* as a corruption of ME *swounen*, swoon, we can find parallels for this phrase in the poetic diction of the alliterative school. For a phrase as 'swouny other swelte', see *Piers Plowman* C. vii. 129, 'swonit in swyne as ho swelt wold'. *suelle* = *swelt* v., die; cf. 'þe war leuer swelt vnder sword' from Advocates' Library ms. 19. 2. 1 in *Religious Lyrics*, p. 34, l. 85. The line can then be read 'and oft to swoon and die'.

⁶⁴ *fille*: abundance, grace; MED *fille*. Note the contrast between *fille* and in the following line *fast*.

⁶⁷ *grete*: lament, weel; MED *greten* v. (3) l. (a).

⁶⁹ *omelle*: address, speech; MED *mēlen* v. (OE *mālan*).

⁷⁰ *glalli*: joyfully, freely; MED *gladli* adv.

⁷¹ *siker be*: *be siker* ms.

[3] ¹ The poem is acephalous. The initial three lines are in fact the final three lines of the partially complete stanza. It is impossible, given the present evidence, to deduce just how much of the poem is missing.

² *sinne and syame sylde*: cf. *Guy of Warwick*, l. 1340, 'So god þe schylde fro synne *and* schame'.

Ic haf sinned selli sare
 Ogain þi sun with semely sicht 5
 Þu may couere me of kare
 For al his luue es on þe licht
 For þi with name Mari þin are
 Mikel of micht
 Þu bid him list vnto þi lare 10
 Þis feble folk lat none forfare
 Als tu ert bird *in* heuen bricht;

Hailsed be þu hide *and* hewe
 In bure born with browes bent
 Þurgh kinde of þe no man þe knewe 15
 To þe seint Gabriel was sent
 And seide, 'Mari þarf þe nocht rewe
 Of his present',
 Þar bigan vs bote to brewe
 Of nede þat suld vs ay be [n]lewe 20
 Þat was vs wrocht þurgh iugement.

Crist *in* þede him umbiþochte,
 Of prisuns haued he gret pite
 Þat he with hali handes wrocht:
 He seid it sulde bett[er] be 25

⁵ *with semely sight*: with brilliant sight/vision. Cf. *Golagros and Gawane*, ed. F. J. Amours (The Scottish Text Society 27, 28; Edinburgh, 1897), p. 9, l. 22, 'Yone is the seymliast sicht that euer couth I se' and p. 42, l. 1257, 'That wes ane semely syght'.

⁸ *with name*: by reason (virtue) of your name. This is not a common phrase in Middle English. I believe that the author's intention is to underscore the sacredness of the Mother of God's name. *þin are*: 'have pity' (cf. *Cursor mundi*, l. 2750).

⁹ *mikel of micht*: cf. *Amis and Amiloun*, ed. MacEdwards Leach (EETS OS 203; London, 1937), p. 38, l. 868, 'þe steward was michel of migt'; *Minot*, p. 21, vii, l. 12, 'Suld he schew ful mekill might'.

¹³ *hide and hewe*: cf. *The Quatrefoil of Love*, ed. Israel Gollancz and Magdalene M. Weale (EETS OS 195; London, 1935), p. 10, l. 303, 'Alle hale of his hurtes in hyde *and* in hewe'.

¹⁴ *browes bent*: cf. *Richard the Redeless* in *Piers Plowman*, p. 621, iii, l. 214, 'with grette browis y-bente'

¹⁹ *bote*: help; MED *bote* n. *brewe*: solicit, contrive; MED *breuen* v.

²² *umbiþochte*: refl., 'to call to mind, consider, bethink (oneself)', usually constructed with *of* or *on* 'about, on' (see OED s.v.). *þede*: 'a people, nation, race, country district' (OE *þiod*, *þeod*); see OED *thede*. *lait*: to search, seek or ask for; MED *leiten* v. (2) l. (a). Sense: 'to ask for help it is very late'.

Þarfor with luue ne lette he nocht
 To licht in þe;
 And siþin with reuth on rode vs bocht
 Longis with sper his herte socht
 Þar he wa[s] graisked vnto þe tre; 30

Ar was he suongen and forsueued
 With smert skurges cnoted alle
 Þe þornes þrested in til his heued
 Al merred was his midel smalle
 Aysil to drink his muth was weued 35
 And galle with alle
 Bityme of dai he was fordreued
 Wen þe lif þat licham leued
 With vten pride of purpel palle;

Sin was he waited dai and nicht 40
 In ay stane þar he was stadde
 With armed men strang and wicht
 In lede þai haued him harde ladde
 f. 2v For aghe of him þat wrange kan richt
 Þai wer fordradde 45
 Ful sone he mustred of his micht

²⁶ *lette*: grant; MED *lēten* v., contracted third person singular preterite form.

³⁰ *wa[s]*: ms. reads *W^a*. *graisked*: fixed (i.e., nailed); MED *greithen* v.

³¹ *ar*: there; MED *her* adv. *suongen*: beaten. Cf. Stratmann, *swingen* v., p. 598. *forsueued*: scourged, harassed; MED *forswongen*.

³³ *þrested*: past participle of *thresten*, with the sense of 'pushed violently' (see OED *threst* v.).

³⁵ *aysil*: vinegar; the bitter drink given to Christ on the cross. See *Legends of the Holy Rood. Symbols of the Passion and Cross Poems*, ed. Richard Morris (EETS OS 46; London, 1871), pp. 184-86, *Uas cum felle*, 'the vessel of aysylle and of galle'. *Aysil* is commonly found in phrases with the word *galle*; the very vessel which held this drink was a subject for popular piety in England in the fourteenth century. *weued*: given; OED *weve* 4.

³⁹ *pride of purpel palle*: cf. *Minot*, p. 24, vii. 110, 'Omang þir princes prowde in pall'; 'Of Sayne John the Euangelist', ed. George G. Perry, *Religious Pieces in Prose and Verse* (EETS OS 26; London, 1862), p. 93, stanza 17.1.1, 'Bot þat puyson to profe that proudeste in palle'

⁴⁰ 'After that (*sin* = *siþen*) he was guarded day and night'.

⁴⁴ In the top margin of fol. 2v appears a nearly illegible note: fa[tu ...] [fa ...]; there is a similar marginal note at the bottom of this folio: fa[t ...]. Of some significance in this scribble is the letter /a/ in fa[tu ...]: the top bow of /a/ is not yet touching the body of the letter, and the letter has the distinctive look of mid-thirteenth-century script. Ultra-violet light was of little help in deciphering these badly faded marginal notes.

⁴⁶ *mustred*: demonstrated, made manifest; MED *moustren* v. (but note that the citations given in MED all date from a later period).

Bereft þai[m] þar ay semely sight
In soft slepe als þai war [stadde];

In soft slepe wen þai wer sone
Ful richtwis ras he þar he lay, 50
Þe toþer dai bifer þe none
Til helle he went þe richt way
Als king þat weldes sun and mone
And clotte and clay,
Þa derne dores wern vndone 55
He kidde his frende ay bliscd bone
And brocht to wele fra wayloway;

Ne wald he nowicht fra þa waghes
For din of deuels þat þar was stadde
Bot did fulfille his leuely laghes 60
With blisse al als his fader bad
Stille Satan and þin felaghes
Þu ert al madde
He knit þer knes into þar ereghes
To wil þat dome of day him daghes 65
For god ne be þai neuer g[lad];
Siþen he stegh ful stith til heuen
Of maistri mikel he beres þe [w]and

⁴⁷ *bereft*: *Hereft* ms. Emendation adopted for sense. Thus ll. 46-47: 'bereft them there of seemly sight as they were fixed in soft sleep'. *þar*: there is a smudge above the /p/ which contains an abbreviation no longer legible. Although *ay* is a possible form of the indefinite article, *a* is unknown to me (cf. line 56 below).

⁵¹ *toþer*: the second; OED *tother*. The word can also mean 'the other', but here the poet is indicating the time of Christ's *descensus ad inferos*, a doctrine dear to the thirteenth-century Church. See also Acts 2:24 and 3:15.

⁵⁴ *clotte and clay*: cf. *The Laud Troy Book*, ed. J. Ernest Wülfing (EETS OS 121, 122; London, 1902-1903), l. 10602, 'He felde hem down as clottis of clay'

⁵⁵ *derne*: hidden, secret; MED *dërne* adj. (OE *derne*) 1 (a).

⁵⁶ *bliscd*: blessed; MED *blessed* pp. and *blessen* v. ms. reads *bliseed*. Sense: 'he made known to his friend [man] a blessed favor'.

⁵⁷ *wayloway*: sorrow; *Early Middle English, wailawai* (OE *weg lā weg*). See Brook, *Harley Lyrics*, p. 119.

⁶⁴ *ereghes*? The three initial letters present in the word are barely legible. The sense is obscure: perhaps a corruption of some anatomical feature.

⁶⁵ *dome* and *day*: may have been transposed by the scribe; the sense is 'until (or while) the day of judgement dawns for them'. See OED *while* sb. 2 (c).

⁶⁶ 'Because of God they may never be happy'.

Vntil his fadre with sautes seuen
 And restes *him* on his richt hand 70
 Almicht[i] god als he gan neuen
 Ful sone he fand
 Aposteles *prude* he belde elleuene
 Þe tueft he sent to quink and queuene
 To lig *in* bale withoute band. 75

4

Vr lauerd þat alle michtes may
 In euen and erthe þi wille þu ma
 Ic haf ben tint sin mani o day
 And ar and late has bene þi [f]a
 To wite I was I wist mi lay 5
 And euer anes halden me þar fra
 Haf mercy lauerd and rew me ay
 Vngraith ich am to þe to ga.

 To ga to *him* þat has me bocht
 Min gode dedes er stil smalle 10
 Wen al min werkes or þurgh socht
 Þe best es bitterer þen þe galle
 Þe gode I wisse ne luued I nocht
 In folye was me lef to falle
 With al mi witte ic af it wrocht 15
 I know me for þe werst of all[e].

University of Tennessee.

⁶⁹ *sautes*: leaps; OED *sault* sb. 2. The idea of the seven leaps of Christ depends ultimately on medieval interpretations of Cant 2:8 *Vox dilecti mei: ecce iste venit saliens in montibus, transiliens colles*. It may have been introduced into the West by St. Ambrose; see R. E. Kaske, 'Eve's "Leaps" in the *Ancrene Riwe*', *Medium aevum* 29 (1960) 22-24.

⁷³ *prude*: proud, excellent; see OED *proud* adj. II. 6. a. *elleuene*: the eleven apostles.

⁷⁴ *tueft*: twelfth (i.e., Judas Iscariot); OED twelfth (OE *twelf*). *quink*: disappear, vanish; (OE *cwincan*), rare in ME. Dr. Lister M. Matheson, Associate Editor of the MED, informs me that, except for the conjectural ME **quink* in the OED's etymology of *quinkle*, there is no other recorded example in the MED's files. *queuene*: shake, plunge; an uncommon word. The only example in ME that I have found is in J. Small's *English Metrical Homilies* (Edinburgh, 1862), p. 128, l. 22, a text also from the northeast c. 1300, 'Quen Satenas sal Jowes quenen'.

[4] ⁵ *mi lay*: creed, faith, religious duty, God's commandments; MED *lei* n. (OF *lei*). Lines 5 and 6 are difficult. If, however, we read *halden* as a singular preterite form of ME *hōlden* v. (1) 13b, we can then read the two lines as 'I was to blame; I knew my creed, and always neglected it' (literally 'held myself there from').

⁶ *euer anes*: The second word appears to read *anes* but *anes* makes better sense, giving *euer anes*, 'always'; MED *everones*.

THE *SOLUTIONS* ADDRESSED TO GEORGE LAPITHES
BY BARLAAM THE CALABRIAN
AND THEIR PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT*

Robert E. Sinkewicz, C.S.B.

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The abbreviations used for Barlaam's works are as follows:

EG = the Greek letters edited by G. Schirò, *Barlaam Calabro. Epistole greche. I primordi episodici e dottrinari delle lotte esicaste* (Istituto Siciliano di Studi Bizantini e Neogreci, Testi e monumenti: Testi 1; Palermo, 1954).

Solutions = *Solutions to the Problems Posed to Him by the Most Sage George Lapithes*, edited below, pp. 200-17.

AL = *Antilatin Treatises* numbered as below, pp. 187-89.

ScT = *Scientific Treatises* as listed below, pp. 185-86.

Or. I-II = the Greek discourses, ed. C. Giannelli, 'Un progetto di Barlaam Calabro per l'unione delle Chiese', *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati* 3 (Studi e Testi 123; Vatican City, 1946), pp. 157-208.

INTRODUCTION

BARLAAM of Calabria (c. 1290-1348) is best known to modern scholars for his role in the controversy with Gregory Palamas over hesychast spirituality and to a lesser extent he is also familiar as an anti-Latin polemicist.¹ The Late Byzantine sources, however, frequently identify him as a philosopher, but his importance as such is still unclear.² In this regard poor Barlaam has had a surprising variety of labels stuck to him: Aristotelian, (Neo-)Platonist, Augustinian, Western Scholastic, Scotist, Nominalist or even Ockhamite.³ The obvious path through this confusion must begin with the publication of Barlaam's sole Greek philosophical work and an attempt to situate it in the context of the philosophical statements found elsewhere in his writings.

The text in question bears the title *Solutions to the problems posed to him by the most sage George Lapithes* (abbr. *Solutions*). The *terminus post quem* for its composition is its citation in Barlaam's letter to Neilos Triklinios which can be dated to the end of A.D. 1336.⁴ There is another reference to the work and the circumstances of its composition in a letter addressed to Barlaam by his friend, Gregory Akindynos, in 1340 ex.-1341 in.:⁵

¹ See principally J. Meyendorff, *Introduction à l'étude de Grégoire Palamas* (Patristica Sorbonensia 3; Paris, 1959), pp. 65-94, 173-94; idem, *Byzantine Hesychasm: Historical, Theological and Social Problems* (London, 1974), articles I-II, V-VI, VII, XIV; G. Schirò, *Epistole greche*, pp. v-226; A. Fyrigos, 'La produzione letteraria antilatina di Barlaam Calabro', *Orientalia christiana periodica* 45 (1979) 114-44.

² e.g., Gregory Akindynos, *Letter to Barlaam the Philosopher* (Ambros. gr. 290 [E 64 sup.], fol. 67r); idem, *Letter to Gregory the Hieromonk* (Ambros. gr. 290, fol. 75v). This title appears often in manuscripts of Barlaam's works: e.g., Paris gr. 1278, fols. 30r, 154v and gr. 1286, fol. 318v; Marc. gr. Z(anetti) 152, fol. 425v and gr. Z 153, fol. 9r.

³ Schirò, *Epistole greche*, pp. vi-vii, 24-25; idem, 'Ὁ Βαρλαάμ καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία εἰς τὴν Θεσσαλονίκην κατὰ τὸν δέκατον τέταρτον αἰῶνα', *Ἑταιρεία Μακεδονικῶν Σπουδῶν. Ἰδρυμα Μελετῶν Χερσονήσου τοῦ Αἰῶνος* 32 (Thessalonica, 1959), pp. 10-11, 13; P. L. M. Leone, *Niceforo Gregora. Fiorenzo o intorno alla Sapienza* (Byzantina et Neo-Hellenica Neapolitana, Collana di studi e testi 4; Naples, 1975), p. 19; R. J. Loenertz, 'Dix-huit lettres de Grégoire Acindyne analysées et datées', *Orientalia christiana periodica* 23 (1957) 115; H. Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner* (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 12/5.1; Munich, 1978), p. 23; J. Romanides, 'Notes on the Palamite Controversy and Related Topics', *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 6 (1960-61) 186-205; J. Meyendorff, 'Humanisme nominaliste et mystique chrétienne à Byzance au XIV^e siècle', *Nouvelle revue théologique* 79 (1957) 909-10.

⁴ Schirò suggests the first half of 1336 (*Epistole greche*, p. 47), but more time should be allowed for the events that Barlaam mentions in the letter (EG 2.40-54). The chronology of the correspondence between Barlaam and Palamas and the events associated with it need revision. On the origins of the controversy see R. E. Sinkewicz, 'A New Interpretation for the First Episode in the Controversy between Barlaam the Calabrian and Gregory Palamas', *Journal of Theological Studies* N.S. 31 (1980) 489-500.

⁵ Ambros. gr. 290 (E 64 sup.), fol. 67v12-21 (text in Meyendorff, *Introduction*, p. 67, n° 4). For the date see Loenertz, 'Dix-huit lettres', 120-21.

Further, after that, when Lapithes of Cyprus, a man well-versed in philosophical matters, and who had often heard of you, respectfully posed in a letter certain difficulties of Aristotelian philosophy, requesting a solution as though from a teacher, instead of answering him courteously and reasonably, you filled your words to him with sarcasm and openly called him quite witless. However, you paid me no heed when I advised you on this at the time. And now you have received another letter from Lapithes, not yet in that manner of yours, but full of those things which you might have sent to him.

This suggests that the origin of the treatise was an exchange of letters between Barlaam and Lapithes. Akindynos made this reference to the matter in what appears to be a chronological list of Barlaam's indiscretions where the correspondence with Lapithes follows the Calabrian's first letter to Palamas (summer 1336).⁶ The *Solutions* was thus written sometime in the second half of 1336.

About George Lapithes little is known apart from the meagre gleanings to be found in the *History* of Nikephoros Gregoras.⁷ A wealthy landowner in Cyprus, Lapithes lived two-days journey from the coast and not far from the palace of King Hugh IV Lusignan (1324-59). With his vast wealth he engaged in various works of charity and encouraged others to do the same. His mansion was a gathering place for the wealthy and the learned of the island. He was much admired by the king and often invited to the court where, since he was skilled in the wisdom of both the Greeks and the Latins (the Latin language included), he debated with the Latin doctors on matters of philosophy and theology. According to our source, Lapithes was indubitably superior to the Latins, for he easily defeated their arguments with the demonstrative missiles of his syllogisms and his proofs from the divine scriptures. His opponents were left as silent as fish. Another contemporary source mentions that he wrote several treatises against the Latin 'heresies', but unfortunately these have not come down to us.⁸ It was through the Cypriot monk, Hyacinth, that Lapithes came to know the works of Nikephoros Gregoras and this in turn led to a correspondence between the two men who shared among other things a common interest in astronomy.⁹ During the 1340's he was a staunch supporter of the anti-Palamites in Thessalonica and Constantinople.¹⁰

⁶ Ambros. gr. 290 (E 64 sup.), fol. 67r-v.

⁷ *Hist.* XXV.8-14 (III.27-38).

⁸ Gregory Akindynos, *Letter to Gregoras*, ed. E. Tsolakes, 'Ὁ Γεώργιος Λαπίθης καὶ ἡ ἡσυχαστικὴ ἐριδὰ', *Ἑλληνικά* 18 (1964) 89, lines 56-59.

⁹ Letters of Lapithes to Gregoras, ed. J. Boivin in *Nicephori Gregorae Byzantina Historia* 1 (Bonn, 1829), pp. xcii-xciii, lix-lx.

¹⁰ As early as 1341 Lapithes was engaged in the controversy, supporting his friends with his letters (Akindynos, *Letter to Lapithes*, Marc. gr. Z 155, fols. 67v-68r). Another letter of Akindynos dated 1348-51 refers to Lapithes' continuing efforts against the *παλαμναίαν νόσον* (ed.

Little survives of Lapithes' writings. The only extensive work is a long poem on the duties of a man to the state, society and family.¹¹ In addition there are the three letters published by Boivin in the preface to the Bonn edition of the *History* of Gregoras. E. Tsolakes edited two short theological fragments from two Paris manuscripts and noted the existence of another theological work in a codex of Patmos.¹² Thus there is not much in Lapithes' career or writings that contributes to a fuller understanding of the debate in the *Solutions*.

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS

Barlaam's work is divided into five sections written in the familiar 'problem-solution' form. E. Tsolakes made the mistake of thinking that the aporia sections were actual excerpts from Lapithes' writings, presumably his letters, and he edited them as such.¹³ However, a careful reading of the text makes it clear that Barlaam was merely summarizing the argument of his correspondent. The general theme of the text is the old problem of reconciling Plato and Aristotle.

Aporia I

The first question introduced by Lapithes was one of natural science in which Aristotle appeared to be contradicting both himself and Plato. In *Physics* 8.4-5 Aristotle argued that nothing can move itself in its entirety, but in the treatise *De caelo* 1.2 he attributed self-motion to all natural bodies. Plato, moreover, held that the soul is self-moved and the principle of motion.¹⁴

In his response Barlaam set out at once to show that Aristotle neither contradicted himself nor was in disagreement with Plato, although there were often differences of terminology between the two philosophers.¹⁵ Plato for his part was not concerned with the material world as Aristotle was, but with the unchanging realm of the separable forms where the soul because of its kinship with the Ideas could attain a true, abiding knowledge of beings. Therefore, when he came to a consideration of the self-moved, he posited it as existing among these separable forms. And in the *Phaedrus* when he referred to the soul as self-moved and a principle of motion, he was talking about an entity which is

R. J. Loenertz, 'Gregorii Acindyni epistulae selectae IX ex codice Marciano 155', *Ἐπετηρίς Ἑταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν* 27 (1957) 105-107.

¹¹ PG 149.1002-46.

¹² 'Ὁ Γεώργιος Λαπίθης', 85, 94-96.

¹³ *ibid.*, 93-94.

¹⁴ Arist., *Ph.* 254b7-258b9, *Cael.* 268b14-16; Pl., *Phdr.* 245C5-9.

¹⁵ *Solutions* I.2.

incorporeal. Aristotle, however, treated the question of self-motion solely in relation to the material world of nature. And in this context he asserted that no material body can be self-moved in a primary sense.¹⁶ Plato, on the contrary, never considered self-motion in the context of the material world.¹⁷

There still remains the other part of the problem raised by Lapithes, the apparent contradiction between the various works of Aristotle with regard to the topic of self-motion. Barlaam resolved this by explaining that Aristotle speaks of the self-moved in two senses.¹⁸ Firstly, in its primary sense the whole as a whole would both move itself and be moved by itself, which is impossible for a material body.¹⁹ But then 'self-moved' is used by Aristotle in two secondary meanings. Animate beings can be spoken of as self-moved because in this case the whole is composed of parts, one of which moves the other: that is, the soul sets in motion and the body is moved by it.²⁰ Inanimate bodies always require an external mover, but they too can be self-moved because their very nature is a principle of motion in that it represents a capacity for being moved.²¹ The Stagirite has now been vindicated on both counts.

Aporia II

The second problem deals with an internal contradiction within Aristotle's writings. In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle says that both One and Being enjoy universal predication, but he also says that One is the principle of number.²² Lapithes reasoned that since One is a part of number and since the whole and the part must be under the same genus, One must be classified under quantity just as number is. But a species within one category cannot be predicated of the other categories, and so Aristotle appears to contradict himself. In Barlaam's presentation of the *aporia* the axiom relating the part to the whole under the same genus is followed immediately by the statement, 'For a point is not part of a line and hence is quite rightly without quantity.' It is not clear how this fitted into Lapithes' original argument.²³ This is a good indication that in the *aporia* sections Barlaam was giving only a very summary account of what Lapithes had actually said in his correspondence.

¹⁶ *Ph.* 8.5 (257a31-b13).

¹⁷ *Solutions* I.3-6.

¹⁸ *Solutions* I.7-8.

¹⁹ *Ph.* 8.5 (257b2-6).

²⁰ *Ph.* 8.4 (254b30-33).

²¹ Cf. *Ph.* 8.4 (255a24-28).

²² *Metaph.* 9.2 (1053b20-21, 25), 4.6 (1016b17-18).

²³ However, in discussions of One as the principle of number Aristotle does make reference to the nature of a point: *Metaph.* 4.6 (1016b25-30), *Ph.* 6.1 (231a21-29), *Top.* 1.18 (108b26-27) and 6.4 (141b5-9).

In his analysis of the problem²⁴ Barlaam decided that the apparent contradiction can be resolved by proving either that in Aristotle the abstract Unity predicated of all things is not equated with the One which is a principle of number; or that the One which is a principle of number is not to be classified under quantity. The first alternative Barlaam set aside for treatment in the final section and turned immediately to the second. Contrary to what the Cypriot had claimed, Unity cannot fall under the genus of quantity, as number does, because quantity necessarily involves distinction into parts which are either continuous or discontinuous,²⁵ but arithmetic Unity is defined as numerical indivisibility.²⁶ Hence One cannot be classified under quantity.

Barlaam in turn replied to Lapithes' statement regarding the nature of a point in relation to a line.²⁷ The Cypriot had adduced the wrong reason for a point's being without quantity. A point is outside the category of quantity because it cannot be divided into parts, not because it is not part of a line. By reason of their indivisibility the point and Unity are similar, but they are distinct in that the former has position but the latter is without position.²⁸ Without the full version of Lapithes' argument, the relevance of these remarks on Barlaam's part remains obscure.

In the last section Barlaam proposed a second solution simply by pointing out that Aristotle attributed several different meanings to the word 'One', quite unlike Plato who referred all things (and all senses of One) to the single Idea.²⁹ Therefore, the One which is a principle of number must not be equated with the One which is predicated of all things.

Aporia III

In the third aporia Lapithes raised a problem regarding certain elements of the Aristotelian theory of forms. If the Aristotelians ('those who consider sense-perception trustworthy') believe that a form is inseparable from the body in which it inheres, and if material bodies act upon one another (e.g., fire heats, snow cools), what, Lapithes asked, happens to the forms in these situations? Either they must change, in which case they are separable from matter, but an Aristotelian will not allow this; or remaining in the matter where they inhere, they will generate new forms, but that would be *creatio ex nihilo* which is God's prerogative.³⁰

²⁴ *Solutions* II.2.

²⁵ Arist., *Cat.* 6 (4b20-22), *Metaph.* 4.13 (1020a7-8).

²⁶ Arist., *Metaph.* 4.6 (1016b23-24), *APo.* 1.2 (72a21-23).

²⁷ *Solutions* II.5-6.

²⁸ Arist., *Metaph.* 4.6 (1016b24-26).

²⁹ Arist., *Metaph.* 4.6 (1015b16-1017a6); Pl., *Parm.* passim.

³⁰ *Solutions* III.1.

Before turning to the solution proper, Barlaam established some basic epistemological presuppositions. Each subject must be examined according to its own criterion: intelligibles are analysed in one way and sensibles in another.³¹ With the former one uses a deductive method, assuming a universal concept and then eliminating the particulars which do not accord with it, as in mathematics. In the latter one applies an inductive method, starting from particulars and proceeding to a general concept, as in natural science. However, even in the case of intelligibles sense-perception can play a useful, though not a determinative role, for the mathematician uses sensible representations as an aid for demonstration.³²

It follows then that the problem of material forms must be treated according to the second method. An inductive examination of particulars leaves no doubt that physical bodies act upon one another according to their nature, and so must their forms.³³ Therefore, in such a case as fire igniting a combustible material, the form releases itself from the matter in which it inhered, giving way to another form of matter, and then as it attains that matter with which it is in contact it drives out the form in that matter.³⁴ Lapithes considered this view unacceptable for an Aristotelian because the forms would then have to be separable and hence equivalent to the Platonic Ideas. Barlaam thus suggested that his correspondent was not very well-acquainted with Plato who insisted that the forms always remained apart from matter in the intelligible world and were never subject to change.³⁵ Furthermore, Aristotle's forms can be called separable only in a qualified sense, unlike the Platonic Ideas which are separable in an absolute sense. According to Aristotle the forms are separable from a particular material body but are never separable from matter absolutely: just as a man can leave a particular locus in space but cannot remove himself from space altogether.³⁶ But Lapithes might insist, so Barlaam suggested, that material forms are absolutely inseparable. He must then explain how he knows the material forms, for he would seem to be denying the data of sense-perception, saying that nothing exists besides sensible things and that no particulars can exist if primary substances are demolished, but in this case he would have to trust sense-perception and admit that the material forms interact in change; or he must join with those who say that all sensible things must be referred to the separable forms, but then he has no excuse for disdaining the

³¹ *Solutions* III.2.12-13; cf. EG 1.431-34, 660-65.

³² *Solutions* III.2.

³³ *Solutions* III.3-4.

³⁴ *Solutions* III.5.

³⁵ *Solutions* III.6.

³⁶ *Solutions* III.7.

separable.³⁷ Hence, whichever position he adopts, Lapithes must accept that the material forms interact in this manner.

In the following section Barlaam examined the alternative theory for the relationship of the forms and change. As far as the matter can be resolved, this theory appears to have been accepted by Barlaam as the preferred alternative, since he goes to some lengths to eliminate the problems associated with it. To illustrate the view that no change occurs in the interaction of the material forms Barlaam chose the analogy of an impression made by a signet ring which, without changing from the matter in which it inheres, imprints those objects which come into contact with it, given that such objects already possess a natural capacity for receiving the Idea of the signet. In this analogy the inseparable material form is the impress (or image) of the separable Idea (or exemplar). When objects with the natural capacity to receive the Idea come into contact with the negative image of the material form, they receive the positive image of the original Idea. Barlaam explained that this does not involve *creatio ex nihilo* because only the new form comes into being, not the substrate, and because the forms receive their limited creativity from God.³⁸

Aporia IV

Whereas the third problem dealt with the material forms and their perception by the senses with the emphasis on the nature of these forms, the fourth problem gives more attention to the forms of the intelligibles and emphasizes their mode of perception. In this case Barlaam appears to have rearranged the elements of Lapithes' original aporia in such a way as to facilitate his refutation, but as a result the actual problem is not immediately obvious and must be reconstructed with the aid of further statements made in the solution section. The Cypriot philosopher appears to be posing his problem from the viewpoint of a Platonist who holds the doctrine of the immortality of the soul (or, in this case, the mind) and who consequently believes that it must be unchanging. In addition, he probably had before him Plato's discussion of recollection in the *Phaedo* or perhaps some Neoplatonic version of it.³⁹ But according to the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, as Lapithes understood it, the soul must be involved in change. And so, to extricate Aristotle from this impasse, Barlaam showed that Lapithes had misrepresented Peripatetic epistemology, especially as it appears in *Physics* 7.3.

³⁷ *Solutions* III.8.7-10.

³⁸ *Solutions* III.9.

³⁹ Pl., *Phd.* 72E3-75C6.

Here Barlaam demonstrated his critical acumen in a precise, point-by-point analysis of his opponent's position:⁴⁰

The author of this problem seems to hold the following opinions about the human mind: (1) thinking means that the mind receives within itself the forms of the intelligibles; (2) thinking means that the mind when it looks at the imagination as at a mirror receives the impress of the forms modelled therein; (3) as visible things are related to vision, so is the imagination to the mind; (4) forgetting means that the mind excludes from itself those forms of intelligibles which it possessed; (5) – which seems to be a problem for him – if on the one hand it forgets, it must be in a state of flux and changeable, but on the other hand if it is without flux and unchangeable, it must be unforgetting. This is a problem because the mind both appears to be forgetful and also seems to be immortal.

With this done, Barlaam considered each point in detail.

First of all, thinking cannot refer simply to the mind's receiving the forms of the intelligibles, for there is the problem of repeated acts of thinking the same object, where each act does not involve a new reception of the form. Rather, there are two activities which must be clearly distinguished. The first might be referred to as receiving the forms of intelligibles, but this, properly speaking, should be called learning or discovery. And then there is thinking itself which is a different process whose essential characteristic is the actualization of knowledge. Neither case involves the soul or the mind in change, and further, not even in the process of learning and discovery does the mind truly receive the forms of the intelligibles. To prove this Barlaam referred, sometimes obliquely and sometimes directly, to *Physics* 7.3⁴¹ where Aristotle explains that neither the original acquisition of knowledge nor its subsequent actualization is in any way a process of becoming or change. Change takes place only in such things which are affected directly and in themselves by sensible objects: The acquisition or loss of an intellectual habitus (e.g., skill in geometry) does not imply any alteration in the soul.⁴²

With regard to the second point (thinking means that the mind looks at the imagination as at a mirror and receives the impress of the forms modelled therein),⁴³ Barlaam again demanded a precise and rigorous use of terminology. As

⁴⁰ *Solutions* IV.2.

⁴¹ Especially *Ph.* 247b24-28 [H]. This is more a recourse to authority than a real proof. A more adequate explanation could have been found by reference to *De an.* 3.4 (429a10-29) where Aristotle says that the soul is receptive of the form of the object because it is potentially the same as its object. The soul in its thinking capacity is the place of forms, and the forms occupy it not actually but potentially.

⁴² *Solutions* IV.4-7.

⁴³ A similar image is found in Arist., *Mem.* 1 (450a27-32), and in his source, Pl., *Tht.* 191D.

Lapithes had it, thinking would be limited to sensible forms because it is only with these that the imagination is concerned. Or he might indeed be confusing intelligibles, sensibles and objects of the imagination.⁴⁴

Proceeding to the next point of the argument (as visible things are to vision, so is imagination to mind), Barlaam examined the analogy in the manner of a mathematical proportion and disproved it as such.⁴⁵ First, converting the terms he showed that the analogy is incomplete: visible things are the object of vision but the imagination is not the object of the mind, at least not in the same way. When vision is in operation visible things must be present, but when the mind is active it is most withdrawn from the imagination. The Calabrian then produced a second proof by a *reductio ad absurdum*, which can best be illustrated schematically:

νοῦς: φαντασία = ὁρασις: ὁρατά [A:B = X:Y]

ὁρασις: ὁρατά = νοῦς: νοητά⁴⁶ [X:Y = A:C]

'But things equal to the same term are also equal to each other.'⁴⁷

νοῦς: φαντασία = νοῦς: νοητά [A:B = A:C]

'Those things for which the same thing possesses the same term are also equal to each other.'⁴⁸

Therefore, φαντασία = νοητά, which is absurd. [B = C]

And thus, Lapithes' original analogy must be incorrect.

The question proper now comes to the fore: when the mind forgets, does it expel the forms of the intelligibles?⁴⁹ Assuming that forgetting must be the same process for both intelligibles and sensibles, Barlaam pointed out that forgetting would also have to involve the expulsion of the forms of sensible objects, if Lapithes is correct. Recollection, the converse of forgetting, will be the reacquisition of the forms previously expelled. But in the case of sensible forms this cannot hold true because of the nature of the process of perception. The imagination receives the sensible forms via the faculty of sense-perception, but this faculty is operative only in the presence of the sensible object. Recollection, however, refers only to the past and thus cannot be the reacquisition of the forms, nor further can forgetting be the expulsion of such forms. To illustrate his argument Barlaam developed an image which Plato had

⁴⁴ Solutions IV.8.

⁴⁵ Solutions IV.9-10.

⁴⁶ Cf. Arist., *De an.* 3.4 (429a17-18).

⁴⁷ Euclid, *Elementa* I, Comm. A. Conc. 1.

⁴⁸ A corollary of the Euclidean axiom, not actually found in Euclid.

⁴⁹ Solutions IV.11-13.

used in the *Phaedo*, that of the lyre which recalls to mind one's lover who had played it.⁵⁰

The Cypriot's underlying problem can now be answered. According to his understanding of Aristotle, forgetting should involve the mind in change. Barlaam explained that the state of the mind after forgetting and before learning is the same. If forgetting is the opposite of learning and if forgetting involves alteration, then learning must entail the opposite alteration: forgetting is a sort of passing away or corruption, and learning is a sort of coming-to-be or generation. But Barlaam had already shown that Aristotle denies any change or alteration in the acquisition of knowledge. Hence, forgetting will bring no change within the mind. And therefore Barlaam concluded that Aristotle is in complete agreement with Plato in this particular aspect of the doctrine of the soul.⁵¹

Having now considered in detail Lapithes' views on the process of thinking, the Calabrian offered his own opinion, based on elements of both Aristotelian and Platonic epistemology. The passage is worth quoting in full:⁵²

But consider whether perhaps thinking means the mind contemplating itself, entering within itself and turning about itself; and that each of the objects of thought is itself that which thinks, since nothing else is involved [in thinking] besides the mind itself. And when we place figures in the imaginative faculty and decide to make some theorem concerning them, perhaps the mind does not receive impressions from them, but, rather, the impressionless concepts which it has within itself, it awakens and recalls and goes through them in detail considering that from which a conclusion might be drawn and that by which a refutation might be made with respect to their essence, and whether there is any similarity, identity and difference among them. In contemplating all this, the mind contemplates its own substance, so that such a figure is a phantasm and the calculations made about it are merely the mind itself. It was thus allotted to the mind to think or to require the imagination for recollection by virtue of the bond whereby the two together are one. And consider whether perhaps the mind is an image of some intelligibles but a model of others. In one instance it would think of the objects of which it is a model by thinking of itself inasmuch as it is a model of them; and in the other instance, it would think of those things of which it is an image by thinking of itself as it is an image of them.

The notion that there is an identity between that which thinks and that which is thought, and that the mind is itself an object of thought, is apparently taken

⁵⁰ Pl., *Phd.* 73D5-8. Barlaam embellishes the image considerably.

⁵¹ *Solutions* IV.14.

⁵² *Solutions* IV.15.

over from Aristotle, but it is indeed curious that most of the nuance and careful qualification of Aristotle's thought is here missing.⁵³ Looking back over the *aporia*, one finds that the Aristotelian element is rather superficial and perhaps entirely limited to the *Physics*.⁵⁴ The *De anima* and the *De memoria*, which could have contributed much to the discussion, were probably unknown to Barlaam, or, at least, they were being consciously ignored. A similar situation is found in the preceding problem about the interaction of the material forms where reference to Aristotle's treatise *De generatione et corruptione* would have been relevant. Even the passage of the *Physics* which Barlaam has been relying upon so heavily is one where Aristotle and Plato are indeed close in their doctrine of the soul, and it is Barlaam who acknowledges this.⁵⁵ In the above passage then the thin veneer of Aristotelianism scarcely disguises the fundamentally Platonist bent of the Calabrian's thought on this particular question. In fact, the Aristotelian element just referred to had already been taken over by Plotinus in his psychology.⁵⁶ Barlaam used well-established Platonic expressions to describe the activity of thinking as progressive interiorization: 'entering within itself and turning about itself', a vocabulary common also to the Fathers.⁵⁷ For Barlaam, as for Plato, thinking is a process of recollection which arouses the 'impressionless concepts' present in the soul. These concepts or *lógoi* are the remnants of Plato's Ideas and play an important role in the Calabrian's theory of knowledge, but their nature and function can best be seen in other passages of his writings which will be discussed on pp. 166-76 below.

Aporia V

In the last problem Lapithes raised an objection to the Aristotelian axiom that an attribute (or in this case, an activity) belongs to its subject either essentially or accidentally.⁵⁸ If this is true, God's activity of creating must fall under one of these two categories. However, neither alternative is dogmatically acceptable, for if the activity of creating is necessary then creation is coeternal with God, and if it is accidental then the immutable nature is subject to change.

Since the Cypriot philosopher had raised a question with important theological implications regarding the doctrine of creation, Barlaam felt it

⁵³ Arist., *De an.* 3.4 (429a15-16, 429b30-430a5); cf. *Metaph.* 10.7 (1072b21-22).

⁵⁴ Lapithes' *aporia*, on the contrary, suggests that he may have been referring directly to the *De anima*.

⁵⁵ Arist., *Ph.* 7.3 (247b10, 24-28 [H-textus alter]); *Solutions* IV.6.10-13, 14.13-19.

⁵⁶ Plot., *Enn.* 3.8.8.4-8; 5.3.5.21-23.

⁵⁷ Cf. Pl., *Phd.* 83A6-8; Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN* 4.9 (PG 3.705A).

⁵⁸ *Solutions* V.2.

necessary to establish first of all his fundamental position on the relationship of theology to the methods of human science: there is no necessity that says that God and the revealed teaching about God must conform to the principles, axioms and common conceptions of human science as these have been set forth by Aristotle.⁵⁹ Barlaam relegated Aristotle's area of true competence to the world of 'naturalia'. The primacy of authority in theology must always be given to statements of scripture and the Fathers. If a tenet of human science should contradict these, it must be abandoned. However, contradiction need not always arise, and if it does not, human science can play a role especially in convincing those who are not of the Christian Faith. The real interest of this passage is that Barlaam here suggests that the opposition which occasionally arises between human and divine science is not an absolute contradiction but rather one which results from the impotence of the human intellect. The Calabrian had already discussed the matter earlier in his other works, and this aspect of his thought will need to be examined in greater detail. This passage was one of those which Barlaam cited to Neilos Triklinios as proof of his theological orthodoxy in face of the criticisms of Gregory Palamas.⁶⁰

Having thus established his basic position, Barlaam went on to criticize the elements of Lapithes' problem. In regard to the first case, creation being an essential attribute, he showed that creation need not be coeternal, if one takes into account the Aristotelian distinction of actual and potential. God is always able to create, but he did so only once. Lapithes' objection is thus eliminated, but a further problem arises since a potency coexistent with God would seem to compromise the divine simplicity, and for that reason Barlaam hesitated about the solution.⁶¹ It would seem, then, that Barlaam would identify the 'energy' of creation with the divine essence.⁶²

In the next section four Aristotelian arguments are produced to show that the activity of creating does not introduce change into the Godhead.⁶³ Firstly, that which is in a state of perfection experiences no change in the activity of creating for there is no motion involved.⁶⁴ Secondly, because that which moves the

⁵⁹ *ibid.*

⁶⁰ EG 2.226-39.

⁶¹ 'I at least would hesitate to say this lest ever I be compelled to speak of composition with reference to the most simple Entity' (*Solutions* V.3.4-5).

⁶² This may be a foreshadowing of Barlaam's later objections to Palamas' distinction of the divine essence and energies.

⁶³ *Solutions* V.4-7.

⁶⁴ It is not clear what passage of Aristotle Barlaam might be referring to, but in *Ph.* 8.5 (257a14-33) it is stated that what causes movement (change) does not necessarily experience change itself.

world is an unmoved mover, it can also be shown that God's creating does not involve him in change, since only what is imperfect and potential can undergo change, but God remains perfect even in creating.⁶⁵ Thirdly, only that which is divisible can undergo change, and thus God, being indivisible, remains unmoved (and without change).⁶⁶ And lastly, since God neither moves himself nor is moved by another, he remains absolutely unmoved and experiences no change.⁶⁷ And therefore, even if someone did speak of the activity of creating as an accident, there would be no change introduced into the Godhead. Barlaam then concluded his work with a problem for Lapithes: why did God create when he did and not at some previous or subsequent time?⁶⁸

When the *Solutions* is considered as a whole it is clear that both Aristotle and Plato occupied an important place in Barlaam's philosophical thought, although he seems to have relegated each to his respective area of competence, the material world and natural science for Aristotle, the immaterial world and metaphysics for Plato. Barlaam spent a large part of his early career in the East writing treatises on scientific subjects, and so it is not surprising to see his predilection for Aristotle's *Physics* in the *Solutions*.⁶⁹ Nikephoros Gregoras had already noticed this preference some years earlier.⁷⁰ However, it is a little odd that there are no references, either here or elsewhere, to Aristotle's works on natural science which were much studied in Byzantium at this time.⁷¹ The references to the *Metaphysics* in *Solutions* II were prompted by Lapithes' question rather than Barlaam's own interest in the work, and when the Calabrian discussed the unmoved mover in *Solutions* V he went again to the *Physics* and not to the more developed treatment of the subject in *Metaphysics* 12. He was likewise poorly informed in Aristotelian psychology and gives no sure indication of an acquaintance with the *De anima*. Throughout the *Solutions* Barlaam's reading of Aristotle is literal and apparently independent of the commentators, whether Greek or Latin. Often he demonstrated his acuity in recognizing the numerous distinctions that Aristotle made in his discussions: the various senses of 'self-motion', 'one' and 'separable'. And he expected the

⁶⁵ The discussion of the unmoved mover here referred to is probably that of *Ph.* 8.5.

⁶⁶ Arist., *Ph.* 6.4 (234b10-29).

⁶⁷ Arist., *Ph.* 8.6 (258b13-16).

⁶⁸ *Solutions* V.8.

⁶⁹ For a list of Barlaam's scientific works see below, pp. 185-86.

⁷⁰ *Florentios* 354-56 (ed. Leone, *Fiorenzo* [n. 3 above]).

⁷¹ Cf. P. L. M. Leone, 'Nicephorae Gregorae Antilogia et Solutiones Questionum', *Byzantion* 40 (1970) 488-513; R. Guiland, *Essai sur Nicéphore Grégoras* (Paris, 1926), pp. 218-26; J. Verpeaux, *Nicéphore Choumnos, homme d'état et humaniste byzantin (ca. 1250/1255-1327)* (Paris, 1959), pp. 126-40.

same terminological precision of his correspondent. As was seen in the *Solutions* and as will become even more evident in the next section, Barlaam was predominantly a Platonist outside the area of natural science and not surprisingly the *Phaedo* and the *Phaedrus* were among his favoured works.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT FOR THE *SOLUTIONS*

As Barlaam wrote no other philosophical works in Greek it is necessary to look at some of his theological writings in order to construct a larger context for what he said in the *Solutions* and to explore more fully the range of sources upon which he was drawing.⁷² Unfortunately, this has the disadvantage of limiting the discussion to the Calabrian's philosophy of knowledge since the nature of such knowledge and its usefulness in theology is what Barlaam was questioning in much of his surviving Greek writings.

Sometime during the winter of 1334-35 there arrived in Constantinople two Dominican bishops (Francesco da Camerino and Richard of England) charged by Pope John XXII with exploring the possibility of renewing theological discussions with the Greeks.⁷³ The task of confronting the Latin envoys and defending the Greek doctrine fell to Barlaam. These two Dominicans were versed in the theology of their confrère, Friar Thomas, and made free use of his arguments countering the Greek doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit.⁷⁴ Barlaam in true Byzantine manner joined battle with a fearsome array of patristic quotations, although it should be noted that he deployed them with unusual skill. Moreover, due credit must be given to the wily Calabrian for recognizing that the new Thomistic tactics of his adversaries required a resourceful counterattack. Noting that his interlocutors were introducing arguments from reason couched in syllogistic form, Barlaam decided to question the propriety of using logic in theological discourse. He started with the bases of syllogistic argument as Aristotle expounded them in the *Posterior Analytics* and showed that any demonstration claiming to be apodictic cannot be allowed in theology. The two treatises where he explores this problem remain for the present unpublished and detailed discussion of them can best be

⁷² After his return to the West in 1341 he wrote a Latin treatise entitled *Ethica secundum Stoicos* (PG 151.1341-64), but his interest in Stoicism has no antecedents in his Greek works prior to 1341.

⁷³ *Acta Ioannis XXII (1317-1334)*, ed. A. L. Tăutu (Vatican City, 1952), doc. 134, pp. 249-51.

⁷⁴ Judging from Barlaam's treatises, their use of St. Thomas was restricted to *Contra errores graecorum* 2.24 ('Quod filius est principium spiritus sancti'), *Summa theologiae* 1-1, 36, 2 ('Utrum spiritus sanctus procedat a filio') and *Summa contra gentiles* 4, 24 ('Quod spiritus sanctus procedat a filio').

left for a future occasion.⁷⁵ It is sufficient to note here that these treatises exhibit a thorough acquaintance with Aristotle's *Organon* and Barlaam's interest in this regard left an important impress on the formal character of his writing which normally exhibits a style that is logically developed and neatly systematic. His treatises are remarkably free of the frustrating and tortuous argumentation of Late Byzantine rhetoric.

In a second stage of the discussion the Calabrian went a little further and asked how we understand the process of knowing and whether God can be known in the same way that we know other things. The documents for this part of the debate are available and it is at this point that we can return to the *Solutions* and see how the statements made there about knowledge and related topics fit in with the philosophical ideas found in Barlaam's theology.

1. *Universals*

In both Aristotelian and Platonic thought the understanding of universals holds important implications for the nature of knowledge. Barlaam referred to this subject several times in the *Solutions* but he did so either in the terminology used by Lapithes or that used by Plato and Aristotle together with their interpreters. Thus, in order to avoid an apparent contradiction between the two ancient authorities, Barlaam pointed out that Plato distinguished between the material forms (τὰ ἐνυλὰ εἶδη as the Peripatetics called them) and the separate, independently existing forms (τὰ χωριστὰ εἶδη, καθ' αὐτὰ ὄντα). After drawing this distinction, Plato confined himself to discussion of the transcendent forms which alone provide a sure ground for knowledge.⁷⁶

In *Solutions* III the Calabrian examined some problems raised by George Lapithes regarding the material forms. In the course of the discussion Barlaam established that these too are separable forms but in the modified sense of logically separable, just as a man is separable from a particular location in space but not from spatial position in general. Plato's Ideas, on the contrary, are separable in an absolute sense. They do not participate in change but stand unmoving in the intelligible order as exemplars. The realities that come into being and decay are both like and unlike these.⁷⁷

When it came to the relationship between the material forms and change, Barlaam considered two possibilities. In one theory, during the process of change the form releases itself from the matter in which it previously inhered

⁷⁵ AL 5 and 16 (see below, pp. 187-88).

⁷⁶ *Solutions* I.3.1-6. The distinction in this form goes back to the Middle Academy although there is some warrant for it even in Plato. See A. C. Lloyd, 'Neoplatonic and Aristotelian logic I', *Phronesis* 1 (1955-56) 59.

⁷⁷ *Solutions* III.6-7.

and gives way to another form. As it attains that matter with which it is in contact it drives out the form in that matter. Thus, the material forms would be active during the process of change.⁷⁸ In the alternative theory the [Platonic] Idea would function as a signet that produces a negative impression (*ἐκτύπωμα*) or mould which is the [Aristotelian] material form. When matter comes into contact with this impression or mould it becomes a reproduction or positive image of the original Idea or signet, thus bringing a new form into being. In this view the forms would be static and have no interaction with one another. Against this solution Lapithes raised the objection that this would involve *creatio ex nihilo* which is the prerogative of God alone. This danger of the Platonic doctrine of the Ideas had long ago been recognized and suitably anathematized by the *Synodikon of Orthodoxy* in the days of John Italos (eleventh century). Barlaam escaped this danger by attributing the very limited creativity of the forms ultimately to God and by pointing out that only the new form comes into being but not the material substrate. Finally, the Calabrian admonished Lapithes for failing to keep his promise, made in the original correspondence, to restrict the exposition of the problems to matters of natural science. Here he had been associating Peripatetic doctrines with Christian beliefs, something which Barlaam very much frowned upon.⁷⁹

According to Barlaam's analysis, his opponent's views were in danger of leading him into one or the other of two untenable positions: either a nominalist stance that would rely solely upon the empirical evidence of sense-perception and accept the real existence of nothing apart from sensibles and primary substances (*πρῶται οὐσίαι*); or an extreme realism that would refer all sensible realities to the separable forms.⁸⁰ One can safely conclude from this passage that Barlaam himself rejected both views.

Under the following aporia Barlaam spoke of the forms of the intelligibles and the forms of the sensibles and the manner in which they are present in the soul. In the case of the intelligibles, thinking (*νοεῖν*) in the strict sense of actualized knowledge (*τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπίστασθαι*) does not involve the acquisition of forms.⁸¹ Although he is not entirely clear on this point, Barlaam appears to have held the Platonic view that not even learning and discovery involve acquisition of forms but rather the awakening of inherent forms.⁸² In

⁷⁸ *Solutions* III.5.

⁷⁹ *Solutions* III.9-10. Cf. *Synodikon*, Articles of Italos, anathemas 4.198-202 and 8.219-24 (ed. J. Gouillard, 'Le Synodikon de l'Orthodoxie. Édition et commentaire', *Travaux et mémoires* 2 [Paris, 1967]).

⁸⁰ *Solutions* III.8.

⁸¹ *Solutions* IV.5.

⁸² *Solutions* IV.6 (especially 14-17).

treating the forms of sensibles, the Calabrian first expressed the Aristotelian view that the intellect regards the imagination and perceives the forms modelled therein and acquired via sense-perception.⁸³ But a little later in the text he hesitated over this and suggested that perhaps the intellect does not receive the impressions from the imagination but here too rouses the forms reposing in the soul by means of anamnesis.⁸⁴

When Barlaam was expressing his own views in his writings against the Latins and in his correspondence with Gregory Palamas, he employed a somewhat different language in referring to universals. In the second *Antilatin Treatise* he described the law that proportionals alternate as 'a universal concept in the soul'.⁸⁵ Later in the same treatise he referred to the universal concepts of beings which have entered the soul from experience of particulars.⁸⁶ A text of AL 5 attributed the same origin to the common notions, definitions, hypotheses and axioms which constitute the principles of apodictic science.⁸⁷ Elsewhere it is said that these universal concepts present in the soul refer solely to beings and not to the transcendent divine realities.⁸⁸ In AL 16 Barlaam elaborated a little on the process whereby universal concepts are abstracted from particulars through experience and said that 'the primary and immediate synthesis or distinction of such thoughts forms the so-called common axioms and common notions from which apodictic syllogisms are primarily constructed'.⁸⁹ Frequently in the first letter to Palamas the universals are also described as substantial concepts of the soul or as naturally inherent knowledge.⁹⁰

These texts all suggest a predominantly Aristotelian view of the origin of the universals as it appears in *APo.* 2.19, but on two occasions Barlaam added an alternative, Neoplatonic theory for their origin. The first of these texts appears in AL 2:⁹¹

⁸³ *Solutions* IV.7-8.

⁸⁴ *Solutions* IV.15.3-8.

⁸⁵ καθολικόν τινα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ... λόγον (AL 2.42v3-4); κοινότατον ἀξίωμα κείμενον καὶ ἡρεμοῦν ... ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (AL 2.42v22-23). Folio and line references are to Paris gr. 1278.

⁸⁶ οἱ καθόλου τῶν ὄντων λόγοι ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ καθέκαστα ἐμπειρίας εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐληλύθασιν (AL 2.43r6-7).

⁸⁷ ἀρχαὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ὁροὶ καὶ ὑποθέσεις καὶ ἀξιώματα ... ἃ εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν ἐλήλυθεν ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ καθέκαστα ἐμπειρίας (AL 5.77v3-11).

⁸⁸ οἱ γὰρ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κείμενοι λόγοι, ἐξ ὧν αἱ ἀποδείξεις, τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶ περιεκτικοί · οὐ μὴν ἐκείνων ἃ ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα εἶναι μεμαρτύρηται (AL 5.78r2-4).

⁸⁹ ἡ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων νοημάτων πρώτη καὶ ἄμεσος σύνθεσις ἢ διάκρισις ποιεῖ τὰ λεγόμενα κοινὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ κοινὰς ἐννοίας ἐξ ὧν πρῶτως οἱ ἀποδεικτικοὶ συντίθενται συλλογισμοί (AL 16.139v6-10).

⁹⁰ Divine truths cannot be encompassed τοῖς οὐσιώδεσι τῆς ψυχῆς λόγοις (EG 1.289-99). Premises may be taken ἐκ τῆς ἐνυπαρχούσης ἡμῖν φυσικῶς γνώσεως / ἐκ τῶν οὐσιωδῶς ἡμῖν ὑπαρχόντων λόγων (EG 1.630, 638-39).

⁹¹ AL 2.46r16-46v15.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν τοσούτου δέομεν ἄτοπον νομίζειν ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεοῦ λεγομένοις τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἀξιωμάτων ἀναίρεσιν, τῶν ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν μὲν διηρημένως συλλεγόντων καὶ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνεκχθέντων, ἐνοειδῶς δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ὑφισταμένων · ὥστε τοῦναντίον μᾶλλον καὶ ἄτοπον καὶ ἀνόσιον ἡγοῦμεθα, εἴ τις τοῖς ἀξιώμασι τούτοις θεόν τε καὶ τὰ περὶ ἐκείνου λεγόμενα ἢ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα ὑποκεῖσθαι ἀξιῶι · τὰ κυριώτερα γὰρ ὅ γε τοιοῦτος τῶν μυστικῶς ἡμῖν παραδοθέντων δογμάτων ἀναιρήσει, εἴ γε ταῖς κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις μᾶλλον αὐτῶν πιστεύσει καὶ παρακολουθεῖν ἐθελήσει.

Ἡμεῖς δὲ εἰδότες ὅτι οἱ καθόλου τῶν ὄντων λόγοι, εἴτε ἀπόρροιαι τινές εἰσιν ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν ὄντων εἰς τὸν καθ' ἡμᾶς νοῦν προϋποστάντα καὶ ἄνευ τούτων ἀπορρυσσάσαι, εἴτε αὐτοὶ ἢ τοῦ νοῦ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες οὐσία, ἐκ τῶν καθεκαστά τε συλλεγόντες καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν παραγενόμενοι ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνυπάρχοντες, τῷ ἐν αὐτοῖς φαινομένῳ ἀναγκαίῳ ἢ ἀδυνάτῳ, οὐ τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον νοῦν ὑποκεῖσθαι ἀναγκάζουσιν, οὐ τούτοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χρῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεοῦ λόγοις, οὐδὲ μέλει τι ἡμῖν κἄν τι τούτων ἀναιρεθῇ.

But surely we are so far from considering absurd in statements about God a denial of such axioms, which are brought together from many things which exist separately and which are taken up into the soul and subsist there unitively, that we think rather that the contrary is both absurd and impious: namely, if someone should think that God and the things said about him or which happen through his agency are subordinate to these axioms. For what such a person denies is the more authoritative of the doctrines handed down mystically to us, if he believes and wishes to follow the common notions in preference to these.

Because we know that the universal concepts of beings – whether they are certain emanations from the First Principle of beings into our mind in its pre-existence and which emanations take place without these, or whether they happen to be the substance of the mind and are collected together from particulars and accrue to the soul rather than inhere there from the beginning – make it necessary, not for the Principle of all things, but for the human mind to underlie the apparent necessity or impossibility in them, we think thus that one must not use these in statements about God, nor are we bothered if one of these should be refuted.

Here Barlaam was simply presenting the two strictly philosophical views current in his own day without any indication that he preferred one over the other, or, indeed, whether it was necessary to choose one and reject the other. The second passage occurs in his first letter to Palamas where Barlaam asked whether the second premiss of a syllogism formulated by Gregory represented some common notion or universal concept, and if so, did it enter the soul from particular sensibles according to Aristotle's theory, or from above, from the Demiurgic Mind from which the concepts emanate according to Plato's understanding of things.⁹² Again Barlaam was merely stating the available options.

⁹² EG 1.462-75.

This was not, however, the situation a little later in the same letter where Barlaam does in fact appear to give his own views on the subject.⁹³ Following his treatment of the syllogism formulated by Palamas, Barlaam examined Palamas' opinion that 'if God is a unique reality, and if there are demonstrations for all unique objects, nothing hinders there being demonstrations also for God'.⁹⁴ Palamas had here fallen into the error of imprecision in terminology, and the Calabrian was forced to point out that singularity does not have the same meaning when applied to God and when used of sensibles.⁹⁵ A sensible is both a particular object and a substance, but God is not such; as a particular a sensible is one and not indeterminate, whereas God is no less all things than he is one, for he surpasses both the one and the many.⁹⁶

After he had thus set forth the problem posed by the statement of Palamas, Barlaam proposed to resolve it by explaining in what sense there can be logical demonstrations for singular realities, for when that is understood it should become clear why there cannot be demonstrations for God. To this end the Calabrian produced two examples, the first to show the general mechanics of demonstration in such a situation, the second to reveal the underlying process involved in knowing.⁹⁷ Firstly, if one is to make demonstrations regarding the sun, it must be realized that this body cannot be referred to a particular species since there are no other suns, i.e., the sun is a *μοναδικόν*. However, there is nothing to prevent it from being referred to under certain universals, such as spherical bodies, illuminating bodies, or bodies whose motion is constant. In this way the essential attributes of the sun are demonstrated by referring to universals such as these. In the strict sense, there can be no demonstrations for this particular sun, for there is demonstration only on the plane of universals. And so the attributes of this particular sun do not belong to it alone, even though it is unique. God is necessarily excluded from such a frame of reference because his uniqueness is such that it will admit nothing more universal than itself. And moreover, the attributes of God belong to him alone.

Secondly, Barlaam took the example of the sky and demonstrations regarding its attributes. It is presupposed that all things have a more genuine, more true and purer existence, first of all, in the substantial concepts of the soul and then, ultimately, in the Demiurgic Mind which embraced and anticipated

⁹³ EG 1.560-651.

⁹⁴ EG 1.531-33. This is Barlaam's summary of the argument in Palamas' *First Letter to Akindynos* § 9.212.20-213.2 (ed. J. Meyendorff in *Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Συγγράμματα* 1 [Thessalonica, 1962]).

⁹⁵ EG 1.534-37: Arist., *SE* 168a24 (fallacies due to double meaning).

⁹⁶ EG 1.537-42. In lines 538-39 the text should read *τόδε τι* as both manuscripts indicate.

⁹⁷ EG 1.543-59 and 560-610.

all concepts unitively and immaterially. Thus, to formulate a demonstration about the sky, it is necessary to consider the substantial concept of the sphere which is present immaterially in the faculty of discursive reasoning. Then, by means of the universal concepts that are joined substantially with the soul, and which the Demiurge placed there through the analogies of arithmetic, harmonics and geometry, it can be proved that certain attributes are predicated of the immaterial sphere. Up to this point there is no use of sense-perception, but now it is possible to see whether these properties belong to this particular sky by rousing the concepts of the immaterial sphere reposing within, by considering the reason or explanation (*διότι*) for these being its properties, and finally by showing that the external, material sphere is receptive of these properties.

But scientifically certain knowledge presupposes knowledge of the cause or reason for A being predicated of B. Therefore, Barlaam went on to explain that while the substantial concepts of beings exist within us immaterially, separately, discursively and 'gnostically' (i.e., they impart knowledge to us), they are merely images and echoes of the concepts which are embraced by the Demiurgic Mind unitively and indivisibly and which are not only 'gnostic' (i.e., the means whereby God knows creation) but also 'demiurgic' (i.e., they are the ultimate causes of beings). Thus, the true reason or cause for an attribute being predicated of the sky is the concept existing in the Demiurgic Mind unitively and transcendently. We participate in this concept partially, discursively and in the manner of an image, when we rouse it and consider this property of the sky. Thus, in knowing the image of the true cause, knowledge is said to be from a cause. Barlaam had said something like this earlier when he noted that the premiss of an apodictic syllogism must be cause of the conclusion not only within the sequence of the syllogism but also in reality.⁹⁸

Such was Barlaam's argument in its original context. Seeing it set out in full in this way will make it easier for us to relate it to the source he was using.⁹⁹ But now, at the risk of some repetition, the various elements of Barlaam's theory of knowledge must be assembled in a more systematic form both from this passage and from elsewhere.

Firstly, all beings have a 'more genuine', 'more true' and 'purer' existence in the substantial concepts of the soul.¹⁰⁰ These substantial concepts of beings are present there immaterially, divisibly, discursively and 'gnostically'.¹⁰¹ Thereaf-

⁹⁸ EG 1.412-14.

⁹⁹ See below, pp. 178-82.

¹⁰⁰ EG 1.560-61, 573-74.

¹⁰¹ EG 1.599-601.

ter, it becomes unclear whether or not Barlaam distinguished two levels or orders of concepts in the soul. At one point he referred to the substantial concept of the sphere which is present immaterially in the *διάνοια* or faculty of discursive reasoning. This is in turn studied by the universal concepts consubstantial with the soul (*διὰ τῶν συνουσιωμένων τῇ ψυχῇ καθόλου λόγων*).¹⁰² Elsewhere he distinguished between a faculty (*δόξα, διάνοια*) for the perception of mathematical notions and universals and a faculty (*νοῦς*) whereby one refers to the indivisible concepts of beings.¹⁰³ The matter remains uncertain and one must be cautious about any attempt to force coherence on what may simply be some incompletely assimilated elements taken from whatever sources Barlaam was using.

The Calabrian maintained that ultimately all beings have their true existence in the Demiurgic Mind which embraces all concepts of beings immaterially and unitively.¹⁰⁴ These concepts of beings present in the Demiurgic Mind unitively, indivisibly and transcendently are not merely 'gnostic' as those concepts in the soul but are also 'demiurgic' in that they are the true causes of beings here below.¹⁰⁵

The substantial concepts in the soul are associated with those in the Demiurgic Mind by participation and those in the soul are thus considered as images and echoes of the transcendent concepts; their presence in the soul is *εἰκονικῶς*.¹⁰⁶ Perhaps because he was drawing his examples from geometry as it is applied to a problem in astronomy (i.e., a demonstration regarding the sky), Barlaam added that the universal concepts were placed in the soul by the Demiurge 'through the analogies of arithmetic, harmonics and geometry'.¹⁰⁷ But elsewhere, it should be noted, the Calabrian said that God placed them in the soul at the moment of its creation.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰² EG 1.574-77.

¹⁰³ EG 1.661-63.

¹⁰⁴ EG 1.561-63.

¹⁰⁵ EG 1.601-603, 605-607, 646-47.

¹⁰⁶ EG 1.601-602, 608, 645-47; Barlaam fragment in Palamas, *Triad* 1.1.q (5.21-7.5), ed. J. Meyendorff, *Grégoire Palamas. Défense des saints hésychastes*, 2nd edition (Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense 30-31; Louvain, 1973): 'The concepts of these [natural phenomena] are present in the divine, primordial and demiurgic mind, and the images of those concepts are present in our soul.'

¹⁰⁷ EG 1.576-78. Cf. Iamblichus, *De communi mathematica scientia* 40.24-41.1, ed. N. Festa (Leipzig, 1891): *διὰ δὲ τοῦτο γεωμετρικῇ τε ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀριθμητικῇ καὶ ἀρμονικῇ ἀναλογίᾳ συνυπάρχει (ἡ ψυχῇ), ὅθεν δὲ καὶ λόγοις τοῖς κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ*.

¹⁰⁸ Fragment in Palamas, *Triad* 2.1.27 (279.1-4): 'But from the moment when he created the soul God filled it with common notions and the powers of definition, of distinction, and of reasoning upon which the sciences are based.'

On numerous occasions Barlaam spoke of these concepts in the soul as *οὐσιώδεις* in the sense that they have no separate existence in the soul distinct from the substance of the soul. There are several texts that illustrate this aspect of his doctrine. In *Solutions* IV Barlaam suggested that in a process of recollection the intellect rouses the concepts in the soul that have received no external impressions (*ἀτυπώτους λόγους*) and in contemplating them it contemplates its own substance (*τὴν ἑαυτοῦ θεωρῆ οὐσίαν*).¹⁰⁹ At the end of this passage he advanced the opinion that the intellect is the image of some intelligibles but the exemplar of others.¹¹⁰ The intellect as image poses no problem, for this was the view expressed in the first letter to Palamas whereby the concepts in the soul are the images of those in the Demiurgic Mind. But the intellect as exemplar of intelligibles is odd, for one would expect it to be the exemplar of sensibles.¹¹¹

While explaining the use of the term *συζυγεῖν* by the pagan Greeks in the context of illumination in the second letter to Palamas, Barlaam mentioned their belief that the intellect in actuality is identical with the objects of intellection: i.e., in conceiving intelligibles the intellect conceives itself. According to their teaching the intellect is an image of transcendent divine realities (*τὰ ἐξηρημένα θεῖα*), and when it conceives itself, it conceives these transcendent realities through their image.¹¹² At an earlier stage, in AL 6, he had described the process of intellection in these terms.¹¹³

The perfect intellect in actuality possesses the object of intellection as always coexisting within itself inseparably, and intellection is a sort of passionless procession from the one who thinks to the object of thought.

Barlaam's theory of universals thus provided him with answers for two important questions. Firstly, scientific knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) presupposes knowledge of the explanation or cause, but how does man arrive at a knowledge of causes? This doctrine proposed that man possesses within himself the universal concepts of beings which are images of the 'creative' concepts in the Demiurgic Mind which in turn are the true causes of all beings.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ *Solutions* IV.15.5-8.

¹¹⁰ *Solutions* IV.15.11-14.

¹¹¹ As in the doctrine of Proclus, e.g., *Proclus. The Elements of Theology*, ed. E. R. Dodds, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1963), prop. 195, p. 170.4-5.

¹¹² EG 3.538-44. Cf. Barlaam fragment in Palamas, *Triad* 2.3.7 (399.20-401.6).

¹¹³ *ὁ τέλειος καὶ ἐνεργεῖα νοῦς συνυπάρχων ἀδιαφύετως αἰεὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ νοούμενον ἔχει καὶ ἡ νόησις πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπαθὴς τυγχάνει οὐσα ἀπὸ τοῦ νοοῦντος ἐπὶ τὸ νοούμενον* (AL 6.90r6-9).

¹¹⁴ EG 1.605-10, 643-51.

Secondly, Barlaam was confronted with the question of how to explain the contradiction that arises between the truest of the axioms of human reason and the divine truths. Barlaam's answer appears in two places, the passage of AL 2 quoted above and in this passage of *Solutions* V:¹¹⁵

These so-called common axioms emanating from the First Principle of all things into our mind require that not the proper principle but the human mind necessarily underlie the apparent impossibility or necessity in them. Thus it is not necessary to expect that anything that happens through God's agency or that is said about God should agree with the common notions.

Therefore, any contradiction that might arise between human and divine truths is only apparent and not absolute. Although Barlaam did not fully explain himself, there are sufficient grounds to conjecture that this false apparency stems from the imperfection of the images in the human mind and their faulty and merely partial reflection of the divine realities. In spite of its crudity and embryonic character such a theory was a bold and unexpected adventure for a fourteenth-century Byzantine philosopher.

2. Sources for Barlaam's Doctrine of Universals

Discernment of the sources here is especially difficult because in a Byzantine author it is frequently impossible to distinguish what was obtained directly from an ancient writer and what was obtained from a secondary source such as a manual or the general philosophical tradition of the day. And then too Barlaam had received at least a part of his education outside the two great centres of Byzantine learning, Thessalonica and Constantinople. Fortunately, however, Barlaam did reveal some of his sources more or less explicitly. He held an official Imperial appointment as interpreter of Pseudo-Dionysius, a sort of 'Regius Professorship of Dionysian Exegesis',¹¹⁶ and throughout his writings he frequently cited the Areopagite as his preferred authority. It is thus not at all surprising to find traces of this influence in Barlaam's theory of universals. In the fifth chapter of the *Divine Names* there are two close parallels. Firstly, God is said to have embraced and anticipated all being in himself in an absolute and indefinable manner.¹¹⁷ A little later Dionysius specified that¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ See above, p. 169; *Solutions* V.2.4-8.

¹¹⁶ Gregoras, *Hist.* XIX.1 (II.923).

¹¹⁷ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀπεριορίστως ὅλον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ εἶναι συνειληφῶς καὶ προειληφῶς (DN 5.4; PG 3.817D). 'All beings exist and preexist unitively in the Demiurgic Mind which embraced and anticipated all concepts of beings in a unitive and immaterial manner [ἅπαντας συνειληφῶτι καὶ προειληφῶτι τοὺς τῶν ὄντων λόγους]' (Barlaam, EG 1.561-63).

¹¹⁸ παραδείγματα δὲ φαμεν εἶναι τοὺς ἐν θεῷ τῶν ὄντων οὐσιοποιούς καὶ ἐνιαίως προῦφεστῶτας λόγους, οὓς ἡ θεολογία προορισμούς καλεῖ καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀγαθὰ θελήματα, τῶν ὄντων ἀφοριστικά καὶ

... we call exemplars those concepts of beings which pre-exist unitively in God and which bring forth the substances of things, concepts which theology names pre-determinations and divinely good volitions which are responsible for the determination and creation of beings.

The Areopagite dealt with God's knowledge of beings by maintaining that the Divine Mind embraces beforehand within itself the causes of all things and thus knows beings through their causes. For Barlaam, too, the concepts of beings in the Demiurgic Mind were 'gnostic'.¹¹⁹

It seems, however, that this source cannot fully account for the external influences on Barlaam's thought. If one looks to Proclus, the ever-present shadow of the Areopagite, several further parallels come to light. In the *Elements of Theology* Proclus said that the soul possesses the forms which the intelligence (ὁ νοῦς) possesses primitively. Intelligence gives to the soul, as part of that soul's being, rational notions of all that it contains (τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πάντων οὐσιώδεις λόγους).¹²⁰ Further, 'Every soul is all things, the things of sense after the manner of an exemplar (παραδειγματικῶς) and the intelligible things after the manner of an image (εἰκονικῶς) It possesses as images the intelligible principles, and has received their Forms – the Forms of undivided existents parcelwise (μεριστῶς)' And finally, the soul shares in the primal orders κατὰ μέθεξιν.¹²¹ When Barlaam referred to the teachings of the philosophers on συζυγεῖν and illumination, he stated one element of their theory in these terms:¹²²

ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τὸν κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοῦν ταῦτόν φασιν εἶναι τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ νοουμένοις · νοοῦντα γὰρ τὰ νοητὰ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖν ὡς αὐτὸν ὄντα τὰ νοητά, καὶ ἑαυτὸν μὲν πρῶτως νοεῖν.

This, too, has its parallel in Proclus who in turn borrowed it from Plotinus.¹²³

Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, prop. 168:

εἰ γὰρ ἐστι κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοῦς καὶ νοεῖ ἑαυτὸν οὐκ ἄλλον ὄντα παρὰ τὸ νοούμενον, οἶδεν ἑαυτὸν καὶ ὁρᾷ ἑαυτόν.

ποιητικά (DN 5.8; PG 3.824C). This recalls Barlaam's 'demiurgic concepts' and 'true causes of things here below' (EG 1.603, 647). Cf. DN 7.4, 872C (God in his unity contains beforehand the causes of all things); DN 13.3, 980B (the One has anticipated and embraced all things unitively within itself).

¹¹⁹ οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων τὰ ὄντα μαρθάνων, οἶδεν ὁ θεὸς νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ κατ' αἰτίαν τὴν πάντων εἰδησιν καὶ γνῶσιν καὶ οὐσίαν προέχει καὶ προσυνεῖληφεν (DN 7.2; PG 3.869AB; Barlaam, EG 1.602-603).

¹²⁰ Prop. 194.

¹²¹ Prop. 195.

¹²² EG 3.538-41.

¹²³ Dodds, *Proclus. The Elements of Theology*, p. xxi.

Plotinus, *Ennead* 2.9.1.46-49:

ὅταν δὲ δῇ ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἐν ταῖς νοήσεσιν αὐτὸν νοῆν καὶ μὴ ἔξωθεν ἢ τὸ νοητὸν αὐτοῦ ... ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν τῷ νοεῖν ἔχει ἑαυτὸν καὶ ὁρᾷ ἑαυτόν.

Although the echoes of Proclus are clear enough in Barlaam's theory of universals, the differences are equally evident. If he was borrowing terminology, he was not buying the entire ontological system. The Calabrian appears to have welded the forms with their corresponding concepts so that these are no more than thoughts in the mind of God; and in this he is much closer to Pseudo-Dionysius. The choice of a philosophical and Neoplatonic vocabulary in place of a theological and Dionysian one can be explained by the context in which Barlaam was demonstrating the gulf that separates human science, where the traditional philosophical theories were still discussed, and divine science where they were always proscribed or severely modified.

3. *Transcendence of the First Principle*

At this point we may digress for a moment from the topic of universals and the process of knowing in order to examine as far as possible what philosophical sources the Calabrian was using in another area. In countering the Thomistic arguments from reason Barlaam relied heavily on the Dionysian notion of the absolute character of divine transcendence. Barlaam identified his sources a little more specifically when he came to treat this subject. In addition to the frequent references to Pseudo-Dionysius, especially in AL 16, he also considered Plato as an authoritative voice:¹²⁴

And yet Plato thought to name the first of beings not intellect and not substance but considered it as beyond intellect and substance in incomparable transcendence.

To this statement he appended quotations from *Parmenides* 142A3-6 and *Republic* 6 (509B6-10). Then in his second letter to Palamas he returned to the subject to affirm that Plato had properly understood the divine transcendence.¹²⁵ The citation given there, supposedly from Plato, is a pastiche of *Parmenides* 142A3-6 and Pseudo-Dionysius, *Mystical Theology* 5 (PG 3.1045D-48A). Most likely Barlaam was quoting from memory and confused the two, very similar texts. There follows a reference to a passage of the *Republic* (which Barlaam named) where Plato compares the Good, intelligence and intelligible objects with the sun, vision and visible objects.¹²⁶ Barlaam

¹²⁴ καὶ μὴν Πλάτων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲ νοῦν ἀξιοῖ ὀνομάζειν, οὐδὲ οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' ἀσυγκρίτοις ὑπεροχαῖς ἐπέκεινα καὶ νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι (AL 6.94v19-22).

¹²⁵ EG 3.482-86.

¹²⁶ Pl., *R.* 6 (508A-509B).

declared that Plato is here speaking of 'the Good as the creative cause of the entire intellectual and intelligible order', absolutely transcendent to both what is intelligent and what is intelligible and ultimately even to the simple conception itself of being.¹²⁷ This sounds very much as if Barlaam was using a Platonic commentary, but it was seemingly not that of Proclus.¹²⁸

In the paragraph immediately preceding this, the Calabrian had similarly referred to the Pythagoreans as exponents of a doctrine of transcendence.¹²⁹

To see that even the pagan Greeks have grasped that the superessential and nameless Good is transcendent to intellect and science and all other direct perception, read what was said about these things by the Pythagoreans Pantainetos, Brotinos, Philolaos, Charmedes and Philoxenos. In their statements you will find the same words which Dionysius the Great uttered in the last chapter of the *Mystical Theology* (τὰς αὐτὰς φωνάς, ἃς ὁ μέγας Διονύσιος ... ἀφίησι); and indeed we have nowhere found a theological statement greater than these on the divine transcendence.

The association of the doctrines of Plato and the Pythagoreans made by Barlaam here is not unusual for it goes back to antiquity,¹³⁰ but the list of names that he produced poses some problems. No trace of Pantainetos or Charmedes has survived. Philoxenos is known only as the father of Syrianus.¹³¹ However, this Syrianus (mentor of Proclus, d. A.D. 437) has preserved the opinions of Brotinos and Philolaos in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.¹³² Philolaos ranged the unitive cause before the two opposite principles (limit and limitless) and transcendent to all things. And Brotinos held that it transcends all intellect and substance by power and eminence.

Influenced by these men, the divine Plato uttered the same words on the same subjects (τὰς αὐτὰς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν φωνάς ἀφίησιν) in the *Letters*, in the *Republic*, in the *Philebus* and in the *Parmenides*.

¹²⁷ EG 3.486-94.

¹²⁸ Cf. Proclus, *Comm. in Rempublicam* 276.23-281.7, ed. W. Kroll, 1 (Leipzig, 1899).

¹²⁹ EG 3.474-81.

¹³⁰ Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* 1.6 (987b7-14); P. Merlan, 'Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus: ch. 5, The Pythagoreans' in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 86.

¹³¹ *Marini vita Procli*, ed. J. F. Boissonade in *Diogenis Laertii De clarorum philosophorum vitis, dogmatibus et apophthegmatibus*, ed. C. G. Cobet (Scriptorum graecorum bibliotheca; Paris, 1862), p. 156.41.

¹³² CAG 6.1.165.33-166.8. There are further fragments of both Brotinos and Philolaos beyond those cited by Syrianus but none of them are relevant here. Brotinos (or Brontinos) was from Metapontos and was either father-in-law or son-in-law of Pythagoras [cf. PW 3.890-91 (E. Wellmann)]. Philolaos (b. c. 470 B.C.) was from Croton or Tarentum and was a Pythagorean, contemporary with Socrates. The authenticity of the fragments is much debated [cf. PW Suppl. 13.453-84 (K. von Fritz)].

And later in his commentary Syrianus remarked.¹³³

For Plato the One or the Good is superessential, as it is also for Brotinus the Pythagorean and, so to speak, for all those influenced by the Pythagorean school.

Barlaam may well have been familiar with these very texts, although the absence of any reference to Pantainetos, Charmedes and Philoxenos is a difficulty.

4. *Syrianus and Barlaam's Doctrine of Knowledge*

However, the Calabrian's acquaintance with Syrianus' commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* can be confirmed with some certainty on the basis of other texts. Barlaam's discussion of demonstration for singulars¹³⁴ reveals numerous similarities with three passages in the commentary. In the first of these Syrianus explained that the astronomer is able to examine this particular sky in that within himself he possesses universal concepts which are images of the forms that created the sky. By associating these universals with the visible reality he can demonstrate the essential attributes of the sky. Because of its physical mass and extension the visible sky manifests the ideal realities only partially. The corresponding concept within us which bisects the great circles on a sphere is singular and is an image of the concept in Zeus who called the All into existence. The nature of a physical body does not allow it to receive at one and the same time the full power of the ideal concept.¹³⁵ The superior and more divine exemplars of the sky preexist in the Demiurgic Mind and in the All-Soul, while our constitution possesses images of these whereby it can ascend to the archetypal reality.¹³⁶ Thus, in defining the sun, sky or moon, the astronomer defines what could be attributed to all suns even though there were a myriad of them similar to one another.¹³⁷

Further on in his commentary Syrianus returned to the same area of discussion, adding significant details to what he had said earlier. According to Plato, the Demiurge placed the intelligible forms in the soul, ordering them by

¹³³ CAG 6.1.183.1-3.

¹³⁴ EG 1.531-618; see above, pp. 170-72.

¹³⁵ Syrianus, CAG 6.1.27.9-20; Barlaam, EG 1.564-610 (demonstration for the essential attributes of the sky) and EG 1.560-63, 573-74 (all things exist more genuinely, purely and truly first of all in the soul and then ultimately in the Demiurgic Mind).

¹³⁶ Syrianus, CAG 6.1.27.30-37; Barlaam, EG 1.561-63 (preexistence of the concepts of beings in the Demiurgic Mind) and EG 1.599-602 (substantial concepts in the soul as images of those in the Demiurgic Mind).

¹³⁷ Syrianus, CAG 6.1.28.20-22. Cf. Barlaam, EG 1.533-54 (... εἰ καὶ ἀπειροὶ ἦσαν ἡλιοὶ τε καὶ οὐρανοί).

means of the analogies of geometry, arithmetic and harmonics.¹³⁸ In the Celestial Soul the mutual bisection of the great circles of a sphere preexists actively and demiurgically (*δραστηρίως καὶ δημιουργικῶς*), but in us only gnostically (*γνωστικῶς μόνον*). Since the external body of the sky is only a partial expression of the ideal sky, the demonstrations of astronomers are based on universal but partial premisses: universal in that they possess the cause because of its preexistence in the soul, partial in being taken from sensibles.¹³⁹ When the soul is roused and awakened, it attains recollection of the middle forms and refers its own concepts to the intelligible and primordial exemplars.¹⁴⁰ Demonstrations regarding intelligibles are made from the middle concepts of the soul as from images, but demonstrations regarding sensible forms are made therefrom as from exemplars.¹⁴¹

And a little later Syrianus added one more precision. Astronomers can base their demonstrations on causes which are primary and proper because they proceed from universal concepts which our souls possess gnostically but which the divine souls possess both gnostically and demiurgically. Thus, when they demonstrate the attributes of a sky, their demonstrations are based on causes not only of the conclusion but also of the reality.¹⁴²

There is one further passage in Barlaam's first letter which exhibits direct borrowing from Syrianus. It is especially significant since the discussion has turned at this point to a theological question, the divine illumination of the pagan sages to whom it was granted to recognize God's transcendence. This passage quickly became a bone of contention between Barlaam and Gregory

¹³⁸ ταῦτα δὴ τὰ διανοητὰ εἶδη ἐν μὲν Τιμαίῳ σαφῶς ὁ Πλάτων ἐνταῖναι φησὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, δι' ἀναλογιῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ ἀριθμητικῶν καὶ ἀρμονικῶν αὐτὰς διακοσμοῦντα (Syrianus, CAG 6.1.82.20-22 and similarly 4.9-11). ... διὰ τῶν συνουσιωμένων τῇ ψυχῇ καθόλου λόγων, οὓς ὁ δημιουργὸς δι' ἀναλογιῶν ἀριθμητικῶν τε καὶ ἀρμονικῶν καὶ γεωμετρικῶν αὐτῇ ἐνέθηκεν (Barlaam, EG 1.576-78). Syrianus in turn may have acquired this from Iamblichus, *De communi mathematica scientia* 40.24-41.1 (see above, n. 107).

¹³⁹ Syrianus, CAG 6.1.82.29-83.1; Barlaam, EG 1.599-603 (the substantial concepts of the sphere within us are gnostic only, but in the Demiurgic Mind they are both gnostic and demiurgic).

¹⁴⁰ Syrianus, CAG 6.1.83.7-10; Barlaam, EG 1.591-92 (we rouse the concepts of the immaterial sphere reposing within us); cf. *Solutions* IV.15.5-6.

¹⁴¹ Syrianus, CAG 6.1.83.18-20. Cf. Barlaam, *Solutions* IV.15.11-13 and EG 1.833-34 (middle concepts of the soul).

¹⁴² Syrianus, CAG 6.1.88.24-32; Barlaam, EG 1.599-604 ('Because the substantial concepts of beings within us which we happen to possess ... only gnostically are certain images and echoes of the concepts gathered together ... by the Demiurgic Mind and which are at the same time demiurgic and gnostic, demonstration of the properties of natural objects can be made on the basis of things which are causes and by nature prior') and EG 1.412-14 (ἐτι δεῖ τὰς προτάσεις τοῦ ἀποδεικτικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ αἰτίας εἶναι τοῦ συμπεράσματος, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν συλλογιστικὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα).

Palamas. There is a close verbal similarity to a passage in the commentary where Syrianus was speaking about knowledge of one of the primary intelligibles, the Circle itself.

Barlaam, EG 1.835-38:¹⁴³

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνο ἰσχυριζομένους – ὡς οἷς μὲν ἂν **θέα παραγένηται** ἄνωθεν καὶ **φῶς ἀναλάμψη νοερόν, δι' οὗ ἔστι τοῖς θεοῖς συζυγεῖν**, τοῦ κρείττονος ἢ κατ' ἀπόδειξιν τὰς τῶν ὑπερκειμένων ἔχουσι θεωρίας.

Syrianus, CAG 6.1.180.1-5:

ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν Ἐπιστολαῖς εἴρηται περὶ τοῦ αὐτοκύκλου ὡς οὔτε τὸ σχῆμα οὔτε τοῦνομα οὔθ' ὁ ὀρισμὸς οὔτ' ἐπιτήμη γινώσις ἔστιν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ **θέαν δεῖ τοῦ πράγματος παραγενέσθαι**, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων τῶν ἐπιστημονικῶν θεωρημάτων παρατρίβομένων **φῶς ἀναλάμψαι νοερόν, δι' οὗ συζυγήσομεν ἐκείνῳ**.

But as it is said in the *Letters* [of Plato, 7. 342AD] concerning the Circle itself, knowledge of it is neither its form nor its name nor its definition nor its scientific understanding; rather, a vision of the reality must occur and ... an intellectual light must grant illumination whereby we can join with that reality.

Such a close parallel makes it almost certain that Barlaam was using the commentary of Syrianus.

The influence of Syrianus on Barlaam does not appear to go very much beyond these three sections of the commentary. There are some other less significant similarities but they may simply be incidental.¹⁴⁴ Even in the above passages where the parallels are the closest there remain important questions where the two differ or part company altogether. Barlaam lent a very sympathetic ear to Aristotle's teachings on certain subjects, but Syrianus was

¹⁴³ There is an important element of the manuscript evidence here that has so far gone unnoticed. In Marc. gr. Z 332, fol. 114v5-16, various phrases in the text (= EG 1.831-45) have been erased and then replaced by a revisor whose hand is identical with that of the revisor in Vat. gr. 1110 whom Giannelli rightly identified as Barlaam himself ('Un progetto', 180-184). In view of the importance of this passage in the controversy between Barlaam and Palamas, I give the revised text in full with the autograph corrections underlined: μένους, ἐπὶ δὲ τ(ῶν) ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνο ἰσχυριζομένου ὡς οἷς / μ(έν) [ἂν mg.] θέα παραγένητ(αι) ἄνωθεν, (καὶ) φῶς ἀναλάμψη νοερόν δι' οὗ / ἔστι τοῖς θεοῖς συζυγεῖν, τοῦ κρείττονος ἢ κατὰ ἀπό / δεῖξιν τὰς τ(ῶν) ὑπερκειμένων ἔχουσι θεωρίας, οὗ δὲ / τοιοῦτοι μὲν οὐκ ἐγένοντο, ὁμῶς δὲ---παρὰ / τοιούτων ἀκηκοότες τὰς περὶ ἐκείν(ων) ἀποφάνσεις (καὶ) πῖ / στεύσαντες ἐπιστήμονες μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ εἰσὶ · βελτί / ους δὲ τ(ῶν) μῆτε αὐτῶν ἑωρακόντων μῆτε τοῖς θεα / σαμένοις πιστευνόντων, καὶ δια ταῦτ(α) μηδὲν ὑπὲρ τὰ ὅ / ρώμεν(α) εἶναι νομιζόντ(ων), ὅτ(αν) ταῦτα ἀκούσω αὐτ(ῶν) λεγόντ(ων), / οὐ δύναμαι ὑπολαβεῖν μὴ (καὶ) αὐτοὺς ἔστιν οὗ ὑπὸ θ(εο)ῦ / πεφωτισθαι (καὶ) ὑπὲρ τ(οὺς) πολλοὺς γεγονέναι. (καὶ) περὶ) μ(έν) /. Further autograph revisions are found on fols. 100r1-2, 111r6, 116r3, 9, 12, 118r9, 140r20.

¹⁴⁴ Syrianus, CAG 6.1.9.18-19 (τὸ αὐλον ἐν οὐχ ἦττον ἔστι πάντα ἢ ἐν): Barlaam, EG 1.540 (ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὐχ ἦττον πάντα ἔστιν ἢ ἐν). The term 'common notions' is frequent in Syrianus (CAG 6.1.18.10, 11; 21.33; 76.34; 77.20; 101.23). Similarly, the expression 'substantial concepts of the soul' (87.12; 91.30; 95.16).

definitely an adversary of the Stagirite for his commentary is decidedly polemical. Barlaam eliminated the unacceptable elements of Syrianus' Neoplatonic doctrine, drawing it closer to that of Pseudo-Dionysius both in language and in substance. The All-Soul or Celestial Soul disappears; the Demiurge becomes God;¹⁴⁵ and the separable Ideas appear as thoughts or concepts in the mind of God. What Neoplatonic elements were retained were kept because Barlaam wanted to demonstrate a 'secular' process of thought which he considered inappropriate in theology. Nevertheless, his recourse to a Neoplatonic writer such as Syrianus shows the affinity of his philosophical tastes with those of other Byzantine scholars, most notably, Nikephoros Gregoras. On the other hand, it does not preclude the presence of other influences such as those from Pseudo-Dionysius and perhaps from Proclus.

5. Direct Perception

Another important aspect of Barlaam's theory of knowledge is his notion of direct perception. As he insisted in AL 5, there is demonstration only for those realities which the intellect perceives directly (*ἐφάπτεται, περιγίνεται, ἐφικνεῖται*).¹⁴⁶ Mathematics and natural science are two examples of subject areas where the intellect is provided with such direct perception.¹⁴⁷ According to what he said elsewhere, scientific knowledge (*τὸ ἐπίστασθαι*) presupposes direct perception through that criterion by which each object is known naturally.¹⁴⁸ Without this *ἐπαφή* for the substance of the object under examination there can be no scientific knowledge either of the substance itself or of its essential attributes.¹⁴⁹ Therefore, sensibles cannot be studied by the intellectual faculty or criterion, nor intelligibles by the faculty of sense-perception.¹⁵⁰ There exist only three faculties for the direct perception of substances: sense-perception for singulars and particular sensibles, opinion and discursive reasoning for universals and mathematical notions, and intellect for referring to the indivisible concepts of beings.¹⁵¹

Although the word *ἐπαφή* occurs six times in the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius, it appears always in a list of other terms related to perception and

¹⁴⁵ At least in the later formulation: fragment in Palamas, *Triad* 2.1.27 (279.1-4).

¹⁴⁶ AL 5.78r6-9.

¹⁴⁷ δι' ὧν ἀποδείξεων ἀποδεικνύομεν τὰ ἡμῖν καταληπτὰ πράγματα, οἷον φυσικὰ ἢ μαθηματικὰ καὶ ὅσων ἐφικνεῖται ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς (AL 5.78v5-7).

¹⁴⁸ EG 1.431-33, 438-39, 454.

¹⁴⁹ EG 1.660-65.

¹⁵⁰ *Solutions* III.2.12-14. Barlaam spoke of the concept thus formed as λόγος ψιλός or νοερός λόγος in the case of intelligibles, and λόγος αἰσθήσει χρώμενος, ὁ αἰσθητικός λόγος or ἡ λογοειδής αἰσθησις (*Solutions* III.3.1-2 and 4.1, 3-4).

¹⁵¹ EG 1.660-65.

knowledge (e.g., αἰσθησις, δόξα, ἐπιστήμη, νόησις, λόγος) and the effect of each passage is to affirm the unknowability of God in his transcendence.¹⁵² In other words, it is not used as the technical term that it appears to be in Barlaam's writings. The basis of the Calabrian's doctrine is the ancient precept that like can only be known by like.¹⁵³ Thus, intelligibles are known by the intellect, sensibles by sense-perception, but according to Barlaam there was no faculty or criterion beyond man's intellectual activities whereby he could come into direct contact with the Divine.¹⁵⁴ The scholiast on the *Divine Names* gives this definition of ἐπαφή:¹⁵⁵

Here he speaks of intellectual apprehension as direct perception, for when we apply our mind to intelligible and immaterial things in scientific manner, we consider it as if we touch them and through the intellect perceive what they are, as we do through touching sensible things. But for God we possess no direct intellectual perception.

This could possibly be the source for Barlaam's use of ἐπαφή except for the fact that nowhere else does he show any knowledge of the scholia on the works of Pseudo-Dionysius or of the paraphrase by George Pachymeres.

The closest parallel for the three faculties listed by Barlaam is to be found in the *Platonic Theology* of Proclus.¹⁵⁶ There he mentions the three intellectual powers (δυνάμεις γνωριστικαί) of sense-perception for the discernment of bodies, opinion and discursive reasoning which are divisible activities whereby one perceives (ἐφάπτονται) multiform realities, and intellection assisted by reason (νόησις μετὰ λόγου) which is concerned with true beings (τῶν ὄντως ὄντων). However, for Proclus there exists beyond these the summit of the intellect, its blossom and pure existence (τὴν δὲ ἀκρότητα τοῦ νοῦ καί, ὡς φασι, τὸ ἄνθος καὶ τὴν ὑπαρξίν) which enables it to unite with the henads and ultimately with the hidden Unity of the divine henads. Such a superior faculty is wanting in Barlaam's doctrine, but otherwise the correspondence is sufficiently close to suggest once again the possibility of direct influence. However, the parallel is incomplete on the second level, that of opinion and discursive reasoning, where Barlaam placed mathematical notions and universals. But he did describe the third level as reference to the indivisible concepts of beings, which fits well enough with the knowledge of true beings in the text of Proclus. Moreover, the implication of Barlaam's text is that the second level is that of divisible realities, which would correspond exactly with what Proclus said.

¹⁵² DN 1.5 (PG 3.593B), 2.4 (644B), 4.10 (705D), 7.3 (872A); MT 4 (1040D), 5 (1048A).

¹⁵³ Cf. Empedocles, cited by Arist., *De an.* 1.2 (405b15).

¹⁵⁴ ταῖς νοεραῖς ἡμῶν ἐνεργείαις οὐκ ἄλλη τις πρόσεστι δύναμις (AL 18.148v14-15).

¹⁵⁵ On DN 1.5 (PG 4.201C). Cf. Pachymeres, *Paraphrasis* (PG 3.1060BC).

¹⁵⁶ *Théologie platonicienne* 1.3.15.1-17, ed. H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink (Paris, 1968).

6. Nikephoros Gregoras

The sole remaining task now is to relocate Barlaam in the Byzantine philosophical milieu. This can best be done by examining the works of Nikephoros Gregoras in order to recover his views on the same topics treated by the Calabrian.

In a letter which Gregoras wrote c. 1332, perhaps originally addressed to Nikolaos Pepagomenos, he distinguished the realm of sensibles and that of intelligibles, explaining that each must be grasped in the manner fitting to it, either proceeding upwards for the former, or starting from above for the latter. Each of these methods for seeking knowledge is worthy of respect, and neither can be considered as an unessential accessory. The ancient philosophers and especially those who dealt with rational science, Gregoras elaborated, took the intellect for their guide and followed the pathway of contemplation in the realm above. After they had acquired an accustoming to, and confidence in, the immaterial, they then returned to the sensible realities which are posterior by nature, in order that their knowledge might not be defective at either extreme and also to provide a ladder of knowledge for the sake of the weak. Anyone incapable of such a discipline must make the descent from below as by a ladder and so return to the plain of true knowledge. Although this might be praiseworthy, it is nothing outstanding, for as one feeble in nature he has merely done what he could. But, on the contrary, one who has attained to wisdom on the level of true reality can descend from the One in nature to disperse himself among the objects of sense-perception. Then, looking upwards, as from the roots, at the One divided among the Many, he gathers together a single weave from the manifold threads of all things, beholding the whole as One. That is worthy of marvel!¹⁵⁷ In this text, redolent with Platonism,¹⁵⁸ Gregoras saw the ways of Plato and Aristotle as complementary while at the same time placing the greater value on the former. Barlaam had done much the same in presenting now one way, now the other, or even offering both within a single passage.

Other passages from Gregoras' writings indicate that he thought much less of Aristotle than did Barlaam. He was of the opinion that Aristotle had departed from Platonic doctrine for the sole purpose of aiding weaker minds. As poets use myths to provide images of the truth to the uneducated, so Aristotle used certain methods involving probability and illusion, but only in order to lead the

¹⁵⁷ Ep. 53.195.1-197.8, ed. R. Guiland, *Correspondance de Nicéphore Grégoras*, 2nd edition (Paris, 1967) = Ep. 55.298.6-30, ed. St. Bezdeki, 'Nicephori Gregorae epistulae XC', *Ephemeris Dacoromana* 2 (1924) 239-377. Gregoras reproduced a large section of this letter (Ep. 53.195.10-197.8) in *Florentios* 941-64.

¹⁵⁸ The mind as guide (Pl., *Lg.* 631D5); habituation to the immaterial (Plot., *Enn.* 1.3.3.6); the plain of true knowledge (Pl., *Phdr.* 248B7).

uninitiated to certain truths. This practice, unfortunately, gave rise to contradictions in his writings.¹⁵⁹ As is evident from the *Solutions*, Barlaam shared a similar tendency to explain away the differences between the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, but with somewhat better success.

Gregoras could be quite harsh in his criticism of Aristotle, much more so than Barlaam, especially in the area of epistemology. Aristotle was wrong to belittle Plato's forms because he was unable to explain how the immaterial intellect can grasp matter. Like is known by like, and so the intellect must have recourse to the Ideas. Aristotle's forms are ever unstable and in flux. This would leave the intellect to wander around, slipping from one form to another, which would be quite foreign to scientific knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) which is concerned with what is stable and permanent.¹⁶⁰ These are not unlike the criticisms voiced by George Lapithes and which Barlaam replied to in the *Solutions*, especially I and III.

Although one might be tempted to explain these various parallels as points of influence of one man upon the other, it appears more probable that they both represent a common witness to the philosophical milieu of fourteenth-century Byzantium. Gregoras thought too little of the Calabrian to stoop so low as to borrow from his ideas. In Barlaam's case the various positions appear in a much more developed form than they do in Gregoras, and are rooted to a large extent in his interest in Pseudo-Dionysius, or in a predilection for the Aristotelian logic which Gregoras disdained.

7. Conclusions

A complete picture of Barlaam's philosophy must await the edition of his unpublished works and a properly critical edition even of those works now in print. Nevertheless, some of the debris of opinions can now be cleared away. At least as regards his philosophical thought, Western Scholasticism (and certainly Scotism) need no longer be considered as a source of influence upon the Calabrian. And to use his own words, Barlaam was a 'friend of the Ideas', thus putting more than geography between himself and his Western contemporary, William of Ockham. This might not exclude the possibility of some sort of vague, formal nominalism in his theology, but it does make it unlikely. Barlaam shared with his contemporaries a tendency to make free use of both Aristotle and Plato, though this was in no way a haphazard vacillation or an instance of eclecticism. The Platonic tradition had long ago been assured of a dominant role

¹⁵⁹ Florentios 964-74.

¹⁶⁰ Florentios 1006-17. Cf. *Antirrhetikos* 1.2.4.3 (291.11-15), ed. H.-V. Beyer, *Nikephoros Gregoras. Antirrhetika I* (Wiener byzantinistische Studien 12; Vienna, 1976).

in Byzantine philosophy by virtue of its use by the Fathers in their theology. Its predominance in Barlaam's philosophy was further strengthened by his veneration of the Areopagite. However, Aristotle was never without his staunch defenders. His physics and logic, at least in epitomized form, had long held a place in Byzantine education. The renewal of scientific studies in fourteenth-century Byzantium may have encouraged the reading of his works. As we have mentioned, Barlaam was himself a scientist of some repute.

Beyond the narrow confines of Byzantium Barlaam would have to be considered a mediocre philosopher living in a tradition which had in the end run out of steam. Historically, his importance is considerable because he offers us a fuller picture of certain areas of Byzantine philosophy (notably metaphysics and epistemology) which were only touched on incidentally by his colleagues. And finally, Barlaam's own role in the theological controversy with Gregory Palamas makes it all the more important to know the philosophical pre-suppositions behind his theological ideas.

INVENTORY OF BARLAAM'S WORKS

Before turning to the text of the *Solutions* it is opportune to give a complete and updated list of Barlaam's works, since the last inventory is that made in the eighteenth century by Johann Albert Fabricius.¹⁶¹

SCIENTIFIC TREATISES

1. *Demonstratio arithmetica*

Ἀριθμητικὴ ἀπόδειξις τῶν γραμμικῶς ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδειχθέντων.

inc. "Οροι. ἀριθμὸν, ἀριθμὸν πολλαπλασιάζειν λέγω ...

des. τετραγώνου, ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι.

ed. C. Dasypodius, *Euclidis quindecim elementorum ... Barlaam monachi Arithmetica demonstratio* ... (Strasbourg, 1564), pp. 70-117.

ed. J. L. Heiberg, *Euclidis elementa* 5 (Leipzig, 1888), pp. 725-38.

2. *Logistica*

Λογιστικὴ ἀστρονομική

inc. Προοίμιον. πολλῶν ὄντων οἷς ἀστρονόμοι ...

des. καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ πᾶσαι δοθεῖσονται.

¹⁶¹ J. A. Fabricius, *Bibliotheca graeca sive notitia scriptorum veterum graecorum ... editio secunda* 10 (Hamburg, 1721), pp. 427-33. The same notice on Barlaam's works appeared in later editions and was reprinted by Migne, PG 151.1247-56.

ed. C. Dasypodius, *Sphaericae doctrinae propositiones graecae et latinae* (Strasbourg, 1572), pp. 1-39 [theorems only].

ed. J. Chambers, *Barlaami monachi Logistica* (Paris, 1600).

3. *On the Square Root*

Περὶ τετραγωνικῆς πλευρᾶς.

inc. Προτίθει τὸν ζητούμενον ἀριθμὸν ...

des. πρὸς τὸ δ' · ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι.

4. *Refutation of the three additional chapters (14-16) of Ptolemy's Harmonics, Book 3*

Ἀνασκευή εἰς τὰ προστεθέντα τρία κεφάλαια ταῖς τελευταίαις ἐπιγραφαῖς τοῦ τρίτου τῶν τοῦ Πτολεμαίου ἀρμονικῶν.

inc. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐπιγραφάς ...

des. τὴν κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις, λέγωμεν τοίνυν.

ed. I. Düring, *Die Harmonielehre des Klaudios Ptolemaios* (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift 36. 1; Göteborg, 1930), pp. 112-21.

5. *Treatises on the Solar Eclipses of 1333 and 1337*

(a) Περὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ ἐκ τῆς μαθηματικῆς τοῦ Πτολεμαίου Συντάξεως ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ἡλιακὴν ἔκλειψιν.

inc. Αἱ μὲν αἰτίαι καὶ αἱ πρῶται ἀρχαί ...

des. ὥς πρὸς μεσημβρίαν μοιρῶν $\overline{05}$.

(b) Ἀκριβέστερον περὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ ἐκ τῆς μαθηματικῆς τοῦ Πτολεμαίου Συντάξεως ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ἡλιακὴν ἔκλειψιν.

inc. Αἱ μὲν αἰτίαι καὶ αἱ πρῶται ἀρχαί ...

des. μετὰ θρινῆς ἀνατολῆς καὶ ἀπαρκτίου.

ed. J. Mogenet et A. Tihon avec la collaboration de D. Donnet, *Barlaam de Seminara. Traités sur les éclipses de soleil de 1333 et 1337* (Louvain, 1977).

6. *Treatise on the Date of Easter*

Ἐξηγησις εἰς τὸν περὶ τοῦ πάσχα τῶν ἀποστόλων κανόνα καὶ περὶ τοῦ γενομένου ὑπὸ τῶν πατέρων κανόνος πρὸς τὴν εὔρεσιν καθ' ἕκαστον ἔτος τοῦ πάσχα.

inc. Τὸν παρόντα κανόνα ἐξηγήσασθαι ...

des. τῷ ἀποστολικῷ νόμῳ συμβαίνει.

THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS

1. *The Greek Discourses*

Or. I: Συμβουλευτικὸς περὶ ὁμονοίας πρὸς Ῥωμαίους καὶ Λατίνους.

inc. Ὅτι μὲν πάντες οἱ ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ ...

des. ὅπερ ἐὰν καλῶς ποιῇτε, εὐλαβήσεσθε.

Or. II: *Πρὸς τὴν σύνοδον περὶ τῆς πρὸς Λατίνους ἐνώσεως.*

inc. *Εἰ μὲν ἐώρων ὑμᾶς ...*

des. *συχνὸν τοῦ εἰκότος ἀμάρτοι.*

Excerpts published by L. Allatius, *De ecclesiae occidentalis atque orientalis perpetua consensione* (Cologne, 1648), p. 786; idem, *Adversus Hottingerum* (Rome, 1611), pp. 123, 125-26, 591.

ed. C. Giannelli, 'Un progetto di Barlaam Calabro per l'unione delle chiese', *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati* 3 (Studi e Testi 123; Vatican City, 1946), pp. 157-208.

2. *The Antilatin Treatises*¹⁶²

Πρὸς Λατίνους

- [II] 1. "Ὅτι ὑποκειμένου ἐκ μόνου τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἔχει τὴν ὑπαρξιν, οὐκ ἀναιρεῖται ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν ταυτότης πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ.
inc. *Εἰ μὲν κριτὴν τινα ἀμφότεροι εἶχομεν ...*
des. *εἰς τὴν τριάδα εἰσάγομεν.*
- [III] 2. "Ὅτι ὑποκειμένου ἐκ μόνου πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, οὐκ ἀναιροῦνται αἱ προσωπικαὶ διαφοραὶ τῶν τριῶν προσώπων πρὸς ἄλληλα.
inc. *Ἐπομένως δὲ τούτοις καὶ περὶ τῶν προσωπικῶν ...*
des. *ἂν ἐβλήσῃ θεός, διαλέξομαι.*
- [IV] 3. "Ὅτι ὑποκειμένου ἐκ μόνου πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, οὐκ ἀναιροῦνται τὰ περὶ θεολογίας ῥητά.
inc. *Ἴσως, ὦ ἄνδρες Λατῖνοι ...*
des. *ἐναντίως ἔχει ἢ τοιαύτη ὑπόθεσις.*
- [V] 4. "Ὅτι ὑποκειμένου καὶ ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐκπορεύεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, πολλὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων ἀναιρεῖται καὶ πολλοὺς ῥητοὺς τῶν ἁγίων ἐναντίως ἔχει ἢ τοιαύτη ὑπόθεσις.
inc. *Ὅταν εἰς λόγους ἀλλήλοις ἐρχώμεθα ...*
des. *ἐν τῷ προκειμένῳ ζητήματι ἀληθείας μετεῖναι.*
- [XVII] 5. *Πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς τῶν Λατίνων, ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς πρὸς Γραῖκοὺς διαλεγόμενους διὰ συλλογισμῶν ἀποδείξαι ὅτι οὐ μόνος ὁ πατὴρ ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ ἐστὶ θεότητος.*
inc. *"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ ὑμετέρα ὑπόθεσις ...*
des. *οὐδένα φημὶ πεποιηκέναι συλλογισμόν.*

¹⁶² The numbering of the treatises in Fabricius' inventory does not follow that of the manuscript tradition. I have therefore given the treatises in the order found in Paris gr. 1278. In other manuscripts AL 20 comes at the head of the list or appears alone. AL 21 is not found in Paris gr. 1278 and only rarely accompanies the other treatises.

- [XVIII] 6. *Πρὸς τὰς κυριωτέρας τῶν Λατίνων ὑποθέσεις, ἐξ ὧν οἴονται δεικνύναι ὅτι τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον καὶ ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἔχει τὴν ὑπαρξιν.*
 inc. Ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀγώνων ...
 des. καὶ τὸ προβάλλειν τὸ πνεῦμα.
- [XXI] 7. *Πρὸς τὸν ἀρχιεπίσκοπον Νικόλαον. Περὶ τῆς τοῦ πάπα ἀρχῆς.*
 inc. Φῆς ὅτι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ...
 des. δηλαδὴ ἱεραρχῶν συσταθήσεται.
- [VI] 8. *Ὅτι ὑποκειμένου ἐκ μόνου πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, οὐδὲν ὅλως ἀδύνατον ἔπεται, οὐδὲ τι τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀναιρεῖται δογμάτων.*
 inc. Ὁ θεὸς ἀπόστολος ...
 des. τὴν ἡμετέραν ὑπόθεσιν.
- [VII] 9. *Ὅτι οὐχ ἀπλῶς ὑπόθεσις τὸ νομίζειν ἐκ μόνου πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη πᾶσα τοῖς εὐσεβεῖν αἰρουμένοις ἐκ μόνου τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου προάγειν τὰ ἐκείθεν ἀχρόνως ἐκλάμψαντα. Καὶ κεφαλαιώδης ἔκθεσις τοῦ ἡμετέρου δόγματος.*
 inc. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὑποκειμένου ἐκ μόνης ...
 des. σὺν καθαρᾷ πολιτείᾳ παραστῆναι.
- [VIII] 10. *Ἀνασκευὴ εἰς τὴν πεμφθεῖσαν αὐτῷ ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ τῶν πρέσβειν τοῦ πάπα.*
 inc. Ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱός ...
 des. περὶ ὧν τοῖς ἀποστόλοις ἀνήγγειλε.
- [IX] 11. *Λέγατος, ἡ Περὶ Πνεύματος.*
 inc. Τεθέασαι τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ...
 des. ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀμειψοίμεθα.
- [XX] 12. *Πρὸς τὸν ἀρχιεπίσκοπον Νικόλαον. Περὶ τοῦ πάπα.*
 inc. Μὴ τοῦτο οἶον, σεβάσμιε πάτερ ...
 des. τὰ ὀρθὰ πιστεύεται δόγματα.
- [X] 13. *Κατὰ Θωμᾶ λέγοντος ὅτι κατὰ μόνα τὰ πρὸς τι διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων τὰ θεῖα πρόσωπα.*
 inc. Θωμᾶς μὲν οὐδένα τρόπον ...
 des. διαφέρει τῷ εἶναι πατὴρ.
- [XI] 14. *Πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας ὅτι μόνῃ ἢ πατρότητι συστατικὸν ἔστι τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου, τὸ δὲ ἀγέννητον οὐδαμῶς.*
 inc. Οἱ περὶ τὸν Θωμᾶν ...
 des. ὥς οἶεται, συνάγει συμπεράσματα.

- [XII] 15. *Πρὸς τοὺς πρέσβεις. "Ὅτι ἐναντίας περιπίπτουσι δόξαις.*
 inc. *"Ὁ μάλιστα τῶν ὑμετέρων θαυμάζω ...*
 des. *ἀγνοεῖν διαρρήδην ὁμολογοῦσιν.*
- [XIII] 16. *Πρὸς τοὺς πρέσβεις. Κοινὴ ἀνασκευὴ πάντων τῶν συλλογισμῶν, οὓς ἐκτίθενται οἱ Λατῖνοι περὶ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος.*
 inc. *Πᾶς ὀρθῶς ἔχων συλλογισμός ...*
 des. *σὺμπνοιαν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καλλιεργοῦσα.*
- [XIV] 17. *Πρὸς τοὺς πρέσβεις. Ἀπόδειξις ὅτι καὶ οἱ μετὰ τοὺς ἀποστόλους θεῖοι πατέρες ἡμῶν ἐκ μόνης τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας καὶ ἅμφω τὰ αἰτιατὰ ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι ὑπελάμβανον.*
 inc. *Ἐκεῖνο δὲ πάντως οὐκ ἀγνοούμενον ...*
 des. *αἴτιος καὶ σύνδεσμος ὁ πατήρ.*
- [XV] 18. *Ἀπάντησις πρὸς τὰ ἐπιχειρήματα ἃ πρὸς αὐτὸν εἶπεν ὁ ἀρχιεπίσκοπος Βοσπόρου περὶ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος.*
 inc. *Φῆς ὅτι πατὴρ καὶ υἱὸς θέλημα ἐν ...*
 des. *ἐπὶ κατασκευὴν τούτου κινήσητε μέθοδον.*
- [XVI] 19. *Λόγος συντεθειμένος ἐκ διαφόρων τμημάτων τῶν τοῦ Θεολόγου λόγων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοῦ μεγάλου Βασιλείου, ἀρμόδιος καὶ πρὸς τοὺς σοφοὺς τῶν Λατίνων λέγεσθαι.*
 inc. *Ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀπερίεργον ...*
 des. *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. Ἀμήν.*
- [I] 20. *Περὶ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος.*
 inc. *Τῇ τῶν θείων ἀποστόλων ...*
 des. *τὰς εὐθύνas ὑφέξουσιν.*
- [XIX] 21. *Περὶ τῆς τοῦ πάπα ἀρχῆς.*
 inc. *Οἱ περὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας δεινοί, ὧς χρηστὲ Φραγκίσκε*
 des. *καὶ μακροθύμως ἀκουσόμεθά σου.*

AL 21: ed. John Luyd, *Barlaami de papae principatu libellus* (Oxford, 1592). The text in PG 151.1255-80 was taken from the reprint of Luyd's edition made by Cl. Salmasius, *Nili de primatu papae romani libri duo. Item Barlaam monachi, cum interprete utriusque latino* (Hanover, 1608).

3. Prayer

Εὐχή.

inc. *Προάναρχε Λόγε θεοῦ ...*

des. *κακοῦ αἴτιος γένωμαι.*

ed. G. Schirò, 'Un documento inedito sulla fede di Barlaam Calabro', *Archivio storico per la Calabria e la Lucania* 8 (1938) 155-66.

ed. M. Jugie, 'Barlaam est-il né catholique? Suivi d'une note sur la date de sa mort', *Échos d'Orient* 39 (1940) 120-23.

ed. R. E. Sinkewicz, *The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God in the Initial Discussions between Barlaam the Calabrian and Gregory Palamas* (D. Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1979), pp. 96-100.

4. *The Avignon Discourses*

I. inc. Quoniam divinum ...
des. parati sumus ducere ad effectum.

II. inc. Licentia mihi data ...
des. ad praedictam unionem animatus.

ed. A. L. Tăutu, *Acta Benedicti XII (1334-1342)* (Vatican City, 1958), doc. 43, pp. 85-97.

5. *The Greek Letters*

EG 1 Palamas:

Τῷ σοφωτάτῳ καὶ λογιωτάτῳ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ πνευματικῷ μοι πατρὶ καὶ ἀδελφῷ κϋρι Γρηγορίῳ τῷ Παλαμᾷ.

inc. Σὺ μέν, ὦ θαυμάσιε ...
des. καὶ τοῖς ἄγαν τῶν τῆδε ἐπιλελησμένοις γένοιτο.

EG 2 Neilos:

Τοῦ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐλαχίστου Βαρλαάμ τοῦ Ἰταλοῦ. Τῷ φιλοσοφωτάτῳ καὶ ἐν κυρίῳ ποθεινοτάτῳ μοι αὐθέντῃ καὶ πατρὶ κϋρι Νείλῳ τῷ Τρικλινίῳ.

inc. Ἀρετῇ τε καὶ λόγῳ καὶ συνέσει παντοῖα ...
des. καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμύνεσθαι.

EG 3 Palamas:

Τοῦ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐλαχίστου Βαρλαάμ τοῦ Ἰταλοῦ. Τῷ φιλοσοφωτάτῳ καὶ ἐν κυρίῳ ποθεινοτάτῳ μοι πατρὶ καὶ ἀδελφῷ κϋρι Γρηγορίῳ τῷ Παλαμᾷ. Ἀπολογητικὸς ἢ κατὰ σοφισμάτων.

inc. Ἄπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρότερον λόγων ...
des. μισῶν δὲ ἔγραψα.

EG 4 Ignatios:

Τῷ κϋρι Ἰγνατίῳ τῷ ἡσυχαστῇ.

inc. Ἦκέ τις πρὸς ἡμᾶς ...
des. ἐπήβολόν σε ποιῆσαι. ἔρρωσο.

EG 5 Ignatios:

Τῷ αὐτῷ.

inc. Σωκράτη φασὶ τὸν σωφρονίσκου ...
des. καὶ μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς ἄλλως πείσῃ.

EG 6 *Disypatos*:

Τῷ Δισυπάτῳ.

inc. Ἐμοὶ μὲν, ὦ θαυμάσιε ...

des. τοῦτο ποιήσον.

EG 7 *Joseph*:

Ἰωσήφῳ τῷ Καλοθέτῳ.

inc. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ...

des. παρὰ τὸ ἀεὶ δόξαν βέλτιστον.

EG 8 *Disypatos*:

Τῷ Δισυπάτῳ.

inc. Οὐ τοῦτο σ' ἐχρῆν ...

des. τὸ ἄριστον ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους.

ed. G. Schirò, 'Le epistole di Barlaam Calabro', *Archivio storico per la Calabria e la Lucania* 2 (1932) 71-79, 426-37 [EG 4-8]; 5 (1935) 59-77; 6 (1936) 80-99, 302-25 [EG 1]; 8 (1938) 47-71 [EG 2].

ed. G. Schirò, *Barlaam Calabro. Epistole greche. I primordi episodici e dottrinari delle lotte esicaste* (Istituto Siciliano di Studi Bizantini e Neogreci, Testi e monumenti. Testi 1; Palermo, 1954).

ed. A. Fyrigos, *Barlaam Calabro. Epistole a Palamas* (Rome, 1975) [EG 1-3].

PHILOSOPHICAL AND LITERARY WORKS IN GREEK

1. *Λύσεις εἰς τὰς ἐπενεχθείσας αὐτῷ ἀπορίας παρὰ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Γεωργίου τοῦ Λαπίθου.*
 inc. Ἀπορία α'. ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις *Περὶ Κινήσεως* λόγους ...
 des. τὰ μέγιστα ἔση εὐεργετηκῶς.
 ed. R. E. Sinkewicz, see below, pp. 200-17.
2. *Ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Βαρλαάμ βίβλου περὶ θεῶν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν εἰσαγομένων.*¹⁶³
 inc. *Πρῶτος μὲν τοῖς Ἑλλήσι* ...
 des. *τῇ ταλαιπωρίᾳ αὐτοῦ.*

¹⁶³ This work is almost certainly authentic, for Barlaam, just after leaving the East in 1341, passed some time in the court of King Robert of Sicily where he met Paolo Perugino and aided him in compiling his encyclopedia of Greek mythology. Boccaccio wrote of Perugino: '... et ob id singulari amicitia *Barlae iunctus*, que a Latinis habere non poterat, eo medio, innumera exhaust a Grecis. Hic ingentem scripsit librum, quem *Collectionum titulaverat*, in quo inter cetera, que multa erant et ad varia spectantia, quicquid de diis gentilium non solum apud Latinos, sed etiam apud Grecos inveniri potest, adiutorio *Barlae* arbitror collegisse' (*Genealogie deorum gentilium* 15.6 [2.761.34-762.5], ed. V. Romano [Bari, 1951]). Boccaccio also mentions that Barlaam gave Leonzio Pilato some information on a particular question of mythology (*Genealogie* 15.6 [2.761.16-22]).

ed. R. E. Sinkewicz, 'A Fragment of Barlaam's Work *On the Gods Introduced by the Greeks*', *Byzantine Studies/Études byzantines* 8 (1981).

OPERA DEPERDITA

Κατὰ Μασσαλιανῶν: a collection of treatises written against the practices and teachings of the hesychast monks and their spokesman, Gregory Palamas. Fragments are preserved in the *Triads* of Palamas, in the latter's third letter to Akindynos and in the *Synodal Tome* of 1341. The titles of the individual treatises and their contents have been discussed by J. Meyendorff, *Grégoire Palamas. Défense des saints hésychastes*, 2nd edition (Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense 30-31; Louvain, 1973), pp. xxiv-xxviii; and he also gives there a convenient list of the fragments and their location. P. Chrestou holds a somewhat different view on the titles and contents of these works (*Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Συγγράμματα* 1 [Thessalonica, 1962], pp. 322-24). In the early summer of 1341 the Patriarch issued an official letter (*Regestes* N. 2211) ordering Barlaam's writings (against the hesychasts) to be collected and destroyed.

SPURIA GRAECA¹⁶⁴

1. The treatise on Purgatory belongs to the common authorship of Bessarion and Mark Eugenikos (see L. Petit, *Patrologia orientalis* 15.7-13; text, pp. 61-79).
2. The dialogue between an Orthodox and a Latin on the Azymes and on the procession of the Holy Spirit is attributed to Barlaam only because it appears in a manuscript which contains some of Barlaam's authentic works. Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana gr. Z 152, fols. i^r-iii^r:
inc. *Περὶ τούτου προθεμένοις ζητῆσαι σκοπητέον ...*
des. *ἐπιτελεῖν λέγουσι δεῖν.*
3. The Greek treatise *Enchiridion Epicteti contractum* (ed. J. M. Suarez; Rome, 1673) has been attributed to Barlaam solely because he wrote a treatise in Latin on Stoic ethics.
4. Mogenet, Tihon and Donnet affirm that the *Treatise on the Astrolabe* (London, British Library ms. Additional 27864, fols. 3r-9v) is wrongly attributed to Barlaam.¹⁶⁵

THE LATIN LETTERS

Epistola 1: Epistola fratris Barlae, episcopi Giracensis, ad omnes amicos suos in Grecia, in qua ortatur eos ad unionem sacrosancte Romane Ecclesie.

¹⁶⁴ M. Jugie has already dealt with a number of the spurious works attributed to Barlaam (art., 'Barlaam de Seminaria', *DHGE* 6 [1932] 830).

¹⁶⁵ *Les traités sur les éclipses*, p. 5.

inc. Quia, o amici et fratres ...
des. et deliberare et agere puto.

Epistola 2: Epistola secunda eiusdem fratris Barlae ad eosdem amicos suos de Grecia, in qua tractat de primatu Ecclesie Romane et in fine de processione Spiritus sancti.

inc. Quod in primo ad uos misso sermone ...
des. Deo ipsam tamquam nouum Israel regente, preualebunt.

[*Epistola 3:*] Epistola Alexii Calocheti ad eundem fratrem Barlaam, episcopum Giracensem, in qua petit ab eo quorundam librorum Latinorum translationem propter bonum unionis.

inc. Tuas communiter ad amicos ...
des. ex maxima parte solute erunt.

[*Epistola 4:*] Epistola sapientissimi ac doctissimi uiri Demetrii Thessalonicensis ad eundem fratrem Barlaam, episcopum Giracensem, in qua ponens omnia sua dubia de processione Spiritus sancti petit ab eo scire per quas ipse cogitationes ex opinando prius quod ex solo Patre procedit conuersus est ad tenendum quod etiam ex Filio procedit.

inc. Cum olim tu ...
des. et a te petere se dicunt.

Epistola 5: Epistola eiusdem episcopi ad eundem Demetrium Thessalonicensem, in qua respondet ei ad petita et ortatur eum ad unionem sancte Romane Ecclesie.

inc. Cum accepissem, o amicum mihi caput ...
des. Det autem tibi ipse reliqua.

Epistola 6: Epistola eiusdem fratris Barlae ad Alexium Calochetum, in qua ostendit quod illi Greci non obediens Ecclesie Romane sunt non solum scismatici uerum etiam heretici.

inc. Audiui te admirari de me ...
des. ad eos dicantur et scribantur.

Probatio: Barlaam episcopi Giracensis Probatio per sacram et diuinam scripturam, quod Spiritus sanctus et ex Filio est quemadmodum ex Patre.

inc. Domino nostro Iesu Christo ...
des. et a catholica fide alieni. Amen. Amen.

The titles above have been taken from ms. Vat. lat. 4068 thought by Giovanni Mercati to be an autograph (*Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, Manuele Caleca e Teodoro Meliteniota ed altri appunti per la storia della teologia e della letteratura bizantina del secolo XIV* [Studi e Testi 56; Vatican City, 1931], p. 153). These titles and the text itself differ somewhat from the editio princeps of H. Canisius, *Antiquae lectionis tomus VI* (Ingolstadt, 1604), pp. 1-78. Canisius was using a sixteenth-century manuscript,

Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 111. These Latin works are reprinted in PG 151.1255-1330.

ETHICA SECUNDUM STOICOS per dominum Barlaamum de Seminaria episcopum Gyracensem, ex pluribus voluminibus eorundem Stoicorum sub compendio composita.

inc. Pars prima. Cap. I. Beatitudo quid dicatur. Hominum aliud alio ...
des. Possibile ergo est perturbationibus vacare.

Canisius published this text too (*Antiquae lectionis* 6.79-110) from the above-mentioned Munich manuscript. The text is reprinted in PG 151.1341-64.

SPURIA LATINA

R. Weiss asserts that the Latin poems sometimes ascribed to Barlaam (Angelo Averno, *De Svevorum gestis* 1.282) are not in fact his: R. Weiss, 'The Greek Culture of South Italy in the Later Middle Ages', *Proceedings of the British Academy* 37 (1951 [London, 1953]) 46, n° 7 (repr. in *Medieval and Humanist Greek. Collected Essays by Roberto Weiss* [Medioevo e umanesimo 8; Padua, 1977], p. 39, n° 169).

MANUSCRIPTS AND TEXT OF THE SOLUTIONS

The text of the *Solutions* is found in three of the earliest manuscripts of Barlaam's theological writings against the Latins: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Vat. gr. 1110 and 1106; Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana gr. 292 (E 76 sup.). In other manuscripts the philosophical text was omitted, probably because it held little interest for the Greek theologians who consulted these three manuscripts and copied them for use in their controversies with the Church of Rome.

V = Vat. gr. 1110

c. A.D. 1336/7, western paper, i + 129 folios, 208 × 146 mm. Contents: Barlaam, AL 1-7, 11, 10 (fols. 5v-78v); *Prayer* (fols. 78v-79r); *Solutions* (fols. 80r-94v); Or. I-II (fols. 94v-116v). The remainder of the present manuscript consists of additions that were bound in later: a fragment of a text on the phases of the moon by a certain Isidore (perhaps Glabas, A.D. 1324-96) – fols. 117r-124v; J. Darrouzès has suggested Ignatios Glabas, Barlaam's contemporary, as the author but the text very clearly reads 'Isidore'.¹⁶⁶ Excerpts from Barlaam's *Logistica* (ScT 2 – fols. 125r-

¹⁶⁶ J. Darrouzès, *Les registes de 1310 à 1376* (Le patriarcat byzantin, Série I, Les registes des actes du patriarcat de Constantinople, vol. 1: *Les actes des patriarches*, fasc. 5 [Paris, 1977], n° 2170, p. 130.

127v). On fol. 128r there is an anonymous aporia entitled: *Τὶ δῆποτε οὐ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον ὁ θεὸς τὸν κόσμον πεποίηκεν*. A later owner of the codex has provided the solution to the problem posed by Barlaam to Lapithes in *Solutions* V.8.4-7. The last text is a theorem attributed to Apollonius of Perga (fol. 129v).¹⁶⁷

Both C. Giannelli and A. Fyrigos have discussed the autograph corrections and revisions made by Barlaam in this manuscript.¹⁶⁸ The nature of these revisions is such as to suggest that they were made very shortly after the original composition of the treatise. Therefore, a date of c. 1335/36 can be proposed for the manuscript in its original form.

X = Vat. gr. 1106¹⁶⁹

Mid-fourteenth century, ms. in two volumes, western paper, 355 folios (178 in vol. 1 and 177 in vol. 2), 220 × 140 mm. Vol. 1, fols. 1-61, was originally part of a separate manuscript containing the works of Barlaam the Calabrian. The remainder of vol. 1 and the entire vol. 2 contain the Platonic commentaries of Olympiodorus. Contents of Barlaam ms.: AL 1-7, 11, 10 (fols. 1r-50v); *Prayer* (fols. 50v-51r); *Solutions* (fols. 51r-61v).

The earliest appearance of the two-volume format of this manuscript is in the Greek inventory of A.D. 1539.¹⁷⁰ The commentaries of Olympiodorus are not mentioned in the earlier inventories which refer only to the Barlaam section of the present Vat. gr. 1106.¹⁷¹ That this originally circulated as a separate manuscript can be still further corroborated. Both the scribal hand and the watermarks are distinct from the Olympiodorus sections. Between fols. 61 and 62 there is a break in the binding, and fol. 62r is worn and slightly faded as might be expected of an

¹⁶⁷ This theorem does not appear in the surviving Greek works of Apollonius, but it is quoted by John Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* (ed. M. Wallies, *CAG* 13.3.105, n° 4). The text of the manuscript differs considerably from the Philoponus version.

¹⁶⁸ Giannelli has also described the manuscript in some detail ('Un progetto', 180-84); and cf. Fyrigos, 'La produzione letteraria' (n. 1 above), 116-39. Fyrigos has been somewhat too generous in attributing corrections to Barlaam's hand. It is hazardous to make palaeographical identifications *sicuramente* when the instance involves only one or two letters and even more so when it is a cancellation. For example, I would attribute the following to the original copyist (V¹): *ὁμοίως* [not *ὁμοίους* as Fyrigos, p. 136] V^{ac}: *ὁμοίας* V¹ (fol. 15v12); *ἐξ* supra, fort. V¹ (fol. 28v19); *ὑπόθεσις* V¹: ? V^{ac} (fol. 31r16); *ἡμᾶς* V^{ac}: *ὑμᾶς* fort. V¹. There are numerous other doubtful instances. Furthermore, by failing to collate a sufficient number of manuscripts against V, Fyrigos has failed to discern the complex character of the corrections and revisions, and the different stages into which they fall.

¹⁶⁹ See the brief discussion of this manuscript in Giannelli, *ibid.*, 182-84 and Fyrigos, *ibid.*, 141-44. I cannot agree with Fyrigos that Barlaam intended this manuscript as an exemplar for further copies of the text. X is filled with orthographic errors of the worst kind, which in itself makes this unlikely. Further, collation of twelve other manuscripts against X has not revealed a single direct descendant from X.

¹⁷⁰ R. Devreesse, *Le fonds grec de la Bibliothèque Vaticane des origines à Paul V* (Studi e Testi 244; Vatican City, 1965), p. 343.

¹⁷¹ The earliest reference is A.D. 1475; see Devreesse, *ibid.*, pp. 75, 114, 148, 206, 231.

initial folio. And finally, Barlaam's treatises are nowhere else associated with Platonic commentaries.

As the Barlaam section now stands it seems to be incomplete, for the text breaks off two words before the end of Barlaam's *Solutions*. In its original state the manuscript may have contained the two Greek *Orations* as does the related manuscript, Vat. gr. 1110. The watermarks suggest a date in the first half of the fourteenth century which would accord well with the form of the scribal hand.¹⁷²

M = Ambros. gr. 292 (E 76 sup.)¹⁷³

Middle to late fourteenth century, western paper, iii + 306 folios (foliated i-iii, 1-85, 85^a-305), 227 × 158 mm. Contents: Ptolemy's *Harmonics* (fols. 1r-107v); Barlaam, *On the Square Root* (ScT 3 – fols. 108r-110v); idem, *Logistica* (ScT 2 – fols. 111r-172r); *Demonstratio arithmetica* (ScT 1 – fols. 172r-178r); Nikephoros Gregoras, *Additional Chapters of Ptolemy's Harmonics* (fols. 178v-180r); Barlaam, *Refutation of the Additional Chapters* (ScT 4 – fols. 180r-190r); AL 1-7, 11, 10 (fols. 191r-254r); *Solutions* (fols. 254v-267v); Or. I-II (fols. 268r-290r); *Treatise on Solar Eclipses* (ScT 5a + b – fols. 291r-300v); *On the Date of Easter* (ScT 6 – fols. 302r-305v, 290v).

In the late fifteenth to early sixteenth century the manuscript required repairs and further leaves with the text newly copied were inserted. The manuscript still bears the leather-board binding which it probably received at this time. In the sixteenth century it passed into the hands of the humanist Giovanni Vincenzo Pinelli (1535-1601), and in 1609 was purchased for the Ambrosian Library by Cardinal Federico Borromeo. The manuscript was originally copied by three scribes in the mid-to-late fourteenth century.

There is one further witness (E) to our text in Barlaam's letter to Neilos Triklinios: EG 2.228-39 = *Solutions* V.2.1-9.

With such a short text as the *Solutions* it is not possible to arrive at any definitive conclusions regarding the relationship of the three manuscripts. However, a number of tentative suggestions can be made. The significant patterns of variation in the readings are as follows:

¹⁷² e.g., fols. 3/6, 4/9: cf. 'Cloches 5 & 6 (A.D. 1313 & 1341)' in D. and J. Harlfinger, *Wasserzeichen aus griechischen Handschriften* 1 (Berlin, 1974), and 'Cloche 2807 (A.D. 1337)' in V. A. Mošin-S. M. Traljić, *Vodeni Znakovi XIII. i XIV. vijeka* 1 (Zagreb, 1957), T. 313. It might also be mentioned here that the watermark of the second part of this volume of X (fols. 62-178) is probably contemporary. It may be identical with the 'Fleur 4077 (A.D. 1340)' in Mošin-Traljić, T. 447, col. 2. This date would seem to accord with that of the scribal hand. The dating of this manuscript to the sixteenth century by W. Norvin, *Olympiodori philosophi in Platonis Phaedonem commentaria* (Leipzig, 1913), p. viii and by L. G. Westerink, *Olympiodorus, In Platonis Gorgiam commentaria* (Leipzig, 1970), p. vi should be modified.

¹⁷³ The manuscript is summarily described in A. Martini and D. Bassi, *Catalogus codicum graecorum Bibliothecae Ambrosianae* 1 (Milan, 1906), pp. 326-28.

1. X contains readings which suggest that it may be a direct copy of V.

- I.6.13 δ' ἐν αὐτῶ: a possible misreading of the V¹ correction δὲ οὐδ' ἑαυτῶ
 II.1.1 τὸ ἐν: the stylized capital τ is identical with that in V
 IV.13.10 πεποιόκεν (πεποίηκεν M): X reproduces the error in V
 IV.16.3 οὐδὲ νοῶ: failure to note the V¹ correction οὐδὲν νοῶ

2. M has two readings which suggest it may be a direct copy of V.

- I.8.2 M retains the space of 4-5 letters that is found in V after ἔχειν
 IV.16.3 οὐδὲ νῶ: failure to read correctly the V¹ correction οὐδὲν νοῶ

3. XM exhibit several common errors against V, which suggests that neither is a direct copy of V, unless these errors be considered coincidental.

- I.3.13 ἐπίστασιν: ἐπὶ στάσιν
 I.8.8 συμβαίνει: συμβαίνειη
 IV.3.7 ἐκάστου σου: ἑκαστά σου

4. X, in addition to numerous orthographic errors, has certain readings not reproduced by M, thus showing that M cannot be a direct copy or descendant of X. M is palaeographically later in date and so cannot be the exemplar for X.

- I.7.2 λογικὸν: λογιστικὸν
 I.8.10 οὐκοῦν: οὐκ ἂν
 II.6.10 κατηγορίαν: περιγραφὴν
 II.7.10 λέγεται: λέγεσθαι

5. X, examples of orthographic errors.

- I.4.6 ἀλ' (ἀλλ')
- I.6.9 παραδεδωμένας (παραδεδομένας)
- I.8.4 λέγω (λέγων)
- III.6.4 ἐντυχηκότι (ἐντετυχηκότι)
- III.6.9 παραδείματα (παραδείγματα)
- IV.4.8 μεσοσυλλαβοῦσαν (μεσολαβοῦσαν)
- IV.16.6 κατοκνίσης (κατοκνήσης)

6. M has few orthographic errors and these are usually of the sort that make some grammatical sense.

- I.4.3 εἶδεν (οἶδεν)
- I.5.6 ἡγγείτο (ἡγοῖτο)
- III.4.4 ἐθέλοι (ἐθέλη)

7. V exhibits numerous corrections and revisions, some by the original copyist (V¹) and others by Barlaam (V²). Where the corrections are minor, it is not always possible to identify them palaeographically as V²; thus, some V² alterations may be still hidden under the rubric V¹. Alterations in the text seem

to have been made in three different stages: a first stage where both X and M exhibit the corrections in V; a second where only X shows the changes in V; and a final stage where neither X nor M has the alterations made by V². To this last phase belongs the change from 'the divine Plato' to simply 'Plato'. Most likely Barlaam made this erasure after coming under the charge of indulging too heavily in Hellenic philosophy. One may thus hazard a date of 1336 for this final stage of correction and revision.

Stage 1:

- | | |
|----------|--|
| I.8.1 | συμφωνῇ V ¹ XM: -εῖ V ^{ac} |
| II.1.1 | τὸ ἐν V ² XM: ? V ^{ac} |
| II.6.9 | διαδιδράσκον V ² XM: διδάσκον V ^{ac} |
| III.1.5 | ἐκ V ¹ XM: εἰ ut uid. V ^{ac} |
| III.1.6 | ἐν V ¹ XM: ? V ^{ac} |
| IV.3.9 | τῷ add. V ² XM: deest in V ^{ac} |
| IV.4.1 | τοῦ πρώτου V ² XM: τὸν πρώτον V ^{ac} |
| IV.4.10 | ἀπεβάλομεν V ¹ XM: ? V ^{ac} |
| IV.6.16 | δέχεσθαι V ¹ XM: ? V ^{ac} |
| IV.13.3 | τε add. V ¹ XM: deest in V ^{ac} |
| IV.15.12 | ἐαυτὸν V ¹ XM: ἐαυτοῦ V ^{ac} |

Stage 2:

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| I.9.16 | μοι V ² X: ἡμῶν V ^{ac} M |
| II.3.13 | ἂν εὔρωμεν V ² X: εὔροισμεν V ^{ac} M |
| II.4.7 | ἂν εἴη post ἐκβλητέον om. V ² X: in textu V ^{ac} M |
| III.1.2/3.5 | ἐναργεία V ¹ X: ἐνεργεία V ^{ac} M |
| IV.15.5 | τυπῶται V ¹ X: τυποῦται V ^{ac} M |
| V.1.7 | ὑποληφθήσεται V ¹ X: ὑπολειφθήσεται V ^{ac} M |

Stage 3:

- | | |
|--------|--|
| I.2.10 | τῷ θείῳ ante Πλάτωνι V ^{ac} XM: erasit V ² |
| I.3.8 | ἐνδέχεσθαι V ^{ac} XM: ἐν- erasit V ² |
| IV.2.4 | τὰ ² deest in V ^{ac} XM: add. supra V ² |

The text is presented below as it appeared after Barlaam's final revisions. All alterations in the text of V have been described in detail. I have adopted the practice of the manuscripts in reading as single words: ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐξ ἴσου, καθ' ὃ, καθ' ἕκαστα, τὰ μάλιστα. An exception was made to avoid the curious word ἀλλάττα (= ἀλλ' ἄττα, IV.11.4). Conjectural readings have been relegated to the apparatus.

Direct quotations have been set apart and indented from the margin. Where Barlaam has incorporated a quotation or a close paraphrase into his text, this is indicated by boldface type.

SIGLA

V	Vaticanus graecus 1110
	V ¹ a librario ipso ut uidetur correctus
	V ² a secunda manu (Barlaami) correctus
X	Vaticanus graecus 1106
M	Ambrosianus graecus 292 (E 64 sup.)
E	Excerptum in Barlaami epistola ad Nilum Triclinium (EG 2.228-39)
V ^{ac} X ^{ac} M ^{ac}	codices VXM ante correctionem
add.	addidit
des.	desinit
fort.	fortasse
hab.	habent
inc.	incipit
litt.	littera
mg.	in margine
om.	omisit
ras.	rasura
ut uid.	ut uidetur

ΒΑΡΛΑΑΜ ΜΟΝΑΧΟΥ

Λύσεις εἰς τὰς ἐπενεχθείσας αὐτῷ ἀπορίας παρὰ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Γεωργίου τοῦ
Λαπίθου

I. ἈΠΟΡΙΑ

1. Ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις *Περὶ Κινήσεως* λόγοις ἀποδείξας Ἀριστοτέλης διὰ πλειόνων ἐπιχειρημάτων πάνυ γενναίως ὥς ἀδύνατον ὅλως αὐτοκίνητον τι εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Οὐρανοῦ* πᾶν σῶμα φυσικόν, φησὶν, ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως · ἀρχὴν δὲ ἑαυτοῦ κινητικὴν. δι' ὧν πάλιν τὸ αὐτοκίνητον εἰσάγειν
5 δοκεῖ καὶ εἰς ταῦτ' ἔρχεσθαι Πλάτωνα, ὃς οὐ μόνον εἶναι τι αὐτοκίνητον τίθεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὴν αὐτὸ πάσης κινήσεως εἶναι ὀρίζεται. πότερον οὖν φῶμεν ἡγαντιῶσθαι ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ Πλάτωνα τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐν τούτοις καὶ αἰτίαις αὐτὸν περιπεσεῖν ἥκιστα φιλοσοφοῦσι πρεπούσαις, ἢ ἔστι τις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λόγος, ᾧ ἀπολύσειεν ἂν τις αὐτὸν ἐνδίκως τῶν τοιούτων αἰτιῶν;

ΛΥΣΙΣ

2. Πρὸς μὲν οὖν Πλάτωνα, ᾧ γενναῖε, ὅπως ποτὲ ἔχει Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν οἷς φιλοσοφεῖ, εἴτε ἐναντίως εἴτε μὴ, οὐ πάνυ τί μοι δοκεῖ ἄξιον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπορίας. οὐδὲν γὰρ θαυμαστόν, εἰ μὴ τὰς αὐτὰς ἕτερος ἐτέρῳ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχει δόξας · ἑαυτῷ δὲ εἰ μὴ διὰ πάντων ὧν λέγει ὁμοφωνῶν φανείη, τοῦτ' εἰκότως ὁ τὰ
5 ἐκείνου πρεσβεύων θαυμάσειεν — εἰ ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀξιῶν ὁδηγὸς εἶναι ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θεωρίαν αὐτὸς εἴη ἐσχάτη περιπεσὼν ἀμαθία, ἐναντίας ἔχων περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δόξας · δηλὸν γὰρ ὥς ἅπερ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτὸς ἦν φρονῶν, ταῦτα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐδίδασκεν. ἐγὼ τοίνυν οὐκ ἀξιῶ τοιοῦτον εἶναι Ἀριστοτέλην · οἶμαι δ' ὅτι οὐδ' ἄλλος τις ὃς ἐν πείρᾳ τῶν ἐκείνου γέγονεν. ἀλλὰ τοσούτου δέω φᾶναι αὐτὸν ἐν
10 τούτοις ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ Πλάτωνα ἡγαντιῶσθαι, ὥστε καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν

Titulus: λόγος ι' mg. V [B]αρλαάμ: B- om. in X rubricator

ΑΠΟΡΙΑ mg. VXM

I.1 1 [ε]ν: ἐ- om. in X rubricator 8 ὑπὲρ: περὶ M

ΛΥΣΙΣ mg. XM

2 1 ποτὲ: ποτ' M 9 τοσούτου: τοσούτῳ M φᾶναι VXM: φάναι rectius 10 τῷ
θεῶν ante Πλάτωνα sub ras. V^{ac}; plene scriptum XM; expunxit V²

I.1 1 *Περὶ Κινήσεως* = Arist., *Ph.* libri 6-8 2 Arist., *Ph.* 8.4-5 (254b7-258b9) 3-
4 Arist., *Cael.* 1.2 (268b14-16) 5-6 Pl., *Phdr.* 245C5-9

δόγμασιν οὐκ ἂν ὀκνήσαιμι ἀποφήσασθαι μηδόλως αὐτὸν Πλάτῳ, μή τί γε ἑαυτῷ, κατὰ τὰς τῶν λεγομένων διανοίας διενηγέχθαι, κἂν τοῖς ὀνόμασι πολλαχοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ διαφέρεσθαι. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὐ νῦν καιρὸς εἰπεῖν. πρὸς δὲ τὴν προκειμένην ἀπορίαν ἀπαντητέον ἂν εἴη δεῖξαι πρῶτον ὅπως οὐ διαφωνεῖ ἐν τούτοις Πλάτῳ. οὐ 15 γὰρ ἀηδῶς οἶμαι καὶ ταῦτα ἀκούσθαι.

3. Πλάτῳ ὁ μέγας διελόμενος χωρὶς μὲν τὰ εἶδη ὅσα τε ἔνυλα τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου λέγεται καὶ ὅσα ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, χωρὶς δ' αὖ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα, τούτων ἀφέντος, περὶ ἐκεῖνα ὡς χωριστὰ καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ ὄντα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβει, ἡγούμενος τοῖς μὲν τῷ μετέχειν τὰς ἐπωνυμίας τῶν εἰδῶν ἰσχυροὺς πλείστον μετεῖναι 5 ἀοριστίας καὶ ἀπειρίας καὶ ἀνομοιότητος καὶ μεταβολῆς, δι' ἃ μηδέποτε ἂν εἰκότως αὐτῶν παραγενέσθαι τῷ βεβαίαν ἐπιστήμην · ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν

αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ τὸ ὅμοιον, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν ὄν, μή ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντιοῦν δέχεσθαι · ἀλλ' αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, μονοειδὲς εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχον καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς 10 ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν δεχόμενον.

οἷς ἐντυχοῦσαν ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου ψυχὴν, **μόνῳ θεατῇ** χρησαμένην **νῶ** ἀγαπᾶν τε αὐτὰ καὶ **θεωροῦσαν τάλῃθ' ἐρέεσθαι τε καὶ εὐπαθεῖν**, πεπαιγμένην τοῦ πλάνου καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ στάσιν **τὴν ὄντως οὖσαν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστήμην** ἔλθοῦσαν. οὐ χεῖρον δ' ἴσως καὶ τινα παραθεῖναι αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τῶν τοῦ σοφοῦ ῥημάτων, ἃ περὶ τούτων ἐν τοῖς περὶ 15 ψυχῆς πεφιλοσόφηται αὐτῷ, δι' ὧν ἀμφοτέρωθεν δείκνυνσι τίς τε ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὰ μεθεκτικὰ ἀλλοτριότης, καὶ τίς ἡ πρὸς τὰς ἰδέας αὐτῆς οἰκειότης.

ἡ ψυχὴ, φησὶν, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως — τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι' αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι — τότε μὲν ἔλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς 20 τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη · ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκείσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ αἰεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅταν περ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαιται γε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα αἰεὶ κατὰ 25 ταῦτά ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη · καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται.

14 δεῖξαι VXM: δεῖξαι fort. melius διαφωνεῖν X

3 4 τὸ ante μετεῖναι rectius 8 δέχεσθαι V²: ἐνδέχεσθαι VM; ἐν- sub ras. V^{ac} 13 ἐπὶ
στάσιν: ἐπίστασιν XM 14 ἐκείνων: ἐκείνῳ X 18 τοῦ¹: τὸ X 21 ὅταν: ὅτα X
23 γίνεταί X 24 γίνεταί ut uid. X^{ac}

4. Οὕτως οὖν ὁ γενναῖος Πλάτων περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἢ ὃν ἔστιν ἕκαστον διατρίβων, παρὲς τοῖς περὶ φύσεως τὰς τούτων πρὸς τὰ μετέχοντα σχέσεις σκοπεῖν. ὥσπερ ὅμοιον οἶδεν ὁ οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὃν τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃν ὅπερ εἶναι λέγεται, οὕτω καὶ
5 αὐτοκίνητον τίθεται εἶναι ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσι τοῖς χωριστοῖς, ὁ οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὃν αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὕτως αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ὑπάρχον.

5. Ἀριστοτέλει δὲ περὶ μὲν τοιούτου αὐτοκινήτου εἴτε ἔστιν εἴτε οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Κινήσεως* λόγος. ὅτι δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν φυσικῶν σωμάτων οἷόν τε συμβῆναι αὐτοκινήτῳ πρῶτως εἶναι, τοῦτο δεικνύει πειράται · ὁ γὰρ ἀποδείκνυσιν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοκίνητον, τοῦτο κινούμενον καὶ μεριστὸν καὶ ξύνθετον ὑποτίθεται · πᾶν δὲ τὸ
5 τοιοῦτον φυσικόν. οὐκ οὖν ἐναντιοῦται ἐν τούτοις Πλάτωνι — εἰ μὴ τις καὶ τὸν ἰσχυριζόμενον μὴ συμβεβηκέναι τῷ ἡλίῳ ἴσῃ εἶναι τῇ σελήνῃ ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἡγοῖτο τῷ τιθεμένῳ ἰσότητά εἶναι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτων φαίνεται πῶς ἀρμόζων τὸ αὐτοκίνητον φυσικῷ τινι σώματι, ὥστε οὐ διηνεχθήτην ἀλλήλοισιν περὶ τούτων τῷ φιλοσόφῳ.

6. Ἔτι Πλάτων ἐν *Φαίδρῳ* αὐτοκίνητον καὶ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως τὴν ψυχὴν φάσκων εἶναι, ταύτην ἀσώματον εἶναι βούλεται · φησὶ γάρ ·

ἡ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφῆς οὐσία ὄντως οὐσα ψυχῆς, κυβερνήτῃ μόνῃ θεατῇ νῶν χρηταί, περὶ ἣν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης γένος,
5 τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον.

οὐκοῦν ἀσώματον αὐτὴν οἶδεν. τίς οὖν ἡ διαφωνία, εἰ Πλάτωνος εἰπόντος ἀσώματόν τι αὐτοκίνητον εἶναι Ἀριστοτέλης ἀπαγορεύει μηδενὶ τῶν σωμάτων ὑπάρχειν τὸ αὐτοκίνητον; ἔτι Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν αὐτοκίνητον ἢ ἑτεροκίνητον ὀνομάζει, ἀναφέρων ἐπὶ τὰς παραδεδομένας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τῶν φυσικῶν κινήσεις · Πλάτων δὲ κατ' οὐδεμίαν
10 ἐκείνων τῶν κινήσεων ἔφη τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοκίνητον, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕτερόν τι κινήσεως εἶδος νοητὸν καὶ τελείαν ἐμφαίνον ἐνέργειαν, ὥς εἶναι αὐτὸ οἰκειότερον ὀνομάζεσθαι αὐτενέργητον. οὐκοῦν οὐ ταῦτο πρᾶγμα ταυτῷ χρώμενον ὀνόματι, ὃ μὲν τίθησιν, ὃ δ' ἀναιρεῖ. τοῦτο δ' οὐ ποιεῖ πάντως ἐναντιότητα · ὅτι δὲ οὐδ' ἐαυτῷ ἀντιπίπτει, ῥᾶδιον ἰδεῖν.

7. Σύνθετός ἐστιν Ἀριστοτέλει ὀνομάζειν πολλὰ τῶν πραγμάτων πρῶτως τε καὶ κατὰ μόρια · οἷον τὸ μὲν λογιστικὸν πρῶτως φρόνιμον τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἢ τὸν ἄνθρωπον

4 1 διατρίβων: διακρίβων X^{ac} 3 οἶδεν: εἶδεν M 6 ἀλλ': ἀλ' X
5 6 ἡγοῖτο: ἡγείτο M 8 φυσικῶν: -όν X^{ac} 9 τῶν: τῷ X
6 6 οἶδε M 9 παραδεδομένης X 10 τῆς ante κινήσεως add. M 12 ὀνόματος: ὀνόματι X
ὁ ὁ μὲν rectius 13 δὲ οὐδ' ἐαυτῷ V¹M: δὲ οὐδὲ αὐτῷ V^{ac}: δ' ἐν αὐτῷ X
7 1 Ἀριστοτέλης ὀνομάζει X 2 λογιστικόν: λογικόν X

5 2-3 Cf. Arist., *Ph.* 8.5 (257a31-b13)

6 3-5 Pl., *Phdr.* 247C6-247D1

κατὰ μόριον. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ αὐτοκίνητον εἴη ἂν λεγόμενον καὶ κατ' ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς
 τρόπους · κατὰ μόριον μὲν τῷ συνθέτου ὄντος τοῦ ὅλου τι τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ κινεῖν τὸ λοιπὸν
 5 (ὡς φαίμεν ἂν τὸ ζῶον αὐτοκίνητον εἶναι, τῷ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν κινεῖν, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ὑπ'
 αὐτῆς κινεῖσθαι) · πρῶτως δὲ τῷ τὸ ὅλον εἶναι ἀμφοτέρα καὶ κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ καὶ
 κινούμενον ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν κίνησιν. οὐδὲν οὖν ἄτοπον εἰ ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Κινήσεως* τὸ
 εἶναι τι πρῶτως αὐτοκίνητον ἀνελών, ἄλλοθί που φαίνεται τὸ δευτέρως εἰσάγων. εἴ τι
 10 ὑπὸ τινος ἀσωμάτου δυνάμεως ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὔσης κινούμενον, αὐτοκίνητον καὶ αὐτὸ
 προσρηθείη. ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ πρῶτως κινοῦν τοῦ κινουμένου ἐστίν. ὥσπερ
 καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ φησιν εἶναι τι, πρῶτως μὲν οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ, δευτέρως δέ. καὶ **ἀμφορεὺς**
οἶνου καὶ ἄλλως χρήσιμος ὢν, οὐχ ἦττον καὶ εἰς τὴν τούτου δεῖξιν χρήσιμος γέγονεν
 αὐτῷ.

8. Μήποτε δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα συμφωνῇ τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ *Φυσικῇ* εἰρημένους ·
 βούλεται γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις μόνα τὰ ζῶα εἶναι οὕτως αὐτοκίνητα, ὥστ' ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχειν
 τὴν κινουσαν ἀρχὴν · τὰ δ' ἄλλα καὶ φύσει κινῆται, ὑπὸ τινος ἀεὶ τῶν ἐξωθεν
 κινεῖσθαι. ἄθρην δὴ μήποτε, ἀρχὴν λέγων κινήτικὴν ἐκάστου τὴν ἐν ἐκάστῳ φύσιν, οὐχ
 5 οὕτως αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν κινήσεως λέγῃ ὡς πάντως κινουσαν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὴν τοῦ κινεῖσθαι
 παρέχουσαν ἐπιτηδειότητα. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τῇ *Φυσικῇ* τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐπεσημίηματο, εἰπὼν ὡς
 τὰ ἄψυχα τῶν φυσικῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κινήσεως οὐχ ὥστε κινεῖν, ἀλλὰ
 κινεῖσθαι · καὶ συμβαίνει λέγεσθαι παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ κινήτικόν διχῶς · πρῶτως μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ
 τοιούτου οἶον κινεῖν · ἔπειτα καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ κινήτου ἐπιτηδειότητος, ἐπεὶ ἄνευ τοῦ
 10 ἐτέρου αὐτῶν κίνησις οὐκ ἐστίν. ὡς γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ κινούντος οὐκ ἂν κινήθῃ τὸ τὴν τοῦ
 κινεῖσθαι ἔχον ἐπιτηδειότητα, οὕτως ἄνευ ταύτης οὐδὲν ὄφελος τοῦ κινούντος πρὸς τὸ
 εἶναι τὴν φυσικὴν κίνησιν. διὸ ἐστίν ὡς καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἐπιτηδειότης τοῦ
 κινήτου προσρηθείη ἂν κινήτικόν, εἰ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐτέρου δεῖται τοῦ κινήσαντος.

9. Ἄ μὲν οὖν ὑπὲρ Ἀριστοτέλους ἀπολογεῖσθαι ἔσχομεν διὰ τὴν πρώτην ἀπορίαν,
 τοσαῦτα ἔστω · οἷμαι γὰρ αὐτὰ ἱκανὰ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ τῷ μετιόντι ὕστερον ταυτά τε καὶ ἃ
 μέλλω ἔρειν περὶ τῶν ἐξῆς ἀποριῶν δόξει ἑλλιπῶς ἔχειν, ἀναφανεισῶν αὐτῷ τινων ἐκ
 τούτων ἄλλων ἀποριῶν καὶ ἐνστάσεων, μὴ θαυμάζετω · ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο λογιζέσθω, ὅτι
 5 πρῶτον μὲν οὐχὶ πρὸς παρόντα τὸν προτείναντά μοι ταύτας τὰς ἀπορίας ἐποίησάμην
 τὸν λόγον, ὥστε ἡ ἐμὲ ἐπανερωτᾶν αὐτὸν περὶ τῶν ἀποριῶν αὐτοῦ εἴ τι αὐτὸς ἠγόρου

4 μόριον μὲν τῷ: μόρια μὲν τὸ M

8 1 συμφωνῇ V¹XM: -εἰ V^{ac}

4 ἄθρην X λέγων: λέγω X

10 οὐκ ἂν: οὐκοῦν X

9 5 τόν: τ (sic) X

7 αὐτὴν: ἑαυτὴν M^{ac}

2 post ἔχειν spatium vacuum 4-5 litt. hab. VM

6 ἐπεσημίηματο X

8 συμβαίνει XM κινήτὸν M

7 4-5 Cf. Arist., *Ph.* 8.4 (254b30-33, 255a12-18)

5-6 Arist., *Ph.* 8.2 (252b22-24)

6-7 Arist., *Ph.* 8.5 (257b26-30)

11-13 Arist., *Ph.* 4.3 (210a30-b21)

8 2-3 Arist., *Ph.* 8.4 (254b14-17)

4 Arist., *Cael.* 1.2 (268b14-16)

6 Arist., *Ph.* 8.4

(255a24-28)

- καὶ προὔργου πρὸς τὰς λύσεις ὑπῆρχεν, ἢ ἐκείνον ἐμὲ ἐπανερέσθαι ἐφ' οἷς ἂν οὐκ ἐδόκουν αὐτῷ πρὸς τρόπον πρὸς τὰς ἀπορίας αὐτοῦ ἀπαντᾶν · ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε ἂν τέλειον ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀπάντων τούτων ἀπόντων τῷ
- 10 λόγῳ, εὐχὴν αἰτιᾶσθαι χρὴ εἰ μὴ παντάπασιν ἐλλιπῶς ἀπεργασθεῖη. ἔπειτα οὐ ταῦτά πάντες περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποροῦσιν ἢ ἀποδέχονται · οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ ἐνίστανται, ὥστε ῥάδιον εἶναι ταῦτα προησθημένον ἀπαλλάξαι τὸν λόγον εὐθύς τῶν τοιούτων ἀντιλήψεων. ἀνάγκη οὖν πρὸς τὸν ἑμαυτοῦ ἀποβλέποντα νοῦν, τοσαῦτα περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν, ὅσα περ ἂν ἱκανὰ ἦν αὐτὸν καταπεῖσαι, εἴπερ ταῦτά περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἠπόρουν.
- 15 εἰ τοίνυν καὶ αὐτὸς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀγαπήσεις (εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι οὐ προσποιῇ ἀπορεῖν), εἴ ἂν ἔχοι · εἰ δὲ μὴ, δίκαιος ἂν εἴης, δι' ᾧς εἶπον αἰτίας, συγγνώμην μοι τῶν παραλελειμμένων ἔχειν.

II. ἈΠΟΡΙΑ

1. Τὸ ἐν Ἀριστοτέλῃ φάσκων πού ἰσαχῶς τῷ ὄντι κατηγορεῖσθαι, φαίνεται αὖθις ἀρχὴν αὐτὸ τιθέμενος ἀριθμῷ · ἐξ οὗ πάντως συμβαίνει ὑπὸ τὸ ποσὸν τάττεσθαι, ὑφ' ὃ γὰρ γένος τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος. οὐ γὰρ ἡ στιγμή μέρος γραμμῆς, ὅθεν εὐλόγως καὶ ἄποσος. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο Ἀριστοτέλει ἀδύνατον δοκεῖ εἶναι, τὸ εἶδος κατηγορίας
- 5 τινὸς πασῶν κατηγορεῖσθαι.

ΛΥΣΙΣ

2. Εἰ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡς θαυμάσιε, ὅπερ ἐν κατηγορεῖ πάντων, ταῦτό τοῦτο τῷ ὄντι καὶ μέρος ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ποσὸν εἶναι τίθεται, αὐτὸν ἔδει παρεῖναι καὶ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὅπως οὐ συμβήσεται, τούτων οὕτως ὑπειλημμένων αὐτῷ, ἀντιφάσει περιπεσεῖν. εἰ δὲ δεῖξομεν ἡμεῖς αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνου δογμάτων ἢ μὴ τὸ
- 5 αὐτὸ ἐν πάντων τε κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀρχὴν ἀριθμοῦ τιθέμενον, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν οὐ μέντοι γε ὑπὸ τὸ ποσὸν αὐτὸ τάττοντα, καὶ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἢ τε ἀπορία ἱκανῶς λυθήσεται καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀνώτερος τῶν τοιούτων αἰτιῶν ἀναφανεῖται.

13 ἑμαυτοῦ: ε- sub ras. ut uid. V
in textu X

16 μοι: ἡμῖν V^{ac}M; ἡμῖν cancellauit et μοι mg. add. V²; μοι

ΑΠΟΡΙΑ mg. VXM

II.1 1 τὸ ἐν: in ras. V²; XM 2 ἀριθμοῦ M

ΛΥΣΙΣ mg. M

2 1 [εἰ]: ε- om. in X rubricator 3 οὐ: μὴ rectius 4 ἢ: εἰ M 5 τε om. X

II.1 1 Arist., *Metaph.* 9.2 (1053b20-21, 25) 1-2 Arist., *Metaph.* 4.6 (1016b17-18)
3-4 Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* 4.6 (1016b25-30), *Ph.* 6.1 (231a21-29), *Top.* 1.18 (108b26-27), *ibid.* 6.4 (141b5-9)

2 1 Arist., *Metaph.* 9.2 (1053b20)

3. Σοὶ μὲν γάρ, ἐκ τοῦ καθόλου ἀξιούν τὸ μέρος δεῖν ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ὅλῳ ἀνάγεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὴν μονάδα μέρος οὔσαν ἀριθμοῦ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους εἶδος καταλογίζεσθαι, οὐπερ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμός. ἐγὼ δέ, καίπερ ἐξ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἔχων δεῖξαι οὐκ ἄξιον λόγου τὸν καθόλου τουτονὶ λόγον, ἐκ τῆς μονάδος μάλιστα καὶ 5 τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δοκῶ μοι ἐλέγξειν αὐτὸν σαθρὸν καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ἔχοντα. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὡς μέρος ἔχει πρὸς ὅλον, δείξει δέ τις ὑγιὲς λόγος αὐτὸ μὴ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἀναγόμενον, οὐδὲ τὸ φαίνεσθαι ἀληθὲς τῷ σεμνῷ περιλειφθήσεται ἀξιώματι. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως · οἱ δύο οὗτοι λόγοι — ὁ τε καθόλου ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶν μέρος καὶ ὅλον ἀνάγων, καὶ ὁ τὴν μονάδα οὐχ ὁμογενῇ τῷ ἀριθμῷ τιθέμενος — φαίνονται πρὸς 10 ἀλλήλους οὕτως ἔχειν, ὥστε ὅποτερουοῦν αὐτοῖν ἀληθοῦς ἀποδειχθέντος, τὸν ἕτερον ψευδῇ καταλείπεσθαι. οὐκοῦν διαστήσαντες αὐτοὺς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, μὴ ἐπιχειρῶμεν αὐτοὺς ἀναιρεῖν δι' ἀλλήλων ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ σκεψάμενοι καθ' αὐτὸν ἑκάτερον, ὁπότερον ἂν εὗρωμεν δυνάμενον κατασκευασθῆναι ἐκ τῶν φανερωτάτων τοῦ φιλοσόφου δογμάτων, τοῦτον ἐγκρίναντες τὸν λοιπὸν καταλείψωμεν.

4. Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἄδηλον ἐκ τίνων ἀποδειχθήσεται ὁ μὴ ὑπὸ τὸ ποσὸν ἀνάγων τὴν μονάδα λόγος. εἰ γὰρ **τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ συνεχὲς τὸ δὲ διωρισμένον**, ἑκάτερον δὲ κέκτηται μόρια τὸ μὲν διακεκριμένα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἓνα τινὰ ὅρον συνημμένα, τὸ δὲ ἐνἀριθμον ἐν καθ' ὅσον ἐν ἡμέρῃς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδιαίρετον (**τίθεται γάρ,** 5 **φησὶν, ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς μονάδα εἶναι τὸ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον**), οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποσὸν τὸ ἐν καθὼ ἐν. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μέλλομεν ἀναιρῆσειν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τῆς τοῦ ποσοῦ διαιρέσεως, ἢ τοὺς ὁρισμούς τῶν διαιρεθέντων, ἐκβλητέον τὸ ἐν ἐκ τῶν τοῦ ποσοῦ εἰδῶν.

5. Φῆς δ' ὅτι ἡ στιγμή ἀποσός ἐστὶν ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐστὶ μέρος γραμμῆς. οὐκοῦν πᾶν ὁ μὴ μέρος γραμμῆς, ἀποσον · εἰ γὰρ μὴ, ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν αἷτιον τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ποσὸν τὴν στιγμήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τις ἕτερον ἢ τὸ ἡμέρῃς αὐτῆς αἰτιῶτο αὐτῇ τοῦ ἀπόσου, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι. διατὶ γὰρ ἡ μὲν γραμμὴ, καίπερ οὐκ οὔσα μέρος ἐπιφανείας, ὅμως ποσὸν ἐστίν, 5 ὁ δὲ πέρας ὃν γραμμῆς μὴ ἐστὶ μέρος αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἐστὶ ποσόν (ὡς γὰρ ἔχει στιγμή πρὸς γραμμὴν, οὕτως αὐτὴ πρὸς ἐπιφάνειαν), ἢ δῆλον διότι τὸ μὲν μεριστόν, τὸ δ' ἡμέρῃς;

6. Ἄλλὰ μὴν τῷ θετῷ καὶ ἀθέτῳ διαφέρουσα στιγμή μονάδος, τῷ ἡμερεῖ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ οὐ διενήνοχεν αὐτῆς. ἐξίσου ἄρα ἢ τοῦ ἡμεροῦς καὶ ἀδιαιρέτου φύσις καὶ τὴν στιγμήν καὶ τὴν μονάδα τῆς ποσότητος ἀλλοτριώσκει. ἀλλ' ὥ τᾶν, εἴποι τις, τὸ τῆς

3 4 λόγου: λόγον M 10 ὁποτερουοῦν X 13 ἂν εὗρωμεν: εὔρομεν V^{ac}M: ἂν add. supra et -σι- mutauit in -ω- V² (ut uid.): ἂν εὗρωμεν X

4 1 ποσόν: σόν X 7 ἂν εἴη post ἐκβλητέον V^{ac}M: cancellauit V (fort. V²): deest in X

5 1 στιγμή: σι (sic) X 1-2 οὐκοῦν ... γραμμῆς om. X

4 2-4 Arist., Cat. 6 (4b20) 4-5 Arist., APo. 1.2 (72a21-31)

6 1-2 Arist., Metaph. 4.6 (1016b25-26)

γραμμῆς μέρος ποσόν ἐστιν. οὐκοῦν δεῖ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μέρος ποσόν εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ
 5 αὐτὸς ποσόν. ναί, εἰ ὥσπερ τὸ τῆς γραμμῆς καὶ ὀπηλικονοῦν μέρος γραμμὴ ἐστιν, οὕτω
 καὶ πᾶν ἀριθμοῦ μέρος ἀριθμὸς ἦν. νῦν δ' ἡ μονάς, μέρος οὕσα ἀριθμοῦ, ἀριθμὸς οὐκ
 ἔστιν. εἰ τοίνυν ἡ μονάς οὐκ ἀνάγεται ὑπὸ τὸ ποσόν, εἴ τις δὲ λέγοι τὸ ἐν ἀρχὴν εἶναι
 ἀριθμοῦ (ἐν ὀνομάζει αὐτὴν τὴν μονάδα), οὐκ ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν ὑπὸ τὸ ποσόν ἀναχθείη.
 ὑπὸ ποῖαν δ' ἄρα ἀνάγεται κατηγορίαν, ἡ ἔστι τι διαδιδράσκον τὴν τῶν κατηγοριῶν
 10 περιγραφὴν; καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ζητεῖν ἄλλου ἂν του δέοι λόγου.

7. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ταμάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τις εἶναι τὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἐν τίθεται,
 ἕτερον ἔσται τοῦ κατὰ πάντων ἀπλῶς λεγομένου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποσοῦ
 καθολικώτερον, τὸ δὲ μερικώτερον· τὰ δὲ ἀπλῶς ταῦτα ἀδύνατον οὕτω πρὸς τι τῶν
 ὄντων ἔχειν. ἕτερα ἄρα ὥστε οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν ἀνάγεται καὶ πάντων
 5 κατηγορεῖται· ἀλλ' ἕτερον, φωνῇ μόνον ταῦτό ὄν. εἴτα καὶ τοῦτο χρή ἐννοεῖν, ὥς
 Ἀριστοτέλης πάντων κατηγορῶν τὸ ἐν, ὥς ὁμωνύμῳ αὐτῷ χρήται φωνῇ, μὴ
 συνεπαγομένη ἰδέαν τινὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπὶ πάντα ἐξηπλωμένην, ἣ φησι Πλάτων. φάσκων
 δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀρχὴν εἶναι ἀριθμοῦ, οὐκ αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ ἐνός μονοσύλλαβον φωνὴν στοιχεῖον
 εἶναι ἀριθμοῦ βούλεται, ἀλλὰ τι ἀφωρισμένον τῶν ὅλων σημαινομένων τοῦ ἐνός, ἥτοι
 10 τὴν μονάδα· ἀπαριθμούμενος γάρ που τὰ τοῦ ἐνός σημαινόμενα, ἐν ἔφῃ λέγεσθαι καὶ
 τὸ ἀδιαίρετον· ἡ δὲ μονάς ἀδιαίρετον. ἡ μονάς ἄρα ἐν ἔστι τῶν τοῦ ἐνός
 σημαινομένων. εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ὁμώνυμος φωνὴ οὐδενὶ τῶν ὑποβεβλημένων αὐτῇ
 σημαινομένων ταῦτόν ἐστιν, ἕτερον ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἀριθμὸν ἐν τοῦ κατὰ πάντων λεγομένου.

III. ἈΠΟΡΙΑ

1. Τὰ ἔνυλα εἶδη πότερον δρᾷ πρὸς ἕτερα ἢ οὐ; ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ δρᾷ, πόθεν αἱ σωματικαὶ
 δράσεις καὶ πείσεις τῇ ἐναργείᾳ καταλαμβανόμεναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως; θερμαίνει τε γὰρ τὸ
 πῦρ καὶ ψύχει ἡ χιών καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον πρὸς ᾧ πέφυκε δρᾷ, ἐξ ὧν γένεσις καὶ
 φθορὰ καὶ πᾶσα μεταβολή. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ χρή τῇ αἰσθήσει πιστεύσαντας ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὰ
 5 δρᾶν, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἄπορον ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου· ἡ γὰρ μεταβατικῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ
 ἔστιν ἐφ' ᾧ δρᾷ μεταβαίνοντα, ἢ μένοντα ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις ὑποκειμένοις, ἕτερα εἶδη ἐν
 τοῖς πεφυκόσι γεννᾷ· κατ' οὐδέτερον δὲ φαίνεται δυνατόν. ὥστε οὐδὲ δρᾷ· εἰ γὰρ
 μεταβαίνει, χωριστὰ ἔσται, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ μένοντα γεννᾷ ἕτερα, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος
 εἰς τὸ εἶναι παράγει, ὅπερ ἀφώρισται μόνῳ θεῷ.

6 9 δ': δὲ X ἄρα M διαδιδράσκον: διδάσκον V^{ac}; δια- add. supra et -p- inseruit V²;
 διαδιδράσκον XM 10 περιγραφὴν: κατηγορίαν X

7 1 τὰ μάλιστα X 9 ἀριθμοῦ V¹XM: -ὅς ut uid. V^{ac} 10 λέγεσθαι: λέγεται X

ΑΠΟΡΙΑ mg. VXM

III.1 2 ἐναργείᾳ V¹X: ἐνεργείᾳ V^{ac}M 5 ἐκ V¹XM: εἰ ut uid. V^{ac} 6 ἐν V¹XM: ? V^{ac}

ΛΥΣΙΣ

2. Οὐ δεῖ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνύλων καὶ αἰσθητῶν, λόγον τινὰ καθόλου πρῶτον ὑποθέμενον, εἶτα πειρᾶσθαι τὰ μὴ συμφωνοῦντα αὐτῷ τῶν κατέκαστα ἀνελεῖν, μαθηματικοῦ γὰρ τοῦτό γε · ἀλλὰ τούναντίον μᾶλλον παρακολουθήσαντα πρῶτον αὐτοῖς, ταῖς οἰκείαις πρὸς ἕκαστον αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενον, ἐπὶ τούτους τῶν λόγων ἀνάγεσθαι, οἱ σύμφωνοι 5 τοῖς ἐναργῶς φαινομένοις ἀεὶ αὐτῷ φανοῦνται · καὶ ὧν ἀπαιτούμενος λόγον, ἔξει ἐπὶ τὰ κατέκαστα ἀναφέρων, πιστοῦσθαι αὐτοὺς τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ, τοῦτο γὰρ φυσικοῦ. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αὐτοῖς καίτοι τὰ πολλὰ ἀπωκισμένοις οὓσι τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ οὐδαμῶς αὐτῇ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις προσχωμένοις, ὅμως ὅταν ὑποκειμένον τινὸς φυσικοῦ σώματος ζητῶσιν εἰ συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ σφαιρικῷ ἢ κονοειδεῖ ἢ ἑτεροίῳ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ 10 εἶναι, αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τηρήσεις χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν γίνονται. καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀτιμαστέα ἐν τούτοις ἢ αἰσθήσεσι αὐτοῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ. καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως οὕτω γίγνεται · ἕκαστον γὰρ ζητεῖν χρή διὰ τούτου τοῦ κριτηρίου ᾧ πέφυκε γινώσκεισθαι, καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἢ τῷ νῦν τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἢ τῇ αἰσθήσει τὰ νοητὰ · ὅμοιον γὰρ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τὸ ἀμάρτημα.

3. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πότερον δρᾷ τὰ ἐνυλα εἶδη πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ μή, οὐκ ἐκ λόγου φιλοῦ πειρᾶσθαι χρή λαβεῖν ἀλλ' ἐκ λόγου αἰσθήσει χρωμένον. ὃς ὀρθῶς τοῦτο ποιῶν μηνύσει ἡμῖν διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἐπιβλέψεως εἶτε πάντα εἶτε μηδὲν δρᾷ · εἶτε τὰ μέν, τὰ δ' οὐ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι τε τὸ πῦρ θερμαίνει καὶ ἡ χιὼν ψύχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον 5 πρὸς ὃ πέφυκε δρᾷ, ἐξ ὧν γένεσις καὶ φθορά, παντὸς μᾶλλον τῇ ἐναργείᾳ καταλαμβάνεται τῆς αἰσθήσεως · καὶ οὐκ οἶδα εἴ τι τούτων σαφέστερόν τις ἔρρωμένης τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἔχων ἐπιζητήσειεν · ὁπότε γάρ τις ταῦτα ἀπορήσειεν, οὐδ' εἰ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶ σαφῶς ἂν ὃ γε τοιοῦτος εἰδείη. οὐκοῦν οὐδενὶ πειστέον λόγῳ ὃς ταῦτα ἀναιρεῖ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐκ τούτων ψευδῇ τὸν τοιοῦτον νομιστέον εἶναι λόγον · ὑποθέμενοι γὰρ 10 ταῦτα ὡς δυνατὰ (τὸ γὰρ γιγνόμενον δυνατόν ἐστι γίγνεσθαι), ὅσα μὲν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἴδωμεν ἐπόμενα, δυνατὰ αὐτὰ νομιμούμεν εἶναι, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῖς δυνατοῖς ἔπεται. εἰ δέ τινα τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κειμένων δοξῶν προσισταμένην τούτοις εὐρήσομεν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ εἰδότες ὅτι ψευδὴς ἐστίν, ἀνασπάσαι αὐτήν, εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐρριζωμένη εἴη, πειρασόμεθα.

4. Ταῦτ' ἄρα τὸ μὲν δρᾶν αὐτὰ ὑποκείσθω. λαβόντες δὲ ἐκ τοῦ νοεροῦ λόγου τὸ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ὅτι ἀνάγκη κατὰ τὸν ἕτερον τῶν εἰρημένων σοι ἐν τῇ ἀπορίᾳ τρόπων αὐτὰ δρᾶν, ὁπότερος αὐτοῖς ὠρισμένως ὑπάρχει τῶν τρόπων οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως τῷ νοερῷ πιστεῦσομεν λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ λόγῳ ἢ τῇ λογοειδεῖ αἰσθήσει, ὡς ἂν ἐθέλῃ τις

ΛΥΣΙΣ mg. XM

2 9 ante ζητῶσιν 3 litt. expunxit V¹

3 5 ἐναργείᾳ V¹XM: ἐνεργείᾳ V^{ac}M

4 4 ἐθέλοι M

σφαιρικῷ V¹XM: -ὄν ut uid. V^{ac}

κωνοειδεῖ M

5 τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζειν, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπιτρέφομεν, καὶ ὁπότερον ἂν φανῇ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχον οὕτω μετιοῦσιν, ὥς δυνατόν καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ πρώτην θέσιν τοῦθ' ὑποθησόμεθα, τὸ δ' ἀντικείμενον ψευδὲς καὶ ἀδύνατον ἡγησόμεθα.

5 Φέρε γάρ · ὑποκείσθω ὁ πρῶτος τρόπος ἀναφανείς ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης διεξόδου. καὶ μηδὲν ἔστω ὁ μὴ μεταβαῖνον ἐκ τῆς ἐν ἡ ἦν ὕλης δρᾶ. ἀλλ' εἴθ' ὕδωρ γῆ παρακείμενον γεοῦται, εἴτε τινὰ πυρὸς ἐφαπτόμενα ἐκπυροῦται, εἴτ' ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν ἢ πάσχει ἢ ποιεῖ ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον, ἀμοιβή τις τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστω καὶ ἀντιπαραχώρησις
5 τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ ἀντιπερίστασις · ἐκάστου ἐν τῇ καλουμένῃ γενέσει ἀφιεμένου μὲν τῆς ἐν ἡ ἦν πρότερον ὕλης, καὶ ἐτέρῳ παραχωροῦντος αὐτῆς εἶδει, ἐπιβαίνοντος δὲ τῆς ἐφαπτομένης, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῃ εἶδος ὠθοῦντος. ταῦτ' οὖν οὕτω γινόμενα καὶ ἀκριβῶς δι' αἰσθήσεως φαινόμενα ὑποκείσθω.

6. Τί οὖν τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἀδύνατον, ὅτι συμβαίνει εἶναι τὰ ἔνυλα εἶδη χωριστά; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν χωριστά φησιν ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, ὃν τρόπον λέγουσι τὰς ιδέας χωριστά, καὶ δέδιε μήποτε συμβῇ ταῦτὸ ἐκείναις τὰ ἔνυλα εἶδη πεπονθέναι, ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτόν, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, ἔοικας οὐκ ἐντετυχηκῶτι τῇ Πλάτωνος μούσῃ καὶ τοῖς περὶ χωριστῶν εἰδῶν
5 λόγοις αὐτοῦ. ἡ γὰρ οὐκ ἂν δέος ἀδεὲς ἐδεδοίκεις; οὐ γὰρ οὕτως οἱ τῶν ιδεῶν φίλοι χωριστὰς αὐτὰς φασιν εἶναι, ὥστε τήνδε μὲν ἀπολείπειν τὴν ὕλην, ἐτέρας δ' ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, μηδέποτε δὲ οὐδ' ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ μεταβάσει ἐκτὸς ὕλης ὑφίστασθαι · ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὅλως μετεῖναι αὐταῖς μεταβάσεως · ἐστάναι γὰρ αὐτὰς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ διακόσμῳ ἀκινήτως ὥσπερ παραδείγματα. τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὁμοιούμενά τε καὶ ἀνομοιούμενα ἐκείναις
10 γίνεσθαι τε καὶ φθείρεσθαι · ὥστε ἡ ὑποκειμένη τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν μετάβασις οὐκ ἐγκρίνει αὐτὰ ταῖς ιδέαις. πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον διαχωρίζει αὐτὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνων · τὸ γὰρ μεταβαῖνον οὐδέποτε ταῦτὸν ἔσται τῷ μηδέποτε μεταβαίνοντι.

7. Εἰ δὲ οὕτω μὲν οὐ φησιν αὐτὰ συμβαίνειν γίνεσθαι χωριστά, ἀλλ' οἶδεν αὐτὰ χωριστὰ γινόμενα, ὃν τρόπον φαῖμεν ἂν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον χωριστὸν εἶναι τοῦ περιέχοντος αὐτὸν τόπου, ὅς τῷ μὲν δύνασθαι αἰεὶ τὸν τέως περιέχοντα αὐτὸν τόπον ἀπολιπεῖν, λέγοιτ' ἂν εἰκότως χωριστὸς αὐτοῦ · τῷ δὲ μηδέποτε τὸ περιέχεσθαι
5 δύνασθαι ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ κἂν τῇ μεταβάσει αἰεὶ τοπικῶς περιέχεσθαι, λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀχώριστος τόπου. εἰ οὖν οὕτω φησὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ μεταβαίνοντα εἶδη χωριστὰ τῆς ὕλης, πόθεν ἡμῖν δείξει τὸ τοιοῦτον ὅτι ἀδύνατον; δι' ἐπαγωγῆς; καὶ μὴ μεταβαίνοντα ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ δρᾶν ὑπετέθησαν δι' αἰσθήσεως φαίνεσθαι. ἡ διὰ καθολικοῦ λόγου; ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἔξει αὐτὸν πιστῶσασθαι δι' ἐπαγωγῆς · αὕτη γὰρ ἡμῖν δυνατόν
10 εἶναι οὕτως αὐτὰ χωριστὰ ὑπάρχειν δέδειχε · σαφεστάτῃ γὰρ παράστασις τοῦ εἶναι ὅτιοῦν δυνατόν, τὸ δεῖξαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο γινόμενον.

8. Ἡ ἐρεῖ ὅτι ἔνυλά γε ὄντα ἔδει καθάπαξ αὐτὰ ἀχώριστα τῆς ὕλης εἶναι, καὶ μὴ δὲ οὕτως εἶναι χωριστά. ἀλλ' ὦ θαυμάσιε, εἰπομεν ἂν πρὸς αὐτόν, πόθεν σὺ τὰ ἔνυλα

6 2 χωριστά² VXM: χωριστὰς recte

4 ἐντυχηκῶτι X

7 οὐδ': μὴ δ' M

8 διακόσμῳ: δια- supra M¹

9 παραδείματα X

7 3 τόπου: τρόπου M

ἔγνωσ εἶδη; ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως εἰ ὑγιαίνει, ἐρεῖ δηλονότι. οὐκοῦν μὴ λέγε ὅτι τοιάδε ἡ τοιάδε ἔδει εἶναι, ἀλλ' οἶα σοι παρέσχεεν αὐτὰ ἡ αἴσθησις, τοιαῦτα καὶ καθόλου νόμιζε
 5 ὑπάρχειν. γελοῖον γὰρ τὸ λέγειν ὅτι τοιόνδε ἢ τοιόνδε ἔδει εἶναι τὸ λευκὸν ἢ τὸ γλυκὺ ἢ τὸ θερμὸν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ οἶα αὐτὰ αἰ τῶν ὑγιαίνοντων αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνονται. εἴτα ποτέρων εἶ, ἄνθρωπε, τῶν τιμώντων τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ μηδὲν παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ οἰομένων εἶναι καὶ τῶν λεγόντων ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναιρουμένων ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τί εἶναι; τούτων τις εἶ, ἡ τῶν ἀνηγγμένων τις καὶ θεωρητικῶν καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ
 10 πάντα ἐπὶ τὰ χωριστὰ εἶδη ἀναφερόντων; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐκείνων, τί ὁρῶν τὰ ἔνυλα εἶδη τῷ μεταβαίνειν δρῶντα, καὶ τήνδε μὲν ἀφιέντα τὴν ὕλην, ἐτέρας δὲ ἐπιλαμβάνόμενα, οὐδέποτε δὲ ἐκτὸς ὕλης ὄντα, ἀπιστεῖς τῇ αἰσθήσει πάλιν καὶ φῆς ταῦτα ἀδύνατον εἶναι; εἰ δὲ τῶν σεμινοτέρων, τί δυσχεραίνεις τὸ χωριστόν; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ἔνυλα εἶδη ἔστιν ὥς χωριστὰ φασιν εἶναι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω εἴπερ ἐωρῶμεν αὐτὰ
 15 τῷ μεταβαίνειν δρῶντα.

9. Πάλιν αὖ ὑποκείσθω ὁ ἀμετάβατος τρόπος καὶ μηδὲν τῷ δρᾶν μεταβαίνειτω. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ δακτυλίου ἐκτύπωμα μὴ μεταβαῖνον τῆς ἐν ἣ ἔστιν ὕλης ἐνσημαίνεται τῶν ἐφαπτομένων αὐτοῦ τὰ πεφυκότα δέχεσθαι τὴν ἐκείνου ἰδέαν, οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν γιγνέσθω τὰ γινόμενα. τί οὖν τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἄτοπον ἀναφυρόμενον; ὅτι ποιήσει ἐκ
 5 τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. εἴτα τί; ὅτι ἡμεῖς οἱ εὐσεβεῖς μόνῳ τῷ θεῷ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφωρίσαμεν; εἴθε ὦ γενναῖε, μὴ μόνῳ τῷ θεῷ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπῆρχεν, εἰ καὶ τολμηρὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἐκείνου φανερῶν κτισμάτων ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρήγεν · ἡ γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἐδόξαμεν τοῖς σοφοῖς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου τερατώδεις τινὲς εἶναι, λέγοντες τὸ πᾶν τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ μηδαμῶς ὄντος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν ὄλων δημιουργοῦ παρήχθαι, ἱκανὰ γε ἔχοντες
 10 δεικνύναι τούτου παραδείγματα; ἀλλ' ὕψειν τοῦτο φέρει τῷ κρείττονι; ἥμιστά γε εἰ πιστεύσομεν τὸ οὕτω δρᾶν εἰληφέναι αὐτὰ ἐξ ἐκείνου · τὸ γὰρ σεμνύνειν τὰ τινος ἔργα ἐξαίρειν ἐστὶ τὸν ποιήσαντα. εἴτα εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα βιάσαιτό τις τὴν τοιαύτην γένεσιν ἐκ τοῦ μηδαμῇ γίγνεσθαι, πολὺ τὸ διάφορον ἔσται ταύτης τε τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ λεγομένης καὶ οὔσης ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος · ἐπὶ τούτων γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν ἐν ὕλῃ ὃν
 15 ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ πρὸς πᾶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιόνδε · καὶ ἐὰν ἡ αὐτοῦ ἐφαπτόμενον, καὶ οὐ παράγει τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὐκ ἐν ὕλῃ ὢν ποιεῖ, καὶ πρὸς πᾶν, ἥμιστα αὐτοῦ ἐφαπτόμενον παράγων καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑποκείμενον · ὥστε τῷ γε τρόπῳ ἴδιον ἂν εἴη θεοῦ τὸ οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ποιεῖν. οὐδὲν οὖν οὐδ' ἐκ ταύτης γε τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἄτοπον συνάγεται.

10. "Ορα δὲ ὅτι ἐπαγγελάμενος ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ ἐκ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων φύσεως τὴν ἀπορίαν ταύτην τε καὶ τὰς ἐξῆς ἐποίειν, οὐ τετήρηκας τοῦτο ἐν γε τῇ παρουσίᾳ · τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὰ ἔνυλα εἶδη καὶ χωριστὰ ὑπάρχειν, πρὸς τὰς τῶν περιπατητικῶν δόξας ἀποβλέπων ἐπήγαγες · τὸ δὲ τῷ θεῷ δεῖν μόνῳ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἐκ
 5 τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ποιεῖν, πρὸς τὰς ἡμετέρας. τὸ δὲ οὕτως ἀπορεῖν οὐκ ἔστι καθαρῶς περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπορεῖν.

IV. ἈΠΟΡΙΑ

1. Ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς πότερον εἰσδέχεται τῶν νοητῶν τὰ εἶδη εἰς ἑαυτὸν ὅταν νοῇ, ἢ μή; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ δέχεται, πῶς νοεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν ὡς πρὸς κάτοπτρον ὄραν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ πρὸς τὰ ὁρατὰ ἀτενίζειν · ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τυποῦσθαι τὰ ἐκεῖθεν ἐκματτόμενα εἶδη. ἀνάλογον δὲ ὡς ὁρατὰ πρὸς ὄρασιν, πρὸς νοῦν
5 φαντασία. εἰ δὲ δέχεται, πῶς αὐθις ἀποβάλλει αὐτὰ ἐπιλανθανόμενος, καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔχων ῥέουσιν οὐσίαν ἢ ἀλλοιουμένην;

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2. Ὁ τόδε τὸ ἀπόρημα προβαλλόμενος δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου νοῦ ταῦτα δοξάζειν · πρῶτον, ὅτι νοεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ δέχεσθαι εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὸν νοῦν τῶν νοητῶν τὰ εἶδη · δεύτερον, ὅτι νοεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ τὸν νοῦν ὀρῶντα πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν ὡς πρὸς κάτοπτρον τυποῦσθαι τὰ ἐκεῖθεν ἐκματτόμενα εἶδη · τρίτον, ὅτι ὡς ἔχει τὰ ὁρατὰ πρὸς ὄρασιν,
5 οὕτω φαντασία πρὸς νοῦν · τέταρτον, ὅτι ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι ἐστὶ τὸ ἀποβάλλειν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν νοῦν ἅπερ ἦν ἔχων εἶδη τῶν νοητῶν · πέμπτον, ὅπερ καὶ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἄπορον, ὅτι εἰ μὲν ἐπιλανθάνεται, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν ῥευστὸν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὸν εἶναι · εἰ δὲ ἐστὶν ἄρρευστος καὶ ἀναλλοίωτος, ἀνάγκη μὴ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ ἄπορον, ἐπειδὴ ἐπιλανθανόμενός τε φαίνεται καὶ ἀθάνατος εἶναι δοκεῖ.

3. Ἄ μὲν οὖν φαίνεται περὶ ἀνθρωπίνου νοῦ δοξάζειν ὁ ταῦτ' ἀπορῶν, ταῦτά ἐστιν · ἐγὼ δὲ τοσούτου δέω ἀληθῆ ταῦτα νομίζω, ὥστε καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὑπεναντία ταῦτα ἡγῆμαι. οὐκοῦν ἂν τοῦτο ἐξελέγξαι οἷοί τε γενώμεθα, ἀφειμένοι ἐσόμεθα τῆς ἀπορίας. εἰ μὲν οὖν παρὴν σοι, ὦ φίλη μοι κεφαλῇ, αὐτόν σε ἀνερωτῶν, ἐκ τῶν σῶν
5 ἀποκρίσεων ἐπειρώμην ἂν περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν · νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη καταστοχαζόμενον τούτων ἃ μάλιστα οἶομαί σε ὁμολογήσειν, ἐκ τούτων τὰς προκειμένας πειρᾶσθαι ἐλέγχειν δόξας. οὐκοῦν ἂν μὲν ὀρθῶς καταστοχάσωμαι τῆς περὶ ἕκαστά σου διανοίας, τῷ θεῷ δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν τούτου · εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν ἀστρονομίαν αἰτιατέον, ἢ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστά τῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ γιγνομένων συμπτωμάτων ἐκ μακροῦ χρόνου προῖδουσα
10 καὶ ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξασα, διορατικούς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οἷα τ' ἐγένετο ποιῆσαι, ὥστε εἰδέναι ἀκριβῶς καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ διὰ λόγου ἀλλήλοις ἐντυχεῖν τὰ ἀλλήλων περὶ ἕκαστον δοξάσματα. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷς μέρει κείσθω.

ΑΠΟΡΙΑ mg. VM; in textu X et mg. X¹

IV.1 5 ἐπιλαν[.]θανόμενος V^{ac} (1 litt. sub ras.)

ΛΥΣΙΣ mg. VX: om. M

2 1 προβαλλόμενος: προσ- V^{ac} (-σ- sub ras.) 2 τὸν νοῦν supra M¹ 4 τὰ² deest in V^{ac}XM: add. supra V²

3 5 δὲ om. X 7 ἕκαστά σου V¹: ἐκάστου V^{ac}; ἐκάστου σου XM 9 τῷ: deest in V^{ac}, add. supra V²; in textu XM 11 διαλόγου XM

IV.2 2 Cf. Arist., *De an.* 3.4 (429a15-16, 27-28)

3-4 Cf. Arist., *Mem.* 1 (450a27-32)

4. Ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν τῶν προκειμένων ἔλεγχον ἰτέον. καὶ πρῶτον, περὶ τοῦ πρώτου φῆς
 ὅτι νοεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ δέχεσθαι τὸν νοῦν εἰς ἑαυτὸν τῶν νοητῶν τὰ εἶδη; ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐστὶ που
 φανερόν ὡς οὐχ ἅπαξ ἕκαστον νοήσαντες, οὐδέποτε αὖθις τὸ αὐτὸ νοοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ
 5 ἐγὼ νοῶ τι · εἴτα παύομαι τοῦτο νοῶν · καθεύδω μηδὲν νοῶν · ἀνεγείρομαι · αὖθις τὸ
 αὐτὸ νοῶ. οὐκοῦν τὸ πολλάκις πολλὰ καὶ νοεῖν καὶ μὴ νοεῖν, ὑποκείσθω ὡς φανερόν.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τι νοήσαντες πρότερον καὶ παυσάμενοι τοῦ νοεῖν αὐτό, ἔπειτα ὅταν
 ἐθέλωμεν ἀνεμποδίστως νοοῦμεν αὐτό, τοῦτο λήθην μεσολαβοῦσαν οὐκ ἔσχεν, οὐδὲ
 ἐπελαθόμεθα αὐτοῦ. ὁ δὲ νοήσαντες πρότερον, ἔπειτα οὐκ ἐπελαθόμεθα αὐτοῦ · τοῦτου
 10 τὸ εἶδος οὐκ ἀπεβάλομεν, ἀλλὰ δεξάμενοι διὰ τῆς νοήσεως τυγχάνομεν αὐτὸ ἔχοντες,
 τῆς ὑπὸ λήθης μὴ γενομένης ἐκβολῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι ἐστίν, ὡς φῆς, τὸ
 ἀποβάλλειν τὸν νοῦν ἃ ἐδέξατο εἰς ἑαυτὸν τῶν νοητῶν εἶδη, τὸ μὴ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι ἄρα
 ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ἀποβάλλειν ἀλλὰ κατέχειν αὐτά. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲν ὅπερ ἔχει, ταῦτο ἀριθμῶ
 15 εἶδη τῶν νοητῶν, ἃ πάλοι μὲν διὰ τοῦ νοεῖν ἐδέξατο, οὐκ ἀπεβάλετο δὲ διὰ λήθης, ἔχει
 δὲ τέως αὐτά, ἀνάγκη τότε μὴ λέγειν ὡς δέχεται τῶν νοητῶν τὰ εἶδη. διττὸν ἄρα, ὡς
 ἔοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ νοεῖν, ὅταν τε πρῶτως δέχεται ὁ νοῦς τῶν νοητῶν τὰ εἶδη ἃ πρότερον
 οὐκ ἐνόει, καὶ ὅταν περὶ ἃ ἐδέξατο καὶ ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ἀπεβάλετο ἐνεργῇ. οὐκ ἄρα καλῶς
 ἐλέγετο οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ὡς νοεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ δέχεσθαι τῶν νοητῶν τὰ εἶδη.

5. Ἔτι τὸ νοεῖν ταῦτό ἐστὶ τῷ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπίστασθαι · τοῦτο δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστι
 τοῦ εὐρίσκειν τε καὶ μανθάνειν · ταῦτα γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι. ἕτερον ἄρα
 ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν τοῦ εὐρίσκειν τε καὶ μανθάνειν · ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ εὐρίσκειν τε καὶ
 μανθάνειν οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστίν ἢ τὸ δέχεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἄρτι πρῶτως τὰ εἶδη τῶν νοητῶν ἃ
 5 πρότερον οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν. οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ δέχεσθαι τῶν
 νοητῶν τὰ εἶδη.

6. Δεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον οὕτως περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν σαφέστερον. πρότερον μανθάνομεν τὰ
 γεωμετρικὰ καὶ εὐρίσκομεν · ἔπειτα ἐν ἑξεί γεγνημένοι αὐτῶν, ἀνεμποδίστως ὅτιοῦν τῶν
 θεωρημάτων προχειρισάμενοι θεωροῦμεν τε καὶ νοοῦμεν. εἰ τοίνυν ὅταν καθ' ἑξὶν ὄντες
 τῶν γεωμετρικῶν ἐπιστήμονες νοῶμεν αὐτὰ τὰ γεωμετρικὰ, τότε δεχόμεθα εἰς τὸν νοῦν
 5 τὰς αὐτῶν ιδέας, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὅταν ἄρτι πρῶτως μανθάνωμεν αὐτὰ δεῖξει τὰ αὐτῶν
 εἶδη δέχεσθαι. εἰ δ' ὅταν μανθάνωμεν αὐτὰ καὶ λεγώμεθα λαμβάνειν τὴν αὐτῶν
 ἐπιστήμην, οὐ τῷ δέχεσθαι τὰ αὐτῶν εἶδη γιγνόμεθα ἐπιστήμονες, ἀλλὰ τῷ
 ἡρεμίζεσθαι καὶ καθίστασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀναλάμπει ἐνόουσα ἢ ἐπιστήμη. εἴ τω φίλον
 Ἀριστοτέλει πείθεσθαι, ὥσπερ

4 1 τοῦ πρώτου in ras. V² (ut uid.): τὸν πρῶτον V^{ac}; τοῦ πρώτου XM

2 ἐστὶ¹: ἐστίν X

8 μεσοσυλλαβοῦσαν X 9 ὁ δὲ: οὐδὲ X 10 ἀπεβάλομεν V¹XM: ? V^{ac}

5 1 ταῦτό: ταῦτόν XM

6 2 ἐν om. X 5-6 αὐτῶν² ... λεγώ- mg. M¹

- 10 οὐδ' ὅταν τις καθεύδων ἐγερθῇ ἢ μεθύων παύσῃται ἢ νοσῶν καταστῇ, γέγονεν ἐπιστήμων · καίτοι πρότερον οὐκ ἐδύνατο χρῆσθαι καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐνεργεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀπαλλαγείσης τῆς ταραχῆς καὶ εἰς κατάστασιν ἐλθούσης τῆς διανοίας ὑπῆρξεν ἡ δύναμις ἡ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμης χρείαν.

εἰ οὖν οὕτω καὶ γεωμέτραι γιγνόμεθα, πολλῶ μᾶλλον γεγονόσι τε ἐπιστήμοσι καὶ ἀπὸ 15 ἔξωθεν ἐνεργοῦσιν, οὐ τῷ δέχεσθαι τι παρέσται ἡμῖν τὸ νοεῖν. εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα μὴ παραδέχεται, ἀλλ' ἰσχυρίζεται κἂν τῇ μαθήσει αὐτῇ δέχεσθαι τὸν νοῦν τὰ τῶν νοητῶν εἶδη, οὐδ' οὕτως ἔσται τὸ δέχεσθαι ταῦτα ἴδιον τοῦ νοεῖν.

7. Ἔτι τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶδη ἑτέρα ἐστὶ τῶν νοητῶν εἰδῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε αἰσθητὰ, τοσαῦτα μόνα καὶ φανταστὰ οἷόν τε γενέσθαι · ὢν γὰρ παρόντων αἰσθησις ἀντιλαμβάνεται, ταῦτα ἀπόντα τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἀπονενέμῃται. οὐκοῦν τὰ τῆς φαντασίας ἑτέρα ἐστὶ τῶν νοητῶν.

8. Φῆς δ' ὅτι νοεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ τὸν νοῦν βλέποντα πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν ὡς πρὸς 20 κάτοπτρον τυποῦσθαι τὰ ἐκείθεν ἐκματτόμενα εἶδη. ἀλλὰ μὴν ταῦτα ἑτέρα τῶν νοητῶν καὶ εἶδη ἐστὶν αἰσθητῶν · ἃ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία παρὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως εἴληφε, ταῦτα μόνα τῷ νῷ διακομίσαι δυνήσεται. οὐκοῦν ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς νοῶν οὐ τὰ εἶδη τῶν νοητῶν, 5 ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κατὰ σὲ δέχεται. κινδυνεύει δὴ ἡ τοῦς δύο τουτουσὶ τοῦ νοεῖν ὀρισμούς ἀναιρεῖσθαι δι' ἀλλήλων, ἢ ταῦτά πως ἡγεῖσθαι νοητά, φανταστὰ, αἰσθητὰ. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἱκανὰ ταῦτα ἔστω.

9. Ἰτέον δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ἀναλογίαν · ὡς ὁρατὰ πρὸς ὄρασιν ἔχει, οὕτω 30 φῆς φαντασία πρὸς νοῦν. ἀνάπαλιν ἄρα ὡς ὄρασις πρὸς ὁρατά, οὕτω νοῦς πρὸς φαντασίαν. οὐκοῦν ἂν τοῦτο ἢ ψεῦδος, οὐδὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἔσται ἀληθές. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἄδηλον πόθεν ἐξελεγχθήσεται ψεῦδος ὄν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὄρασις ὁρατῶν ἐστὶν ὄρασις · ὁ δὲ 5 νοῦς οὔτε φαντασίας οὔτε φανταστῶν ἐστὶ νοῦς. καὶ ἡ μὲν ὄρασις δυνάμει μὲν οὔσα ἀφίσταται τῶν ὁρατῶν, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ γίνεται ἐκείνοις · ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐναντίως δυνάμει μὲν ὢν σύνεγγρὺς ἐστὶ τῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ γενόμενος ὅτι πλείστον αὐτῆς ἀφίσταται. οὐκ ἄρα ὡς νοῦς πρὸς φαντασίαν, οὕτως ὄρασις πρὸς ὁρατά.

10. Ἔτι εἰ ὡς νοῦς πρὸς φαντασίαν, οὕτως ὄρασις πρὸς ὁρατά, ὡς δὲ ὄρασις πρὸς ὁρατά, οὕτω νοῦς πρὸς νοητά, ὡς ἄρα νοῦς πρὸς φαντασίαν, οὕτω νοῦς πρὸς νοητά.

οἱ γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶν οἱ αὐτοί,

16 δέχεσθαι V¹XM: ? V^{ac} (δέχ[.]εσθαι, 1 litt. sub ras.)

17 τὸ: τοῦ M

7 1 νοητῶν bis X

9 8 ὁ ante νοῦς add. X

10 1 ὡς¹: ὁ X

6 10-13 Arist., *Ph.* 7.3 (247b24-28 = H-textus alter)

7 3-4 Cf. Arist., *De an.* 3.3 (427b14-16)

10 2-3 Cf. Arist., *De an.* 3.4 (429a17-18)

4 Euclides, *Elementa* I, Comm. A. Conc. 1

γεωμετρῶν παιῖδες λέγουσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν πρὸς ἃ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον, κακεῖνα
5 ταῦτά φασιν εἶναι ἀλλήλοις. φαντασία ἄρα καὶ νοητὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο
ἄτοπον, ἀνάγκη ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὰς ὑποκειμένας ἀναλογίας.

11. Σκεπτέον δὲ πάλιν τὰ περὶ λήθης. φῆς ὅτι εἰ ἐπιλανθάνεται νοῦς, ἀποβάλλει
ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἃ ἔχει τῶν νοητῶν εἶδη. οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐν χρόνῳ γιγνομένων
λήθην ἀποβολὴν εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀναμνησθεσθαὶ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τινων
ὁμοίων καὶ σύνεγγυς ἀνατυποῦν αὐτῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἄλλ' ἅττα ἃ εἰδῶς πρότερον, ὑπὸ
5 χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο, ἀνάγκη ἀνάπαλιν ἔχον τὸ
ἀναμνησθεσθαὶ τῷ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι, ἃ ἡ λήθη ἐξέβαλεν εἶδη, ταῦτα τοῦτο μὴ ἐνόντα
πάλιν ἀναλαμβάνειν.

12. Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνάμνησιν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν μεταβάντες, σκεψώμεθα
πότερον λῆψις δευτέρα ἐστὶ τῶν ἀποβληθέντων αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν καὶ μὴ ἐνόντων ἐν τῇ
ψυχῇ, ἢ οὐ. ἦν γὰρ εὖρωμεν μὴ τοῦτο ὃν τὴν τοιαύτην ἀνάμνησιν, ἰκανὴν παράστασιν
νομοῦμεν ταύτην ἔχειν τοῦ καὶ τὴν λήθην μῆτε αἰσθητῶν μῆτε νοητῶν εἰδῶν ἀποβολὴν
5 εἶναι. πρὸς δὲ τὴν τούτου δεξιῶν, ἐκεῖνο ὡς φανερόν κείσθω ὡς ἡ φαντασία δέχεται τὰ
τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἶδη οὐ δι' ἑαυτῆς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἢ παρόντων μόνον τῶν
αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλαμβανομένη παραπέμπει ταῦτα τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

13. Ἀναμνησκόμεθα τοίνυν πῶς; πρὸς γάμον παραγενόμενος, ἐθεασάμην ἄλλα
τε πολλὰ ξενίζοντα καὶ ἔτι λυρωδὸν λύρα χρώμενον ἀνομοίᾳ ταῖς ἄλλαις · χρόνου δὲ
ὑστερον πολλοῦ διελθόντος, ὑπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀναπολεῖν αὐτὰ ἐπελαθόμην τοῦ τε γάμου καὶ
πάντων ὧν ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐθεώρησα. ἔπειτα γεγραμμένη λύρα ἐνέτυχον ὁμοίᾳ ἐκείνῃ · τοῦ
5 λυρωδοῦ ἀνεμνήσθην εὐθὺς, τοῦ γάμου, τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενομένων, τοῦ τόπου, τοῦ
χρόνου, λόγων τῶν τότε λαληθέντων, σχημάτων, βρωμάτων, προσώπων. πότερον νῦν
λαμβάνω τὰ τούτων εἶδη ἀποβαλόμενος αὐτὰ διὰ τῆς λήθης, ἢ ἔχων; ἀλλὰ νῦν
λαμβάνειν αὐτὰ μὴ ἔχοντα ἀδύνατον · νῦν γὰρ λαμβάνω ταῦτα ὧν νῦν αἰσθάνομαι ·
καὶ ἡ φαντασία νῦν δέχεται ἃ νῦν ἡ αἴσθησις αὐτῇ δίδωσιν. ἔχων ἄρα ἀναμνησσκομαι
10 αὐτά. οὐκ ἄρα ἡ λήθη ἐκβολὴν αὐτῶν πεποίηκεν · ὥστε εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ νοῦς
ἐπιλανθάνεται, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ αὐτοῦ λήθη νοητῶν εἰδῶν ἀποβολή.

14. Λοιπὸν οὖν ἐστὶ σκέψασθαι εἰ συμβαίνει τῷ νῷ ἐπιλανθανομένῳ ἀλλοιωτῷ
εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τις οἶός τε δεικνύναι ὡς οὐκ ἐπιλανθάνεται, χάριν αὐτῷ πολλὴν
ἔξομεν βοηθοῦντί τε τῷ νῷ καὶ ἡμᾶς πραγμάτων ἀπαλλάττοντι. ἡμῖν δ' ὁμως ἐπεὶ

11 4 ἀλλάττα VXM 5 ἐπελέληστο M ἔχων ut uid. X

13 3 τε: deest in V^{ac}, add. supra V¹; in textu XM 7 λαμβάνων XM 10 πεποίηκεν
M: πεποίηκεν VX

11 4-5 Pl., Phd. 73E2-3

13 1-11 Cf. Pl., Phd. 73D5-8

φαίνεται τοῦτο πάσῃ, ὑποκείσθω αὐτὸν ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι
 5 ἀνάγκη ἃ ἠπίστατο · ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἃ ἢ ἔμαθεν ἢ αὐτὸς εὔρεν. οὐκοῦν ποιήσει αὐτὸν ἢ
 λήθη τοιοῦτον οἶος ἦν πρὸ τοῦ μαθεῖν ἢ εὔρεν. οἶον νῦν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι τὰ
 γεωμετρικά · μαθήσομαι αὐτά · εἴτα ἐπιλήσομαι. ἔξω ἄρα πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐπιλαθόμενος,
 ὥς νῦν ἔχω πρὸ τοῦ μαθεῖν. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τελεία λήθη. οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι
 10 ἀνάπαλιν ἔχει τῇ τῆς ἐπιστήμης λήψει. λεγέσθω οὖν ἀποβολὴ ἐπιστήμης. εἰ οὖν αὕτη
 ἀλλοιώσις ἐστὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ἀνάγκη τὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμης λῆψιν, τὴν ἀντικειμένην εἶναι
 ἀλλοίωσιν · οἶον εἰ αὕτη μέλανσις ἢ νόσανσις ἐστίν, ἐκείνην ὑγίανσιν ἢ λεύκανσιν. ἔτι
 δὲ καὶ εἰ ἡ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐκβολὴ φθορά ἐστὶ νοῦ, ἀνάγκη τὴν λῆψιν γένεσιν εἶναι
 αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ μὴν Ἀριστοτέλης πολλαχοῦ δοκῶν διαφέρεσθαι τῷ καθηγεμόνι Πλάτῳ
 περὶ ψυχῆς, ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα συμφέρεται αὐτῷ ἐν οἷς λέγει

15 τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λῆψιν τῆς ἐπιστήμης μήτε τοῦ νοῦ μήτε τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτῆς γένεσιν
 ἢ ἀλλοίωσιν εἶναι.

ἀλλὰ τῆς φυσικῆς παυσμένης ταραχῆς καὶ κινήσεως καὶ ἀποκαταστάσεως τὰ μὲν ὑπ'
 αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ ἐθνῶν τοιῶνδε καὶ διδασκάλων, ἀναλάμπειν τὴν τέως
 κεχωσμένην ἐπιστήμην. οὐκ ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι ἢ ἀλλοίωσιν ἢ φθορὰν νῶ ἢ
 20 ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπάγει.

15. Τὰ μὲν δὴ τῆς ἀπορίας τέλος ἐχέτω. σκόπει δὲ σὺ μήποτε νοεῖν ἢ τὸ τὸν νοῦν
 ἑαυτὸν θεωρεῖν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἔρχεσθαι καὶ περὶ ἑαυτὸν στρέφεσθαι, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν
 νοουμένων αὐτὸ ἢ τὸ νοοῦν, ὥς οὐκ ἄλλων ὄντων αὐτῶν παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν νοῦν. καὶ ὅταν
 τὰ διαγράμματα εἰς τὸ φανταστικὸν τιθῶμεν καὶ προαιρώμεθα τι θεωρεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν,
 5 μὴ οὐ τυπῶται ἐξ αὐτῶν ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ' οὕς ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀτυπώτους λόγους αὐτῶν,
 ἀνακινῇ καὶ ἀναμνησκηται καὶ διεξέρχεται θεωρῶν τι ἐκ τίνος συνάγεται καὶ τι ὑπὸ
 τίνος ἀναιρεῖται τὴν τε οὐσίαν αὐτῶν καὶ εἴ τις ὁμοιότης καὶ ταυτότης καὶ ἑτερότης ἐν
 αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ · ταῦτα δὲ πάντα θεωρῶν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ θεωρῇ οὐσίαν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν τηλικόνδε
 διάγραμμα εἶναι φάντασμα, τὰ δὲ τούτου ἀναλογίσματα αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν.
 10 εἰμαρμένον δ' ἢ αὐτῷ οὕτω νοεῖν ἤτοι δεῖσθαι τῆς φαντασίας εἰς ἀνάμνησιν αὐτοῦ διὰ
 τὸν δεσμόν, ὅπως ἐν ἢ τὸ συναμφοτέρον. μήποτε δὲ καὶ τῶν μὲν ἢ εἰκῶν, τῶν δὲ
 παράδειγμα τῶν νοητῶν. καὶ ὧν μὲν ἐστὶ παράδειγμα, νοῇ αὐτὰ τῷ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖν καθὼ

14 11 εἰ om. X λάκανσιν ut uid. X

15 5 τυπῶται: τυποῦται V^{ac}M; -οῦ- in -ῶ- mutauit V¹; τυπῶται X
 9 αὐτόν: αὐτῶν X 12 ἑαυτὸν V¹XM: ἑαυτοῦ V^{ac}

6 τι² om. M

14 15-16 Arist., *Ph.* 7.3 (247b10) 17-18 *ibid.*, 247b17-18

15 1-3 Arist., *De an.* 3.4 (429a15-16, 429b30-430a5)

ἐκείνων ἐστὶ παράδειγμα · ὧν δὲ εἰκῶν, νοῆ πάλιν αὐτὰ τῷ νοεῖν ἑαυτὸν καθὼ ἐκείνων ἐστὶν εἰκῶν.

16. Ταῦτα εἴτε οὕτως ἔχει εἴτε μή, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι διῶχυρίσασθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀπορίᾳ τούτων πολλάκις γινόμενος μὴ δυνάμενος κατανοεῖν αὐτὸ τὸ νοεῖν ὅπως ποτὲ γίγνεται, ἀπορῶ μήποτε οὐδὲν νοῶ ὅλως, ἡγούμενος τῆς αὐτῆς δεῖν εἶναι δυνάμεως τὸ νοεῖν ὅτιοι ἄκριβῶς καὶ ἔτι νοεῖν πῶς αὐτὸ νοεῖ. σὺ δ' ὦ βέλτιστε φίλων, πρὸς τὸν 5 σαυτοῦ βλέπων νοῦν καὶ τὰς νοήσεις αὐτοῦ, οἶον ἂν εὔρης τὸ νοεῖν εἴτε τοιοῦτον εἴτε ἄλλοιον, μὴ κατοκνήσης καὶ ἡμῖν μεταδοῦναι διὰ σαυτοῦ γραμμάτων τῆς περὶ ταῦτά σου θεωρίας.

V. ἈΠΟΡΙΑ

1. Ἐπεὶ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια ἢ ἐξανάγκης ἔπεται τῇ ἐνεργούσῃ οὐσίᾳ ὡς τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμαίνειν καὶ τῷ ἡλίῳ τὸ φαίνειν ἢ ἐνδεχομένως ὡς τὸ βαδίζειν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἢ τοῦ κτίζειν ἐνέργεια ἐπὶ θεοῦ πότερον ἀναγκαῖα ἐστὶν ἢ ἐνδεχομένη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα, ἔπεται πάντως τὸ ἀεὶ συνεῖναι ταύτῃ τὰ κτίσματα, ὅπερ χριστιανοῖς ἀποτρόπαιοι 5 οὕτω φρονεῖν · εἰ δ' ἐνδεχομένη, μεῖζον ἄτοπον ἀπαντήσεται · συμβεβηκός τε γὰρ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πᾶν καὶ φθαρτὸν ἐξανάγκης, ὥστε μεταβολὴ περὶ τὴν ἄτρεπτον φύσιν ὑποληφθήσεται.

ΛΥΣΙΣ

2. Ὅπερ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν εἴπομεν, τοῦτο κἀνταῦθα ἐροῦμεν · ὡς ἅπαξ πιστεύσαντες θεοπαράδοτα εἶναι τὰ ποιοῦντα ἡμᾶς εἰς εὐσεβεῖς τελεῖν δόγματα, οὐδεμιᾶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν μᾶλλον πιστεύσομεν αὐτῶν · ἐκεῖνην κυριωτέραν πασῶν ἐννοιῶν ἡγούμενοι ὡς ταῦτα τὰ λεγόμενα κοινὰ ἀξιώματα ἐκ τῆς πρώτης τῶν ὅλων 5 ἀρχῆς ἀπορρύνετα εἰς τὸν ἡμέτερον νοῦν, τῷ ἐν αὐτοῖς φαινομένῳ ἀδυνάτῳ ἢ ἀναγκαίῳ οὐ τὴν οἰκειᾶν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον νοῦν ὑποκεῖσθαι ἀναγκάζει · ὥστε οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη τὰ ὑπὸ θεοῦ γιγνόμενα ἢ περὶ θεοῦ λεγόμενα ὡς συμφωνοῦντα ταῖς κοιναῖς ἐννοιαῖς ζητεῖν. δεῖ τοίνυν τὰ μὲν τῶν λογίων ὑποκεῖσθαι ἀεὶ. εἴ τι δὲ ἀντίξουν ἐκ τῶν

16 3 οὐδὲν νοῶ ut uid. V¹: οὐδὲ νῶ M; οὐδὲ νοῶ V^{ac}X 6 κατοκνήσης X

ΑΠΟΡΙΑ mg. M

V.1 1 τῷ: τὸ M 2 ἢ: ἡ X 7 ὑποληφθήσεται V¹X: ὑπολειφθήσεται V^{ac}M

ΛΥΣΙΣ mg. V

2 1 ὅπερ ... hic inc. E περὶ: ἐπὶ E 3 οὐδεμία VXM: οὐδεμιᾶ E recte 4 τῶν ὅλων om. E

V.2 1-9 Barlaam, EG 2.228-39; cf. AL 2.46r16-46v15 (vide supra, p. 169)

ἀνθρωπίνων λογισμῶν φαίνοιτο, πειρᾶσθαι τοῦτ' ἀνελεῖν — καὶ περὶ τῶν προκειμένων
 10 ἄρα ὑποθεμένοις ἃ εὐσεβῶς ἔχει ὑποκεῖσθαι, εἴ τι αὐτοῖς φανείη ἀδύνατον ἐπόμενον —
 δεήσει αὐτὸ ἀνελεῖν. καὶ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ἀποκρήσει δηλονότι εἰς λύσιν τῆς προκειμένης
 ἀπορίας. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐννοιῶν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιούμενον δείξομεν,
 καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ ἀποκρῶσα τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔσται λύσις.

3. Λέγομεν δὴ ὡς ὁ θεὸς τοιοῦτος μὲν οἷος ἐκ τοῦ μηδενὸς τὸ ὄν δημιουργεῖν αἰεὶ
 ἔστιν, οὐκ αἰεὶ δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖ · ἐν γάρ τινι ὠρισμένῳ χρόνῳ παρειλήφαμεν τοῦτο αὐτὸν
 πεποιηκέναι. σὺ δὲ εἰ βούλει, λέγε ὡς ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις ἐξανάγκης αἰεὶ ἔπεται τῷ
 θεῷ · συναΐδιος γάρ. ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ τοῦτο ὀκνήσαιμ' ἂν εἰπεῖν, μήποτε ἀναγκασθῶ
 5 σύνθεσιν τε λέγειν περὶ τὴν ἀπλουστάτην ὄντοτητα, καὶ ἀνάγκη τινὶ ὑποθεῖναι τοῦτο ἐξ
 οὗ πᾶσαι αἱ λεγόμεναι καὶ νοούμεναι ἀνάγκαι ὥσπερ τινὲς ἄλλοι σύνδεσμοι τῶν ὄντων
 ἀπεγενήθησαν.

4. Εἰ τοίνυν ὁ θεὸς ἐκ τοῦ νῦν μὲν κτίζειν, νῦν δὲ μὴ, πάσχει τινὰ μεταβολήν,
 ἀνάγκη μεταβάλλειν ἢ ὅτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ κτίζειν ἄρχεται κτίζειν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ κτίζειν ἢ ὅτε
 παύει τὸ κτίζειν. ἀλλὰ πειθέτω σε Ἀριστοτέλης ἀποδεικνύς γεωμετρικαῖς τὸ δὴ
 λεγόμενον ἀποδείξεισιν ὡς τὸ καθ' ἑξὶν τέλειον, ἔκ τε τοῦ μὴ ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον τοῦ
 5 ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀποπαῦον, οὐδεμίαν πάσχει μεταβολήν ἢ ποιεῖ · οὐ γὰρ εἶναι
 ποιούντος καὶ πάσχοντος κίνησιν · οὐδ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ποιεῖν ἢ ἐνεργεῖ, μεταβάλλει · καὶ
 ταῦτα περὶ τῶν φυσικῶς ἐνεργούντων διαλεγόμενος.

5. Ἔτι δὲ οἷς λόγοις δείκνυσιν ἐκεῖνος τὸ αἰεὶ τὸν κόσμον κινεῖν μένον ἀκίνητον τῷ
 κινεῖν, τοῖς αὐτοῖς δειχθήσεται ταῖς ἐξ ἡμέραις θεὸς οὐ μεταβάλλων τῷ κτίζειν ·
 μεταβάλλει γὰρ πᾶν καθὼς ἔστιν ἀτελὲς καὶ δυνάμει. θεὸς δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ κτίζειν κατὰ
 πάντα ἔστι τέλειος.

6. Ἔτι εἰ τὸ ἀμερὲς ἀκίνητον, καὶ τὸ αἰεὶ ἀμερὲς αἰεὶ ἀκίνητον. θεὸς δὲ αἰεὶ ἀμερὲς,
 ὥστε καὶ κτίζων καὶ μὴ ἀρχόμενός τε τούτου αὖθις καὶ παυόμενος, ἀκίνητός ἐστιν αἰεὶ
 καὶ ἐστώς.

7. Ἔτι εἰ κινεῖται αὐτὸς ἐκ τοῦ νῦν μὲν ποιεῖν, νῦν δὲ μὴ, ὑπὸ τίνος κινηθήσεται;
 ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ; καὶ μὴν ἀπλοῦν · ἢ ὑφ' ἑτέρου; οὐκοῦν ἔσται τοῦ πρώτου τι πρότερον.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τι ὅλως ἀκίνητον, οὐδεμίαν οἷόν τε πάσχειν μεταβολήν.

8. Ὡστε τὸ κτίζειν εἴτε ἀναγκαῖον εἴτε ἐνδεχόμενον εἴτε συμβεβηκὸς χαίρει τις
 ὀνομάζων, οὐδεμίαν προστρέβεται μεταβολήν τῇ θεῇ φύσει. οὐ γὰρ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἢ
 τούτοις ἢ ἄλλοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς πράγμασι προσέχειν δεῖ τὸν φιλοσόφως τὰ τοιαῦτα
 μετιόντα. ὁ δὲ μάλιστα ἀπορήσειε μὲν ἂν, εἴ τις πάντα τολμῶη, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν

9 ...τοῦτ' ἀνελεῖν hic des. E

4 6-7 Cf. Arist., *Ph.* 8.5 (257a14-23)

5 1-4 Cf. Arist., *Ph.* 8.5

6 1 Cf. Arist., *Ph.* 6.4 (234b10-29)

7 3 Cf. Arist., *Ph.* 8.6 (258b13-16)

5 ὁμολογῶ, ἀγαίμην δ' ἂν θαυμαστῶς εἴ τις τοῦτο διδάξειε, τὸ περὶ τοῦ χρόνου ἐστί · τί ποτε οὐ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον θεὸς τὸν κόσμον πεποίηκεν. εἰ οὖν αὐτὸς τοῦθ' εὐρών καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐβελήσας αὐτὸ διδάξαι, τὰ μέγιστα ἔση εὐηργετηκώς.

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

8 7 ... μέγιστα hic des. X

THE *EGO DORMIO* OF RICHARD ROLLE IN GONVILLE AND CAIUS MS. 140/80

Margaret G. Amassian and Dennis Lynch

RICHARD Rolle's *Ego dormio*, originally written in English, was at some time translated into Latin, and a unique copy of that translation has survived.¹ Some brief mention of the English tradition and its problems is in order so as to relate the translation to the English manuscripts and to establish some sort of authority for it.

The English texts of the *Ego dormio* (hereafter cited as the *Ed*), are extant in the following manuscripts:

- A = Oxford, Bodleian Library Rawl. A. 389, fols. 77r-81r (and see T), early fifteenth century
- C = London, British Library Additional 22283 (the Simeon ms.), fols. 150v-151v, late fourteenth century²
- G = Warminster (Wilts.), Longleat House, Library of the Marquess of Bath 29, fols. 41v-54v, fifteenth century
- I = Oxford, Bodleian Library Eng. poet. a. 1 (the Vernon ms.), fols. 369r-370v, late fourteenth century

¹ We are assured by the Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes in a letter dated May 1977 that they have no record of another Latin translation: 'Nos fichiers ne contiennent pas d'autre référence que celle du manuscrit de Cambridge' The authors wish to express their gratitude to the Master and Fellows of Gonville and Caius College for their kind permission to publish the text of the *Ego dormio* in ms. 140/80. Special thanks are owed to J. H. Prynne, Fellow and College Librarian, for his help in providing information not immediately available. We also wish to thank Catherine A. Lynch and Johanne M. Jeffrey for their kind assistance in proof-reading the Latin text. The text of the *Ego dormio* has been transcribed from microfilm and photocopy of the manuscript. The authors have also consulted *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Gonville and Caius College*, ed. M. R. James, 1 (Cambridge, 1907), pp. 153-55. Based on our study of the manuscript, we conclude that James is to be read with caution. His *incipits* are often vague and misleading; *explicit*s, for the most part, are lacking, and sometimes his transcriptions are inaccurate.

² For the relationship of CI, cf. A. I. Doyle, 'The Shaping of the Vernon and Simeon Manuscripts' in *Chaucer and Middle English Studies in Honour of Rossell Hope Robbins*, ed. Beryl Rowland (London, 1974), pp. 328-41.

- J = Cambridge, Magdalene College Pepys 2125, fols. 99r-101r, fifteenth century
 L = London, British Library Arundel 507, fols. 40r-41r, c. 1400
 M = London, British Library Additional 37790 (the Amherst ms.), fols. 132r-135v, fifteenth century
 P = Paris, Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève 3390, fols. 95v-108r, fourteenth century
 Q = Dublin, Trinity College 155 (C.5.7), fols. 1r-9v, early fifteenth century³
 T = Oxford, Bodleian Library Rawl. A. 389, fols. 95v-99r (and see A), early fifteenth century
 W = London, Westminster School 3, fols. 225r-231r, c. 1420
 X = Cambridge University Library Dd. 5. 64, fols. 22v-29r, late fourteenth century
 Y = Bradfer-Lawrence 10 (the Gurney ms.), fols. 24r-28r, fifteenth century ; presently on loan to the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge.⁴

The Latin translation of the *Ed* is extant in the following manuscript:

- Ca = Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College 140/80, fols. 115v-118v, fifteenth century.

Dublin, Trinity College ms. 159 (C.3.13) (= Tr), fols. 108r-146v, contains references to Rolle's works, including the *Ed*, but these particular citations would appear to be paraphrases. Those which are felt to reflect the Latin in Ca will be cited in the testimonia placed after the *apparatus criticus* and the *apparatus fontium*.

The *Ed* printed from X and emended with A is in *English Writings of Richard Rolle, Hermit of Hampole*, ed. Hope Emily Allen (Oxford, 1931; rpt. 1963), pp. 61-72 (hereafter cited as *Writings*). For a modernized text see *The Mediaeval Mystics of England*, ed. Eric Colledge (New York, 1961), pp. 143-54.

Word-for-word collation of the English texts of the *Ed* reveals several things. First, there is an astonishing amount of textual variation, even between manuscripts that can be said to be related. Indeed, the list of variants runs

³ Q can only be called an imaginative adaptation of a text of the *Ego dormio*. Cf. Mary Arthur Knowlton, *The Influence of Richard Rolle and Julian of Norwich on the Middle English Lyrics* (Paris, 1973), pp. 104-106.

⁴ The authors wish to thank the Curators of the Bodleian Library, the Trustees of the British Library, the Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève, the Headmaster and Librarian of Westminster School, the Syndics of Cambridge University Library, the Master and Fellows of Magdalene College, the Master and Fellows of Trinity College Dublin, Col. P. L. Bradfer-Lawrence and his sister Mrs. B. E. Gray for their kind permission to cite from the manuscripts. Except for GPQ, the manuscripts have been examined at first hand. London, British Library Additional ms. 37049, fols. 24r-67r, mid-fifteenth century, contains fragments of prose and verse from the English *Ed*, but these are too scanty to be of relevance for the present purpose. For the reader's convenience, page and line numbers referring to the English manuscripts are those of X in the text given below; all citations are taken from photocopy of the manuscripts and are punctuated and emended according to the authors' judgment.

into the thousands. Second, the tradition is hopelessly contaminated because, although the witnesses can be roughly grouped into families, i.e., AGY:CIPTW:J:Q:LMX, certain identical readings, which could hardly have arisen coincidentally, appear in manuscripts that otherwise agree only rarely. Thus, it is not possible to construct a traditional closed stemma. Third, the number of omissions, interpolations, textual displacements, and substantial variants (*lyfe/loue*, *hope/herte*, etc.), which would have been difficult for a scribe to correct and which are unique to each text, strongly argues that none of the extant manuscripts is copied from any other surviving one. Fourth, differences in the verses in the *Ed* cause nearly insurmountable editorial difficulties. That Rolle meant verses to be part of his treatise is indisputable and hence the question of his intentions cannot be avoided. However, until further notice, a comparison of the various versions suggests that we accept provisionally those found in X as reasonably representative because they show, like X as a whole, fewer signs of external meddling than those in the other texts, in which quite often the rhyme has been destroyed, or embellishment is so lavish as to alter what we may presume that Richard had in mind.⁵

Two examples from the first lyric, a meditation on the passion, should help to illustrate the point:

- (1) XGY Þe thorne crownes þe keyng; ful sare es þat prickyng (148).
A is wanting fol. 80, on which the verses may have been written.
C Þe kyng crounede with þorn ful sore prikkynge.
I Þe kyng crouned with þorne, ful sore he is prikked.
J And þis kyng corowned was with þornes sore prikkynge.
L is fragmentary and ends before this.
M His heede thay crounede with thornes sare prykknge.
P And wiþ þorne kene crouned was þi kyng.
Q Wiþ þornes þei crouned hym kyng, hard was þat prykkynge þat he suffurd þan of hem.
T Þe kyng crowned wiþ þorn, ful sore he is prickynge.
W Þe kyng crouned wyth thornes, scharp he was prykkede.
- (2) X Þis to see es grete pyte, how he es demed to þe dede (154).
Σ To thynk hertly on þis, certes, hit is grete pyte how he is demed to dede.⁶

⁵ For a discussion of the canon of Rolle's poetry, see Rosemary Woolf, *The English Religious Lyric in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 380-82. See also Hope Emily Allen, *Writings Ascribed to Richard Rolle, Hermit of Hampole, and Materials for His Biography* (Modern Language Association of America Monograph Series 3; New York, 1927, rpt. 1966) (hereafter cited as *Rolle*).

⁶ Greek majuscule sigma is used to designate all or a majority of the manuscripts. See S. S. Hussey, 'Latin and English in the Scale of Perfection', *Mediaeval Studies* 35 (1973) 456-76, for the use of this siglum.

AJ *Omit.*

Q Grete peyne it was to see þe nayled to an tree withouten gult or trespasse.

It should be pointed out that there is variation in Σ , but the citation represents the prosaic nature of the line, typical of the style of the verses in texts other than X.

That GY share the first verse reading with X might raise the question as to whether these two manuscripts would not be preferable to X. But the agreement is not maintained, as the second example demonstrates. Furthermore, in relation to the other manuscripts, X has fewer problematical readings and has no obvious interpolation, making it the best basis upon which Rolle's original text could be reconstructed.

The hitherto unpublished version of the *Ed* in Ca is worth study and comment because, like the translation of Rolle's *Form of Living* in the same volume, it is unique.⁷ In addition, it helps to shed some light on the text of X, and it raises some interesting questions about medieval theories of translation and about the transmission of Rolle's works in particular.

Of obscure provenance, Ca is a compilation of various religious and devotional works, including four of Richard Rolle's. It was written in Latin by several hands of about the third quarter of the fifteenth century.⁸ Copied on vellum on leaves measuring 255 × 179 mm., the texts mostly appear in double columns of 48 to 52 lines, except for the last three pages, which are written continuously across the page. The writing block measures approximately 179 × 128 mm. The manuscript was foliated and paginated by later hands.

The manuscript was rebound by J. P. Gray and Son of Oxford in 1909. The first folio contains some sixteenth-century names of owners, i.e., 'Jo: Cr:'; 'Johannes Backhus est verus possessor istius libri'; 'J Lat: ex dono .G. sed J. noluit habere, ergo .G. adhuc me possidet.' The book was given to Caius

⁷ An edition of the *Form of Living* in Ca is in preparation by the authors.

⁸ According to James's description, a third hand begins at fol. 83v and continues to the end of the manuscript. However, the script of the *Treatise on the Nine Virtues* (fol. 83v) consistently has the characteristic *a* and *r* graphs of late Anglicana. The *De regimine sanitatis* begins two folia later and, besides other differences, consistently has the characteristic *a* and *r* graphs of late Secretary. On fol. 89r the script again radically changes, but the hand, despite certain inconsistencies, remains the same until the end of the book. While it is possible that one scribe produced the three different scripts, we have based our conclusions as to the date of the manuscript on this final portion of the book, which, undoubtedly, is the work of one person. This script is a late Anglicana exhibiting Secretary influence in the letter shapes. See L. C. Hector, *The Handwriting of English Documents* (London, 1958), pp. 49-56; and M. B. Parkes, *English Cursive Book Hands, 1250-1500* (Oxford, 1969), pp. xiii-xxv and plates.

College by William Moore, College Librarian 1653-59.⁹ 2 fo. *Consecrēt facies*. The following references locate Rolle's works within the volume:

- (1) fols. 17r-47r. Richard Rolle's *Incendium amoris*.¹⁰ *Inc.*: 'Incendium amoris secundum Ricardum Hampol. Admirabar amplius quam enuncio' *Expl.*: '... summo imperatori in secula seculorum. Amen. Explicit Incendium Amoris sancti Ricardi de Hampole.'
- (2) fols. 108r-115v. Richard Rolle's *Form of Living*.¹¹ *Inc.*: 'Omnes homines peccatores istius mundi mortalibus nequicijs ligati' *Expl.*: '... Ecce Margarita breuiter te de modo viuendi instruxi et vt ad perfeccionem attingeres si Iesum amaueris gracia Christi Iesu nobiscum. Amen. Explicit Ricardus heremita de modo viuendi ad M(argaritam) inclusam.'
- (3) fols. 115v-118v. Richard Rolle's *Ego dormio*. *Inc.*: 'Ego dormio, et cor meum vigilat, Canticorum capitulo quinto' *Expl.*: '... omnium genera temptacionum viriliter vincamus. Amen.'
- (4) fols. 118v-126r. Richard Rolle's *De emendatione vite*. *Inc.*: 'Ne tardas conuerti ad dominum' *Expl.*: '... ipsum eternaliter laudare cui sit honor et gloria et graciaram accio in secula seculorum. Amen. Explicit libellus de emendacione vite siue de regula viuendi et distinguitur in duodecim capitula. Primo Duodecimo de Contemplacione.'

Close comparison of Ca with the English manuscripts reveals that it was not translated from any extant English witness. Rather, it seems to have arisen from a manuscript basically similar to MX. Those instances in which Ca agrees with the English witnesses at points of major variation in the tradition are cited below:

I

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| 8 | Ca Tecum morari. |
| 7 | QX With þe dwelle. |
| | Σ Wed wiþ þe. (<i>M omits.</i>) |

⁹ Cf. the article by Norman Moore, DNB 13. 833. See also James Bass Mullinger, *The University of Cambridge* 3 (Cambridge, 1911; rpt. New York, 1969), pp. 96 n. 1, 293, 513-14; and J. C. T. Oates, 'The Libraries of Cambridge, 1570-1700' in *The English Library before 1700: Studies in Its History*, ed. Francis Wormald and C. E. Wright (London, 1958), p. 219.

¹⁰ As Margaret Deanesly points out, Ca does contain the long text of the *Incendium*. However, she is incorrect in ascribing the *Treatise on the Nine Virtues* (fols. 82v-85r) to Rolle (like-wise Thomas Tanner, *Bibliotheca Britannico-Hibernica: sive de scriptoribus ... commentarius* (London, 1748), p. 375 n. q). Cf. Rolle, pp. 317-20 for a discussion of the authorship of this piece. Deanesly also is mistaken in saying that it and the *Incendium* are the only Rolle works in the manuscript. Leaving aside the Latin translations of the English epistles, Ca also contains a copy of Rolle's *Emendatio vite* (fols. 118v-126r). Cf. *The Incendium Amoris of Richard Rolle of Hampole*, ed. Margaret Deanesly (University of Manchester Publications 97; Manchester, 1915), p. 15.

¹¹ See Rolle, pp. 256-68. It should be noted that this work is erroneously entitled *De emendatione vi <te> siue regula viuendi* in the margin by a later hand.

- 9 Ca Mea cara soror in Christo.
 8 X Dere syster in Criste.
 Q Dere frende in Christe.
 Σ *Omit.*
 16 Ca In quo.
 13 MX In wham.
 Σ In heuen(e).
 95-96 Ca Vt hij lugentes videant suum placitum tristissimum in eis
 eternaliter firmandum.
 74-75 AGY Þat þai may se þare sorowyng þare wa es all þe rabel.
 CIPTW Þat þai may se þare sorowyng (sorowe P) full waa (it *add.*
 W) es þat rabel.
 JM *Omit.*
 Q Þat þai may se þare dome & himself worþi to sorowz ay
 durable.
 X Þat þai may se þare sorowyng whare waa es euer stabel.

Ca seems to be closest to X here. It also should be noted that there is a major crux in the reading *stabel/rabel*. Both words make sense in context, but the meaning is drastically altered and illustrates the problem of establishing a Rolle poetic canon.

II

- 140 Ca Omni opere tuo.
 93 X Al þi werkis.
 Σ Al his werkes.

Again, Ca is supporting X, and again this is a genuine crux because it is unknowable whether Richard meant his reader to praise God in all of His works or in all of hers.

III

- 173 Ca Te abducet.
 117 X Halde þe.
 Σ Halde hit.
 195 Ca Dire abstinencie.
 133 GJXY Discrete abstinence.
 CITMW Grete abstinence.
 P Abstinence.
 Q Reasonable abstinence.

This last reading will be discussed on p. 227 below.

IV

- 203 Ca Sed [sc. affectabis] omnia, tanquam nichilum, parui
 pendere.
 138 X Als noght it ware.
 Σ *Omit.*
 210 Ca *Omits.*

142-143

MX *Omit.*

Σ *include an interpolation after mekenes. With variations ACGJIPWY read: And þanne thynk on me þat I be noght forgete(n) in þi prayer(es) þat am so faste abouteward þat þou were dere with Christe whose mercy me (vs) nedys.*

Q *Meke prayer & deuoute, as holy writte wittnes: resiste diabol & fugiet a vobis, for myche helpe þe bysy preyer of an rígtwisse man to Ihesu Crist, whose mercy, helpe & grace gretely vs nedes.*

The interpolation may have been part of the original *Ed*, if any weight may be placed on the manuscript tradition, and could have been dropped out in the copying process. Whatever the case, it clearly isolates Ca (210) MX (142-143) from the other manuscripts at this point.

V

240 Ca Nam ipsum Iesum morti dampnatum videre.

154 X Þis to see.

Σ To thynk (vp)on þis.

262 Ca Firmamentum.

170 JMX Firmament.

Σ Skye.

Ca's reading (262) looks as if it were an attempt at literal translation because *skye* could more easily be translated as *celum*.

VI

270-271 Ca Dependet in voluntate diuina ... eligente.

174-175 GJMQXY To chese wham he will.

CIPTW Þat scheweþ to do.

282 Ca Semper magis ac magis.

182-183 X Euer mare & mare.

Σ Euer mare.

305 Ca Spem.

228 MX Hope.

Σ Herte(s).

As has been demonstrated, Ca agrees with MX, although less frequently with the former. The following three readings, however, show Ca's contamination by the variant traditions:

- (1) 6-7 Ca Ego vellem esse veniens et nuncius.
 5-6 AJW I will be comer & messenger.
 Σ I wil becomm þat messenger.

This looks very much like an attempt at literal translation.

- | | | |
|-----|---------|---|
| (2) | 304-307 | Ca Ne secularis tristicia nobiscum maneat. Sed spem nostram in Christo Iesu ponendo contra diabolum firmiter stabiliamur, ac huius sanctissimi nominis Iesu virtute omnia genera temptacionum viriliter vincamus. Amen. |
| | 200-204 | J No wordles sorwe be nat in vs and þat we holde euere faste hoope in Ihesu Crist & stonde myztili azenst alle temptaciouns. Now haf Y wryten here a song of loue þat þou shalt haue delit ynne when þou ert louyng Ihesu Crist, þat loue Ihesu vs graunte. Amen. |
| | 201-202 | Q Regne with God in ioy in þe toþer world & haue we oure trust & oure delyte on Ihesu Crist, strongly standyng azeayne alle temptaciouns. |

None of the other English manuscripts, except L, which safely can be called a fragment, omits the second lyric. The use of the past tense 'wryten' instead of the usual present in J suggests that the scribe was copying an incomplete exemplar and had to end it somehow, or that his exemplar had what appears to be a deliberate shortening of the *Ed*.¹² It is possible but improbable that the second lyric was never meant by Richard himself to be part of the *Ed* because the discourse on each of the first two degrees of love is marked off, in the first instance, by a short, alliterative rhythmical verse, and, in the second, by the meditative poem on the passion. It would seem reasonable, then, to end the discussion of the third and highest degree of love with a poem of ecstatic praise and longing. As is clear, J's reading is *sui generis*, while Ca seems to be echoing Q, i.e., 'sed spem nostram in Christo Iesu ponendo contra diabolum firmiter stabiliamur ... omnia genera temptacionum viriliter vincamus. Amen. / & haue we oure trust & oure delyte on Ihesu Crist, strongly standyng azeayne alle temptaciouns.'

- | | | |
|-----|----|------------------------|
| (3) | 31 | Ca In [Deo] amore suo. |
| | 26 | JM In Goddes lufe. |
| | | W In God. |
| | | X In his lufe. |
| | | Σ In lufe. |

It is possible that the translator was reproducing a Middle English genitive, originally written either *in God is loue*, or *in God his loue*. But it is just as likely that the reading in Ca represents the conflation of variants in Ca's exemplar like those found in JMWX.¹³

¹² It could be argued that J's reading 'Now haf Y wryten ...' should be presented as 'Now haf y-wryten ...', i.e., as a past participle with a prefixed intensifier. However, the editors have decided to let *Y* stand for the first person singular pronoun, because that is consistent with the orthography of J's text of the *Ed*, and because the sentence would lack a pronoun, were *y* to prefix 'wryten'.

¹³ That Ca is not an autograph, but rather is a copy of another Latin manuscript is beyond dispute. As the *apparatus criticus* shows, Ca suffers certain significant palaeographical

Whether the differences between Ca and the extant English texts occurred in Ca's lost English ancestor or in its translation into Latin must remain an open question, but no English manuscript has the equivalent of 'Quamobrem, etsi penitencia exteriori videatur affligari, maiori pena interius castigabitur, nisi nos ipsos ad diuinum seruicium vniuersos nostros cogitatus in ipso continue infigendo discrete mancipemus, qualemcunque vanitatem respuentes' (67-70).

The point here is *videatur* and *castigabitur*. With variation, Σ read: 'Pof we seme in penance withowten, we sal haue mykel ioy within ...' (52-53). First, there is no equivalent in Σ of 'maiori pena interius castigabitur'; second, there is absolutely no sign of hesitation or doubt in the formation of *videatur*, *castigabitur* in Ca. The editors have decided not to align Ca with the English tradition by changing the verbs to the first person plural, because of the distinct possibility that the subject of the two verbs is Christ, again enduring his passion, not the seeker after salvation. That is, 'Therefore, although he seems afflicted with exterior penance, he shall be punished by greater pain within, unless we wisely give ourselves up to divine service, continuously fixing our thoughts on him and casting out all manner of vanity.' This remark is doctrinally orthodox and is in keeping with the interpolations unique to Ca which follow:

anomalies, of which a few may be mentioned. *Dilex la* (178) as it stands in Ca is nonsense. With the assistance of the English texts the ending *-is* can safely be added, restoring *dilexeris*; with somewhat less assurance, *ancil-* or *famu-* can be prefixed to *-la*. Compare:

- 122 X Criste dere seruande.
 AGPTWY Cristes dere mayden & (his *add. W*) spouse.
 CI Cristes dere maiden.
 J Cristes dere seruant & his spouse.
 M Cristes dere frende.
 Q Cristes spouse.

Furthermore, it can be conjectured that, at some point in the transmission, the Latin text lost at least one line which corresponded to the phrase in X: 'Pou sal be fulfild of grace in erth ...' (121). Although the Latin for that phrase, allowing for abbreviations and spacing, would fill one line of Ca, it would be impossible, not to say irresponsible, to try to restore the line with any degree of certainty. At 218, one reads *verba* as an equivalent of the *verbera* suffered by Christ during his passion. *Videns*, which should be *vides* (21), may have arisen from the scribe's having seen what he thought was a mark of suspension and having unthinkingly added it, if the error was not already in his exemplar. Moreover, Ca reads *in sanctitate et quiete* (145) instead of *in sanitate et quiete*, which would correspond to *in paire ese and hele* (96-97). Further, we find *spem* for *speciem* (231). If it was there at all, the scribe missed the mark of suspension and thus produced the nonsensical *abiectem spem* to describe Christ's physical appearance during the passion. Finally, at 304 the intrusion of *quid* or *quod absit* after *ne* impedes the flow of the sentence and its meaning, muddles the context and, while not in itself meaningless, brings the reader up short. Its presence in the sentence argues that it may have originally been a marginal comment to point out that something was missing after *huius* (304). The editors have supplied *seculi*.

- (1) 75-76 Following 'Bot he may syng of solace þat lufes Ihesu Criste. Þe wretchesse fra wele falles into hell', Ca adds: 'Caueas ergo de isto hoste, ... vbi dominatur peccatum' (98-109).

The sentence 'Magis ergo displicet Christo mortaliter peccare, vt videtur, quam ipsum in cruce mortificari' seems to be a sterner echo of the comment on the interior pain caused Christ by man's vain indifference, a pain greater than the suffering of the passion.

- (2) 77-79 'Bot when þai haue wele leued in þe ten comandementes of God, & styfly put þam fra al dedely synnes, & payes God in þat degre, vmbethynk þe þat þou wil plesse God mare & do better with þi sawle & becomm parfyte' becomes 'Sed cum per decem mandatorum Dei obseruanciam, ... paratur pulsare presumis' (110-118).

Ca's interpolation of 'vt ad perfeccionis semitam, Deo inspirante, studeas gressus tuos dirigere; et tunc ad hostium cenaculi in quo domini amantibus conuiuium eternum paratur pulsare presumis' seems a quite deliberate gloss on the attributes of the first degree of love. Indeed, the same image of the heavenly banquet is in the section on the third degree of love with its meditative lyric, as will be seen.

Admittedly, the portion of Ca which treats of chastity and abstinence may be transmitting the same sort of confusion found in some of the English texts. (See above, p. 223). Still, whether or not the Latin results from contamination, responsibility for its meaning would seem to lie with the translator and is in direct contradiction to Rolle's rejection of rigorous mortification of the flesh and harsh abstinence:

- (3) 131-133 X Þi flesche sal þou ouercomm with haldyng of þi maydenhede for Goddes lufe anely, or, if þou be na mayden, thorow chaste lyuyng & resonabel in thoght & dede & thorow discrete abstinence.
- 192-197 Ca Caro tua potest superari per tue virginitatis firmam et continuam custodiam tantum pro amore domini Iesu, aut si ex feruore carnali in iuuentute per lapsum carnis Deum sepius offenderis, procul dubio in magna carnis afflictione et cum dire abstinencie obseruacione discreta, – quoniam dies mali sunt tempus tuum maligne et obdurate consuetudinis redimere te necessario oportebit, donec in sapore castitatis fueris solidata –

Both passages seem to leave open the question as to whether or not the reader has kept her virginity. But, unlike the English, Ca assumes that if she has not kept it, she has often lapsed. Then it leaps from assumption to certainty that, because she has failed so often, she must atone for her period of wickedness *cum dire abstinencie obseruacione discreta*. In the first place, there is no hint in the text of the *Ed* that it was written for a reformed sinner; in the second, Rolle would never make such an assumption and trans-

form it into a certainty; in the third, it is difficult to see how a reader of Ca would go about prudently observing *dira abstinencia*.

The passage jars with Ca's earlier 'Tibi scribo specialiter, soror, quia spero superhabundanciozem bonitatem in te quam in alio' (32-33). This, of course, is a translation of the English 'Til þe I write specialy, for I hope mare godeness in þe þan in another ...' (27). It is a sudden shift in tone, such as this one, that raises questions as to the interpolator's intent and as to what might have happened to his text in the copying process.

(4) Finally, to 'þe egh of þi hert mai loke intil heuen ...' (171) Ca adds: 'et tunc ad mensam domini Iesu inter eius amatores in medio cenaculi residere licenciaberis' (263-264), thus bringing the reader from the first degree of love, in which she may dare knock at the door of the upper room where an eternal banquet is prepared for the Lord's lovers, to the third degree, the *vita contemplativa*, in which she will be allowed to linger at the banquet table in the company of Christ and his lovers.

It may be argued that, when it duplicates readings found in LMX, Ca is a reliable reflection of that tradition, and thus, despite its own dissimilarities, gives authority to the LMX tradition as being the closest example of what Rolle may have originally written. Indeed, if one were to excise all the interpolations in Ca, what would remain would be a slightly contaminated version of X which, as has been said, is the best version of the *Ed*, however imperfect. Therefore, Ca should be consulted in the preparation of any future critical edition of the *Ed* because it contains readings that validate certain helpful emendations of X and is of great value in reconstructing an archetypal text.

It is regrettable that Ca's origin is unknown, because such information might help illuminate the problem of the transmission of Rolle's works. The *Ed* certainly was tampered with to a far greater extent than, say, *The Commandment*. A study in progress of the interrelationships of the Latin manuscripts of Rolle's Latin *Emendatio vite* and their seven independent translations into English suggests that those charged with disseminating the Latin texts took a relatively conservative approach, unlike the English translators, who treated their Latin exemplars with varying degrees of literalness ranging from as strict an Englishing of the Latin as possible, to a seeming use of a Latin text as a point of departure for lavish embellishment.

Similarly, it may be asked whether the translation of the *Ed* in Ca may be showing the interpolator's efforts to intensify the reader's intellectual and, more especially, her emotional responses? Does this account for disquisitions, both in the prose and the rhythmical paraphrase of the lyric, on the suffering caused Christ by man, and on his unhesitating damnation of those in mortal sin, and for the twice repeated allusion to Mark 14:15 and the joys of the eternal banquet?

Whatever the case, the unique interpolations in Ca evidence a certain sense of freedom and an almost cavalier attitude toward the transmission of Rolle's

works. Further investigation of the entire Rolle canon is needed before any hypotheses may be adduced as to the bases for the extraordinary variation one finds in some of his texts. His enormous popularity, wide audience, and, at the least, the vehemence of the Carthusian detractor, against whom Thomas Basset felt compelled to defend Rolle, more than justify such an investigation.

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In presenting the Latin text below, the editors have adopted modern punctuation and paragraphing. Proper names have been capitalized, scribal orthography has been preserved, and abbreviations silently expanded in a manner consistent with the intact spellings in the text. It should be noted that Ca's abbreviations are standard with this exception: the scribe used *d* with a descending line to stand for *-do* as well as for the usual *-dum*.

The three *apparatus* are, in descending order, the *apparatus fontium*, *apparatus criticus*, and *apparatus testimoniorum*. The following sigla are used in the *apparatus criticus*: *Ca* stands for the uncorrected manuscript; *Ca*¹ stands for corrections made by the scribe himself; *Ca*² stands for corrections made by a different hand. Angled brackets have been used for editorial additions; square ones for editorial deletions.

Facing the Latin version is Amassian's transcription of the *Ed* from X based on word-for-word collation. To present a text of X in critical form would have been undesirable in an article devoted to the Latin translation of the *Ed*, and it would also be impossible to reproduce the vast number of significant English variants, as reference to those cited on pp. 220-25 above indicates. X, therefore, has simply been transcribed, with only one obvious emendation at l. 1, in order to demonstrate its relationship to Ca and to illustrate the process of adaptation of an English text into Latin. The editorial practices used for Ca have been followed in presenting X. Readers interested in Allen's version may consult *Writings*. Collation of all extant manuscripts of the *Ed* leads us to conclude that she made a good choice in X, but her editorial practices do not coincide with the authors', and so have not been adopted here.

< *Ego dormio* >

(f. 122v) < *E* > *go dormio et cor meum vigilat*. Þai þat lyste lufe, herken & here of luf. In the sang of lufe it es writen: I slepe & my hert wakes. Mykel lufe he schewes þat neuer es irk to lufe, bot ay standand, sittand, gangand or wirkand es ay his lufe thynkand and oftsyth þarof es dremande. Forþi þat I lufe,
 5 I wow þe þat I myght haue þe als I walde, noght to me, bot to my lorde. I wil becomm þat messenger to bryng þe to hys bed þat hase made þe & boght (f. 123r) þe, Criste þe keyng sonn of heuen, for he wil with þe dwelle if þou will lufe hym. He askes þe na mare bot þi lufe, and my dere syster in Criste, my wil þou dose if þou lufe hym. Criste couaytes noght els bot at þou do his wil and
 10 enforce þe day & nyght þat þou leue al fleshly lufe and al lykyng þat lettes þe til lofe Ihesu Crist verraly, for ay whils þi hert es heldand til lufe any bodely thyng þou may not perfitely be coupuld with God.

In wham er neyn orders of aungels þat er contened in thre ierarchies. Þe lawest ierarchi contenes aungels, archaungels & vertues; þe mydel ierarchi
 15 contenes principates, potestates & dominacions; þe heest ierarchi, þat neest est God, contenes thronos, cherubyn & seraphyn. Þe lawest es aungels; þe heest es seraphyn, and þat order þat leste es bryght es seuen sythe sa bryght. Als þe sonn es bryghtar þan a kandle, þe kandel bryghtar þan þe mone, þe mone bryghtar þan a sterne, also er þe orders in heuen ilk ane bryghtar þan other, fra aungels
 20 to seraphyn. Þis I say to kyndel þi hert for to couayte þe felichip of aungels, for al þat er gude & haly when þai passe owt of þis worlde sal be taken intil þies orders: somm intil þe lawest þat hase lufed mykel, somm intil þe mydelmest þat hase lufed mare, oþer intil þe heest þat maste lufed God & brynandest es in hys

<Ego dormio>

(f. 115vb) *Ego dormio, et cor meum vigilat*, Canticorum capitulo quinto. Illi, quibus † liquet † amore, ascultent huc et audiant de amore. Multum amoris monstrat ipse qui nunquam est lassus ad amandum, sed semper stando sedendo eundo seu cetera opera faciendo est semper super suo amore cogitans et
 5 (f. 116ra) multociens idem sompnians. Et quia diligo te, allicio te vt possem habere te sicut vellem, non michi sed domino meo. Ego vellem esse veniens et nuncius ad ducendum te suo lecto qui fecit te et eciam redemit te, Christus filius regis celorum, quia vellet tecum morari si tu volueris amare eum. Non querit a te amplius nisi tuum amorem, et, mea cara soror in Christo, meam voluntatem
 10 facis si amaueris eum. Christus cupit tui pulcritudinem in anima vt tu des sibi integre cor tuum, et nichil aliud pondera nisi quod facias voluntatem eius, et te ipsam conare, quantum vales, vt [quod] tam die quam nocte dimittas omnem amorem carnalem et omnes delectaciones que te impediunt ad diligendum Iesum Christum veraciter; quia quam diu cor tuum est vacillans et inclinans
 15 diligere aliquam rem corporalem, non potes perfecte copulari cum Deo.

In quo sunt nouem ordines angelorum contenti in tribus ierachijs. Infima ierarchia continet angelos, archangelos, et virtutes; media ierarchia continet principatus, potestates, et dominaciones; supprema ierarchia que est proxima Deo continet tronos, seraphyn, et cherubyn. Infimus ordo continet angelos et
 20 suppremus continet seraphyn; et ordo ille qui est minime lucidus septies lucidior est quam sol; et sicut vide[n]s solem magis splendidum candela, candelam splendi < di > orem luna, et lunam splendi < di > orem stellis, taliter sunt ordines angelorum in celo: quilibet splendi < di > or reliquo de angelis vsque ad seraphyn. Hoc dico ad faciendum cor tuum capere societatem
 25 angelorum, cum omnes qui sunt boni et sancti quando migrant e mundo isto erunt recepti in ordines istos: quidam ad infimum ordinem qui multum

1 Cant 5:2

12 quantum scripsimus: quē vel que Ca
 homines Ca²

18 et in marg. Ca¹

25 omnes corr. ex

12-15 cf. Tr 137v8-10, 14-18: Porro, ait (Hampul), amor iste purius est quando iam illi non miscetur alterius rei affectus, nec inclinacionem habet ad aliquam delicabilem spem faciendam corporee creature Hampul, esto feruens semper, inquit, in quantum in te est, et affectum tuum non habens inclinatum ad aliquod [quod] de hoc mundo, vel concupiscibilis haberi potest. Non enim, inquit, aliquis Deo perfecte vnitur, dum alicui creature mundi affectu ligatur.

lufe. Seraphyn es at say brynand, til þe whilk order þai er receyued þat (f. 123v)
 25 leest couaytes in þis worlde & maste swetnes feles in God, & brynandest hertes
 hase in his lufe.

Til þe I write specialy, for I hope mare godenes in þe þan in another, and þou
 wil gyf þi thocht to fulfil in dede þat þou says es maste prophetabel for þi sawle,
 and þat lyf gif þe til, þe whilk þow may halyest offer þi hert to Ihesu Criste, &
 30 leste be in bisynes of þis worlde. For if þow stabil þi lufe & be byrnande whils
 þou lyfes here, withowten dowte, þi settel es ordayne ful hegh in heuen &
 ioyful before Goddes face amang his haly aungels, for in þe self degre þeir
 prowde deuels fel downe fra er meke men and wymen, Criste dowves, sett to
 haue rest & ioy withowten ende for a litel schort penance & trauel þat þai haue
 35 sufferd for Goddes lufe. Þe thynk parauenture hard to gife þi hert fra al erthly
 thynges, fra al ydel speche & vayne, & fra al fleschly lufe, & to be alane to walk
 & pray, & thynk of þe ioy of heuen & of the passyon of Ihesu Criste, and to
 ymagyn þe payne of hell þat es ordande for synful man. Bot wyterly, fra þou be
 vsed þarin, þe wil thynk it lyghter & swetter þan þou dyd any erthly thyng or
 40 solace. Als sone als þi hert es towched with þe swetnes of heuen, þe wil lytel
 lyst þe myrth of þis worlde, and when þou feles ioy in Criste lufe, þe wil lathe
 with þe ioy & þe comforth of þis worlde & erthly gamen, for al melody & al
 riches & delites þat al men in þis world (f. 124r) kan ordayne or thynk sownes
 bot noy and anger til a mans hert þat verraly es byrnand in þe lufe of God, for
 45 he hase myrth & ioy & melody in aungels sang, als þou may wele wyt. If þou
 leue al thyng þat þi fleschly lufe list for þe lufe of God and haue na thocht on
 syb frendes, bot forsake al for Goddes lufe & anely gyf þi hert to coueyte
 Goddes lufe & pay hym, mare ioy sal þou haue & fynd in hym þan I can on
 thynk. How myght þou þan wyt it? I wate neuer if any man be in swilk lufe,
 50 for ay þe hegher þe lyfe es, þe fewer folowers it hase here, for many thynges

amauerunt, alij ad medium ordinem qui magis amaueru < n > t et quidam ad
 suppressum ordinem qui maxime Deum dilexerunt et feruentissimi fuerunt in
 sua dileccione. Seraphyn interpretatur ardens, cui ordini sunt recepti hij qui
 30 minime cupiunt in hoc seculo et maxime dulcedinem senciunt in Deo et
 feruentissima corda habent in [Deo] amore suo.

Tibi scribo specialiter, soror, quia spero superhabundanciolem bonitatem in
 te quam in alio, et quod vis dare velle tuum et cogitatum ad im- (f. 116rb)
 plendum in facto quod vides tibi maxime proficiens pro tua anima et illi te vite
 35 disponere in qua valeas purissime domino tuo Iesu cor tuum offerre et nichil
 negocijs mundi intricari. Quia si stabiliter feruenterque dum hic moram traxeris
 Iesum dilexeris, procul dubio sedes tua ordinatur excelsa valde et gaudiosa apud
 faciem Dei inter ciues angelicos. Ad eundem nanque gradum vnde superbi
 demones corruerunt mites homines ac mulieres, Christi columbe, collocantur
 40 ad quiescendum et eternaliter gaudendum pro modica penitencia et labore quos
 propter Dei amorem tollerauerant. Difficile forsán videtur tibi pro nunc cor
 tuum ab omnibus rebus terrenis euocare, ab omnimoda vana verbositate
 ociosaque abstinere, omne < m > affectionem carnalem funditus expellere, te
 eciam facere solitariam in vigilando, orando et meditando celestes amenitates et
 45 Christo Iesu conpaciendo ac tormentorum infernalium immanitates pro miseris
 peccatoribus ordinatas mentaliter memorando. Sed reuera, carissima soror,
 cum post modicum in istis te ipsam excercitaueris, tibi consuetudo ista pre omni
 terreno temporalive solacio dulcior et faciliior se ipsam conprobabit. Quanto
 etenim dulcore celesti cor tuum vel minimo tactum fuerit, omnis mundialis
 50 amenitas te modice delectabit; necnon, cum in amore Iesu Christi delectacio-
 nem senseris, tibi omnis gloria humana seu secularis abhorrebit, quia omnes
 melodie et diuicie et delicie vniuerse, quas omnes homines ordinari
 ymaginarentur vel cogitare valerent, nocumentum et angustia reputarentur ab
 homine cuius cor ardens amor Iesu veraciter succenderit, ac omnia prefata tali
 55 amatori in tedium verterentur; et hoc ideo fit quia in se ipso melodia et cantico
 superhabundat angeli, [quo] prout tu per experienciam poteris agnoscere. Si ob
 amorem Iesu Christi omnem rem tibi in amore carnali coniunctam respueres,
 nec vllo cogitatu pro propinquis carnis tue alligata fores, sed et omnia pro sui
 dileccione relinquendo, totum cor tuum ad ipsum diligendum ac illi placendum
 60 mancipare solo modo te oportebit. Tunc enim excellencius gaudium in ipso
 quam valeam cogitare experieris. Quomodo, queso, ergo possem illud tibi in
 scriptis referre? (f. 116va) Si vero quamplures tali amoris Dei fuerint sucensi

36 Quia *scripsimus*: -que Ca

40 et¹ in marg. Ca¹

55 in² s. s. Ca¹

drawes man fra Goddes lufe þat þow may here and se. And God comfortes his lufers mare þan þai wene þat lufes hym noght. Forþi, þof we seme in penance withowten, we sal haue mykel ioy within if we ordayne vs wysely to Goddes seruyce, & sett in hym al owre thoghtes & forsake al vanye of þis worlde.

55 Gyf þien entent til vnderstand þis wrytyng and if þou haue sett al þi desyre til lufe God, here þies thre degrees of lufe, sa þat þou may rise fra ane til another to þou be in þe heest, for I wil noght layne fra þe þat I hope may turne þe til halynes.

þe fyrst degre of lufe es when a man haldes þe ten commandementes, and
 60 kepes hym fra þe seuen dedely synnes, & es stabyl in þe trowth of hali kyrke, and when a man wil noght for any erthly thyng wreth God, bot trew- (f. 124v) ly standes in his seruyce & lastes þarin til his lyues ende. Þis degre of lufe behoues ilk man haue þat wil be safe, for na man may com til heuen bot if he lufe God & his neghbor withowten pride, ire, envy or bakbityng, & withowten
 65 al other venemus synne: glotony, lichery & couayties, for þies vices slaes þe saule & makes it to depart fra God withowten wham na creature may lyf. For als a man pusonde of a swete morcell takes venome þat slase his body, so dose a synful wreche in likyng and luste of hys flesch destrues his sawle & brynges it to dede withowten end. Men thynk it swete to synne, bot þaire mede þat es
 70 ordand for þam es bitterer þan þe gall, sowrar þan þe atter, war þan al þe waa þat we may here se or fele. It wanes into wrechednes þe welth of þis worlde; robes & ritches rotes in dike; prowde payntyng slakes into sorow; delites & drewryse stynk sal ful sone. Þair golde & þaire tresoure drawes þam til dede. Al þe wikked of þis worlde drawes til a dale, þat þai may se þare sorowyng whare
 75 waa es euer stabel. Bot he may syng of solace þat lufes Ihesu Criste. Þe wretchesse fra wele falles into hell.

penitus ignoro. Quanto enim vita alcior perfecciorque esse dinoscitur, tanto a paucioribus insecutoribus possidetur propter multitudinem obstaculorum per
 65 que totum humanum genus sepe ab amore Dei retardatur; verumtamen, sicut audiendo et videndo scire potes, plus amatores suos Deus confortat quam ipsum non diligentes credere valerent. Quamobrem, etsi penitencia exteriori videatur affligari, maiori pena interius castigabitur, nisi nos ipsos ad diuinum seruicium vniuersos nostros cogitatus in ipso continue infigendo discrete mancipemus,
 70 qualemunque vanitatem respuentes.

Omnibus tue mentis potencijs ac viribus huic scripture intellectum tuum inclinare oportebit, si cor tuum ad amandum Deum assuefieri affectes, cum quia tres gradus amoris pulchrę tibi describam vt ab vno in alium valeas erigi et per diuinam gratiam demum ad supremum exaltari, tum eciam quia nichil a te
 75 celare intendo quod tue saluti prodesse considero.

Primus gradus amoris in hoc consistit: cum homo Dei precepta inuiolabiliter ex omni posse suo custodit, ipsumque a septem peccatis mortalibus perfecte retractat, et in communi fide ecclesie catholice et in bonis operibus firmiter stabilitur et fundatur, et taliter vsque ad diem mortis sue semper in voluntate
 80 Dei, et suam relinquens, vitam suam continuare proponit. Sed et istum amoris gradum requiritur vt habeat omnis qui propriam affectat saluacionem. Nemo certe attingit cela nisi Deum et proximum fideliter amauerit absque superbia et omnibus peccatis criminalibus, eo quod illa sunt animarum mors et vitam anime, que est ipse Deus, separari ab ipsa conpellunt, quia cum miser homo seu
 85 mulier pro peccato a Deo, sine quo omnes creature viuere nequaquam possunt, derelinquitur, spiritali morte inficitur. Sicut enim homo dulci morcello intoxicatus per venenum, quamuis ignoranter receptum, corporaliter occiditur, ita miser peccator per delectaciones cordis, diabolice delusus, suam preciosam animam perimit, ipsam versus ignem eternum perducendo. Multis enim ad
 90 peccandum et Deum grauiter offendendum valde dulce estimatur, sed eorum merces pro eis ordinata fellis amaritudinem, absinthij acerbicatem, immo omne tormentum (f. 116vb) plus quam aliquis valeat cogitare, excellere ab eisdem experietur. Euanescet in nichilum honor mundanus, res et diuicie tandem putrescit, ioci et iocalia quam cito vilescent, pro miseris thesauris trahuntur ad
 95 inferos ac mundi vanitas ducit ad laqueos, vt hij lugentes videant suum placitum tristissimum in eis eternaliter firmandum. Sed canticum leticie verus Iesu Christi dilector cantabit quando miseri et prauī pro peccatis ad inferos sine spe redeundi velociter ducentur. Caueas ergo de isto hoste, scilicet peccato, et

68 affligari *corr. ex. affligi* Ca²
 86 inficitur *corr. ex. interficitur* Ca²

72-74 cum ... tum *scripsimus*: tamen (fñ) Ca
 95 inferes Ca

Bot when þai haue wele leued in þe ten comandementes of God, & styfly put
 þam fra al dedely synnes & payes God in þat degre, vmbethynk þe þat þou wil
 plese God mare & do better with þi sawle & becomm parfyte. Þan enters þou
 80 into þe toþer degre of lufe, (f. 125r) þat es to forsake al þe worlde, þi fader, & þi
 moder, & al þi kyn, & folow Criste in pouerte. In þis degre þou sal stody how
 clene þou be in hert & how chaste in body, and gife þe til mekenes, suffryng &
 buxumnes. & loke how fayre þou may make þi saule in vertues & hate al vices,
 so þat þi lyf be gastly & noght fleschly. Neuer mare speke euyl of þi neghbor, ne
 85 gyf any euyl worde for another, bot al þat men says, euyl or gude, suffer it
 mekeli in þi hert withowten styrryng of wreth, & þan sal þou be in rest within
 & withowte, and so lyghtly sal þou comm to þe gastly lyfe þat þou sal fynde
 swettar þan any erthly thyng.

- nullus alius metuendus est siue homo malus siue tribulacio vel infirmitas nec
 100 ipse diabolus. Nichil certe, bone Iesu, odisti eorum que fecisti nisi pro peccato
 quod tu non fecisti. Non enim habet Deus ita bonum amicum in celo nec in
 terra quem non in eternum dampnaret si inueniret peccatum mortale in eo,
 quem tamen tantum dilexit quod pro illo mori voluit. Magis ergo displicet
 Christo mortaliter peccare, vt videtur, quam ipsum in cruce mortificari. Ad
 105 plus, certe, non valet diabolus vel homo malus siue per<se> cucio in
 infirmitate, in aduersitate, in mortis periculo, nisi ad fabricandum tibi coronam.
 Sed peccatum conuertit vitam hominis in mortem, salutem in dampnationem,
 domini regnum in eternum et omnia bona aufert, nichilque homini est salubre
 vbi dominatur peccatum.
- 110 Sed cum per decem mandatorum Dei obseruanciam, Deo laudabiliter et
 perfecte obediendo, vitam tuam diu traxeris et ab illo hoste pessimo, scilicet
 peccato, te coartaueris, ipsum plus quam mortem corporalem metuendo, et in
 isto gradu amoris Deo mediocriter placueris, apud te ipsam tunc recogita
 perfeccius Deum imitari, et preciose anime tue puriorem vitam, sibi magis
 115 naturaliter conuenientem et domino Iesu Christo accepciozem, inponere vt ad
 perfeccionis semitam Deo inspirante studeas gressus tuos dirigere; et tunc ad
 hostium cenaculi in quo domini amantibus conuiuuium eternum paratur pulsare
 presumis. Secundum gradum amoris Dei aggredi temptabis: scilicet mundum et
 omnem eius gloriam penitus respuas, patrem et matrem et omnes carnis tue
 120 propinquos ac ceteros tibi in amore carnali familiares perfecte deseras, (f. 117ra)
 omnimodas iniquitates funditus a te expellas, et Christum per paupertatis viam
 sequi continue concupiscas. In isto gradu amoris vacare te iugiter oportet quam
 pure cor tuum mundare potes, corpus tuum castum conserues omni humilitati,
 paciencie et benignitati te subiungendo; discas eciam quomodo in scola
 125 honestatis animam tuam a vicijs vacuare vales, et ipsam omnia genera virtutum
 que sunt vestes sibi naturales induere festines, preciose sapiencie thesauris et
 non rerum corruptibilium inanibus occupacionibus vel similitudinibus ditari
 indesinenter laborare debes; et sic vita tua spiritualis interius a Deo iudicetur, et
 non carnalis sed perfecta ab hominibus exterius cognoscatur. Nunquam malum
 130 de proximo loquens nec eciam audire affectans aut vnum malum verbum pro
 alio cogitans, sed omne verbum tibi oblatum siue bonum siue malum benigne
 in corde tuo absque omni rancoris vel ire commocione equanimiter tollerabis;
 et sic peroptime quietem externam acquirere vales pariter et internam, vite
 spiritualis castro tutissimo facillime ascendendo, que tibi apparebit super
 135 omnem exultacionem corporalem indubitanter dulcescere.

Parfite life & gastly es to despise þe worlde & couete þe ioy of heuen, &
 90 destroy thorow Goddes grace al wicked desyres of þe flesh and forgete þe
 solace & þe lykyng of þi kynredyn & lufe noght bot in God, whethir þai dy or
 lyfe, or be pore or riche, or seke, or in wa, or in hele. Thank þou ay God &
 blisse hym in al þi werkis, for his domes er so pryue þat na creature may
 comprehend þam; and oftsithes somm haues þar likyng and þair wil in þis
 95 worlde & hell in þe toþer; & somm men er in pyne & persecucion & anguysch
 in þis lyfe & hase heuen to þair mede. Forþi, if þi frendes be ay in þaire ese and
 hele & welth of þis worlde, þou and þai bath may haue þe mare drede þat þai
 lose noght þe ioy of heuen withouten ende. If þai be in penance & sekenes, or if
 þai lyf rightwisly þai may trayste (f. 125v) to comm til þe blysse. Forþi, in þis
 100 degre of lufe þou sal be fulfild with þe grace of þe Haly Gaste þat þou sal noght
 haue na sorow ne grutchyng bot for gastly thyng, als for þi synnes & other
 mennes, & after þe lufe of Ihesu Criste & in thynkyng of his passyon. And I wil
 þat þou haue it mykel in mynde, for it wyll kyndel þi hert to sett at noght al þe
 gudes of þis worlde & þe ioy þarof, & to desyre byrnandly þe lyght of heuen
 105 with aungels & halowes. And when þi hert es haly ordande to þe seruice of God
 & al worldly thoghtes put oute, þan wil þe liste stele by þe alane to thynk on
 Criste & to be in mykel praying, for thorow gode thoghtes & hali prayers þi hert
 sal be made byrnand in þe lufe of Ihesu Criste, & þan sal þow fele swetnes &
 gastely ioy bath in praying & in thynkyng. And when þou ert by þe alane, gyf
 110 þe mykel to say þe psalmes of þe Psauter and Pater Noster & Aue Maria, & take
 na tent þat þou say many, bot þat þou say þam wele, with al þe deuocion þat
 þow may, liftand vp þi thoght til heuen. Better it es to say seuen psalmes wyth
 desyre of Crystes lufe, hauand þi hert of þi praying þan seuen hundreth

Perfeccio vite spiritualis consistit in mundi contemptu, glorie celestis affectu, omnium carnis concupiscenciarum per Dei gratiam expulsu[m], omnium parentum solacium et affectum obliuioni tradendo, nec illos siue sint mortui siue viui, sani vel infirmi, diuites vel egeni, tristes aut leti, nisi in Deo aliquialiter diligendo. In omni opere tuo Deum laudando ipsi gratias age, cuius iudicia propter [iusticiam] suam occultacionem omni creature inconprehensibilia consistunt. Quamplures nanque, quibus in hoc mundo omnia cedunt ad votum et prosperitatem, in futuro penam patientur perpetuam; e contrario alij in hac vita presenti miserijs, persecucionibus et angustijs afflicti in alia vita fruentur gloria celesti. Ideo si amici tui vitam suam in san[ct]itate (f. 117rb) et quiete et in rerum mundi possessione diu continuant, tu † a per...a † et ipsi eciam maiorem timendi materiam habent ne gloria celesti priuentur in eternum. Quod si penitencia et [iam] infirmitatibus fuerint castigati vel si viuendo fuerint discreti, spes copiosa ad celum veniendi graciose eis ministratur. In isto certe gradu amoris gracia Spiritus Sancti repleberis, dolore et murmure non eris particeps nisi propter res spirituales necnon et pro tuis ac aliorum peccatis et propter amoris domini Iesu dulcedinem quam nondum possides, sibi que per sui passionis memoriam intime conpaciendo, in qua omnino te iugiter reminisci volo. Que quidem passionis memoria cor tuum conpellet mundum et omnem eius gloriam tanquam stercora refutare, celestemque exultacionem cum angelis et sanctis introducet mentem tuam feruenter affectare. Cunque cor tuum seruicio diuino ex toto subiugaueris mundanasque cogitaciones funditus a te expuleris, tunc cum te sola secrete spaciari intime placabile inuenies, super Iesu Christo continue meditando et oraciones oracionibus indesinenter accumulando, eo quod per bonarum cogitationum ac supplicum deprecacionum studia in ardente amore domini Iesu cor tuum assufferi faciliter informabitur, et tunc tam in orando quam meditando dulcedinem sencies in gloria celesti. Ideo cum ab illorum consorcia te separaueris, psalmos psalterij et Pater Noster et Aue Maria in dicendo multum te exerceas, et non ad multitudinem psalmorum sed ad feruenter orandum; sit tibi cura peruigil in dulcedine deuocionum et inde mens tua vsque ad celum valebit eleuari. Melius enim est vij psalmos cum corde oracioni tue continue vacanti et Iesu Christi amorem desideranti exprimere

141 omni] omnia *Ca*² (a *ex i facto, ut vid.*)
(fort. tu, a parua vel tua persona)

143 contrarij *Ca*

146 a per...a (a *p*^a) *Ca*

162-165 cf. Tr 130r3-6: Quando solo es, inquit Hampul, ad quamdam solitariam prebe te multum ad dicendum psalmos et oracionem dominicam, et non attendes quod multa dicas, sed quod bene et deuote illa dicas.

166-169 cf. Tr 130r6-9: Melius est, inquit (i.e., Hampul), quod dicas vij psalmos in desiderio amoris Christi, habendo cor tuum super oracionem tuam, quam septingentos, permittendo cor tuum vagari vbi voluerit in mundo.

thowsand, suffrand þi thoght passe in vanitees of bodyli thynges. What gude
 115 hopes þou may come þarof, if þou lat þi tonge blaber on þe boke, & þi hert ren
 abowte in sere stedes in þe worlde? Forþi, sett þi thoght in Criste, & he sal
 rewle it (f. 126r) til hym & halde þe fra þe venome of þe worldly bisynesse.

And I pray þe, als þou couaytes to be Goddes lufer, þat þou lufe þis name
 Ihesu, and thynk it in þi hert sa þat þou forget it neuer whareso þou be. And
 120 sothely I say þe þat þou sal fynd mykel ioy & comforth þarin. And for þe lufe
 þat þou lufes Ihesu so tenderly & so specialy, þou sal be fulfild of grace in erth
 & be Criste dere seruande in heuen, for nathyng pays God swa mykel als verray
 lufe of þis nam Ihesu. If þou luf it ryght & lastandely & neuer let for nathyng þat
 men may do or say, þou sal be receyued intil a heghar lyfe þan þou can couete.
 125 His godenes es sa mykel þare we inwardely aske hym ane, he wil gyf fyfe, so
 wele payde es he when we wil sett al oure hert to lufe hym.

In þis degre of lufe þou sal ouercome þi enmyse: þe worlde, þe deuel, & þi
 flesch. Bot neuerþelatter, þou sal euer haue feghtyng whils þou lyfes. Til þou
 dye þe behoues to be bysy to stande þat þou fal noght intil delites, ne in euel
 130 thoghtes, ne in euel wordes, ne in euel warke. Forþi, grete aght þi zernyng be
 þat þou lufe Criste verrayly. Þi flesche sal þou ouercomm with haldyng of þi
 maydenhede for Goddes lufe anely, or if þou be na mayden, thorow chaste
 lyuyng & resonabel in thoght & dede, & thorow discrete abstinence. Þe worlde
 þou sal ouercom thorow couaytyng of Cristes lufe & thynkyng on þis swete
 135 name Ihesus, & desyre til heuen. For als sone (f. 126v) als þou feles sauoure in
 Ihesu, þe wil thynk al þe worlde noght bot vanyte & noy for men sawles. Þow

quam septingentos psalmos cum vagacione mentis circa vanitates et res corporales occupate verbaliter proferre. Quod bonum putas ex oracione tibi
 170 posse euenire si verbo tenus circa librum lingua balbucias et cor tuum circum-
 quaque in diuersis mundi partibus circumferri permittas? Ideo, cara soror,
 cogitatus tuos in Iesu firmiter inprime, et ipse sibi cor tuum constringet et ab
 istius mundi alijs occupacionibus, veneno, te abducat.

Insuper tibi, prout amatrix Christi fieri affectes, supplico vt hoc nomen Iesu
 175 diligas et in corde tuo per memoriam illud reponas, ita quod vbicunque moram
 feceris illius non obliuiscaris, et veraciter (f. 117va) tibi promitto quod inde
 inuenies multum gaudium continuum et solamen, ac pro amore quo tam tenere
 et specialiter Iesum dilexer < is...ancil > la in celo eris carissima; verax nanque
 amor istius nominis Iesu pre omnibus Deo redolet. Si Iesum prudenter
 180 amaueris ac ita stabiliter quod pro nullo quod homines facere aut dicere tibi
 possunt ab eius amore cesses, ad alciorem vitam quam ipsa cupere scires
 exaltaberis. Cum ipsa tanta habundat bonitate quod vbi nos eum intime vnum
 poscimus in triplo petitionem nostram dando multiplicat. Tantum enim sibi
 placemus quando ad ipsum diligendum omnes anime nostre vires apponimus.
 185 Et in hoc secundo gradu amoris trium inimicorum nostrorum, mundi
 scilicet, diaboli et carnis tue, efficieris triumphatrix magnifica; tamen durante
 tua vita esto certissima quod bellum continue cum illis continuabis, et ideo ad
 diem exitus tui oportet te circa salutem tuam reddere sollicitam et firmiter tenere
 pedem fixum ne quando ex delicijs inordinatis in turpes cogitatus, verba
 190 maliciosa aut in opera nepharia imprudenter cadere contingat. Idcirco ad
 amandum dominum Iesum veraciter et non fecte ex omni cogitatu feruenter
 accelerares. Caro tua potest superari per tue virginitatis firmam et continuam
 custodiam tantum pro amore domini Iesu, aut si ex feruore carnali in iuuentute
 per lapsum carnis Deum sepius offenderis, procul dubio in magna carnis
 195 afflictione et cum dire abstinencie obseruacione discreta, – quoniam dies mali
 sunt, tempus tuum maligne et obdurate consuetudinis redimere te necessario
 oportebit, donec in sapore castitatis fueris solidata – mundum et omnia vicia illi
 adherencia deinceps per affectuosum desiderium Christi Iesu et per assuetam

195-196 Cf. Eph 5:16

178 dilexer < is ... ancil > la *supplevimus ex Ed (angl.)* 122: dilexerla *Ca* 183 poscimus
scripsimus ex Ed (angl.) 125: possumus *Ca* 197 ante mundum *tacite suppl. est potes*
superare vel superabis (anacoluthon)

174-177 cf. Tr 113v24-114r2: Dilige hoc nomen Iesus, inquit Hampol, / ita quod vbicumque
 fueris non obliuiscaris illud. Et promitto tibi quod multum gaudium et solamen inuenies in illo.

will noght couayte þan to be riche, to haue many mantels & fayre, many kyrtels
 & drewryse, bot al þou wil sett at noght & despise it als noght it ware, & take na
 mare þan þe nedes. Þe wil thynk twa mantels or ane inogh. Þow þat hase fyue
 140 or sex, gyf some til Criste þat gasse naked in a pore wede. And halde noght all,
 for þou wate noght if þow lif til þai be half gane. Þe deuell es ouercome when
 þou standes stabely agaynes al his fandynghys in sothefast charite & mekenes.

I wil þat þow neuer be ydel, bot ay owther speke of God, or wirke som
 notabil warke, or thynk on hym: principaly þat þi thought be ay hauand hym in
 145 mynde, and thynk oft on his passyon. My keyng þat water grette and blode
 swette, sythen ful sare bette, so þat hys blode hym wette when þair scowrges
 mette. Ful fast þai gan hym dyng and at þe pyler swyng, & his fayre face
 defowlyng with spittyng. Þe thorne crownes þe keyng; ful sare es þat prickyng.
 Alas, my ioy and my swetyng es demed to hyng. Nayled was his handes;
 150 nayled was hys fete, & thyrlled was hys syde, so semely & so swete. Naked es
 his whit breste & rede es his blody syde. Wan was his fayre hew, his wowndes

memoriam huius dulcis nominis Iesu et per regni celestis appetitum. Quam cito
 200 ergo in Iesu senseris saporem, totus mundus tibi vaniter videbitur, et non aliud
 illud iudicabis nisi pro animabus hominum nocumentum et tedium. Tunc enim
 non affectabis esse aut reputari diues vel copiam vestium vel plura iocalia penes
 te retinere, sed omnia, tanquam nichilum, parui pendere, sed et solum tibi
 205 et forte vnus tunc tibi videbitur sufficere; etsi quinque vel sex habes, parciaris
 cum Christo Iesu qui omni (f. 117vb) die transit iuxta te nudus et pauperime
 indutus, hoc est, in omnibus egens. Non es enim segura de tua vita quousque
 media pars vestium et mantellorum tuorum per tuum vsum fuerit consumpta.
 Diabolum, tercium tuum inimicum, subpeditabis cum firma fide que erit tibi in
 210 scutum contra omnes eius insideas in caritate sincera et humilitate profunda.

Et ideo volo quod nunquam sis ociosa, quia ocium et venialia ducunt
 citissime ad mortalia, sed semper aut loquendo de Deo aut aliquod notabile
 opus operando aut bonum cogitatum ymaginando inuenias tibi occupationem,
 et principaliter quod hoc nomen Iesu menti tue per firmam et consuetam
 215 meditationem habeas sine interpellatione ligatum, atque in eius passionis
 compassione[m] te debes exercere, quomodo: rex tuus pro iniuria quam sibi
 feceris lacrimas plorando et sanguinem sudando mansuetissime effudit,
 grauissimaeque verb <er> a quando flagellancium virge sibi inuicem obuabant
 pacienter sustinuit. Tunc enim preciosum eius corpus ex sanguinis decursu,
 220 heu, liuido et deformi liquore madidabatur. O quam violenter ipsum
 percusserunt! sed violencius ipsum apud columpnam flagellantes suam
 speciosam faciem vilissime screando deturpauerunt. Ecce tuus rex mille locis in
 capite spinis in despectu coronatus incedit. O quam diram et dolorosam
 acerbiter illarum puncture spinarum sibi inferebant! Ha, h <a>! Tocius
 225 cordis mei dulcor et gaudium propter meum peccatum per me contra eum
 commissum turpissime morti adiudicatus ducitur ad patibulum. Speciosi sui
 pedes et caput eius regale, tanto decore olim ornatum, clauorum aculeis
 transuerberatum torquebantur; latus eius inestimabile pulcritudine decoratum
 dolor permaximus penetrauit, pectusque eius lacteo colore refulgens pre
 230 nuditate tremescit, et latus eius tam eleganti naturalique liniamento ditatum et
 sanguinolentam et abiectam sp <eci> em vndique possidebat. Sed et facies
 domini mei Iesu rubicunda et lilia pulcritudine per totum circumfulsa, immo
 omnem gloriam hominum ac eciam angelorum excellens in aspectu, (f. 118ra)
 nunc vultum liuidum spiccis illatum, pauore mortis perfusum intuentibus

224 Ha, ha] cf. *Ca 108vb6 (Forma viuendi)*: 'Ha, ha! Quanta est miseria nomen et habitum sanctitatis habere et sanctum non esse.'

depe & wyde. In fyue stedes of his flesch þe blode gan downe glyde, als stremes of þe strande. Hys pyne es (f. 127r) noght to hyde.

Þis to see es grete pyte, how he es demed to þe dede, and nayled on þe rode
 155 tre, þe bryght aungels brede. Dryuen he was to dole þat es owre gastly gude,
 and also in þe blys of heuen es al þe aungels fude. A wonder it es to se, whasa
 vnderstude, how God of mageste was dyand on the rude. Bot suth þan es it
 sayde þat lufe ledes þe ryng, þat hym sa law hase layde, bot lufe it was nathyng.
 Ihesu, receyue my hert & to þi lufe me bryng. Al my desyre þou ert, bot I
 160 couete þi comyng. Þow make me clene of synne & lat vs neuer twyn. Kyndel
 me fire within þat I þi lufe may wyn, and se þi face, Ihesu, in ioy þat neuer sal
 blyn. Ihesu, my saule þou mend. Þi lufe into me send, þat I may with þe lend in
 ioy withowten end. In lufe þow wownde my thoght, and lyft my hert to þe. My
 sawle þou dere hase boght, þi lufer make it to be. Þe I couete, þis worlde noght,
 165 & for it I fle. Þou ert þat I haue soght; þi face when may I see? Þow make my
 sawle clere, for lufe chawnges my chere. How lang sal I be here, oft to here
 sang þat es lastand so lang? Þou be my lufyng, þat I lufe may syng.

If þou wil thynk þis ilk day, þou sal fynde swetnes þat sal draw þi hert vp,
 þat sal gar þe fal in gretyng & in grete langyng til Ihesu. & þi thoght sal al be on
 170 Ihesu, and so be receyued abouen all erthly thyng: abouen þe firmament & þe
 sternes so þat þe (f. 127v) egh of þi hert mai loke intil heuen.

And þan enters þow into þe thirde degre of lufe, in þe whilk þou sal haue
 grete delyte & comforth if þow may get grace to com partill. For I say noght þat
 þou or another þat redes þis sal do it all, for it es at Goddes will to chese wham
 175 he will to do þat here es sayde, or els another thyng on another maner, als he
 gifes men grace till haue þaire hele, for sere men takes seer grace of oure lorde

235 tribuebat. Carnem eius virginea teneritate indutam in latis vulneribus et plagis profundis in quinque locis membratim distrahi et furibunde dilacerari, vt me sic per dileccionem traheret, benigne tolleravit. Quorum vlnorum riuuli sanguinij ad modum vndarum aque fluentis totum eius corpus copiose irrorabant.

Non est enim tanta domini Iesu pena inestimabilis a nobis celandi sed nostri
 240 cordis oculis frequenter aperienda. Nam ipsum Iesum morti dampnatum videre illumque, angelis fulgentibus panem perpetuum, ligno crucis tam dire afflixum aspicientibus diligenter magna pietas reputatur; ab omnibus eicitur derisui nostrum spirituale[m] et melius nutrimentum ac sanctorum solacium; tanquam stultus et nescius, spernitur turpissime. Bene enim et discrete perscrutantibus
 245 videtur mirabile et fere inintelligibile quomodo immortalis et magestatis dominus mortem crucis vilissimam subire consentiret. Sed verum in prouerbio dicitur quod amor preit in tripudio et ducit coream. Nichil certe nisi dileccionis virtus ad ita abhominabilem mortis interitum Iesum deduxit. Iesu, suscipe cor meum illudque integro amore penetratum; te in ipso sacias. Omne desiderium
 250 meum es tu, et nos ab inuicem dissolui nequaquam permittas. Sed ignem nutritium intra me accendas inestinguibilem vt dulcorem tui amoris mihi lucrifaciam, tue faciei splendorem indesinenter speculando. In amore mentem religa, in excelsis cor tibi subleua, anime mee care redemptor, perfecte dileccionis vitam inspira. Nichil preter te cupiens, totum mundum pro te
 255 fugiens, te ipsum solum querens, presenciam tuam rogo quando fiam prospiciens? Igitur, o bone Iesu, fias michi amator peroptimus vt tibi in amore canam scincerus.

Si ista de die in diem cogitaueris, continue magnum inde dulcedinis fructum percipies; tunc ex dulcore (f. 118rb) eleuabitur cor tuum, tu eciam ad
 260 lacrimandum [dum] conpungeris, et inde Dei amore multum languebis ad Iesum. Sed eciam et cogitacio tua supra omnes res terrenas erigetur, immo supra firmamentum et stellarum altitudinem, in tanto quod cor tuum in celum directe prospiciet, et tunc ad mensam domini Iesu inter eius amatores in medio cenaculi residere licenciaberis.

265 Tunc enim tercium ac summum perfecti amoris domini Iesu gradum attingere, Deo consummante, valebis, in quo gaudium inexpertum et dulcorem permaximum inuenies, si illum gradum ascendendi gracia ex Deo tibi concedatur. Tamen propter totum istud antedictum affirmare non intendo te seu alium quemcunque, qui presens scriptum legerit, illud perfecte conplere,

254 inspira vitam *Ca*²

260 conpungeris *corr. s. s. ex conpingeris Ca*¹

Ihesu Criste, and al sal be sett in þe ioy of heuen þat endes in charite. Whasa es in þis degre, wisdom he hase & discrecion to luf at Goddes will. Þis degre es called contemplatife lyfe þat lufes to be anely, withowten ryngyng, or dyn, or
 180 syngyng, or cryng. At þe begynyng when þou comes þartil, þi gastly egh es taken vp intil þe blysse of heuen & þar lyghtned with grace & kyndelde with fyre of Cristes lufe, sa þat þou sal verraly fele þe bernyng of lufe in þi hert euer mare & mare liftand þi thoght to God, and feland lufe, ioy, & swetnes so mykel þat na sekenes, anguys, ne schame, ne penance may greue þe. Bot al þi lyf sal
 185 turne intyl ioy. & þarfore, heghnesse of þi hert in prayers turnes intil ioyful sange, and þi thoghtes to melody. Ðan es Ihesu al þi desyre, al þi delyte, al þi ioy, al þi solace, al þi comforth, al I wate, þat on hym euer be þi sang, in hym all þi rest. Ðen may þow say I slepe and my hert wakes. Wha sall tyll my lemman (f. 128r) say for hys lufe me langes ay?

190 All þat lufes vanytees and specials of þis warlde and settes þaire hert on any other thynges þan of God, intyll þis degre þai may noght come, ne intyll other degre of lufe before neuynd. And þarfore, all worldely solace þe behoues forsake þat þi hert be heldande til na lufe of any creature, ne til na bysynes in erth. Ðat þou may be in sylence, be ay stabilly & stalwortly with þi hert in
 195 Goddes lufe & hys drede. Owre lorde gyfes noght to men fairehede, ritchesse, & delytes for to sette þaire hertes on, & dispend þam in synne, bot for þai sulde knaw hym, & lufe hym, & thank hym of al hys gyftes. Ðe mare es þaire schame if þai wreth hym þat hase gyfen þam gyftes in body & in saule. Forþi, if we couayte to fle þe payne of purgatory, vs behoues restreyne vs parfitely fra þe
 200 lust & þe likyng, & al þe il delytes & wikked drede of þis worlde, and þat

- 270 quia hoc precipue dependet in voluntate diuina homines ad gradum prefatum
eligente seu ad aliquod reliquum opus alio modo perimplendo, prout ipse ad
salutem hominum eis graciose concedit, quia diuersi viri diuersa munera
secundum voluntatem domini Iesu ab eo percipiunt. Omnia tamen ad gloriam
celorum reducentur si in caritate terminentur. Siquis enim in isto amoris gradu
275 consistit, sapienciam et discrecionem penes se retineat ad Deum perfecte
diligendum secundum eius voluntatem et honorem. Ille nempe amoris gradus
vita contemplatiua nuncupatur, que cupit solo modo et prorsus carere
tampanarum pulsacionibus, hominum cantibus, ceterorumque corporum
sonoris tumultibus. In principio enim quando illum gradum attinges, oculus
280 tuus spiritualis sursum in celi gaudium suscipitur ibique cum gracia illuminatur
et igne domini Iesu Christi accenditur, sic quod tu sensibiliter experieris amoris
ardorem in corde tuo feruere semper magis ac magis, tuo cogitatu apud Deum
perdurante. In tanto insuper amoris et dulcoris leticiam sencies quod infirmitas
vlla angustiaue aliqua, pudor aliqualis vel eciam penitencie austeritas te posse
285 grauare nequaquam valebit; sed vita tua integre vertetur in gaudium, et pre
superhabundante eleuacione tui cordis oraciones tue in gloriosum canticum et
cogitatus tuus in dulcem melodiam continuo vertentur. Tunc (f. 118va) certe
Iesus totum tuum desiderium, integer tuus dulcor, completum tuum solamen
tibi efficitur ita quod in illo semper vis canere et in illo finaliter quiescere, et
290 tunc vere vales dicere: *Ego dormio, et cor meum vigilat. Quis annuntiabit dilecto
meo quia eius amore languo?*

- Quisquis vtique qui vanitates et amicitias mundi diligit vel eciam super
aliquam rem aliam quam in Deo solo mentem fixerit, nec in istum nec in alium
gradum prefatum ascendet. Quare omnem huius seculi leticiam te requiritur
295 perfecte declinare, et cor tuum ad amorem creature alicuius nunquam inclinari
permittas ac terre ocupacionibus, vt tu in silencio continuo posses firmari
fortissime in amore Iesu et Dei timore, cogitatum cordis tui continuare
concupiscas. Dominus enim creator omnium decorem, gazas et reliquas seculi
delicias viris et mulieribus non tribuit vt super talia corda illorum principaliter
300 reflectant et illa in peccando expendant, sed vt ipsum Deum in donis suis
cognoscerent, illum amarent, et pro suis beneficijs sibi gracias reddant. Ideo si
penam purgatorij post mortem vis euitare, necesse est vt ab omnimodis

290-291 Cant 5:2, cf. 5:8

274 *post* celorum *exp.* perducentur *Ca*¹

272-273 cf. Tr 137v5-6: Ideo diuersitas amoris diuersitatem facit sanctitatis et meriti.

worldely sorow be noght in vs, bot þat we halde owre hope faste in Ihesu Criste & stande manly agaynes al temptacions.

Now I wryte a sang of lufe þat þou sal delyte in when þow ert lufand Ihesu Criste. My sange es in syhtyng; my lyfe es in langyng til I þe se, my keyng, so
 205 fayre in þi schynyng, so fayre in þi fayrehede. Intil þi lyght me lede, and in þi lufe me fede. In lufe make me to spede þat þou be euer my mede. When wil þou come, Ihesu, my (f. 128v) ioy, & couer me of kare? & gyf me þe þat I may se, lifand euermare? Al my coueytyng war comen if I myght til þe fare; I wil nathyng bot anely þe, þat all my will ware. Ihesu my sauoure, Ihesu my
 210 comfortoure, of al my fayrnes flowre, my helpe & my sokoure, when may I se þi towre? When wil þou me kall? Me langes to þi hall, to se þe þan al. Þi luf lat it not fal. My hert payntes þe pall þat steds vs in stal; now wax I pale & wan for luf of my lemman. Ihesu, bath God & man, þi luf þou lerd me þan when I to þe fast ran. Forþi, now I lufe kan.

215 I sytt & syng of luf langyng þat in my breste es bredde. Ihesu, Ihesu, Ihesu, when war I to þe ledde? Full wele I wate þou sees my state. In lufe my thought es stedde. When I þe se, & dwels with þe, þan am I fylde & fedde. Ihesu, þi lufe es fest, & me to lufe thynk best. My hert when may it brest to comm to þe, my rest? Ihesu, Ihesu, Ihesu, til þe it es þat I morne, for my lyfe & my lyuyng.
 220 When may I hethen torne? Ihesu, my dere & my drewry, delyte ert þou to syng. Ihesu, my myrth & melody, when wil þow come, my keyng? Ihesu, my hele & my hony, my whart & my comfortyng, Ihesu, I couayte for to dy when it es þi payng. Langyng es in me lent þat my lufe hase me sent; al wa es fra me went sen þat my hert es brent in Criste lufe sa swete, þat neuer I wil lete, bot
 225 euer to luf I hete, for lufe my bale may bete, and til hys blis me bryng, & gyf me my zernyng: Ihesu, my lufe, my swetyng. Langyng es (f. 129r) in me lyght þat byndes me day & nyght, til I it hafe in syght, his face sa fayre & bryght.

Ihesu, my hope, my hele, my ioy euer ilka dele, þi luf lat it noght kele, þat I þi luf may fele, & won with þe in wele. Ihesu, with þe I byg and belde. Leuer
 230 me war to dy þan al þis worlde to welde, & hafe it in maystry. When wil þou rew on me, Ihesu, þat I myght with þe be, to lufe & loke on þe?

My setell ordayne for me, & sett þou me þarin, for þen moun we neuer twyn. And I þi lufe sal syng, thorow syght of þi schynyng, in heuen withowten endyng. Amen. Explicit tractatus Ricardi heremite de Hampole scriptus cuidam
 235 moniali de zedyngham.

voluptatibus, carnis delicijs sibi que conplacentibus vniuersis et a falso
periculosoque huius <seculi> timore te coherceas ne [quod absit] secularis
305 tristitia nobiscum maneat. Sed spem nostram in Christo Iesu ponendo contra
diabolum firmiter stabiliamur, ac huius sanctissimi nominis Iesu virtute omnia
genera temptationum viriliter vincamus. Amen.

Fordham University.

304 seculi *supplevimus ex Ed (angl.) 200*

306-307 omnium genera *Ca, sed cf. sup. 125*

CHRESTIEN, MACROBIUS, AND CHARTREAN SCIENCE: THE ALLEGORICAL ROBE AS SYMBOL OF TEXTUAL DESIGN IN THE OLD FRENCH *EREC**

Thomas Elwood Hart

I

CONTEXT AND SCOPE

WE owe to the eminent Romanists Vincent Foster Hopper and Ernst Robert Curtius the impetus that generated modern research interest in what has gradually emerged as a kind of medieval 'structuralism': the ingenious ways many medieval poets exploited number-based designs as a tool of literary *dispositio*.¹ Curtius termed the technique *Zahlenkomposition*, and since the appearance of his seminal chapter on the subject in 1948 the number of studies in this field has grown in almost geometric progression.² Paradoxically, however, the response among Romanists has been relatively reserved, particularly in research on Old French literature. Only two books, a pair of master's theses, and a modest handful of articles have been devoted to this subject during a period when Old French scholarship has been notably productive in other areas of literary structure.³ This is particularly surprising because much of the

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¹ V. F. Hopper, *Medieval Number Symbolism* (New York, 1938; rpt. 1969); E. R. Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York, 1963), pp. 501-509.

² The most complete bibliography is by Ernst Hellgardt, *Zum Problem symbolbestimmter und formalästhetischer Zahlenkomposition in mittelalterlicher Literatur: mit Studien zum Quadrivium und zur Vorgeschichte des mittelalterlichen Zahlendenkens* (Munich, 1973), pp. 303-51. It subsumes the earlier bibliographical surveys by Horst Schümann (1968) and Michael S. Batts (1969).

³ Margaret Munroe Boland, *Cleomads: A Study in Architectonic Patterns* (University, Miss., 1974); Eleanor Webster Bulatkin, 'The Arithmetic Structure of the Old-French *Vie de Saint Alexis*', *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* 74 (1959) 495-502 and *Structural Arithmetic Metaphor in the Oxford 'Roland'* (Columbus, Ohio, 1972); Gerald F. Carr,

research on numerical (or tectonic) features of structure has been concerned with the Middle High German courtly epics, most of which are either based on Old French models or heavily indebted to French cultural influences. It is surprising too because of the suggestive affinity between the numerical modus and such popular metaphors of recent Old French scholarship (all derived to some extent from comparison with the visual arts and architecture) as triptych, *entrelacement*, and 'spatial form'.⁴

In a recent paper I have presented evidence of a hitherto unrecognized type of tectonic structuring in the Middle High German courtly epic *Iwein* by Hartman von Ouwe (c. 1200).⁵ The findings show that Hartman utilized the proportionality of simple geometric figures, primarily the radical-two proportion characteristic of any square or isosceles right triangle (diagonal or hypotenuse is to side as $\sqrt{2}$ is to 1), in selecting which verse-lines would contain repetitions of certain key concepts. Although Hartman's structural techniques are easier to describe than to account for, the paper also cited historical evidence to document the likelihood that the geometric proportionality governing the *Iwein* text owed some (perhaps direct) inspiration to the new scientific and mathematical thinking characteristic of the School of Chartres, a cultural development inspired largely by the 'Pythagorean' cosmology of Plato's *Timaeus* and itself preeminently influential for both Gothic architecture and contemporary poetic theory, for example the *Poetria nova* of Geoffrey of Vinsauf (c. 1200). Since Hartman's *Iwein* is an adaptation of the *Yvain* by Chrestien de Troyes, the question arose to what extent Chrestien too utilized numerical techniques in designing the *dispositio* of his text. The scope of that paper allowed only a preliminary look at this question. The discussion showed that the specific *Iwein* patterns under consideration there were apparently independent of the French

'The Prolog to Wace's *Vie de Saint Nicholas*: A Structural Analysis', *Philological Quarterly* 47 (1968) 1-7; A. G. Hatcher, 'The Old French Poem "St. Alexis": A Mathematical Demonstration', *Traditio* 8 (1952) 111-58; Paul G. Imhoff, *The Numerical Symbolism in the Old-French Poem 'La Vie de Saint Alexis'* (M. A. thesis, University of Maryland, 1963; cited by Bulatkin 1972); Robert Lucas, *The Mathematical Structure of the 'Chanson de Roland'*, ms. Digby-23 (M. A. thesis, Ohio State University, 1964; cited by Bulatkin 1972) and 'The Golden Section in the Structure of an Old French Poem', *Romance Notes* 8 (1967) 315-23; Charles A. Robson, 'The Technique of Symmetrical Composition in Medieval Poetry' in *Studies in Medieval French Presented to Alfred Ewert*, ed. E. A. Francis (Oxford, 1961), pp. 26-75.

⁴ On the latter two especially see, respectively, Eugène Vinaver, *Form and Meaning in Medieval Romance* (Leeds, 1966), 'From Motive to Ornament' in *Medieval Literature and Folklore Studies: Essays in Honor of Francis Lee Utley*, ed. Jerome Mandel and Bruce A. Rosenberg (New Brunswick, N. J., 1970), pp. 147-53, and *The Rise of Romance* (Oxford, 1971); and Norris J. Lacy, 'Spatial Form in Medieval Romance', *Yale French Studies* 51 (1974) 160-69 and 'Spatial Form in the *Mort Artu*', *Symposium* 31 (1977) 337-45.

⁵ 'Twelfth-Century Platonism and the Geometry of Textual Space in Hartman's *Iwein*: A "Pythagorean" Theory', *Res publica litterarum* 2 (1979) 81-107.

text, but it also gave reason to encourage closer study of Chrestien's works for patterns of similar type and perhaps even comparable shape.

The present paper pursues this issue a step further by examining new evidence of tectonic structuring in one of Chrestien's works, *Erec et Enide*.⁶ The findings are concerned primarily with two parts of the text, the initial 1844 lines which Chrestien explicitly designated as a structural unit – 'Ci fine li premerains vers' (1844) – and the remarkable passage near the end which, in digressing to describe Erec's robe, passes in review the four mathematical arts of the *quadrivium*: *geometrie*, *arimetique*, *musique*, and *astronomie*. As will become evident, however, these focused findings also have important implications for the structure of the poem as a whole. The two passages were selected for independent analysis because the surface texts in both contain suggestive features pointing to the likelihood that Chrestien, if he used tectonic patterning as a tool of composition in any of his works, would well have used it here. Both passages also have certain advantages as test cases, each with its own implications for future research in this area. The passage on Erec's robe, for example, is a short, self-contained excursus, clearly delineated from the narrative that surrounds it; it also has a reliable textual foundation, well attested in the manuscripts and supported by the total agreement of the textual dimensions in the critical edition by Wendelin Foerster and the essentially diplomatic edition of the Guiot ms. by Mario Roques. The *premerains vers*, on the other hand, poses different kinds of analytical challenges because it is longer, more complex, and textually somewhat less reliable to the extent that the Foerster and Roques texts disagree here in line totals. This part of the poem thus affords an opportunity to test the reliability of the two editions for a narrative unit which is explicitly concluded by the same conspicuous wording (*premerains/premiers vers*) in both, but for which the Guiot ms. preserves 48 fewer lines (1796 versus 1844 in the critical edition based on collation of *all* surviving mss.).⁷

⁶ Except where otherwise noted, the edition cited throughout is Wendelin Foerster, ed., *Erec und Enide*, 3rd edition (Halle, 1934); also consulted throughout and cited where appropriate were Foerster's large edition, *Erec und Enide* (Halle, 1890; rpt. Amsterdam, 1965), and Mario Roques, ed., *Les romans de Chrétien de Troyes édités d'après la copie de Guiot (Bibl. nat., fr. 794)*, vol. 1: *Erec et Enide* (Paris, 1952).

⁷ Half of the shortfall in the Guiot ms. results from deletions in the name catalogue following line 1690. A complete list of the lines missing in the ms. and therefore from Roques' (diplomatic) edition (using the line numbers from Foerster's text) is: 903-906 (after Roques 902), 1195-96 (after Roques 1190), 1307-12 (after Roques 1300), 1315-19 (after Roques 1302; the Guiot ms. adds a line, Roques 1304, to replace the lost rhyme of 1319), 1359-62 (after Roques 1342), 1705-1706 (after Roques 1684), 1709-12 (after Roques 1686), 1715-18 (after Roques 1688), 1727-28 (after Roques 1696), 1739-50 (after Roques 1706), and 1831-34 (after Roques 1786) for a total of 48 lines (= 49 less the one replacement).

The analysis proceeds from two textual assumptions, both of which were adopted as working hypotheses to be tested and validated – via the familiar ‘circularity’ of hermeneutic reasoning – by the results of the analysis. The first assumption is that Foerster’s critical edition contains no alterations of Chrestien’s original text substantial enough to affect the line count of either the *premerains vers* or the section on Erec’s robe, 1844 and 97 lines respectively. The second assumption is that the structural paragraphing which Foerster reconstructed from the convergence of initials and other division-markers in the majority of *Erec* mss. is a provisionally trustworthy record of a tradition of manuscript paragraphing presumably based ultimately on Chrestien’s own indications of textual organization for the two passages. The first assumption is the less problematical of the two since no lacunae are suspected in these texts;⁸ it is also the more important, since the line count is a crucial factor in the quantitative aspects of tectonic patterning. As will be shown, the findings dramatically confirm the reliability of the line count in both passages. In fact, they strongly suggest that the line total of Foerster’s text as a whole is very nearly, perhaps perfectly, accurate. The assumption about the paragraphing is less critical for the analysis, but here too the findings indicate that the manuscript divisions deserve systematic study for what they can tell us about Chrestien’s organization of his text.

In addition to these working hypotheses the study also adopts several general procedural guidelines which I have tested elsewhere and found useful in gaining access to suspected numerical designs in other medieval literary texts.⁹ The guidelines follow from a theoretical consideration of the kinds of clues one could reasonably expect to find in a text if a poet used some or all of the means available to him for marking the contours of such a design : (1) graphic, such as manuscript punctuation (majuscles, line spacing, etc.) signaling relevant

⁸ Indeed only at one point in the entire poem has it been seriously suggested that a few lines may have been irretrievably lost from the archetype from which all surviving mss. are thought to have derived – between lines 2219 and 2220 (cf. Foerster’s 1890 ed., p. 314, and 1934 ed., p. 196) – but the speculative reasons for this and for one other less likely possible lacuna have been called into doubt by Mario Roques, ed., p. xxxvi. There appears to be no indication of a break in either rhyme or syntax after line 2219. Foerster’s 1890 and 1934 editions have the same line total. However, the numbering from 3815 to 5240 differs by two because in the edition of 1934 a couplet was added after line 3814 and the couplet bracketed as lines 5239-40 in the 1890 edition was later deleted.

⁹ Cf. my ‘The Structure of *Iwein* and Tectonic Research: What Evidence, Which Methods?’, *Colloquia Germanica* 10 (1976/77) 97-120, especially 99-101; and ‘Tectonic Methodology and an Application to *Beowulf*’ in *Essays in the Numerical Criticism of Medieval Literature*, ed. Caroline D. Eckhardt (Lewisburg, Pa., 1980), pp. 185-210; and ‘Calculated Casualties in *Beowulf*: Geometrical Scaffolding and Verbal Symbol’, forthcoming in *Studia neophilologica* 53 (1981).

divisions ; (2) formal or textural, such as positionally controlled patterns of wording, rhyme, or other stylistic features within structural divisions ; (3) numerical, especially precision and consistency among parts and whole (what may be viewed as the 'esthetics' of the arithmetic relationships which the poet chose to exploit) ; and (4) thematic, such as change of person, place, theme, or action coincident with numerical junctures, and parallels among resulting structural units.

In section II below textual evidence for all four kinds is examined for the narrative unit describing Erec's robe. In section III evidence based on a similarly systematic analysis is presented for the text of the *premerains vers*. In both discussions the aim is succinct description of textual facts. It is not my purpose here to offer either an exhaustive analysis or an interpretation of these data, but rather to document specific examples of tectonic patterning in one poem which are unlikely to have been created in total isolation and therefore are probably representative of an aspect of Chrestien's art that deserves further study. Following the analysis a concluding section (IV) explores, in a necessarily preliminary manner, several implications the findings have for the procedural assumptions adopted here and for our understanding of the poem's structure and Chrestien's poetic theory. Chief among these is the symbolic reading suggested in my title: that Chrestien's at first surprising digression describing portraits of the mathematical *artes* on Erec's robe serves primarily as an allegorical representation for one aspect of poetic art which apparently was important to him — the use of number and proportion in the poem's visible exterior, or, to stay with Chrestien's metaphor, in the poem's textual fabric.

II

THE ROBE-ALLEGORY, MACROBIUS, AND TEXT-STRUCTURE

1. *Graphic evidence*

The description of Erec's robe which Chrestien devised as an occasion for his excursus on the *quadrivium* is embedded in a larger digression in which the narrator sets the scene for the coronation of Erec and Enide, the ninety-seven lines 6713-6809 (Roques 6651-6747). This unit is marked off by paragraphing (majuscule letters, etc.) in lines 6713 and 6810 of Foerster's text. Although unfortunately no detailed information is readily available about the manuscript evidence for paragraphing, Foerster indicated that the majuscule letters mark-

ing the sections of his text are based, in his words, 'auf der überwiegenden Mehrzahl der verschiedenen Handschriften'.¹⁰

2. Formal and thematic evidence

Within these ninety-seven lines it appears Chrestien positioned prominent repetitions of wording and rhyme to call attention to important formal subdivisions. As is depicted in Figure 1, the 47-line excursus on the *quadrivium* (lines 6744-90; Roques 6682-6728) is framed by conspicuous repetitions in wording and sense (upper case letters are used to emphasize verbal echoes, and other capitalization is suppressed).¹¹




FIG. 1. – Verbal echoes framing the 47-line excursus on the *quadrivium* (6744-90).

Within this 47-line section the subdivisions devoted to each of the four *artes* are clearly signaled by number words. As shown by Figure 2, the subdivisions for the first two *artes*, geometry and arithmetic, are further distinguished by repetitions of one of the keynote concepts which constitute the frame depicted in Figure 1, *portreire*. Similarly, the subdivisions for the other two *artes*, music

¹⁰ See Foerster's 1934 edition, p. xxii; his text contains fifty-seven such sections, averaging about 120 lines each. According to the information given by Roques, p. 210, the Guiot ms. marks the beginning but not the end of the 97-line section. A systematic analysis of the paragraphing in the Chrestien mss. remains a desideratum; compare the data given for the mss. of the works of Hartman von Ouwe by Hansjürgen Linke, *Epische Strukturen in der Dichtung Hartmanns von Aue* (Munich, 1968), especially the tables after p. 164.

¹¹ Note too that the emphasis on the trustworthiness of *arimetique* in the central line of the 47-line excursus – the absence of *mantir* (6767; Roques 6705) – is prominently repeated for *astronomie* in the excursus' final line, 6790 (Roques 6728): 'sanz mantir'. Three lines preceding the excursus the narrator appeals to the authority of Macrobius, as he explains, 'que l'an ne die que je mante' (6740; Roques 6678, my emphasis). The same concept thus occurs near the start, the middle, and the end of the 47-line excursus.

and astronomy, are identified with another keynote concept from that frame, *oeuvre*.




FIG. 2. — Subdivisions and a supporting word-pattern in the 47-line excursus on the *quadrivium* (6744-90).

The relevance of the excursus on the *quadrivium* both to the coronation scene which it interrupts and to the poem as a whole has not been adequately explained. The patterns just described raise the suspicion that Chrestien introduced the passage not merely as an emblem of his thorough Latin schooling but, at least in part, as a veiled allusion to the theory and practice of poetic technique. This hunch deserves to be pursued, for, if it is borne out by further analysis of the text, the excursus on Erec's robe would emerge not only as an important source of insight into a new side of Chrestien's literary theory but also as a rare contemporary reference by a medieval poet to the numerical features of poetic composition. Let us look at the text again from this point of view.

To begin with, it is notable that Chrestien introduces the entire digression with an interesting twist on the traditional inexpressibility topos,¹² namely, by representing the digression he is about to embark on as a particular challenge to (and demonstration of) his own skill *as a poet* :

Or ne porroit langue ne boche
De nul home, tant seüst d'art,
Deviser le tierz ne le quart
Ne le quint de l'atornemant
(6702-6705).

Nevertheless – Chrestien allows – though it be an undertaking of ‘grant folie’ (6707), he will make the effort, as he must, to describe, as best he can, ‘une partie’ (6712). The ‘part’ of the coronation scene which he selects to prove his craftsmanship concerns not the literary *artes* of the *trivium* – as might have seemed, at least to us today, quite natural – but rather pictorial representation (on both the ivory thrones and Erec’s robe) and, especially, an excursus on the mathematical *artes* of the *quadrivium*. The pictorial emphasis is less surprising than the excursus on the mathematical *artes*. After all, the pictorial comparison *ut pictura poesis* had been one of the most traditional in Western poetics since Horace and is well attested also in the late twelfth century (e.g., in Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s *Poetria nova*).¹³ Moreover, Chrestien carefully modulated the pictorial component to lead us gradually to the symbolic portraiture on Erec’s robe: the digression begins by celebrating another example of skillful craftsmanship, that evidenced in Arthur’s two thrones of ivory and gold.

But the mathematical symbolism of the portraits themselves, at first so unexpected and still not accounted for, appears less surprising when we observe that the transition to the language of the mathematical arts is also carefully modulated. This transition begins, suggestively, in the very syntax of the sentence with which Chrestien introduces the entire digression (the introductory lines 6702-6705 quoted just above): the verbal metaphors *langue* and *boche* at the start are gradually identified with the numerical, first (following a brief parenthesis) by being conjoined with a verb which has mathematical connotations and then by being identified with objects which are explicitly mathematical – neither ‘tongue’ nor ‘mouth’, no matter how knowledgeable the

¹² Cf. Curtius (n. 1 above), pp. 159-62.

¹³ See Horace’s *Ars poetica* in C. O. Brink, ed., *Horace on Poetry*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1963-71), 2, lines 361-65. Cf. Geoffrey’s *Poetria nova* (lines 743-50), ed. Edmond Faral, *Les arts poétiques du XII^e et du XIII^e siècle. Recherches et documents sur la technique littéraire du moyen âge* (Paris, 1924).

speaker be in 'art', could 'devise' (related to division, etc.) the 'third', 'fourth', or 'fifth' part.¹⁴

How are we to know if we are on the right track in recovering the *san* behind this long puzzling text? Fortunately, in this case the reading itself points toward the kind of evidence which could validate it. If Chrestien did in fact devise the subtle introductory transition from *langue* to numbers and the more striking excursus on the *quadrivium* in order to suggest the role of the mathematical arts in his literary esthetics, it seems reasonable to expect we will find reliable evidence of numerical patterning in this particular part of the poem, perhaps related in some palpable way to what the text itself says about the four *artes* it depicts.

3. Numerical and thematic evidence

Perhaps the most conspicuous mathematical element of the digression and the immediately preceding lines introducing it is the emphasis on specific number words and number concepts themselves – 'le tierz', 'le quart', 'le quint' (6704-6705; Roques 6642-43), 'deus faudestués' (6713; Roques 6651), 'li dui manbre' (6727; Roques 6665), 'li autre dui' (6729; Roques 6667), 'quatre fees' (6744; Roques 6682), 'l'une' (6746; Roques 6684), 'la premerainne' (6755; Roques 6693), 'la seconde' (6756; Roques 6694), 'la tierce' (6770; Roques 6708), 'la quarte' (6777; Roques 6715), 'quatre pierres' (6806; Roques 6744), 'deus crisolites' (6807; Roques 6745), 'deus ametites' (6808; Roques 6746) – in addition to repeated use of more generic mathematical terms like 'mesure' (6747 and 6754; Roques 6685 and 6692) and 'nonbre' (6759 and 6766; Roques 6697 and 6704). The two descriptions of works of pictorial art involve several close parallels stressing artistic design and craftsmanship: Erec's robe and the two ivory thrones were wrought with great skill (6716-17 and 6744-45; Roques 6654-55 and 6682-83), are embellished with gold (6725, 6793, and 6809; Roques 6663, 6731, and 6747), and have associations with exotic animals (6728-29 and 6795-6801; Roques 6666-67 and 6733-39). More importantly, however, the parallel emphases on craftsmanship in both extend into the realm of number, since the two thrones, like the robe, are distinguished by what may be termed a *quaternity* of design: the two identical 'faudestués', each apparently *four*-sided, depict a total of *four* animals (two – a leopard and a dragon – on each). Thus, the *four* pictorial representations on the thrones correspond to the *four* portraits depicting the four *artes* on Erec's robe. Moreover, the fourness of

¹⁴ Cf. *deviser* a few lines later: 'Por l'un de l'autre deviser' (6721; Roques 6659). Note too Curtius (n. 1 above), p. 182: 'Chrétien's term for ecphrasis is *devise*.'

ornamentation on the thrones (two animals on each) is echoed at the end of the digression by the *four* jewels which grace the tassels of Erec's mantle (again two each of two different species, 'quatre pierres' = 'deus crisolites' plus 'deus ametites', set in gold: 6806-6809; Roques 6744-47).¹⁵

What is the significance of these repeated references to numbers, especially the number *four*? Is the recurrent emphasis on fourness merely a decorative touch intended to echo the four *artes* of the *quadrivium*? Or is there perhaps more to it than that? Chrestien's twofold allusion to Macrobius (in lines 6738 and 6741; Roques 6676 and 6679) strikes me as potentially relevant in answering this question. Given the verdict of past scholarship on the sincerity of Chrestien's allusion, a reopening of the case for Macrobian influence on the French poet may seem somewhat surprising. In order to set the stage for a proper reconsideration of the issue, an excursus on the Macrobian connection is purposeful at this point.

4. *Macrobius*

Modern scholarship has generally not taken Chrestien's references to Macrobius very seriously since the earlier hunt for specific sources in Macrobius' surviving writings turned up no comparable descriptions of robes. Wendelin Foerster's (partially contradictory) judgment remains representative: 'Was die Gewährung Makrobs anlangt, so ist sie wohl auf Kristians Erfindung zu setzen. Die Elemente zu seiner Beschreibung mag er in seinem Comment. in Som. Scip. gefunden haben' (1890 ed., p. 333).¹⁶ Scholarly dismissal of the allusions has been based on a literal reading of the passage, especially lines 6741-43 (Roques 6679-81): 'Macrobes m'ansaigne a descrire, / Si con je l'ai trouvé el livre, / L'uvre del drap et le portret.' Certainly nothing in Macrobius' transmitted works justifies taking this statement *literally*. But, if my hunch about literary-theoretical innuendos in the *san* of this digression is correct, there is much in Macrobius' *Commentary on Scipio's Dream* (c. 400) to justify our taking Chrestien's statements *figuratively*, that is, as allusions to Macrobian thinking rather than to any specific analogue for Erec's robe and its unusual decoration. This is particularly true for the Neoplatonic cosmology transmitted to the Middle Ages through Macrobius' *Commentary* and for the likely influence its 'Pythagorean' component had on philosophical motivations for numerical composition in medieval art and literature. Macrobius'

¹⁵ The numerical echoes continue in the subsequent passage: each of the *two* gold crowns Arthur gives to Erec and Enide has *four* large gemstones (6842-43; Roques 6780-81).

¹⁶ Cf. recently Claude Luttrell, *The Creation of the First Arthurian Romance* (Evanston, Ill., 1974), pp. 20-25 and 78 n. 22.

Commentary, in fact, was one of the three major vehicles through which Platonic and Pythagorean thinking was rediscovered in twelfth-century France, and thus played a prominent role in the remarkable Neoplatonist renaissance associated with the Cathedral School at Chartres (the other two vehicles being Chalcidius' fragmentary translation of and commentary on the only Platonic dialogue then widely known, the *Timaeus*, and Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*, especially the immensely popular poem in book 3, 'O qui perpetua' [metrum 9], and the numerous commentaries on it). As such, Macrobius' book was one of the most important sources of the numerically oriented cosmology and *ordo*-esthetics which provided the larger philosophical context for the four disciplines of the *quadrivium*. At no place or time in the Middle Ages was the mathematical aspect of Plato's metaphysics in greater esteem than in France during the generation preceding the composition of the *Erec* (c. 1170).¹⁷

None of this, of course, constitutes conclusive proof that Chrestien's citation of Macrobius as a source for his digression on the mathematical sciences also implies an allusion to Macrobius' Neoplatonic and Pythagorean world-view, with its mystical theology of the sacred decad, its science of the celestial order and of the proportions binding the elements, its knowledge of the numerical ratios of musical consonance, and its belief in the harmony of the spheres. But it does justify the suspicion of a possible larger, more theoretical frame of reference behind the mathematical symbolism in *Erec*, one perhaps including the direct influence of Chartrean science recently suggested by Winthrop Wetherbee and Paul Archambault.¹⁸ Moreover, it prompts us to inquire further

¹⁷ Regarding points of history and philosophy surveyed here see section II of my 'Twelfth-Century Platonism' (n. 5 above) and the sources cited there. For Macrobius specifically see William Harris Stahl's detailed introduction to his translation, *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio* (New York, 1952), and the scholarship on which it is based. Stahl summarized: 'To the medievalist, Macrobius' *Commentary* is an intensely interesting document because it was ... one of the basic source books of the scholastic movement and of medieval science. Next to Chalcidius' *Commentary*, it was the most important source of Platonism in the Latin West in the Middle Ages' (p. 10). Of more specific application in our context, Stahl drew on the earlier source studies of Schedler and Duhem to document Macrobius' considerable influence on writers associated, directly or indirectly, with the Chartres School: 'Adelard of Bath borrowed heavily from the *Commentary* in his *De eodem et diverso*. It was also the main source of the Neoplatonic doctrines of the *De mundi universitate* of Bernard Silvester of Tours, although Macrobius' name is never mentioned. Another writer to make extensive use of the *Commentary* was William of Conches in his *Dragmaticon* John of Salisbury made greater use of the *Saturnalia* than of the *Commentary* in his *Policraticus* Traces of Macrobian influence are to be found in almost all the writings of Alanus de Insulis, especially in his encyclopedic *Anticlaudianus*. The *Commentary* is also an important source of the *Summa universae theologiae*, by Alexander of Hales' (p. 44).

¹⁸ Winthrop Wetherbee, *Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The Literary Influence of the School of Chartres* (Princeton, 1972), especially p. 241; and Paul Archambault, 'Erec and the Search for a New Language', *Symposium* 35 (1981) (forthcoming). The original impetus for

whether specific passages in Macrobius' writings may, after all, now prove to have motivated innuendos previously overlooked in Chrestien's text.

What Macrobius had to say about the concept of *fourness* specifically – much of it, incidentally, derived, through Porphyry, from Plato's *Timaeus* – offers an excellent illustration of the philosophical tenor of his discussion of all four mathematical *artes*. Because of what I see as their possible direct relevance to Chrestien's use of numerical structuring in the *Erec* text, it is necessary at this point to examine several passages from Macrobius' *Commentary* in some detail. The *Commentary* distinguishes two functions of the number four in Platonic cosmology. The first has to do with the theory of geometrical figures, the second with the proportions which bind together the four elements of the universe, earth, water, air, and fire. In discussing the first topic Macrobius outlined the steps in the generation of geometrical figures (familiar to us today from the definitions beginning books 1 and 11 of Euclid's *Elements*) as proceeding from point to line (connecting two points), to surface (bounded by length and breadth), to solid (having length, breadth, and depth). He then continued (the passages quoted below are labeled A, B, C, and D for ease of reference later):

- (A) To these geometrical steps numbers are applied. The monad represents the point because, like the point, which is not a body but which produces bodies from itself, the monad is said to be not a number but the source of numbers. The first number, therefore, is two, which is like the line protracted from the point by giving it two termini. *The number two doubled gives four, presenting the mathematical body which is limited by four points, having length and breadth.* Four doubled gives eight, the number representing a solid body, to repeat what was previously stated, that two lines placed above two others and limited by eight points produced the solid body; this explains why geometricians speak of two times two times two as a solid body.¹⁹

the present study of *Erec* emerged during discussions with Professor Archambault about his thought-provoking thesis. See also, more generally, Curtius (n. 1 above), pp. 106-22, and Leo Pollmann, *Chrétien de Troyes und der Conte del Graal* (Tübingen, 1965), especially pp. 83-85.

¹⁹ Macrobius, *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio*, trans. William Harris Stahl (n. 17 above), p. 190 (= 2.2.8-10, emphasis added). The cross-referencing to the Latin text, here and below, is by the conventional numbering; Stahl's authoritative translation is based on the earlier edition by Ludwig von Jan (Quedlinburg, 1852); more accessible now is James Willis' edition, *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis* (Leipzig, 1963), from which I quote here and below: (A) 'his geometricis rationibus adplicatur natura numerorum, et monas punctum putatur, quia sicut punctum corpus non est, sed ex se facit corpora, ita monas numerus esse non dicitur, sed origo numerorum. primus ergo numerus in duobus est, qui similis est lineae de puncto sub gemina puncti terminatione productae. hic numerus duo geminatus de se efficit quattuor ad similitudinem mathematici corporis, quod sub quattuor punctis longo latoque distenditur. quaternarius quoque ipse geminatus octo efficit, qui numerus solidum corpus imitatur, sicut duas lineas diximus duabus

And more explicitly for the generation of solid figures:

- (B) If you should wish to consider not the surface of one side, but all the surfaces of a solid figure, which we may assume for the purpose of illustration to be rectangular and equilateral, there are now not four but eight angles to be reckoned with. This you will recognize if you imagine that above one quadrat (a surface such as was described above) you have placed another exactly like it, so that altitude, which was lacking in the plane, is now added: with the three dimensions filled up a solid body is produced which geometers call a die or cube. Hence it is apparent that the number eight both is and is considered a solid body, if indeed one is represented by a point, two by the drawing of a line (which, as we said above, is

superpositas octo angulorum dimensione integram corporis soliditatem creare, et hoc est quod apud geometras dicitur bis bina bis corpus esse iam solidum' (2.2.8-10, emphasis added).

The Latin texts for the subsequent passages (B, C, and D) are: (B) 'si vero non unius partis sed totius velis corporis superficiem cogitare, quod proponamus esse quadratum, ut de uno quod exemplo sufficit disputemus, iam non quattuor sed octo anguli colliguntur. quod animadvertis si super unum quadratum quale prius diximus alterum tale altius impositum mente conspicias ut altitudo quae illi plano deerat adiciatur fiatque tribus dimensionibus impletis corpus solidum quod [Graeci] *στερεόν* vocant ad imitationem tesserae quae *κύβος* vocatur. ex his apparet octonarium numerum solidum corpus et esse et haberi. si quidem unum apud geometras puncti locum obtinet, duo lineae ductum faciunt quae duobus punctis ut supra diximus coercetur, *quattuor vero puncta adversum se in duobus ordinibus bina per ordinem posita exprimunt quadri speciem, a singulis punctis in adversum punctum eiecta linea*. haec quattuor ut diximus, duplicata et octo facta, duo quadra similia describunt, quae sibi superposita additaeque altitudine formam cybi quod est solidum corpus efficiunt' (1.5.10-11, emphasis added).

(C) 'de secunda septenarii numeri coniunctione dicta haec pro affectatae brevitatis necessitate sufficiant, tertia est de tribus et quattuor, quae quantum valeat revolvamus. geometrici corporis ab impari prima planities in tribus lineis constat, his enim trigonalis forma concluditur, a pari vero prima in quattuor invenitur. item scimus secundum Platonem, id est secundum ipsius veritatis arcanum, illa forti inter se vinculo conligari, quibus interiecta medietas praestat vinculi firmitatem. cum vero medietas ipsa geminatur, ea quae extrema sunt non tenaciter tantum, sed etiam insolubiliter vinciuntur. primo ergo ternario contigit numero, ut inter duo summa medium quo vinciretur acciperet, *quaternarius vero duas medietates primus omnium nactus est, quas ab hoc numero deus mundanae molis artifex conditorque mutuatus, insolubili inter se vinculo elementa devinxit*, sicut in Timaeo Platonis adsertum est, non aliter tam controversa sibi ac repugnantia et naturae communionem abnuentia permisceri – terram dico et ignem – potuisse et per tam iugabilem competentiam foederari, nisi duobus mediis aeris et aquae nexibus vincirentur. ita enim elementa inter se diversissima opifex tamen deus ordinis opportunitate conexuit, ut facile iungerentur' (1.6.21-25, emphasis mine).

(D) 'item omnia corpora aut mathematica sunt alumna geometriae aut talia quae visum tactumve patiantur. horum priora tribus incrementorum gradibus constant. aut enim linea eicitur ex puncto, aut ex linea superficies, aut ex planitie soliditas. altera vero corpora quattuor elementorum conlato tenore in robur substantiae corpulentae concordii concretionem coalescunt. nec non omnium corporum tres sunt dimensiones, *longitudo latitudo profunditas. termini adnumerato effectu ultimo quattuor, punctum linea superficies et ipsa soliditas*. item cum quattuor sint elementa ex quibus constant corpora: terra aqua aer et ignis, tribus sine dubio interstitiis separantur. quorum unum est a terra usque ad aquam, ab aqua usque ad aerem sequens, tertium ab aere usque ad ignem' (1.6.35-36, emphasis mine).

limited by two points), and four by points arranged at right angles to each other, with lines extending between the points to form a square. When these four are duplicated and made eight, forming two equal squares, and one is superimposed upon the other, giving the figure altitude, the result is a cubical figure, which is a solid body (p. 97 = 1.5.10-11, emphasis mine).

The second function of the number four, having to do with the cosmic proportion $A : B :: C : D$, is derived directly and explicitly from Plato:

- (C) Let us consider the abilities of the third pair [of numbers which combine to produce the number seven], of three and four. In geometry the smallest odd number of lines in a surface is three, in the triangle, and four, the smallest even number, in the quadrangle. Moreover, we know, according to Plato (that is, according to the sanctuary of truth itself), that those bodies alone are closely held together which have a mean interposed between extremes to create a strong bond. When that mean is doubled the extremes are bound not only firmly but even indissolubly. Now the number three is the first to have a mean between two extremes to bind it together, and the number four is the first of all numbers to have two means. Borrowing the means from this number the Creator of the universe bound the elements together with an unbreakable chain, as was affirmed in Plato's *Timaeus*: in no other way could the elements of earth and fire, so opposed and repugnant to each other and spurning any communion of their natures, be mingled together and joined in so binding a union unless they were held together by the two means of air and water. For thus, in spite of the utter diversity of these elements, the Creator harmonized them so skillfully that they could be readily united (pp. 104-105 = 1.6.21-25, emphasis added).

Following a discussion of the bonds among the four elements, in which he freely translates Plato's own explanation of how a 'mutual attraction ran through the universe, linking together unlike elements by the similarities underlying their differences' (after *Timaeus* 32B) – a concept frequently discussed in glosses and commentaries on Boethius' famous chant 'O qui perpetua' and directly pertinent to the discussion of Chrestien's poetic theory (cf. at n. 54 below) – Macrobius combines the two functions of the number four as follows:

- (D) To continue, all bodies are either mathematical, creatures of geometry, or such as are perceptible to sight or touch. The former possess three stages of development: the line grows out of the point, the surface out of the line, and the solid out of the surface; the latter, because of the adhesive qualities in the four elements, harmoniously grow together into firm bodily substances. All bodies have three dimensions, *longitude, latitude, and altitude*, and the sum total gives us four terms, *point, line, surface, and solid*. Moreover, since all material bodies consist of four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, they must be separated by three interstices: one of these lies between earth and water, the second between water and air, and the third between air and fire (pp. 106-107 = 1.6.35-36, emphasis mine).

The Timaeon-Pythagorean cosmology of Macrobius' *Commentary* is reflected by Chrestien's wording throughout the 97-line digression, particularly in the embedded 47-line passage on the *quadrivium*. In fact, Chrestien's treatment of the mathematical *artes* differs most noticeably from the typical description of them by the curriculum authors (Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, Isidore) precisely in his underlying Platonic perspective. The Platonic tenor is evident first in the lack of sharp differentiation between geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy: all three disciplines, Chrestien's text tells us, are concerned with the essential numerosity of the universe. For example, both geometry and arithmetic are said to measure the sea (6753 and 6761; Roques 6691 and 6699); both arithmetic and astronomy are portrayed studying the stars (6763 and 6782; Roques 6701 and 6720) and time (6759-60 and 6788; Roques 6697-98 and 6726); and all three unlock the heavens (6747-48, 6763, and 6780-83; Roques 6685-86, 6701, and 6718-21). But Chrestien's Platonism is most evident in his choice of examples to illustrate what is numbered and measured: *geometrie* measures heaven and earth, the ocean, and the entire universe; *arimetique* enumerates the days and the hours, the water in the ocean drop by drop, sand and stars one by one, and the leaves of trees; *astronomie* studies the stars, the moon, and the sun. All the elements in Chrestien's universe, not merely geometrical figures and arithmetic computations, are bound together by measure and number. And, revealing yet further his indebtedness to Timaeon thinking, Chrestien repeatedly emphasizes the Pythagorean doctrine that the study of the numbers leads to truth: 'Onques nombres ne l'an boisa' (6766; Roques 6704); 'Li [sun, moon, stars] font certainement savoir, / Sanz mantir et sanz decevoir' (6789-90; Roques 6727-28).

Clearly, then, Chrestien is pointing to more than the mathematical *artes* in his self-proclaimed 'grant folie' (6707; Roques 6645) of attempting to describe Erec's coronation in mere words – and then digressing (instead!) into 'portraits' of geometry, arithmetic, music, astronomy, and the universe of shape and number which they study and reveal. By citing Macrobius as his authority in this context – and of course rhyming 'Macrobe' with 'robe' (lines 6737-38; Roques 6675-76) – Chrestien is revealing his allegiance to the Timaeon worldview which for Macrobius, following Plato, provided the philosophical context that gave the mathematical disciplines their special dignity. I suspect Chrestien may even have wanted to acknowledge his allegiance here by design, since the double reference to Macrobius as his teacher seems intentionally cryptic. What is implicit in the text, in any case, is not only a philosophical context for the mathematical *artes*, but a cosmology which embraces and conjoins all seven liberal arts, the verbal and the numerical. And for this implication the references to Macrobius are of crucial significance to Chrestien's symbolism because it was Macrobius, in his study of Virgil in the *Saturnalia*, who first

rendered explicit what Chrestien's digression seems to be suggesting: that the poet is comparable with the Divine Author of the universe because both God and poet create by binding the elements of their *oeuvre* with *nonbre* and *mesure*.²⁰ Curtius' summary of Macrobius' influential theoretical innovation is instructive on this point:

It is clear that Macrobius already sees in poetry everything that the Middle Ages saw in it: theology, allegory, universal knowledge, rhetoric. Accordingly, he also has a conception of the poet which was foreign to classical Antiquity: The poem is comparable to the cosmos Hence there is a great similarity between the 'divinum opus mundi' and the 'poeticum opus'; between the 'deus opifex' and the 'poeta' ([*Saturnalia*] V, 1, 19 f. and V, 2, 1). In the mouth of a pagan Neo-platonist of late Antiquity, then, we first find the 'cosmic' conception of the poet which compares him to the architect of the universe.²¹

This theoretical and somewhat philosophical explanation for Chrestien's digression involves a type of symbolism which, as suggested earlier, fortunately – in contrast with many other kinds of symbolic readings familiar in modern literary scholarship – has a special capacity for independent self-validation: if the numerical hypothesis is at all valid, the proof must be accessible to objective verification in the very shape of the text itself. And here again the allusion to Macrobius is singularly illuminating, because both of the numerical functions we have seen (for the number four) in Macrobius' *Commentary* – let us label them for convenience the geometrical and the proportional function respectively – are reflected in the shape and, in part also, in the very wording of Chrestien's digression.

5. *Wording, sense, and number*

When one rereads Chrestien's digression after reading Macrobius' *Commentary*, the geometrical emphasis is more immediately apparent than the proportional, but it soon becomes clear how Chrestien has worked Macrobian proportionality into his text here when we follow up his specific references to geometrical shapes and properties. Just as Macrobius stressed that 'All bodies have three dimensions, longitude, latitude, and altitude, and the sum total gives us four terms, point, line, surface, and solid' (quotation D above), so too Chrestien depicts the art of geometry measuring, in the more generic formulation, 'le bas et puis le haut, / Et puis le le et puis le lonc' (6750-51;

²⁰ A notion with biblical authority in a passage quoted ubiquitously in the Middle Ages: 'Sed omnia in mensura, et numero, et pondere disposuisti' (Wisdom 11:21).

²¹ Curtius (n. 1 above), p. 444, emphasis mine.

Roques 6688-89) and, more specifically, how the ocean is 'lee et parfonde' (6753; Roques 6691). Chrestien was clearly at pains to call attention to these geometrical concepts, for in addition to the repeated emphasis here he used the term *haut* a second time and the term *le* for even a third time in describing how the two ivory thrones, when regarded 'all around' ('antor', 6720; Roques 6658), appear to be 'D'un haut, d'un le et d'un ator' (6719; Roques 6657).

It appears that Chrestien viewed these geometrical concepts as determinants not only in the structure of physical objects but also – by analogical extension – in the proportions he gave his text. His (implicit or explicit) logic may have run like this. Each (octosyllabic) line of verse has four metrical feet; in the rhymed couplet it becomes a combinable unit. No less than stars, grains of sand, or drops of seawater, verse-lines are therefore also countable units. Thus the literary text, especially in verse form, offers opportunities for numerical shaping and binding. Given the context of mathematical allusion in this digression the obvious question is: did Chrestien take advantage of these opportunities here? As we have seen, the section marked off in the mss. contains 97 line-units, while the embedded excursus on the *quadrivium* (cf. Figures 1 and 2) contains 47. The relative placement of the forty-seven lines within the ninety-seven thus involves a kind of organizational shaping. Were the numbers calculated to make the resulting 'shape' significant, harmonic, pleasing, symbolic, even 'geometric'?

For convenience let us label the 97-line and 47-line sections '97S' and '47S' respectively ('S' for 'structural unit'). The embedding of 47S within 97S is placed in such a way that 31 lines precede and 19 lines follow; let them be called 31S and 19S respectively. 97S may thus be viewed as a sequence of three sections (31S + 47S + 19S = 97S) or as a combination thereof, that is, either 31S + 66S (combining 47S and 19S) = 97S, or 78S (combining 31S and 47S) + 19S = 97S.

The following patterns indicate to me that Chrestien shaped these structural sections so that the sums of lines in the resulting groupings would be proportional with one another and that the arithmetic ratios involved would approximate as closely as possible the constant proportions characteristic of simple geometric figures, especially the square and the circle.

6. The square

(a) The phrase 'D'un haut, d'un le' in the comparison of the two ivory thrones (6719; Roques 6657) is richly ambiguous. The denotation here concerns what I have called the proportional function in Macrobius' exposition of Platonic number theory – the two figures or objects are of the same height and the same width and therefore appear in perfect proportion with one another, i.

e., in a ratio of one-to-one in each dimension. One text-structural reflection of the equivalent proportionality is diagrammed in Figure 3; the two verbally most equivalent references to the geometrical concepts height and width are arranged so that they occur *at equivalent points* in the two structural sections 31S and 47S, seven lines from the respective start of each, or in a one-to-one ratio.

6719 d'un HAUT, d'un LE et d'un ator,

6750 et puis le bas et puis le HAUT,

6751 et puis le LE et puis le long;

6753 con la mers est LEE et parfonde.




FIG. 3. — The relative disposition of the three references to the geometrical concepts height ('haut') and width ('le') in the digression and its embedded excursus on the *quadrivium*.

(b) One possible geometric connotation of the ambiguity in the phrase 'D'un haut, d'un le' is a figure whose height and width are equal. Earlier we saw how the number four is linked with the thrones as well as with Erec's robe. In quotation B from Macrobius' *Commentary* we learned further that the number four implied a square in Platonic number theory, just as, in Macrobius' words, 'the number eight both *is and is considered*' (my emphasis) a cubical figure. In any square — that is, any four-sided figure 'D'un haut, d'un le' — the proportionality remains constant: the sides are in one-to-one ratio with one another, and the diagonal is equal to the square root of the sum of the squares of two sides (height and width), that is, the ratio of any side to the diagonal equals

1:√2. As is also shown in Figure 3, the third of the three references to the concepts of height (or depth) and width, the one containing the third occurrence of the term *le* (6753; Roques 6691), is located such that thirty-four lines separate it from the first and ten lines from the start of its section, 47S. The resulting intervals, 24 and 34, 7 and 10, are proportional: (rounded off to the nearest integer) 34 is to 24 as 10 is to 7. The controlling ratio here is the geometric constant √2, the ratio diagonal/side in a square. In other words, a square with side 24 has a diagonal 34 (more precisely, 33.94); a square with side 7 has a diagonal 10 (more precisely, 9.899).²²

(c) The same proportion obtains in the arrangement of the content groupings 31S + 47S + 19S = 97S. A square with side 47 has a diagonal of 47 + 19, or 66.

(d) Within 47S the content groupings marked off by the patterns diagrammed in Figure 2 earlier all reveal the √2 proportionality: 10/7 = 14/10 = √2 (in expressing such proportions throughout I use colon and virgule interchangeably; e.g., alternatively, 10 : 7 :: 14 : 10 = √2).

7. The circle

Chrestien singles out astronomy as 'la mellor des arz' (6779; Roques 6717). Macrobius ranks, with Chalcidius and Martianus Capella, among the three most important transmitters of antique astronomical doctrine. William Harris Stahl cited earlier research in support of the views 'that in the twelfth century the works of Capella and Macrobius became the leading textbooks [for geographical lore] in the schools' and 'that Macrobius and Capella were the authorities responsible for the wide adoption of Eratosthenes' figure of 252,000

²² The square root of two is, of course, an irrational number (cannot be expressed as a ratio of one integer to another), so any formulation, including the 'more precise' decimals (e.g., the approximation 1.4142135 used here and below), is 'rounded off' to some extent. The decimal figures are cited throughout not to imply that Chrestien worked with decimals but to suggest the precision of his integer results (i.e., fractional remainders rounded up or down to nearest integer). Of the four most common traditional approximations for √2 (i.e., 17/12, 75/53, 41/29, and 99/70, in order of increasing accuracy), Chrestien seems to have favored the third; with the smaller numbers here, of course, we find 17/12 (doubled to 34/24). It is intriguing to speculate on the methods of computation and/or geometrical procedures (with scale, rule, and compass) which Chrestien could have used, both here and in calculating the (considerably more ambitious and therefore demanding) proportions discussed in Section III below. It seems best at this point, however, to focus on textual data until more is known about the design, as an art historian might do in recording initial measurements for a Gothic cathedral without attempting to explain the engineering which produced it. Cf., for example, George Lesser, *Gothic Cathedrals and Sacred Geometry*, 3 vols. (London, 1957-64); all of the 'six typical geometrical magnitudes' which he discerned in the designs of the cathedrals he analyzed are based on √2 (1:66-67 and 3:175). Cf. n. 52 below.

stades for the earth's circumference in the Middle Ages.²³ The astronomy of classical antiquity, especially as Macrobius' *Commentary* presents it, is concerned chiefly with spheres, circular orbits, and the measurement of the diameter and circumference of round bodies;²⁴ it is essentially the geometry of circles and spheres applied to the heavens. In Chrestien's text much of the subject of *astronomie* is already described in the earlier section on *geometrie*: repeatedly we are told about the 'geometry' of sun, moon, earth, and stars, most explicitly in the lines describing how geometry 'esgarde et mesure, / Con li ciaux et la terre dure' and how '[geometry] mesure tot le monde' (6747-48, 6754; Roques 6685-86, 6692).

The implicit emphasis on circular forms here and in the subsequent description of *astronomie* deriving its wisdom 'as estoiles ... / Et a la lune et au soleil' (6782-83; Roques 6720-21) is supported by implicit and explicit references to the concept of circularity elsewhere in the digression: first, the comprehensive rhyme-words 'atornemant' and 'coronemant' (both etymologically suggestive of circularity, from *torner* and *corone* respectively) in the important keynote challenge, 'ne porroit langue ne boche / De nul home ... / Deviser le tierz ne le quart / Ne le quint de l'atornemant, / Qui fu a son coronemant' (6702-6706; Roques 6640-44); and second, the rhyme-word 'ator' (related to 'atornemant') in the comparison of the two thrones and especially its rhyme-mate 'antor' (Foerster: 'in der Runde, ringsum') in the verbally and conceptually similar passage, 'D'un haut, d'un le et d'un ator, / Ja tant n'esgardissiez antor / Por l'un de l'autre deviser' (6719-21; Roques 6657-59). Though of course less direct and conspicuous than the overt references to the terms suggesting angular figures (e.g., 'haut' and 'le'), the text's repeated suggestion of curvilinear forms in the explicitly numerical passages warrants a closer look.

Macrobius' *Commentary* gives detailed directions on how 'geometry teaches' the measurement of heavenly bodies (p. 174, 1.20.32). In the course of his explanation he also discusses the proportionality of any circle, the ratio of circumference to diameter worked out by Archimedes of Syracuse. This geometric constant, π , is an irrational quantity (like $\sqrt{2}$) and can therefore only be *approximated* arithmetically. The convenient approximation used throughout the Middle Ages was Archimedes' upper limit, 22/7. Macrobius teaches the procedure, in his clear expository manner, as follows:

... that chord alone divides a circle into two equal parts which is drawn from one point on a circumference to another point on the circumference and which passes

²³ Stahl (n. 17 above), p. 51.

²⁴ Macrobius and Martianus Capella were largely responsible for the belief in a spherical earth during the Middle Ages: cf. Stahl (n. 17 above), p. 204 n.

through the center. The line which divides a circle equally is called the diameter. Furthermore, the diameter of every circle, when tripled with the addition of a seventh part, gives the measurement of the circumference in which it is inclosed; for example, if a diameter is seven inches long and you desire to know the length of the circumference, you triple seven, making twenty-one, and add a seventh part or one, and the circumference of a circle whose diameter is seven inches is twenty-two inches. We could prove these statements by obvious geometrical processes were it not that we believe everyone assents and that we are anxious to keep this commentary reasonably brief (p. 171 = 1.20.15-17).²⁵

The ratio 22/7 appears prominently in the following relationships in the digression.

(a) $31S \times 22/7 = 97S$; a circle with circumference 97 has a diameter of 31 (more precisely, 30.86).

(b) The passages devoted to the first three *artes*, geometry, arithmetic, and music (see Figure 2 above) contain $10 + 14 + 7 = 31$ lines. These 31 lines are in the exact middle of the 97-line digression; 33 lines precede and 33 lines follow. The choice of a 10-line length for the initial unit (*geometrie*) was apparently also based on the ' π '-ratio: $10 \times 22/7 = 31$ (more precisely, 31.43). The ratio here is thus the same one we saw in the 97-line digression as a whole, creating a proportion between the central 31 lines and the larger 97-line section by which it is enclosed. Expressed formulaically this proportion is: $97 : 31 :: 31 : 10$ ($= 22 : 7 = \pi$). Accordingly, both the entire 'circumference' of the digression (97S) and its 31-line central 'diameter' have the same proportional shape: $31S + 66S = 97S$, and 10 (*geometrie*) $+ 21$ (*arimetique + musique*) $= 31$, both proportional to geometrical features in any circle and both structured with the *same sequential shape*: diameter + difference-between-circumference-and-diameter = circumference.

²⁵ '... illa enim tantum linea in partes aequales orbem medium dividit, quae a summo in summum ita ducitur ut necesse sit eam transire per centron, et haec linea, quae orbem sic aequaliter dividit, diametros nuncupatur. item omnis diametros cuiuscumque orbis triplicata cum adiectione septimae partis suae mensuram facit circuli quo orbis includitur, id est, si uncias septem teneat diametri longitudine, et velis ex ea nosse quot uncias orbis ipsius circulus teneat, triplicabis septem et faciunt viginti unum; his adicies septimam partem, hoc est unum, et pronuntiabis in viginti et duabus uncias huius circuli esse mensuram cuius diametros septem uncias extenditur. haec omnia geometricis evidentissimisque rationibus probare possemus, nisi et neminem de ipsis dubitare arbitraremur, et caveremus iusto prolixius volumen extendere' (1.20.15-17). For further evidence of the use of this π -approximation in the Middle Ages see the pseudo-Boethian *Geometria* 2.32-34, ed. Menso Folkerts, 'Boethius' *Geometrie II: ein mathematisches Lehrbuch des Mittelalters* (Wiesbaden, 1970), pp. 162-63 (= Friedlein [Leipzig, 1867], p. 423; = Migne, PL 63.1350).

(c) The digression 97S is situated 149 lines from the end of the *Erec*-text in line 6958.²⁶ A circle with circumference 149 has a diameter 47 (more precisely, 47.41). Thus the external parameters of the digression 97S echo its internal structure, again with 'circular' proportionality: $149 : 47 :: 97 : 31$ (more precisely, 30.6), that is, ' π '.

8. *Quadrature of the circle?*

In surveying these sets of proportions as a whole we observe a delicate interplay of two of the most fundamental geometric constants, one for the square, one for the circle, combined in such a way that they appear precisely coordinate rather than disjunctive. Two patterns suggest to me that the combining of 'circular' and 'quadrangular' proportions here was meant to symbolize a harmonic resolution of square and circle (otherwise opposed geometric shapes). First, $97/31 = \pi$; but the difference between 97 and 31, the 66 lines of 47S plus 19S, is divided in such a way that the larger of the two resulting segments (47S) is proportional to the 66 as 1 is to $\sqrt{2}$. Second, the central grouping of 31 lines for the three *artes*, geometry, arithmetic, and music, establishes a triptych symmetry of $33 + 31 + 33 = 97$ lines. Because of the numbers Chrestien selected, this symmetry is *both* 'circular' and 'quadrangular'. It is 'circular' – at the *center* – because $31 \times \pi = 97$; that is, as with the initial 31 lines of 31S, this central 31 is to the entire 97 as diameter is to circumference in a circle. On the other hand, the symmetry is also 'quadrangular' – in its wings – because $33 \times \sqrt{2} = 47$ (more precisely, 46.67), and of course the 'center' of the asymmetrical system (31S + 47S + 19S = 97S) has 47 lines; that is, a square with sides 33 has a diagonal 47.

The consciously math-historical context of both the explicit appeal to Macrobius and the allegorical portraiture of the four mathematical *artes* on Erec's robe leads naturally to the question about possible *structural* 'symbolism' behind the patterns. If the reading suggested in the title is accepted as at least provisionally substantiated at this point – namely, that the robe is a symbol for the poetic text, and the robe's unusual iconography (the *quadrivium*) is symbolic of the use of the mathematical *artes* in structuring the text's physical dimensions (and all that implies) – then it may also seem justified to suspect in the 'geometry' of the patterns in the digression a clue to the nature of Chrestien's larger design for the poem as a whole. As indicated in section I above, it is one purpose of the present study to set out for discussion a sufficient

²⁶ The Guiot ms. lacks a total of 18 lines in this passage: corresponding to Foerster 6924, 6926, and the entire conclusion 6743-58. Roques' edition therefore has only 131 lines following 97S.

sampling of preliminary findings to convince students of Old French literature that an analysis of that larger design (and others like it?) is both possible and desirable. We have in the findings reported above a new source of insight into a potentially enlightening aspect of Chrestien's compositional technique. It remains now to take the first step down the path these findings are pointing. In the interest of succinctness I again focus on description of textual facts; only a few of the questions or implications raised by these data are pursued. To facilitate understanding of these often somewhat abstract phenomena, readers may find it helpful to sketch out – in graphic format as in the figures above – the contours of the dispositional patterns described, for the most part, only verbally in the discussion which follows.

III

THE *PREMERAINS VERS* AND RELATED STRUCTURES

1. *Proportionality of the square in the premerains vers*

Although there is continuing controversy about the meaning and derivation of the term *vers* in line 1844 (Roques 1796), 'Ci fine li premerains vers',²⁷ and about the overall structure of *Erec*,²⁸ there is substantial scholarly agreement that the section ending in line 1844 is a self-contained structural unit whose thematic integrity warrants the title of *premerains* or *premiers* (Roques) *vers* in the sense usually applied: part one, 'erste Episode' or 'Hauptteil eines Abenteuerromans' (Foerster), 'introduction du roman' (Hoepffner),²⁹ 'le début plaisant' (Roques), 'first narrative sequence' (Kelly).³⁰ The summary by Z. P. Zaddy may be quoted both to cite a statement representative of present scholarly opinion and to recall the main lines of the narrative:

The first episode (vv. 1-1796 [= Foerster 1-1844]) is one of major importance for it forms a narrative complete in itself which could be detached from the rest of the

²⁷ See the summary by Roques, pp. ix n. 1 and 219.

²⁸ See the review of earlier scholarship given by Z. P. Zaddy, 'The Structure of Chrétien's "Erec"', *Modern Language Review* 62 (1967) 608-19, especially 608-609; and, more recently, William W. Ryding, *Structure in Medieval Narrative* (The Hague, 1971), especially pp. 89-91, and Wolfgang Brand, *Chrétien de Troyes: zur Dichtungstechnik seiner Romane* (Munich, 1972), with survey and bibliography, pp. 34-36.

²⁹ E. Hoepffner, "'Matière et sens" dans le roman d'*Erec et Enide*', *Archivum romanicum* 18 (1934) 433-50, especially 433-34.

³⁰ Douglas Kelly, 'The Source and Meaning of *Conjointure* in Chrétien's *Erec* 14', *Viator* 1 (1970) 179-200, here 189.

romance to stand as an independent tale. It deals with the quest that Erec undertakes to avenge an insult to himself and to Guinièvre, and which leads to the winning of Enide. The story of the quest is skilfully combined with the story of the hunting of the White Stag by Arthur and his court; for the incident leading to the quest arises out of the hunt, whilst the outcome of the hunt is decided by that of the quest. In the one case, Erec and the queen meet with Yder and his churlish dwarf whilst riding out to watch the huntsmen (vv. 125-48); in the other, the bride Erec brings back with him is unanimously declared the lady best entitled to receive the trophy from the chase, and so a question which has threatened to disrupt the court is settled to the satisfaction of all ... With the coalescence of its two themes at this point, the first section of the romance is brought to a natural and satisfactory close: a fact underlined by the author's comment: 'ici fenist li premiers vers.'³¹

The convoluted intertwining of the two main themes has been compared – by an appealing and probably in part appropriate analogy – with the *entrelacement* characteristic of contemporary manuscript illumination.³² Using the manuscript divisions as juncture points, Foerster (1934 ed., p. xvii) analyzed the separate strands of the interlaced motifs in the *premerains vers* as follows:

- A. Prologue, 1-26 = 26 lines;
- B. White Stag, 27-341 = 315 lines;
- C. Sparrowhawk, 342-1080 = 739 lines;
- D. Two themes combined, 1081-1844 = 764 lines.

The major division is at the climactic victory over Yder, line 1080; from here to the end at line 1844 is denouement (D). The numerical dimensions of this thematic division may be expressed formulaically as $1080 + 764 = 1844$, that is, $(A + B + C) + D$. The numbers 1080 and 764 reflect, with remarkable precision, the $\sqrt{2}$ -proportionality of the square. A square with diagonal 1080 has sides of 764 (more precisely, 763.68). Moreover, as shown in Figure 4, the interweaving of the two themes reflects almost exactly the same numbers ($A + C = 765$; $B + D = 1079$).

³¹ Zaddy (n. 28 above), p. 609. Similarly William W. Ryding (n. 28 above), p. 127: '... the first part of the story is over The two motifs have been gracefully drawn together; nothing remains to be added.'

³² See the work of Vinaver cited in n. 4 above and Kelly (n. 30 above), especially pp. 196-97. The metaphor has also been applied to literary structure in the early Middle Ages; cf. John Leyerle, 'The Interlace Structure of *Beowulf*', *University of Toronto Quarterly* 37 (1967) 1-17. For cautions and objections regarding the blanket application of the metaphor see Morton W. Bloomfield's review of Vinaver's *The Rise of Romance* (n. 4 above) in *Speculum* 48 (1973) 584-86.




FIG. 4. — Interlaced themes and proportionality in the *premerains vers*: $1080/764 = \sqrt{2}$.

2. The prologue

The textual organization of the prologue (A), lines 1-26, exhibits proportionality characteristic of both the circle (π) and the square ($\sqrt{2}$). The text consists of the following thematic-syntactic units (the Foerster and Roques texts agree in numbering here): (a) a proverb (lines 1-3), (b) an application of the proverb (4-8), (c) introduction of the author, his source, and his motives (9-18), (d) the present literary work distinguished from the (oral) competition (19-22), and (e) the author's claim for the work's immortal literary merit (23-26). As in the analysis of the *quadrivium*-digression, we may look to repetitions of wording and sense for a formal design governing the disposition of these thematic-syntactic units. One notable repetition concerns the word *conte*. The term is particularly intriguing for our context because it means 'number' as well as 'story'. *Conte* occurs first embedded in the much discussed statement of Chrestien's literary theory in the prologue's two central lines: 'Et tret d'un conte d'avanture / Une mout bele conjointure' (13-14). It recurs prominently (in rhyme) in line 19. Line 19 starts unit *d* by introducing the hero ('D'Erec, le fil Lac, est li contes') and appears to mark one major thematic break in the prologue: the first eighteen lines concern, in the main, the poet ($a + b + c$), the remaining eight lines the poem ($d + e$). Moreover, the first eighteen lines end with a reference to God and God's grace, the remaining eight with a reference to Christianity, and both references are introduced by the same anaphoric phrase, 'Tant con', in lines 18 and 25 respectively. The 'number'-word *conte* thus appears to mark the center of the whole and one major division. A square with side 13 ('conte') has a diagonal 18 (more precisely, 18.38; cf. 'contes' immediately after the break at line 18). Or, by corollary, a square with diagonal 26 (total prologue) has a side 18 (more precisely again, 18.38).

The ' π '-proportionality of the *quadrivium*-digression, $97/31 = \text{circumference/diameter}$, may also be reflected in this division, since $18 + 8 = 26$, and $97 : 31 :: 26 : 8$ (more precisely, 8.31). Lines 1 and 9 both have the word *dit*, and Chrestien's introduction of himself by name in line 9 suggests another

major thematic juncture: 'Por ce dit Crestiens de Troies'. Chrestien repeats his name in the prologue's final line, forming an envelope pattern framing the final eighteen lines. The thematic breakdown suggested by this is 8 ($a + b$, proverb and exegesis) + 18 ($c + d + e$, poet-source-poem-poet) = 26 lines. The proportionality perhaps has an echo within the initial eight lines, since units a and b , their junctures highlighted by the paired anaphoric repetition of 'Qui mout', beginning lines 3 and 8, and of 'Por ce', beginning lines 4 and 9, may have been intended to reflect, in small, the proportional structure of the whole (again to the nearest integer, but here less precise because of the small numbers involved): $26/8 = 8/3 = \pi$.




FIG. 5. — Proportionality of the circle and the poet's name in the prologue: $26/8 = \pi$.

One other possible detail of the proportional pattern $8 + 18 = 26$ is diagrammed in Figure 5. The juncture-line in which the poet gives his full name has the same number of alphabetical characters as the prologue has lines, twenty-six. Moreover, the proportional distribution of name-letters within the name-line corresponds exactly to the placement of the name-line within the prologue: the initial eight letters are in the first three words leading up to the name, the last eighteen in the final three words of the name itself.³³

³³ This detail is, to be sure, somewhat speculative, not only because of the ingenuity it ascribes to the poet, but also because of the accuracy it assumes in the manuscript transmission (i.e., editorial reconstruction) of this verse. Foerster provides no variant readings for this line, but the Guiot ms. apparently spells 'Crestiens' with only one *i*. Thus for purposes of this one aspect of the analysis Roques' text conflicts, since its line 9 contains only twenty-five letters. Nonetheless, the textual evidence seems to justify at least preliminary acceptance of the pattern, and there is, in addition, some supplemental support from possible medieval analogues recently proposed. Cf. the hypotheses regarding name-play and related anagrammatic subtleties put forth by Paul Zumthor, *Essai de poésie médiévale* (Paris, 1972), especially pp. 140-43, and 'Des programmes chez les troubadours?', *Romanic Review* 65 (1974) 1-12, reissued in his *Langue, texte, énigme* (Paris, 1975), pp. 55-67; further, Pierre Le Gentil, *Villon: Connaissance des lettres* (Paris, 1967), especially pp. 21-30 (I am indebted to Dr. Ruth Cassel Hoffman for originally calling these references to my attention); and Peter Haidu, 'Narrativity and Language in Some XIIIth Century Romances', *Yale French Studies* 51 (1974) 133-46, especially 140. In this connection it is worth

Taken as a whole, these relationships make it appear likely that Chrestien intended overlapping patterns of $18 + 8 = 26$ and $8 + 18 = 26$ lines, each constituted by different thematic perspectives and different sets of verbal repetitions, but both based on an underlying symmetry of $8 + 10 + 8 = 26$ lines delineated (in lines 9, 19, and 26) by the *names* of the story's hero and of the poet himself. Because the numbers here are relatively small, the proportionalities of square and circle could be only roughly approximated in integers; but this necessary limitation also offered Chrestien the flexibility to combine *both* proportionalities in a unity of design which would not have been possible with larger integers, for both $\sqrt{2}$ - and ' π '-relationships were expressible in the prologue by essentially the same basic numerical division of 26 into 18 and 8. The distinguishing factor here is therefore less the numbers than the placement of the verbal repetitions. The chief clue to both proportions, of course, is the prologue's structural consistency with the 'geometrical' patterns documented above for the *quadrivium*-digression. Further corroboratory evidence is cited in the following discussion.

3. *The premerains vers and beyond: proportional patterns based on the prologue*

The emphasis on names as markers of structure in the prologue prompts us to follow this lead further. Several important structural patterns emerge.

(a) The name 'Cresttiens' occurs only in the prologue. But its sound-companion in the prologue's final couplet, 'crestiantez' (25), has one echo during the coronation of Erec and Enide, 100 lines from the end of the poem:

noting that the number of letters in the individual words also corresponds closely to the number of lines in the thematic-syntactic units outlined earlier (and determined independently): *Por* (1-3; cf. *a*), *ce dit* (5-8; cf. *b*), *Cresttiens* (9-18; cf. *c*), *de Troies* (19-26; cf. *d + e*). Note too that the letters *de* at the juncture of Chrestien's name in line 9 (with $18 + 8 = 26$ letters) also occur beginning line 19, 'D'Erec', at the corresponding (structural) juncture in the prologue (with $18 + 8 = 26$ lines). The only other line beginning with *de* in the prologue is the last (also with 'Cresttiens'). If we add to this anaphoric repetition the one already mentioned, the 'Tant con' in lines 18 and 25, we find that both the juncture 18-19 and the end, lines 25-26, have the same three letters beginning the initial words: 'Tant con ... / De' The initial letters of these prominently (and anaphorically) repeated words are C, D, and T, the initials of Chrestien's name. This case of anagrammatic name-play is corroborated by a close parallel and a larger symmetry in which both parallel patterns participate. Observe that the rhyme symmetrically opposite the anaphoric couplet 25-26, that is, lines 25-26 *from the end* of the poem (6933-34), has homonymic *conte + conte*; the poem's final rhyme, lines 6957-58, is also homonymic, *tant + tant*. Thus we find anaphor appropriately at the beginning, end-rhyme at the end of the poem, but patterns repeating *tant + con(te)* at both points. See also Figure 7 and the related discussion in section IV below, especially n. 46.

'Por enoindre le novel roi / Selonc la crestiienne loi' (6859-60). This couplet of course falls within the 149 lines between the *quadrivium*-digression, 97S, and the poem's conclusion in line 6958; in fact, it is at the point of proportionality between the digression's central line, 6761, and the end: $6761/6859 = 6859/6958$.³⁴ The placement of the final couplet in the prologue relative to the end of the *premerains vers* in line 1844, 1818 lines later (= 1844 minus 26), involves exactly the same proportion: $6859/6958 = 1818$ (more precisely, 1817.8)/1844.

(b) The name of the hero recurs, of course, frequently. Its first mention in the story proper is in line 82, and Erec is here explicitly associated with the 'Table Reonde': 'Uns chevaliers, Erec ot non. / De la Table Reonde estoit' (82-83). Is the reference to so geometrically suggestive a name as the Round Table here a clue to the pattern of 'geometric' proportionality involving Erec's name in the prologue? The following relationships indicate that Chrestien exploited the term's mathematical suggestiveness. (1) A circle with diameter 26 (number of lines in the prologue) has a circumference of about 82 (more precisely, 81.7), the number of lines preceding this initial reference to the 'Table Reonde' (83). (2) The interval from the prologue to the passage linking Erec and the Round Table is 56 lines. A circle with circumference 56 has a diameter 18 (more precisely, 17.8), the number of lines preceding the original reference to 'Erec, le fil Lac' (19) in the prologue. (3) Taken together, the relationships described above for the first two occurrences of the name Erec exhibit the following combination of π - and $\sqrt{2}$ -proportionality: if in a circle with circumference 82 ('Erec') or 83 ('Table Reonde') a square is inscribed, the sides of the inscribed square will be 18 (or 19), that is, exactly the point where the name 'Erec' is first mentioned in the prologue. (4) The next occurrence of Erec's name is in line 127. The intervals separating the initial three occurrences (lines 19, 82, and 127) are 63 and 45 lines respectively. A square with diagonal 63 has sides of 45 (more precisely, 44.55).

(c) In one other passage the name 'Erec' and the name of Arthur's celebrated retinue, 'la Table Reonde', are explicitly linked. The passage is notable for its mathematical allusions as well as its thematic importance: there are so many doughty knights in Arthur's hall when Erec and Enide first arrive, Chrestien tells us,

Que je n'an sai *nomer* le disme,
Le trizisme ne le quinzisme;

³⁴ This type of proportion was known in the Middle Ages as *geometrica medietas*; cf. Boethius, *De institutione arithmetica*, ed. G. Friedlein (Leipzig, 1867), pp. 144-49 (= 2.44). It has only three terms and is thus the shortest possible proportion, the *minima proportionalitas* (Boethius, 2.40). Its general form is $A : B :: B : C$, or $AC = B^2$.

Mes d'auquanz des mellors barons
 Vos sai je bien dire les nons,
 De çaus de la *Table Reonde*,
 Qui furent li mellor del monde.
 Devant toz les buens chevaliers
 Doit estre Gauvains li premiers,
 Li seconz *Erec*, li fiz *Lac*,
 Et li tierz Lanceloz del Lac.
 Gornemanz de Gohort fu quarz

(1685-95, emphasis added).

From lines 82-83 – '*Erec ot non. / De la Table Reonde*' – to the end of the *premerains vers* at line 1844 is 1763 lines (82-1844). The interval from the same lines up to the point in the passage just quoted where Erec's full name is given, '*Erec, li fiz Lac*' (1693), is 1612 lines (82-1693). The number of lines to the introduction of the onomastic and numerical emphases in lines 1685-86 ('*nomer le disme*', etc.) is 1686 (1-1686). These intervals, 1844, 1763, 1686, and 1612, are all so precisely proportional with one another that they form a proportional chain: $1844/1763 = 1763/1686 = 1686/1612$.

(d) From the end of the *premerains vers* to the end of the poem is a span of 5114 lines (1845-6958). If we apply the ratio $1763/1844$ to the two segments of text divided by the now well-documented structural juncture at line 1844, we find the following two passages at the points of proportional correspondence ($5114 \times 1763/1844 = 4889$; $1844 + 4889 = 6733$):

Par la main doucemant [Artus] l'a prise
 Et delez lui [Enide] a destre assise;
 De la senestre part s'assist
 La reïne, qui au roi dist

(1761-64)

Le roi Artu et la reïne.
 Li rois Artus sor l'un s'assist,
 Sor l'autre Erec asseoir fist,
 Qui fu vestuz d'un drap de moire

(6732-35).

The thematic similarity of the two passages is manifest: in the first we find Enide seated at the place of honor beside Arthur just prior to her receiving the kiss of the White Stag; later it is Erec whom Arthur seats beside him, on one of the two identical ivory and gold thrones, just prior to the coronation. This proportional pattern thus brings us back to the *quadrivium*-digression, for the words '*drap de moire*' of line 6735 introduce, for the first time, the robe on which – beginning ten lines later – the mathematical *artes* are depicted.

(e) This pattern, in turn, calls attention to another marked correspondence between the 1844-line and 5114-line 'parts'. The lines in the *premerains vers* corresponding positionally to the digression on Erec's robe in the last 5114 lines correspond also in sense. The *quadrivium*-digression begins in the 246th line from the end of the poem and concludes in the 150th from the end (6713-6809 = 97S). The 246th line from the end of the *premerains vers* is 1599; the 150th from the end is 1695. Most of lines 1599-1695 describe another *robe* (especially its *bliaut* and *mantel*), the one which Guenievre gave to Enide. The descriptions of the two robes correspond verbally at numerous points. Concerning the jewelry on Enide's tunic and mantle, for example, we are informed, at the start of the ninety-seven lines there (*italics* in the following passages indicate verbal correspondences):

Plus de demi marc d'or batu;
 Et *pierres* de mout grant vertu,
 Indes et verz, bloes et bises,
 Avoit par tot sor l'or *assises*.
Mout estoit riches li bliiaus,
 Mes por voir ne valoit noauz
 Li *mantiaus* de rien que je sache
 (1599-1605).

Similarly, at the end of the 97-line *quadrivium*-digression, we learn the following about Erec's mantle:

Que vos diroie del *mantel*?
Mout fu riches et buens et biaux:
 Quatre *pierres* ot es tassiaus,
 D'une part ot deus crisolites,
 Et de l'autre deus ametites,
 Qui furent *assises* an or
 (6804-6809).

The descriptions of the fur lining in both mantles correspond verbally and positionally: '*La pane fu de blanc ermine*' (1615) and '*La pane qui i fu cosue*' (6794). Line 6794 is the 16th from the end of 97S; line 1615 is preceded by 16 in its 97 (1599-1614). The term *pane* occurs only here (contrast line 3830).

The perhaps most important verbal and conceptual correspondence is appropriately located at the points of ' π '-proportionality in the two 97-line spans of text, 31 lines from the start of each. In the digression 97S the point is the start of the excursus on Erec's robe:

Quatre fees l'avoient fet
 Par grant san et par grant *mestrie*
 (6744-45).

The corresponding (proportional) point in the comparable 97 lines in the *premerains vers* describes the person who was commissioned to decorate Enide's mantle with ribbons of silk and gold as being one

Qui bien estoit *mestre* del metre.
Quant el mantel n'ot rien que feire
(1630-31).

The terms *mestre* (1630) and *mestrie* (6745) occur, in this meaning, only here. These passages are, respectively, 215 lines from the end of the poem and 215 lines from the end of the *premerains vers*.

4. Chrestien's critical calculations: *textual fractions and the proportions of the text*

Very recently R. G. Peterson challenged scholars claiming discoveries of number-based designs in literary works to prove authorial intent by citing evidence of what he called 'explicit warrant for number symbolism and pattern'.³⁵ The textual evidence for tectonic structuring considered up to this point for *Erec* has concerned Chrestien's allusion to the mathematical *artes*, words with arithmetic (e.g., *conte*) or geometric connotations (e.g., *Table Reonde*), and dispositional patterns of verbal repetition based directly on the text's implicitly or overtly mathematical language. More 'explicit warrant' than Chrestien has provided in his *Erec* could hardly be expected in a literary text. Yet there are a few points in the text where the language becomes so explicitly mathematical that it seems meant to suggest clues to specific calculations governing the design. It remains then to examine whether some of the mathematical implications of Chrestien's language give even more explicit warrant for both the design and Chrestien's computational ability.

Besides the digression regarding Erec's robe there is one other passage where Chrestien's attention turns conspicuously to undisguised mathematical matters: the catalogue of knights listed for the *Table Reonde* prior to Enide's receiving the honor of the White Stag near the end of the *premerains vers*. The introductory lines of this catalogue are quoted in 3 (c) above. Chrestien begins here in much the same tone as in the introduction to the *quadrivium*-digression. There are, he tells us in terms that seem almost intentionally humorous, so many knights in Arthur's court

³⁵ R. G. Peterson, 'Forum', *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* 92 (1977) 128-29, in response to comments by S. K. Heninger, Jr., Daniel Laferrière, and myself on his 'Critical Calculations: Measure and Symmetry in Literature', *ibid.* 91 (1976) 367-75.

Que je n'an sai nomer le disme,
 Le trezisme ne le quinzisme
 (1685-86),

just as in introducing the later coronation ceremonies for Erec and Enide he claims, as we saw earlier, that no mouth can

Deviser le tierz ne le quart
 Ne le quint de l'atornement
 (6704-6705).

Are the fractions more meaningful than they have seemed? The catalogue, lines 1691-1750, lists fifty-one knights all told. The first ten are explicitly numbered, in order, first through tenth. Then Chrestien allows himself what seems (now) to be a private joke:

Les autres vos dirai sanz nonbre
 Por ce que li nonbrers m'anconbre
 (1703-1704).

It should come as no surprise that Chrestien continues to keep close tally nonetheless. The unnumbered remaining knights, listed 'sanz nonbre' after the numbered ten, total forty-one. Among the mathematical subtleties I suspect Chrestien tucked away in this catalogue of ten plus forty-one knights are the following.

(a) One *disme* plus one *trezisme* plus one *quinzisme* equals exactly $19/78$. $19/78 \times 41$ (unnumbered knights) = 10 (numbered knights; more precisely, 9.99).

(b) The name of the thirty-second knight is 'li Vaslez au *Cercle* d'or' (1712, emphasis mine). In the list of fifty-one knights he is preceded by thirty-one and followed by nineteen. Compare in the *quadrivium*-digression $(31S) + 47S + (19S) = 97S$. A 'cercle' with circumference 31 has a diameter 10 (more precisely, 9.86). The first ten names in the list are, as mentioned, prefixed by an ordinal number; the last ten are introduced by the word *ne*. Thus the inventory of Arthur's fifty-one named knights breaks down into a kind of symmetrical triptych: $10 + 31 + 10 = 51$. By suggesting the ' π '-ratio $31/10$ ($= 22/7$), the numbers here seem intended to reflect the implicit geometry of the 'cercle' being described, indeed enumerated, the 'Table Reonde'.

(c) The proportion $19/78 = 10/41$ based on the named fractions $(1/10 + 1/13 + 1/15)$ also appears prominently in the *quadrivium*-digression 97S. In the content sections there, $31S + 47S + 19S$, the last is to the first two as 19 is to 78 (since $31 + 47 = 78$).

(d) The total number of lines in the poem as a whole is 6958. One *disme* plus one *trezisme* plus one *quinzisme* of this total is 1694.9, that is, the point in the text between lines 1694 and 1695. Lines 1694 and 1695 are of course very near (*three* and *four* lines respectively from) the start of the catalogue and name the first two knights to be listed after Erec himself:

Li seconz Erec, li fiz Lac,
Et li tierz Lanceloz del Lac.
Gornemanz de Gohort fu quarz
(1693-95).

This passage too reveals a carefully executed numerical connection with the *quadrivium*-digression. The juncture between the *third* and *fourth* of the four mathematical *artes*, namely, music and astronomy, comes after line 6776, which ends the central thirty-one lines in the geometrical triptych-pattern discussed near the end of section II above. As is shown in Figure 6, this numerical parallel between the *Table Reonde* and the *quadrivium* is placed in such a way that the three-of-four pattern in the verbal fabric is echoed precisely by the number of lines in the intervals: $1694 \times 4 = 6776$.³⁶




FIG. 6. – 'Thirds' and 'fourths' in the *premerains vers* and the excursus on Erec's robe.

³⁶ Compare the emphasis on the numbers *three* and *four* in passages C and D quoted from Macrobius' *Commentary* in II.4 above.

(e) There is yet another catalogue of Arthurian luminaries, the one listing the inventory of kings who attended Erec and Enide's wedding. The list, lines 1933-2006, is centrally situated in a structural section (lines 1915-2024) which, according to Foerster's text, is marked off as a unit by the punctuation in the mss. The manuscript section embraces 110 lines, so arranged that the embedded inventory of kings, which comprises 74 lines, constitutes the center of a symmetrical triptych of $18 + 74 + 18 = 110$ lines. The same proportion appears here: one *disme* plus one *trezisme* plus one *quinzisme* of 74 is 18 (more precisely, 18.03).

We return now to the other fractions – and indeed to the passage with which the inquiry into the meaning of Chrestien's digression on the mathematical *artes* began back in section II – the *tierz*, *quart*, and *quint* of the *atornement* for the coronation which the tongue of no man could *deviser*, no matter how knowledgeable he be in *art* (6702-6706). These fractions too are symbolic of text structure. If we apply the procedure just followed and add a *tierz*, a *quart*, and a *quint*, the resulting fraction (ratio) is 47/60. Within the 5114-line span from the end of the *premerains vers* to the end of the poem there are two other passages which are conceptually and verbally most similar to the lines with these fractions. The first, lines 2950-52, refers to three of the eight thieves whom Erec and Enide encountered upon beginning their quest:

Li *tierz* dist qu'il avroit le noir.
 'Et gié le blanc!' ce dist li *quarz*.
 Li *quinz* ne fu mie coarz
 (2950-52, emphasis added).

The other is a brief digression concerning the beauty of Enide's cousin, Mabonagrain's lady. It begins and ends much like the introduction to the *quadrivium*-digression, emphasizing both the (mathematical) concept *deviser* (here in rhyme; see at n. 14 above) and the fraction *quart*:

De li ne vuel plus *deviser*;
 Mes qui bien seüst raviser
 Tot son *ator* et sa biauté,
 Dire poïst par verité,
 Qu'onques Lavine de Laurante,
 Qui tant par fu et bele et jante,
 Nen ot de sa biauté le *quart*
 (5887-93, emphasis added).

Let us label these three related passages A (2950-52), B (5887-93), and C (6702-6706). Four intervals established by the placement of these passages relative to one another and to the end of the poem are proportional. From A to the end (2953-6958) is 4006 lines; from A to C (2953-6705) is 3753 lines; and from A to

B (2953-5892) is 2940 lines. One *tierz* plus one *quart* plus one *quint* of 5114 (lines 1845-6958) is 4006 (more precisely, 4005.97). One *tierz* plus one *quart* plus one *quint* of 3753 is 2940 (more precisely, 2939.85). Expressed as proportions: $47/60 (= \textit{tierz} + \textit{quart} + \textit{quint}) = 4006/5114 = 2940/3753$.

5. Larger design?

Do these patterns point to a larger design? By following where the verbal, conceptual, and numerical patterns have been leading, we have found evidence of a major division of the text into $1844 + 5114 = 6958$ lines. The patterns of proportionality distinguishing these two parts (e.g., III.3 above) seem to support the earlier interpretation by E. Hoepffner, who, on purely thematic grounds, viewed the poem's structure as introduction (*premerains vers*) plus main narrative (everything else).³⁷ But it is unlikely that this is the only division. The 5114 lines following the 'introduction' are not thematically homogeneous, and scholars have proposed internal structural (sub)divisions at several points.³⁸ It is true, as Hoepffner and others have rightly emphasized, that Chrestien does not mention a 'second' or 'third' *vers*, but the obvious sensitivity to wording patterns documented for Chrestien above gives reason to expect that tectonic relationships can now be looked to for a solution to the long-standing scholarly puzzlement about the poem's structure. One promising starting point is the wording of line 1844 itself. Besides this line two other concluding manuscript sections mark the respective junctures (as conclusions?) with the term *finer*:

1844 Ci *fine* li premerains vers.

6410 Departi sont, la Joie *fine*.

6958 Li contes *fine* ci a tant.

Is this wording a key to *primary* divisions in the poem's overall structure? Perhaps 1844 (*premerains vers*) + 4566 (adventures culminating with *la Joie de*

³⁷ Hoepffner (n. 29 above), p. 434; arguing that *vers* in line 1844 means 'introduction', Hoepffner concluded: 'On comprend alors qu'il ne puisse plus être question d'un deuxième ou d'un troisième *vers*. Ce n'est donc pas une première partie du roman, mais son introduction qui prend fin ici.' Very similar two-part structures are distinguished by proportional patterns of the same type in the Middle High German romances *Iwein* ($890 + 7272 = 8162$ lines) and *Daniel* ($890 + 7592 = 8482$ lines); cf. the *Iwein* study cited in n. 5 above and my "'Werkstruktur" in Stricker's *Daniel*? A Critique by Counterexample', *Colloquia Germanica* 13 (1980) 106-41. Compare with this what Curtius (n. 1 above) had to say about the 'prevailing view' of rhetorical theory 'that there must be an organization at least into introduction and main body', *praefatio* and *narratio* (p. 501), and Ryding's (n. 28 above) conclusions about two-part structure in medieval narrative. The strongest evidence for the diptych theory is the inventory of *Motiv-* and *Episodendoppelungen* assembled by Wolfgang Brand (n. 28 above), pp. 16-41 and 103-21.

³⁸ E.g., the content-analysis by Zaddy (n. 28 above), which distinguished eight subdivisions in the 5114 lines with junctures (by Foerster's numbering) at 1914, 2270, 2472, 4938, 5259, 6509, and 6558.

la Cort) + 548 (coronation) = 6958? Although this question cannot be answered in detail here, it should be stated and documented, at least provisionally, that the textual intervals defined by the three junctures are all supported by tectonic patterns related to those we have been discussing. For convenience again let us adopt the shorthand used earlier and label the six resulting text-intervals '1844S' (1-1844), '4566S' (1845-6410), '548S' (6411-6958), '6410S' (1-6410), '5114S' (1845-6958), and '6958S' (entire poem), whereby, as before, the numeral refers to the line total and 'S' signifies 'structural unit'. Evidence for 1844S and 5114S has been presented above. It remains then to examine patterns involving 4566S, 6410S, and 548S (within 6958S).

(a) Within 4566S, the series of adventures extending from the end of the *premerains vers* to the end of the *Joie de la Cort*, there is an important passage in which Erec's full name is the focus of attention. Following the hero's victory over Mabonagrain the giant agrees to explain the *Joie de la Cort* in exchange for Erec's consent to reveal his name; Erec keeps his pledge in the following lines:

Erec son non plus ne li test:
 'Oïs onques parler', fet il,
 'Del roi Lac et d'Erec son fil?'
 (6036-38).

These are lines 4192-94 from the start of 4566S (i.e., 6037 minus 1844 = 4193). The placement of this passage within 4566S and of the reference to Erec's full name (among those of the other knights of the *Table Reonde*) within the *premerains vers* – 'Li seconz Erec, li fiz Lac' (1693) – is proportional: $4193/4566 = 1693$ (more precisely, $1693.36/1844$).³⁹

(b) The previous pattern establishes a proportional bond between 1844S and 4566S. The following one again involves these two sections, this time, however, as components of a larger unit, 6410S (= 1844S + 4566S). Two of the patterns discussed separately in III.4 above now reveal themselves to be participants in a larger proportional unity. One *disme* plus one *trezisme* plus one *quinzisme* of the line total 6958 is 1695; line 1695 describes the fourth knight in the list of Arthur's *Table Reonde*. The position of the line's rhyme-word *quarz* within 1844S may be expressed as a ratio, $1695/1844$. The proportionally corresponding point in 6410S is $6410 \times 1695/1844$, or 5892. 5892 lines precede the occurrence of *quart* in the digression on the beauty of Enide's cousin quoted near the end of III.4 above.

³⁹ See further the interlocking proportional name-patterns in 1844S described in III.3 (c) above.

(c) The final example concerns proportionality in the coronation part, 548S. It is an appropriate illustration with which to conclude, because it discloses a larger structural context for the digression on Erec's robe and points up the interrelatedness of several types of tectonic design-features discussed in the course of the preceding analysis: fractions, proportions, and 'geometric' proportionality. The *quadrivium*-digression 97S is embedded in 548S in such a way that it is preceded by 302 lines (6411-6712) and followed by 149 lines (6810-6958): $302 + 97S + 149 = 548S$. The end of 97S, line 6809, is 399 lines ($302 + 97$) from the juncture at line 6410 ('la Joie fine'). One *disme* plus one *trezisme* plus one *quinzisme* of 399 equals 97 (more precisely, 97.2). Moreover, one *trezisme* of 399 is 31 (more precisely, 30.69), the 'diameter' of 'circumference' 97 (cf. II.7 above). The ratio (*disme* + *trezisme* + *quinzisme*) ÷ one *trezisme* is close to our ' π '-approximation 22/7, that is, 97/31.

IV

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR EDITORIAL SCHOLARSHIP, POETIC THEORY, AND FUTURE LITERARY RESEARCH

Because the present findings represent a departure from earlier studies of Old French literature in several important respects (e.g., their mathematical tenor and rigor, their relative complexity, the geometric symbolism, the analytical criteria and procedures applied, not to mention specific points on which the evidence brings the study into conflict with earlier scholarship on *Erec* itself) and because the findings concern aspects of structure which will be unfamiliar, perhaps even disquieting, to many students of literature, the hypothesis is likely to face some skepticism. But sufficient evidence has been assembled here both to allow and, it may be hoped, to encourage others to check up on the findings. Since the evidence is by nature readily accessible to scrutiny by more or less objective criteria, research on this aspect of medieval poetry need not and should not be treated as a matter of belief (or disbelief) on intuitive grounds – as too often in the past. It should also not be neglected. For if further research on the subject proves the findings essentially valid for this 'First Arthurian Romance' (Luttrell), further elucidation of Chrestien's design could be of substantial benefit to the study of subsequent works in the genre, French, German, and English.

It cannot be the task of this paper to explore all implications or questions raised by the findings, although some of immediate relevance were broached above in the contexts in which they arose. But the specific implications for the assumptions and methodological criteria adopted tentatively at the outset, as well as for Chrestien's literary theory, do warrant brief comment in conclusion.

1. *Textual implications*

First, the findings dramatically confirm the assumptions about the reliability of Foerster's critical text, particularly its line count. The precision of the proportional patterns is such, both in the two parts emphasized and in the text as a whole, that it now seems likely that the preserved line totals are accurate to within a couplet or two of Chrestien's original, perhaps even exactly. The cumulative testimony of the surviving mss. has not been seriously questioned for the text of *Erec*. But the corroboration by the new numerical data is nonetheless important, both because medieval mss. are widely viewed as suspect *a priori*, and because the line count is so crucial to analysis of compositional designs of this type. In this regard especially, then, the preliminary findings provide an encouraging foundation for a more comprehensive and detailed study of the poem's total structure.

Corollary to this assessment, of course, is a judgment about the relative value of the two available editions. If the patterns described were consciously devised by Chrestien – and it is difficult to explain their presence in the text if they were not – then clearly Chrestien planned the *premerains vers* to have (exactly or very close to) 1844 lines. The Guiot ms., with forty-eight less lines in this part alone, is thus demonstrably defective. Accordingly, the essentially diplomatic redaction of that manuscript by Roques is a less reliable witness of what Chrestien himself wanted us to read and probably should no longer be cited, as it now often is, without qualification.⁴⁰

Further findings along this line of inquiry could prove beneficial in the preparation of a new critical edition, especially where other editorial criteria prove inadequate. As an illustration consider lines 1741-50. This passage is so poorly attested – it is lacking not only in the Guiot ms. but also in H, E, and, for the most part (1741-48), in P as well – that Foerster bracketed it; he did not question the passage's authenticity to the point of deletion, but he was suspicious enough to speculate about an alternative explanation for its presence: 'Alle die Namen kommen sonst nicht mehr vor und sind daher als Zuthat eines Kopisten, der die Liste verlängern wollte, zu betrachten' (1890 ed., p. 311). The speculation is not convincing on either count: many other names in the well-attested part of the catalogue are equally unique, and scribes typically sought ways to shorten, not lengthen, their labors, notably in just such inventory

⁴⁰ The differences between the Foerster and Roques editions exemplify in capsule the long-standing controversy about the nature of the editor's task, i.e., 'whether he should try to reconstruct the author's original text, or instead, honor the redaction of the best manuscript available to him'; for an admirable history of this controversy see Alfred Foulet and Mary Blakely Speer, *On Editing Old French Texts* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1979), especially pp. 1-39 (quote here from p. xiii).

passages as this – and, incidentally, often at the end of ms. sections, as here – where the deletion would less likely be noticed. But it might seem plausible to a future editor in view of the poor transmission of these ten lines and the lack of other internal clues. In such cases, then, the tectonic evidence could be of unique assistance to an editor in determining whether the lines are authentic or not.

This assistance could be of two kinds, either based primarily on the numerical features of certain patterns (e.g., these ten lines are necessary to the numbers in Figure 6), or based on words and concepts occurring in a questioned passage. For example, in addition to the *general* fact that a number of patterns clearly require 1844 (not 1834) lines in the *premerains vers* in which lines 1741-50 occur – specific content aside – the relationships described in III.4 (a) are based on a complete list of fifty-one knights, that is, a list including the five named in this presently bracketed group of lines (namely, Labigodés, Cadorcariois, Letron, Breon, and Conte de Honolan).

2. *The symbolism of Erec's robe and its implications for Chrestien's poetic theory*

The patterns described in sections II and III above, especially when assessed in their cumulative effect, point to the presence of an ambitious number-based design in the text of *Erec* and support the interpretation proposed for Chrestien's *quadrivium*-digression and Macrobian allusions. By this interpretation Chrestien's digressing to depict allegorical portraits of the mathematical *artes* on Erec's robe represents a calculated attempt on his part to symbolize the Platonic-Pythagorean-Macrobian element in his text, especially the incorporation of numerical harmonies as essential elements of structure. If this reading is correct, Chrestien's *quadrivium*-digression is uniquely important for the understanding of medieval literary theory, for it represents the only contemporary poetic statement now known regarding the relevance of numbers to the composition of poetry. In view of the likely historical significance of Chrestien's symbolic statement, it seems justified to hazard a speculation or two about the implications for poetic theory, especially (but perhaps not solely) Chrestien's.

Given the image of 'fabric' shared by both the allegorical robe and the poetic text it symbolizes, one suspects that the symbolism may have been inspired by play on etymological associations touching both: *textura*, *textile*, *textorium*, etc. suggesting *textus*, or vice versa. John Leyerle has pointed out that in an age of little Latin, like our own, the connection between *texere* 'to weave' and its past participle *textus* 'is so obvious that no one thinks of it'.⁴¹ The term *textus* had

⁴¹ Leyerle (n. 32 above), p. 4.

become obvious enough in Chrestien's day; in fact, its borrowing into Old French is documented in line 6902 of this poem ('textes'). But the unusual (some might even say forced) imagery of allegorical portraits on Erec's robe suggests to me that Chrestien had not lost touch with the etymological connotations, and probably exploited them here quite deliberately. In fact, Chrestien seems to be calling attention to the etymology when, in the sentence immediately following the *quadrivium*-excursus, he explicitly collocates the French verbs corresponding to *oeuvre* and *texte*, *ovrer* 'to make' and *tistre* (Lat. *texere*) 'to weave' (cf. Figures 1 and 2 above):

Ceste oeuvre ful el drap portreite,
De quoi la robe Erec fu faite,
A fil d'or *ovree et tissue*
(6791-93).

This is the only occurrence of the verb *tistre* in the poem.

The image of 'clothing' a poem with words is certainly not unique. Writing a generation or so after Chrestien, Geoffrey of Vinsauf, for example, described the compositional process in just such terms: 'Mentis in arcano cum rem digesserit ordo, / Materiam verbis veniat vestire poesis.'⁴² But 'clothing' a poem with *numbers* (or the numerical *artes*) is, to my knowledge, unparalleled in Western literary theory.⁴³ Yet the play of mathematical *artes* on both 'fabrics' in Chrestien's work – allegorically on the robe, structurally on the poem's palpable textual exterior – is entirely consistent with the exalted status that the concept *numerus* enjoyed during the Middle Ages. Thanks to the research of

⁴² Geoffrey of Vinsauf, *Poetria nova* (n. 13 above), lines 60-61.

⁴³ This is not to gainsay the impressive evidence Luttrell (n. 16 above) cited concerning possible models (Martianus Capella and especially Alan of Lille's *Anticlaudianus*) for the iconography (pp. 20-25). My point pertains to the *symbolic use* which Chrestien made of the imagery, whether or not he used models (it of course remains to be seen whether the imagery in the *Anticlaudianus* text, for example, has comparable symbolic functions). The closest analogue I have yet found for the symbolism itself is Macrobius' repeated use of images like 'interweaving' and other concepts related to *texere* to describe how the World-Soul is fabricated with numbers and proportions (*Commentarii* 2.2.1-23). Cf. 2.2.1: 'Hinc Plato postquam et Pythagoricae successione doctrinae et ingenii proprii divina profunditate cognovit nullam esse posse sine his numeris [Pythagorean musical ratios] iugabilem competentiam, in Timaeo suo mundi animam *per istorum numerorum contextionem* ineffabili providentia dei fabricatoris instituit' (my emphasis here and below); 2.2.14: 'Timaeus igitur Platonis in fabricanda mundi anima consilium divinitatis enuntians ait illam *per hos numeros fuisse contextam*, qui et a pari et ab impari cybum id est perfectionem soliditatis efficiunt'; 2.2.19: 'ergo mundi anima ... *contexta numeris* musicam de se creantibus concinentiam necesse est ut sonos musicos de motu quem proprio impulsu praestat efficiat, quorum originem in fabrica suae *contextionis* invenit.' Not unlike the Creator of the universe, then, the poet could appear, according to this analogue, as an *auctor* composing a *contextio* with *numeri* and even filling in the *intervalla* with proportions: 'ait enim Plato ... *auctorem animae deum post numerorum inter se imparium contextionem hemioliis epitritis et epogdois et limmate hiantia intervalla supplesse*' (2.2.20).

Hermann Krings, Johannes Rathofer, Michael S. Batts, and others, it is now possible for us to see that Chrestien's symbolism has a firm grounding in medieval conceptions of *ordo*, whether derived from traditional Augustinian ontology or from the (then newly rediscovered) Platonic cosmology that inspired the turn to science and the mathematical *artes* during the twelfth century.⁴⁴ This is not to diminish Chrestien's initiative, for the very presence of the excursus on the *quadrivium* here suggests that Chrestien did not merely accept the inherited philosophical imperative uncritically. He reflected on it and sought to symbolize its relevance to poetry by both creating and then alluding to the highly cerebral patterns of *ordo* which we have encountered in his text.

This brings us to the intriguing question of what Chrestien's compositional *practice* can tell us about the poetic *theory* contained in the prologue, especially the central ten lines:

Por ce dit Crestiens de Troies,
 Que reisons est que totes voies
 Doit chascuns panser et antandre
 A bien dire et a bien aprandre,
 Et tret d'un conte d'avanture
 Une mout bele conjointure,
 Par qu'an puet prover et savoir
 Que cil ne fet mie savoir,
 Qui sa sciance n'abandone
 Tant con Deus la grace l'an done
 (9-18).

Consider, first of all, the word which Chrestien uses most in referring to his narrative, *conte* 'story' – as, for example, again at the end in the poem's final line, 'Li contes fine ci a tant.'⁴⁵ We saw in III.2 above that the placement of the first two occurrences of the word in the prologue establishes an arithmetic (geometric) proportion. It is, I believe, significant that in rhymed position the word is collocated with a homonym, *conte* 'count' or 'knight' (lines 19-20). In the poem's final twenty-six lines, symmetrically opposite the twenty-six lines of the prologue, this same rare rhyme of homonyms recurs *twice*, in lines 6933-34 and 6949-50. But both times here the form *conte(s)* appears with a third meaning, 'number'. In these collocations of *conte* in its three meanings, conspicuously placed in concentrations near the beginning and end, Chrestien appears to be playing on etymological connections which – to judge by the obvious

⁴⁴ See the overview of the scholarship in Hellgardt (n. 2 above), pp. 255-302.

⁴⁵ On Chrestien's use of *conte* and other members of the word-field see Marie-Louise Ollier, 'The Author in the Text: The Prologues of Chrétien de Troyes', *Yale French Studies* 51 (1974) 26-41, especially 27.

effort he expended on the numerical patterns – must have seemed to him highly suggestive for the *theory* of poetry: the intimate etymological link between the concepts ‘narrative’ and ‘number’ (reflexes of which persist today in most of our languages: *raconter*, *Erzählung*, account, etc.).

Did Chrestien believe that the kinship of poetry and number was a mandate of the language itself? The pattern governing the repetitions of *conte* which frame the entire narrative would seem to support the inference that he did. This pattern is sketched in Figure 7. In addition to the (three) occurrences of the rhyme *conte(s)/conte(s)* only one other rhyme used in the prologue is repeated in the symmetrically corresponding final twenty-six lines, *antandre/(ap)randre* (lines 11-12 and 6941-42).⁴⁶ Both of these rhymes are quite rare; in fact, the rhyme collocation *conte(s)/conte(s)* occurs only one other time in the entire poem (lines 5093-94). The placement of the repetitions in both 26-line segments of text defines exactly the same pattern. Not only that, both correlative components of the symmetrical frame they constitute involve intervals of 8, 10, 18, and 26 lines. These are precisely the proportional numbers of square ($26/18 = \sqrt{2}$) and circle ($26/8 = \pi$) which we found governing the tectonic structure of the prologue (cf. III.2 above).




FIG. 7. – Proportional patterns with *conte*- and *antandre*-rhymes symmetrically framing the poem at beginning and end.

For us today the conceptual chain ‘knight-story-number’ (*conte-conte-conte*) probably seems a tenuous trinity at best: an *esthetic* ‘logic’ by which poetic

⁴⁶ For a discussion of the place of *antandre*, *antante*, and *antancion* in Chrestien’s poetics see Ollier, *ibid.*, 32-36. In connection with the anagrammatic name-play pointed out at the end of n. 33 above, compare the continuing *paronomasia* connecting *tant* and *con* with the rhyme-words *con(te)* and *(an)hand(re)* repeated in the pattern graphed in Figure 7; the pattern of anaphor with *tant con* (and *de*) in the prologue marks the same intervals of $18 + 8 = 26$ lines.

language could unite the three terms we can perhaps appreciate; with any more *rational* logic connecting them we have more difficulty. It may be no less difficult for many modern readers to follow the logic when Chrestien appropriates the mathematical *artes* for poetic theory. Yet one of the main points Chrestien puts forth in the prologue is that the proper application of 'estuide' (lines 4 and 6), 'savoir' (15-16), and even 'science' (17) is relevant to a 'conte d'avanture' (13), because these pursuits somehow conduce to the 'pleisir' (8) which the text should engender. Much of the difficulty may be resolved if we take the enigmatic and unusual term 'science' of line 17 (and perhaps also 'estuide') in its literal meaning, that is, as an allusion to the *scientia*⁴⁷ of the schools, the *artes liberales*, and (in light of all we have learned about Erec's robe and what is known about twelfth-century intellectual history)⁴⁸ particularly the *quadrivium*.

What then would be the underlying connection implicit here between *science*, in this sense, and *pleisir*? In my judgment the key to the connection, and therefore to the theory of poetry it implies, is the term 'conjointure', for as Chrestien himself states, it is the 'mout bele conjointure' (14) that distinguishes his work from the improvisations of the less educated competitors whom he censures in lines 20-22. Few words in Old French literature have received so much scholarly attention as Chrestien's *conjointure*, a term which he used in his surviving works only here at the midpoint of the prologue to *Erec*.⁴⁹ Citing uses of the concept *iunctura* by Horace and his medieval descendants, notably Alan of Lille, Conrad of Hirsau, and Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Douglas Kelly traced the gradual shift in application of the term from style to narrative structure and defined Chrestien's *conjointure* as 'disposition and linking on all levels of composition' (p. 185), especially the 'arrangement and linking of narrative elements' (p. 200; cf. p. 188).⁵⁰ The subsequent discussion of the issue by Claude Luttrell confirmed Kelly, but placed special stress on one feature connoted by Alan of Lille's use of *coniunctura*, the 'links' between elements of diverse origin ('ex diversorum competenti conjunctura').⁵¹ Precisely what the nature of such

⁴⁷ The usual practice of despair is to 'consider *san*, *sapiance*, *science* to be synonyms'; cf. Ollier, *ibid.*, 31.

⁴⁸ See Wetherbee (n. 18 above) and the discussion and sources cited in section II of my 'Twelfth-Century Platonism' (n. 5 above).

⁴⁹ See Douglas Kelly (n. 30 above) and the references he cited; more recently also Ollier (n. 45 above), pp. 29-30, and Claude Luttrell (n. 16 above), pp. 66-69.

⁵⁰ Kelly claimed further that '*conjointure* is specifically the result of the interlacing of different elements' (p. 200). But he offered no documentation for his identification of *conjointure* with interlace. Ollier viewed Kelly's focus on 'narrative argument' as 'extremely restrictive' and defined *conjointure* instead as 'textual organization in its entirety' (p. 30), which of course only compounds the vagueness.

⁵¹ Luttrell (n. 16 above): 'The operation of the artistic principle of *conjointure* in the putting together of his romance must entail the application of an overall pattern, and links between

'linking' has not been clarified by the Latin analogues as discussed to date and probably can only be determined by inductive analysis of the ways Chrestien actually connected elements in his texts. The present findings, which are of course founded on just such an inductive textual analysis, strongly suggest that *one* determinant of Chrestien's conception of *conjointure*, in both its theoretical and practical dimensions, was the conjoining of textual parts by number and proportion, including the proportions which characteristically bind line and surface into geometrical shape.⁵²

My 'Platonic' reading of Chrestien's *conjointure* as implying linkage by *numerical* bonds – like those binding the elements of the universe in Platonic cosmology – raises the question whether this meaning can be documented for the Latin cognates *coniunctura* or *coniunctio* (and their linguistic kin), especially

individual elements, to components which are selected and placed in association, and whose diverse origin makes their cohesion a *tour de force*' (p. 68).

⁵² In this connection see my 'Twelfth-Century Platonism' (n. 5 above), n. 33 and the attending discussion. The context of the passage Kelly cited from the *Poetria nova* to demonstrate Geoffrey's 'concern for *series* and *iunctura*' (p. 187) resorts repeatedly to *geometric* imagery in discussing how the poet should shape his materials. The most suggestive of the images appropriates the geometrician's principal tool, the compass: 'Circinus interior mentis praecircinet omne / Materiae spatium' (lines 55-56). It is hard to know how literally to take imagery like *circinus* and *praecircinare* (or how literally it was taken by medieval readers) in a treatise on poetic structure; it may be little more than play on the implications of the commonplace comparison between architectural planning and poetic composition – regarding which see Douglas Kelly, 'Theory of Composition in Medieval Narrative Poetry and Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria nova*', *Mediaeval Studies* 31 (1969) 117-48, especially 126-27. But even at that the striking specificity of an image so overtly geometric and technical in a context so quintessentially poetic suggests the extent to which implications of the architecture-poetry analogy could appear totally natural and appropriate only a generation after Chrestien composed *Erec*. It seems a short step indeed from here to the use of geometric proportions in designing textual *dispositio* as a *materiae spatium*. Accordingly, the possibility that the particular (geometric) proportions used by Chrestien were also popular with contemporary master masons (for whatever structural and/or symbolic reasons) deserves looking into. The following preliminary observations seem promising. Two of the six proportions which George Lesser (cf. end of n. 22 above) discovered to be 'typical geometric magnitudes' in his survey of some two dozen Gothic churches (including the Amiens, Chartres, and Reims cathedrals) coincide exactly with the macro-structure of the *premerains vers* discussed in III.1 above: his proportion 'a' is $\sqrt{2}/(1 + \sqrt{2})$, which is 1080/1844; his (correlative) proportion 'b' is $\sqrt{2}/(2 + \sqrt{2})$, which is 764/1844. Similarly, the proportion Lesser labeled 'alpha', $\sqrt{2}/(3 + 2\sqrt{2})$, turns up in the organization of 5114S: the episodes with the $(3 + 5 =)$ eight brigands conclude in line 3085 (mid-couplet!) with Erec and Enide riding on, 'Les chevaus an mainnent toz huit' (ms. division acc. to Foerster); line 3085 is the 1241st in 5114S (3085 minus 1844 = 1241), and $1241/5114 = \sqrt{2}/(3 + 2\sqrt{2})$. Is Chrestien's use of the number *eight* so conspicuously (rhyme) at the end of line 3085 an allusion to the structural relevance of octagonal proportions? See Lesser 1:11-16 on the structural functions of the octagon in his 'typical geometric magnitudes'; compare also Chrestien's repeated architectural allusions, e.g., the *mestre eglise* (6889). Pursuit of these implications may reveal even closer connections between the *mestrie* of Erec's robe (line 6745; cf. III.3 (e) above) and the most impressive artistic application of *geometrie* during Chrestien's lifetime, the *mestrie* of Gothic architecture.

in texts used in the schools during the twelfth century. The answer to this question is yes, as I hope to demonstrate in a separate study devoted more specifically to this topic.⁵³ (Indeed, the Platonic notion of numerical 'conjunction' turns out to be implicit in some of the Latin sources which scholars have brought to bear on Chrestien's term.) Since the point is important to the present interpretation of Chrestien's symbolic digression on the *quadrivium*, I cite, as preliminary documentation, two (representative) examples.

The first directly concerns the Macrobian connection discussed above, for Macrobius himself uses the term *coniunctio* in the context from which the excerpts quoted in section II are drawn. As Macrobius used it, *coniunctio* refers to two kinds of bond, both of which are numerical. The one is the 'conjunction' of the members of the number seven: one and six (1.6.10: 'in coniunctione ... septenarii'; 1.6.12: 'senarius ... cum uno coniunctus septenarium facit'), two and five (*copulatio*, 1.6.18, then *coniunctio*, 1.6.21), and three and four. For example, the sentence leading into quotation C above (II.4) reads: 'de secunda septenarii numeri *coniunctione* dicta haec pro affectatae brevitatis necessitate sufficient, tertia [*coniunctio*] est de tribus et quattuor, quae quantum valeat revolvamus' (1.6.21, emphasis added). The second applies to the proportional bonds among the four elements; one of the 'interstices' referred to at the end of quotation D (again II.4), that between water and air, is called *harmonia*, and its binding force is expressed by the verb *iungere* and the noun *coniunctio* (1.6.39).

The second example, more contemporary with Chrestien, is found in a commentary on Boethius' 'O qui perpetua' (*De consolatione philosophiae* 3, metrum 9) preserved in a twelfth-century Heiligenkreuz ms. of reputedly French derivation or origin. The comment on line 10 of the poem – 'Tu numeris elementa ligas' (emphasis added) – repeatedly glosses the 'binding' denoted by *ligas* as 'coniungis', and, at one point, with the word 'coniunctiones' (parts of this commentary, incidentally, are based on Macrobius): 'TU NUMERIS LIGAS i.e. coniungis NUMERIS i.e. quatuor monadibus. Nam quatuor sunt elementa quorum coniunctiones sunt sex quas Greci *zinzuias* uocant.'⁵⁴

We are now, I believe, in a position to propose an answer to the question pending about the logical link between *science* and *pleisir*. If the preceding inferences from the findings carry conviction, the conceptual progression in the prologue from *estuide* and *science* through *conjointure* to *pleisir* reveals a totally consistent Platonic logic: *science* (particularly the mathematical *artes*) is relevant to poetry because number is the essence of form (a commonplace since

⁵³ Thomas Elwood Hart, 'The *Quadrivium* and Chrestien's Theory of Composition: Some Conjectures and Conjectures', *Symposium* 35 (1981) (forthcoming).

⁵⁴ See the transcription and commentary by Nicholas M. Haring, 'Four Commentaries on the *De Consolatione Philosophiae* in MS Heiligenkreuz 130', *Mediaeval Studies* 31. (1969) 287-316, here 309.

Augustine),⁵⁵ because form conduces to beauty (Chrestien's *conjointure* is, as he emphasizes, 'mout bele'), and because beauty causes *pleisir*.

3. Methodology and future research

The findings in this French poem at the beginning of the Arthurian tradition confirm the procedural criteria adopted from my work on its Middle High German descendants, especially those regarding the need for attention to the four kinds of textual features available to medieval poets for structuring with numerical designs: graphic markers (e.g., ms. divisions), patterns of verbal repetition, numerical consistency, and thematic organization. Again the procedural importance of the (cumulative testimony of the) manuscript divisions has been corroborated. Structural hypotheses proposed without manuscript support or without even considering manuscript divisions are therefore open to question on procedural grounds. For example, of the eight junctures claimed by Z. P. Zaddy's analysis of the 'structure' of *Erec* (using purely thematic criteria, i.e., the critic's), *only one* corresponds to punctuation in the Guiot text he cited; *four* of the eight do correspond to the data Foerster gave for the other mss., but *neither* of the two divisions claimed by Zaddy for his overall tripartite structure (at lines 2270 and 5259 in Foerster's text, 2214 and 5211 in Roques') has any support whatsoever in the manuscript data furnished by either Foerster or Roques.⁵⁶ Of perhaps even greater importance for methodology, however, is the added confirmation the findings for *Erec* provide for the prevalence of formal patterning by means of lexical repetition, especially repetition of formally conspicuous elements like rhymes, number-words, etc. The more reliable insight which such patterns give into the poet's own compositional plan and priorities suggests a general indictment of much modern scholarship on the 'structure' of medieval narrative, especially the typical over-reliance on purely thematic criteria, for such criteria have proven ultimately subjective and resulted, regrettably, less in clarity about authorial design than in a proliferation of competing hypotheses. But the findings also give further reason for optimism that, at least in well-transmitted tectonically structured texts, numerical designs can be confidently ascertained by a judicious comparison of *all* kinds of available textual evidence – including *conjointure* by number.

Although devoted chiefly to two specific parts of Chrestien's overall design for *Erec*, the present analysis exposes outlines of the whole for further study

⁵⁵ e.g., Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 2.16.42-44 (CCL 29. 265-67), especially: 'Intuere caelum et terram et mare et quaecumque in eis uel desuper fulgent uel deorsum repunt uel uolant uel natant. Formas habent quia numeros habent; adime illis haec, nihil erunt' (2.16.42). Similarly: 'Si ergo, quicquid mutabile aspexeris, uel sensu corporis uel animi consideratione capere non potes, nisi aliqua numerorum forma teneatur, qua detracta in nihil recidat' (2.16.44).

⁵⁶ Zaddy (n. 28 above), especially pp. 610-12; cf. also n. 38 above.

and points up some of the *types* of patterning which future studies of this and Chrestien's other texts can expect to encounter (especially patterns based on proportionality).⁵⁷ One notable advantage which research on this aspect of literary structure enjoys is the innately *systematic* character of the evidence it addresses. Individual patterns are unlikely to appear in isolation. If there is design behind them, patterns intended by the poet – and I am concerned here with design features which can be ascribed to the more *conscious* aspects of compositional craft – can be expected to lead, by their very nature, to recognition of others. In fact, one criterion by which suspected patterns of this kind may be judged is the extent to which they intersect with others.

It is to be hoped that the initial evidence proposed now for Chrestien's remarkable achievement with form in *Erec*, a work, though his earliest, wrought 'par grant san et par grant mestrie' (6745), will help summon increased scholarly attention to this hitherto overlooked aspect of his art. Whatever our own esthetic preferences may be (or yet become), we are dealing here with a mode of textual organization that apparently had a profound meaning for some medieval poets, including poets of recognized stature like Chrestien, Hartman, and Dante. The demands of accommodating structural designs as fundamental as that emerging in *Erec* must have exerted a pervading influence on all levels of structure in poems so composed. Careful attention to the dimensions and meaning of such designs should prove to be of far-reaching value for scholarship charged with understanding these poems. A reversal of the overlong neglect shown this aspect of Old French literature thus seems called for, if we are to understand and appreciate these early poets and their esthetic accomplishments on their own terms. For as Chrestien himself enlightened us in his key-note commentary (self-evaluation? caution? boast? challenge?):

Li vilains dit an son respit
 Que tel chose a l'an an despit,
 Qui mout vaut miauz que l'an ne cuide.
 Por ce fet bien, qui son estuide
 Atorne a san, quel que il l'et;
 Car qui son estuide antrelet,
 Tost i puet tel chose teisir,
 Qui mout vandroit puis a pleisir
 (1-8).

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⁵⁷ On the contemporary importance of proportionality as an esthetic principle see 'Twelfth-Century Platonism' (n. 5 above), n. 53 and the related discussion and bibliography. For background history concerning the philosophical ramifications of arithmetic and geometric proportionality see F. D. Harvey, 'Two Kinds of Equality', *Classica et mediaevalia* 26 (1965) 101-46, and his bibliography.

THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION TO COURT CHRISTIAN BEFORE 1500*

R. H. Helmholz

THE English writ of prohibition was the principal tool used during the Middle Ages to restrain what the seventeenth-century Protestant controversialist William Prynne called the 'daring contempts of the ecclesiastical courts'.¹ A royal writ available to any person who had been sued in an ecclesiastical court over a secular matter, a prohibition could be directed both against the person who had wrongfully brought suit in a Church court and against the judge in that court. It required them to desist from prosecuting and from hearing a suit which fell outside ecclesiastical competence. Its broad purpose was to enforce, through the powerful self-interest of private litigants, the secular position on the proper jurisdictional boundaries between the courts of Church and State. Because the Church held a more expansive view of the permissible scope of its jurisdiction than did the royal courts, prohibitions were a necessary judicial remedy.

The fundamental work on the history of the writ of prohibition was done thirty years and more ago by G. B. Flahiff in a series of articles which appeared in *Mediaeval Studies*.² As works of scholarship, Flahiff's articles were meticulous, original, comprehensive and trustworthy. But we now know that

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¹ William Prynne, *Exact Chronological Vindication and Historical Demonstration of the Supreme Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of our ... Kings*, 3 vols. (London, 1665-68), 3. 580 [hereinafter cited as Prynne's *Records*].

² 'The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in the Thirteenth Century' (part 1), *Mediaeval Studies* 6 (1944) 261-313, and (part 2) 7 (1945) 229-90 [hereinafter cited as Flahiff 1 and 2]. See also G. B. Flahiff, 'The Use of Prohibitions by Clerics against Ecclesiastical Courts in England', *Mediaeval Studies* 3 (1941) 101-16; Norma Adams, 'The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian', *Minnesota Law Review* 20 (1936) 272-93.

his assessment of the ultimate effectiveness of the writ of prohibition was mistaken. He concluded that the study of actual procedure permits us 'to see how the ecclesiastical courts found themselves constantly disadvantaged and just how the constant pressure of prohibitions was rendered so effective.'³ Recent study of the records of the Church courts themselves has shown the contrary. The Church courts were able to maintain their jurisdiction in many areas theoretically outside their competence throughout the medieval period. The writ of prohibition was not decisive in determining the actual scope of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.⁴

This discovery has raised the obvious question: how can this have been? What can explain the apparent anomaly that the peremptory commands and penalties of the royal writ failed in practice to restrain the ecclesiastical courts? This article addresses that question by carrying Flahiff's investigation of the plea rolls of the royal courts through the end of the medieval period. He stopped in 1285. It concludes that the answer lies, at least in part, in examination of the seemingly straightforward question: how did the royal courts determine whether a suit brought in a Church court belonged there or not? What mechanisms were available, what were used, to decide whether or not a prohibition lay?

The evidence of the plea rolls shows that there were three different periods, each with a different fundamental way of making this decision. During the earliest, the predominant means of proof was by wager of law. That is, in a typical case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had sued him in Court Christian over a secular matter. The defendant denied this in general terms, swore an oath to that effect, and found eleven oath helpers who swore that they believed he had sworn truly. That is, wager twelve-handed. During the second period, trial was predominantly by jury. The defendant typically denied that he had sued a lay plea contrary to a prohibition, and that question then went to the jury under the general issue. During the third period, the predominant method of decision was removed from the trial court almost entirely; argument and

³ Flahiff 2. 283.

⁴ See Brian Woodcock, *Medieval Ecclesiastical Courts in the Diocese of Canterbury* (Oxford, 1952), pp. 89-92; J. W. Gray, 'The Ius Praesentandi in England from the Constitutions of Clarendon to Bracton', *English Historical Review* 67 (1952) 481-509; M. M. Sheehan, 'Canon Law and English Institutions' in *Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, ed. Stephan Kuttner and J. Joseph Ryan (Vatican City, 1965), pp. 391-97, especially pp. 393-94; Charles Donahue, Jr., 'Roman Canon Law in the Medieval English Church: Stubbs vs. Maitland Re-examined after 75 Years in the Light of Some Records from the Church Courts', *Michigan Law Review* 72 (1974) 647-716; R. H. Helmholz, 'Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio', *Law Quarterly Review* 91 (1975) 406-32 and 'Debt Claims and Probate Jurisdiction in Historical Perspective', *American Journal of Legal History* 23 (1979) 68-82.

decision about the propriety of prohibiting a suit in the Church courts occurred in Chancery, largely on the basis of the ecclesiastical libel. Rarely was there more trial than this.

The adoption of each method of trial did not happen suddenly. Change from one to another occurred gradually. There was much overlapping. Likewise, the apparent definiteness of each method conceals what seems to have been more complex procedure in practice. Judges and litigants had more choice than this scheme suggests. There was room for dispute and variation in methods of decision. But with these caveats, the three-part division is useful and valid. Above all, when looked at in detail, each stage helps to understand the reasons for the failure of the medieval writ of prohibition effectively to determine the scope of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

I

WAGER OF LAW

The earliest method of proof in prohibition cases was defendant's wager of law. Flahiff found that it was the exclusive method for trial of the general issue before the reign of Edward I (1272-1307).⁵ Juries were used only to answer specific factual questions.⁶ Thus, in a typical case, the plaintiff's formal count alleged that the defendant had sued him in an ecclesiastical court over a lay debt not touching marriage or testaments. It further specified the amount of the debt, the ecclesiastical court and judge before whom the suit had been brought, the place and date of the delivery of the writ of prohibition, the witnesses to the delivery, the refusal of the party prohibited to comply with the writ and the action taken against the plaintiff by the Church court judge. A suit against the judge contained similar allegations *mutatis mutandis*.⁷ To this, the defendant's general denial (and this is the important point) alleged that never after receipt of

⁵ Flahiff 2. 267.

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ Although there is not absolute regularity of form, most Edwardian entries contain these elements; e.g., *Croke v. Ros and Wygeyn*, CP 40/57, m. 49d (1285): 'Et unde queritur quod cum Hugo le Estraunge implacitasset ipsum Rogerum in curia christianitatis coram predictis archidiacono et officiali exigendo ab ipso decem solidos qui non sunt de testamento vel matrimonio et idem Rogerus die lune proxima post festum sancti Michaelis anno regis nunc duodecimo detulisset eis regiam prohibitionem in ecclesia extra portam sancti Augustini London' in presencia decani London' et Johannis Oysel et aliorum ne predictum placitum ulterius tenerent in curia christianitatis predicti archidiaconus et officialis spreta prohibitionem predicta tenuerunt predictum placitum in curia christianitatis ita quod fecerunt ipsum ab ingressu ecclesie suspendi et postea excommunicari' This plea roll, and all other citations to ms. sources not otherwise indicated, are found in the Public Record Office, London.

any writ of prohibition had he sued such a plea concerning a lay debt not touching marriage or testaments, and he then offered to deny this against the plaintiff and his suit as the court should award. The court awarded that the defendant should wage his law twelve-handed, and the defendant was ordered to come personally with his law on a later day.

Such, in its barest form, was the earliest method of proof in prohibition cases. It was simple. It was direct. And it put the proof of the central question – had the defendant sued over a matter outside ecclesiastical competence? – into the hands of the defendant and his oath helpers. That is, the responsibility for proof was placed not on the plaintiff who had been harmed, but on the party who had allegedly broken the Crown's jurisdictional rules and who would pay damages and suffer an amercement unless he could swear that he had not been guilty of illegitimately invoking spiritual jurisdiction, and find eleven of his fellows to take an oath that he swore truly.

What exactly did the defendant, and his oath helpers, swear to? What, that is, did the general denial put in issue? Normally, one cannot say with assurance; by nature the general issue was a blank denial.⁸ But in this case we do know from cases in which the king was a party that the general denial could be based on any one of several possible defenses, for where the king was one of the plaintiffs it was disputed whether one could plead the general issue at all, and the specific objection raised against it was, as a 1295 case put it: 'the answer is *multiplex* and can have several causes of truth.'⁹ It might signify that the defendant had never sued the plaintiff before an ecclesiastical court. It might signify that the defendant had sued but had discontinued the action once he received the writ. Or it might signify that the defendant had sued but over a matter properly within ecclesiastical competence.¹⁰

All this means, of course, that the earliest system of proof allowed a defendant to base his denial on any one of a number of legitimate defenses, that it drove no defendant to specify exactly which of them he relied on except where the king was a party, and that it tested the veracity of that defense by a

⁸ See generally S. F. C. Milson, 'Law and Fact in Legal Development', *University of Toronto Law Journal* 17 (1967) 1-19.

⁹ *Rex v. Wallys et al.*, CP 40/109, m. 27 (1295), in which the plaintiff's argument was 'quod predicti prior et alii ad huiusmodi verificationem admitti non debuerunt quia dixit quod predicta responsio sua quam pretenderunt verificare multiplex fuit et plures causas veritatis habere potuit'

¹⁰ *idem*, CP 40/106, m. 16d (1294): 'Predicta responsio ... plures causas veritatis habere potest videlicet quod predicti prior et Robertus nullum placitum ibidem inde tenuerunt nec predictus Galfridus de Wallys idem placitum secutus fuit vel quod idem prior et alii idem placitum tenuerunt ibidem et secuti sunt set non attingit ad quartam partem advocacionis predictae ecclesie vel quod ipsi tenuerunt idem placitum et secuti fuerunt ibidem ante prohibitiones eis porrectas sed non post unde petit per dominum regem quod certam inde dent responsionem.'

system of oath and compurgation largely within the defendant's control. It was, in short, a system of proof which favored defendants.

On the other hand, the plea rolls do show that the realities of proof in prohibition cases could be more complex. The possible unfairness of wager led to efforts to restrict the cases in which wager was allowed. There was, in the first place, the necessity for award of wager by the court. Some reality evidently lay behind this formal award. Bracton wrote that the oath helpers must be 'trustworthy and of good repute',¹¹ so that there must have been an initial determination of whether to allow compurgation to go forward with the men the defendant had brought. Several Yearbook cases where the availability of wager was argued also show the exercise of some control by the judges.¹² Moreover, in two specific situations, wager was excluded by rule: where the king's interest was directly involved, and where there had been a prior plea involving the same prohibited case in the Church courts. If the king was a party to a prohibition case,¹³ or if a prior plea in his court had allegedly been disregarded by the defendant,¹⁴ no defendant could be permitted to wage his law. He must put himself on the country.¹⁵

¹¹ Henry Bracton, *De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae*, fol. 410, ed. and trans. G. Woodbine and S. E. Thorne, 4 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1968-77), 4. 276: 'Sufficit enim si fideles sint et bone opinionis.'

¹² See, e.g., *Baret v. Sparewe* (1310), Y.B. 3 Edw. II (Selden Society 20; London, 1905), p. 134; *Gras v. Houghton* (1312), Y.B. 5 Edw. II (Selden Society 33; London, 1916), p. 118, suggesting a judicial reluctance to deny defendants a right to wager. In *St. George v. Prioress of Easebourne*, CP 40/113, m. 58 (1296), the defendant argued 'quod predicta priorissa per legem suam se defendere non potest in hoc casu etc. cum huiusmodi prosecutiones placitorum de transgressionibus contra pacem regis factis et advocationibus etc. in lesionem corone et dignitatis regis manifeste redundant.' The case was tried by the country. See also *Brevia placitata* (Selden Society 66; London, 1951), pp. 171-72.

¹³ *Staunton et al. v. Pykeryng*, London, British Library Add. ms. 31826, fol. 118r (c. 1301) *per Warr*: 'Mes ore se plainent il que vous avez play tenu de lor lay fe queu chose le rey ad playnement retenu a la dignete de sa coroune.' Dr. Robert Palmer called my attention to this case. See also *Buttiller v. Le Wronge* (1311), Y.B. 5 Edw. II (Selden Society 63; London, 1944), pp. 121-23, in which the same argument was successful as to trespass by battery; *St. George v. Prioress of Easebourne*, above, n. 12.

¹⁴ Compare the two entries of *Lucy et al. v. St. Elena*, CP 40/158, m. 231 (1306), a case tried by wager, with CP 40/163, m. 84 (1307), a second attachment on a writ of prohibition between the same parties, involving the same ecclesiastical plea which had been continued after the first action. The second was consequently tried by the country. Another example is furnished by *Boheler et al. v. Nicholas parson of L.*, CP 40/171, m. 193d (1308), in which the defendant was summoned specifically for continuing suit pendente lite in the royal court, and was compelled to answer 'tam domino Regi quam predictis [plaintiffs] de contemptu et malicia predictis etc.'

¹⁵ Thus the importance of the development of the writ brought by the king *ex relatu plurium* was specifically that it allowed the king to be made a nominal party and so excluded wager. See *Historical Papers and Letters from the Northern Registers*, ed. J. Raine (RS 61; London, 1873), pp. 70-71.

Initial determination of the availability of wager is also suggested by plea roll cases which contain more detailed pleading of facts than was necessary for the general denial appropriate in wager cases. In a case of 1286, for example, a woman was impleaded for having sued before an ecclesiastical court over lay debts and chattels. The entry in her defense states that 'the day he espoused her, her husband granted the aforesaid chattels to her as a *maritagium* and afterwards in his last will he left the aforesaid chattels to her, wherefore she sued [the plaintiff] in Court Christian for the aforesaid chattels as of those touching testaments, ... and she is ready to deny [etc.] as the court should award.'¹⁶ The court then awarded wager. In a case from Easter term 1306, the defendant's denial specified both that the case in the ecclesiastical court had involved tithes, not lay chattels, and that a writ of consultation had previously been issued allowing him to proceed. Then wager was awarded.¹⁷ It may be that such deviations from a simple denial were ways of justifying wager to the court, a means of making a plausible case for having sued which the court could pass on before admitting the defendant to wager. Some of the stories placed on the rolls by defendants were quite elaborate, obviously intended for some sort of scrutiny,¹⁸ and where wager followed it is hard to see any reason for such pleading except as part of a preliminary discussion on the availability of wager.

However, none of these exceptions ever swallowed the ordinary rule. The king's interest was not invoked indiscriminately for the benefit of all litigants, and the pattern of blank denial and wager was the norm.¹⁹ Even with such

¹⁶ *Fraunceys v. Grysun*, JUST 1/578, m. 11: the defendant's full answer was 'quod quidam Hugo quondam vir suus die quo ipsam disposnavit concessit ei predicta catalla nomine maritagii et postea in ultima voluntate sua legavit ei predicta catalla unde dicit quod ipsa implacitavit predictum Rogerum de predictis catallis in curia christianitatis tanquam de illis que sunt de testamento et quod aliter ipsum non implacitavit et parata est defendere contra ipsum et sectam suam sicut curia consideraverit.'

¹⁷ *Tresel v. Nicholas parson of Hasalor*, CP 40/159, m. 5: the defendant made his law at once.

¹⁸ E.g., *Bentle v. Lacy*, JUST 1/1089, m. 17 (1293), in which the defendant pleaded the real nature of the underlying suit, his obedience to the original writ of prohibition, his successful attempt to secure a writ of consultation from the Chancellor Bishop Burnell. He also produced the writ of consultation before being allowed to wage his law. In *Patemere v. Baldok and Graveshende*, CP 40/155, m. 159 (1305), involving alleged suit over lay chattels in Court Christian, the defendant pleaded the tithing custom of the parish, alleging that the plaintiff had refused to comply with it. The plaintiff attempted to take issue on the custom and asked that this question be tried by the country. The court, however, refused to admit this form of issue, and forced the defendant to plead the general issue instead, i.e., 'non fuit secutus predictum placitum in eadem curia christianitatis etc.', and to wage his law.

¹⁹ E.g., *Rex v. Archbishop of Canterbury and Sardene*, CP 40/121, m. 285 (1297): '... et super hoc iusticiarii interloquentes de forma querele domini regis in hac parte videtur curie quod huiusmodi querela potius ad predictas heredes ad quarum prosecutionem predicte prohibitiones impetrate fuerunt pertinet quibus directe competit actio in hoc casu versus predictum archiepiscopum et eius officialem quam ad dominum Regem etc.'

checks as there were, therefore, proof by wager of law in prohibition cases was naturally weighted in favor of defendants. In the end, proof was within their control. This was not necessarily because they and their oath helpers perjured themselves. We do not yet know enough to say that. It was rather because it was a good defense to a prohibition action that the underlying plea was properly within ecclesiastical competence. Mere disobedience to a writ was not enough to allow the plaintiff to recover. And it is undeniable that the same underlying facts might seem different when seen through ecclesiastical glasses than when seen through secular ones. What seemed to secular eyes a suit for trespass might legitimately seem sacrilege or even defamation from an ecclesiastical point of view.²⁰ What appeared to one person as a lay debt or contract might appear to another as a suit over usury or for correction of the soul of the debtor.²¹ What looked to some like a suit over an advowson or lay chattels might look to others like one for tithes or spoliation.²² Wager's weakness lay in allowing defendants to choose the glass through which the nature of the underlying facts would be seen.

Figures taken from the rolls confirm this weakness. In an overwhelming majority of cases wager was successful. Flahiff himself remarked on the 'somewhat disconcerting ease and regularity' with which defendants successfully made their law.²³ Searches in the post-1285 plea rolls amplify this suspicion. Of the ninety wager cases found on the rolls between 1285 and 1335 which show a result, fully eighty-four ended with the defendant successfully making his law.²⁴ In other words, in a meagre 7% of the cases where the rolls

²⁰ *Roger v. Abbot of Oseney*, CP 40/69, m. 28 (1287), in which the defendant pleaded 'quod super spoliacione illa predictum Ingeranum implacitavit etc. Et si hoc non sufficit dicet aliud.' *Manham v. Wyke*, JUST 1/1100, m. 23 (1292), in which the defendant admitted 'quod ipse implacitavit ipsum ibidem de quadam diffamacione quam ei imposuit de qua nichil inde recuperare optinisset in curia laycali.' See also Y.B. Hil. 14 Edw. II, fol. 416 (1321).

²¹ *Rex v. Executors of Peter of Middleton*, KB 27/354, m. 99d (1348), in which the defendants justified 'quod ipsi prosequebantur versus prefatum Willelmum de Popelton in curia christianitatis pro lesione fidei sue in correctione anime ipsius Willelmi absque hoc quod ipsi prosequebantur' An interesting example comes from the manor court of Boxley, SC 2/180/9, m. 10 (1322), a prosecution against Richard Sutton for having sued wrongfully in Court Christian; he justified 'quod racione usure hoc fecit et non aliter.' He was allowed to go without day.

²² *Danner v. John parson of Thurlaston*, CP 40/208, m. 289d (1315): 'Et bene concedit quod ipse secutus fuit placitum in curia christianitatis de quibusdam decimis ... per viam spoliacionis.' See generally Donahue, 'Stubbs vs. Maitland' (above, n. 4), 661-62.

²³ Flahiff 2. 269. And see generally W. R. Jones, 'Relations of the Two Jurisdictions: Conflict and Cooperation during the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries', *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History* 7 (1970) 79-210, especially 82-83.

²⁴ Cases counted for the defendant were found on the following CP 40 rolls: Nos. 57, m. 49d; 58, m. 29; 60, m. 121d; 62, m. 1; 64, mm. 61, 64d; 68, mm. 24, 65; 73, m. 14d; 78, m. 82; 80, m. 19d; 100, mm. 53d, 111d; 103, m. 57; 104, mm. 131d, 133d; 106, mm. 186d, 200; 108, m. 53;

show a result did the plaintiff's suit on a prohibition bring him success.²⁵

These laboriously collected figures may admit of some difficulties, and perhaps they do not rise to the level of statistics. But surely they furnish confirmation that the possible advantages to defendants inherent in wager were more than theoretical. They suggest that good reasons existed for the move to the second method of proof in prohibition cases, that which began with the possibility of submission of the general issue to a jury, a move which occurred, as Flahiff established, during the reign of Edward I.

II

TRIAL BY JURY

By the beginning of the fourteenth century, the use of juries rather than wager of law was the normal, though not the exclusive, way of trying the general issue in prohibition cases. In 1300, for instance, eleven of the fourteen cases pleaded to issue on the Common Plea rolls went to juries; only three were tried by wager of law.²⁶ The last use of wager found comes from 1335²⁷ and thereafter trial by jury is the only method so far found on the rolls, although surely a more dogged search would produce a few later cases of wager.

The evident advantage, at least to our eyes, of the end of wager was that it took the final determination out of the hands of the party with an interest in the outcome and put it into the hands of a more neutral body. The continued weakness of trial by jury was that it left the decision of the ultimate issue in the hands of a lay body, one which might or might not make its decision according to formal law. The general issue went to the jury in as blank a form as the general denial had put the question in wager cases; this meant that the jury could decide the underlying question of whether the original plea was within

113, mm. 36d, 74d; 115, mm. 185d, 200d; 118, mm. 51d, 68d; 123, m. 84d; 134, m. 58; 135, m. 164; 136, mm. 37d, 72d; 138, mm. 27, 27d; 139, m. 153d; 141, m. 57d; 145, mm. 152, 314d; 146, mm. 7d, 136; 149, m. 111; 151, mm. 168d, 207d; 153, m. 377d; 154, mm. 14d, 114; 155, mm. 126, 130, 159; 158, m. 231; 159, m. 5; 160, mm. 159, 203d; 171, m. 36; 173, mm. 284, 303; 176, m. 120; 178, mm. 41, 165, 246; 180, m. 231; 183, m. 169; 184, m. 164; 187, m. 234; 189, m. 383d; 193, m. 19; 195B, m. 60; 205, m. 145d; 211, m. 218d; 216, m. 170d; 219, m. 39; 220, m. 58d; 236, m. 329; 237, m. 158; 248, m. 189; 281, m. 19d; 288, m. 104; 292, m. 437d; 296, m. 408d (two cases); 300, m. 287. Also on the following JUST 1 rolls: Nos. 574, m. 7; 578, m. 11; 652, m. 38; 1089, m. 17.

²⁵ Cases counted for the plaintiff were found on the following CP 40 rolls: Nos. 69, m. 52d; 109, m. 81; 154, mm. 132, 236d; 171, m. 231d; 183, m. 287.

²⁶ Taken from CP 40/132-35; see also Flahiff 2. 274 n. 60.

²⁷ Letton v. Florence, CP 40/300, m. 287; the defendant successfully made his law.

spiritual or secular jurisdiction.²⁸ Its verdict may often simply have reflected community judgment on the question, and community judgment would of course have been formed as much by the influence of the parish church and by contemporary practice in the ecclesiastical courts as it would have been by the strictest royal view of the matter.

It is rare when one sees this in detail. But in a few cases where juries were questioned by the judge or where their verdict included the finding of facts we can see this community assessment at work, as in a 1296 case in which the jury apparently accepted the defendant's characterization of the underlying plea as involving sacrilege, not trespass,²⁹ or in a 1300 case from the Common Pleas in which the jury specifically found that the defendant had sued for tithes, not lay debts or chattels.³⁰

Whether a plea belonged to ecclesiastical or lay jurisdiction was a question in which quite ordinary people might well have held a strong opinion. Besides their familiarity with ecclesiastical practice, they were often confronted with the same question in local courts. There, without the complicating factor of the royal writ of prohibition, were heard cases in which defendants were prosecuted for suing in Church courts over matters which could have been, and perhaps ought to have been, heard in the courts of manor,³¹ borough,³² or hundred.³³ Much skirmishing over jurisdiction went on at this local level – a

²⁸ See Flahiff 2. 273: 'This time the jury is going to answer directly about the very substance of the plea.' On the general subject see M. S. Arnold, 'Law and Fact in the Medieval Jury Trial: Out of Sight, Out of Mind', *American Journal of Legal History* 18 (1974) 267-80.

²⁹ St. George v. Prioress of Easebourne, CP 40/113, m. 58.

³⁰ Rex v. Richard parson of Drayton Beauchamp, CP 40/135, m. 262. A similar case is Rex v. Bray and Brian, CP 40/211, m. 51 (1315), in which the jury returned this verdict: '[P]redictus magister Willelmus non tenuit aliquid placitum in curia christianitatis de laico feodo Willelmi de Bikle nec idem Johannes secutus fuit idem placitum contra prohibitionem regiam. Dicunt enim quod predictus magister Willelmus tenuit quoddam placitum in curia christianitatis de decimis de quadam piro exeuntibus.' Judgment was entered for the defendant; this meant of course that the jury accepted the defendant's characterization of the goods as tithes.

³¹ E.g., Wakefield Manor Court Rolls [Yorkshire Archaeological Society, Leeds] Md 225/1341-2, m. 7d (1342): 'Robertus Goldesmith et Willelmus de Sandale attachiati fuerunt ad respondendum Johanni de Gayrgrave de placito quare secuti sunt placitum contra eum in curia christianitatis de debito quod non est de testamento vel matrimonio contra prohibitionem et defensionem ballivorum per quod dictus Johannes suspensus fuit ab ingressu ecclesie.'

³² E.g., Great Yarmouth Borough Court Records [Norfolk Record Office, Norwich] C4/18, s.d. Monday before Feast of St. Matthew (1297): 'Convictum est per inquisitionem in quam se posuerunt quod Rogerus de Leringsete clericus laboravit et maliciose fecit summoniri Thomam le Warrenner et Caterinam uxorem eius coram officiali Norwic' de debitis et catallis que non sunt de testamento vel matrimonio ad dampnum suum iii s.'

³³ E.g., Milton Hundred Records [P.R.O.] SC 2/181/76, m. 1 (1291): 'Gilbertus persona ecclesie de Milstode attachiatus per plegios quod sit ad proximum hundredum ad respondendum domino rege de placito quare traxit Johannem le Hewe in placitum in curia christianitatis et

fact worth emphasizing because it suggests that prohibition practice in the royal courts operated against a background of local habits and assumptions. The jury verdict was the means by which these were felt.

On the other hand, just as in wager cases, the plea rolls show that steps were taken to minimize the effects of leaving so much discretion in the hands of juries. Actual trials were not always so simple, it appears, as this outline suggests. The plea rolls give evidence of three ways this happened. First is by the introduction of evidence, which we must assume was open to evaluation and comment. The rolls contain references to documents introduced: to examination by the court of the original writ,³⁴ to inspection of appropriate writs of consultation,³⁵ and to production of other unspecified 'acts and instruments'.³⁶ We know also that witnesses were introduced in prohibition cases. The plea rolls record their presence,³⁷ Bracton mentioned them,³⁸ and churchmen challenged their suitability.³⁹ It is a good guess, for instance, that the well-nigh invariable practice of pleading the time and place of delivery of the writ, together with the names of at least two people who had been present,⁴⁰ had reference to verification by witnesses to be undertaken at trial. The testimony of two men was a familiar way of proving any fact. Why else were at least two identified men always mentioned in the pleading as having witnessed the crucial delivery if they were not meant to vouch for the fact at trial?

ipsum ibidem implacitavit de hoc quod ipse verberasse debuit quendam Henricum clericum suum.'

³⁴ E.g., *Rex and Edmund earl of Cornwall v. Raymond chaplain of Egloshayle et al.*, KB 27/43, m. 16 (1279), a prohibition case in which the defendants demurred because the plaintiffs did not produce the writ of prohibition: 'Et predicti Raymundus et alii petunt iudicium si sine brevi originali debeant respondere.'

³⁵ E.g., *Bentele v. Lacy*, JUST 1/1089, m. 17 (1293): '... et profert predictam consultacionem que hoc idem testatur'

³⁶ E.g., *Rex v. Archbishop of Canterbury and Sardene*, CP 40/121, m. 285 (1297): 'Et profert quedam acta et instrumenta iudicialia.' See also the complaint of the clergy that the royal judges were requiring them to produce their *acta* before the royal court so that a decision could be made in prohibition cases (Provincial Council at London, 1257 no. 30 in *Councils and Synods with Other Documents Relating to the English Church II. A.D. 1205-1313. Part I. 1205-1265*, ed. F. M. Powicke and C. R. Cheney (Oxford, 1964), p. 544.

³⁷ E.g., *Clarel v. William parson of Belton*, JUST 1/454, m. 22d (1247): 'Et testes quos predictus Willelmus producit versus predictum magistrum Willelmum hoc idem cognoscunt et testificantur.'

³⁸ Bracton, fol. 410.

³⁹ See Provincial Council at London, 1257 no. 7, in *Councils and Synods* 1. 538; the clergy complain that they have been put to purgation in prohibition cases 'per testimonium duorum ribaldorum'.

⁴⁰ The pleading of delivery 'in the presence of X and Y and of others' was normal, although not absolutely invariable; e.g., *Mateschale v. Shropham et al.*, CP 40/145, m. 152 (six named men); *Lucy v. Bishop of Exeter and Briwelon*, CP 40/160, m. 203d (no witnesses mentioned); *Resham v. Wytham*, CP 40/164, m. 66 (eight named men).

Second is the use of pleading containing statements of fact and characterizations of the underlying suit in a form beyond that necessary for framing the general issue. Both plaintiffs and defendants evidently enjoyed considerable freedom to put events and theories on the formal record to accord with their own view of the underlying matter, thus moving beyond the general issue to present each side's case more fully. We cannot speak with assurance about the nature of a medieval trial, but it is at least a reasonable supposition that this pleading was meant to have a use at trial. And when expanded pleading was used, its purpose seems likely to have been either to influence the jury's view of the facts or to invoke the help of the judge in determining the proper scope of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

For example, a case from 1379: the plaintiff pleaded that the defendant had wrongfully sued him in Court Christian over lay debts and chattels, namely, for £ 10 in damages because the plaintiff had previously accused him of stealing some hay. Defendant answered with his own version of the same facts: he had sued for defamation, but only to clear his name; he had obeyed the writ of prohibition; he had obtained a writ of consultation; it was the plaintiff who had himself appealed to the Court of Arches; the plaintiff who had failed to show that the defendant was guilty of the theft and had been condemned to pay expenses of £ 10 by the ecclesiastical official acting *ex officio* and not at the instance of the defendant. The plaintiff's replication pleaded that the defendant had instigated every part of the prosecution in the Church court, and that the £ 10 represented damages, not expenses.⁴¹

It is impossible to be sure which side was right in this quarrel, although the jury apparently saw it the plaintiff's way because they brought in a general verdict for him. But the point is that the plea roll here and in like cases contained information which can only have been used to fill out the otherwise blank general issue.⁴² It must have been meant for comment by judges and

⁴¹ Colvyll v. Weston, CP 40/477, m. 414d. See the discussion on the general topic in James B. Thayer, *A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law* (Boston, 1898, rpt. 1969), pp. 114-18.

⁴² This was perhaps most usual in cases in which the defendant alleged that tithes, not lay chattels, were the subject of the suit in the Church court; e.g., *Rex v. Fraunceys*, CP 40/164, m. 315 (1307), in which the defendant's answer reads: 'Et bene defendit quod ipse non tenuit aliquod placitum de laicis catallis ipsius abbatis sicut ei imponitur etc. Dicit revera quod quidam Adam de Osegoodby persona ecclesie de Goyngrove traxit predictum abbatem et conventum suum in placitum coram eo in prefata curia christianitatis super quibusdam decimis eidem persone subtractis per ipsum abbatem infra limites predictae ecclesie prout continetur in quodam libello ipsius persone quem profert, et quod quidem placitum post prohibitionem domini regis ei liberatam etc. tenuit ulterius per consultationem a curia domini regis sibi directam etc. eo quod cognitio decimarum spiritualium etc. spectat ad curiam christianitatis et dum tamen decime ille non excedant quartam partem valoris ecclesie etc. unde dicit quod ipse nullum placitum tenuit de laicis catallis etc.' The issue went to a jury, but no verdict is recorded.

perhaps by the lawyers and for whatever influence a one-sided presentation of the case would have had on a jury.⁴³

The third check on jury discretion was the use of detailed verdicts and of interrogatories which judges put to juries in order to clarify the nature of their general verdict. Similar to the detailed questioning of recognitors used in assizes of novel disseisin,⁴⁴ this practice evidently resulted from dissatisfaction with the lack of elaboration inherent in the simple 'guilty-not guilty' choice of the general verdict. Thus, for example, when the jury returned a verdict that the defendant had not sued in a Church court over a plea of trespass belonging to king's crown and dignity, the jurors were asked, what was the offense? They said, adultery. The judge then asked, was any money demanded? They said, no. Then, judgment for the defendant was entered.⁴⁵ Or, in a case where the attachment on prohibition was against ecclesiastical officials for holding a plea involving an advowson, when the jury found that the defendants had not done so, the judges asked, did the defendants, nevertheless, affix their seal to documents for an appeal to Rome? The jurors said that the officials had, adding that they had delivered the documents to the proctor of one of the parties.⁴⁶

Similar to such questioning were verdicts which contained detail about the nature of the underlying suit in the Church courts, but which still included a general verdict on behalf of the jurors.⁴⁷ Not special verdicts in the sense that the jury found only the facts and left the application of legal principles to the judge, these not infrequent entries again suggest a dissatisfaction with the blankness of the general verdict.⁴⁸ And as M. S. Arnold has shown in a recent article, even when the plea roll records a simple general verdict, this may conceal greater discussion of fact and law at the trial level.⁴⁹ Therefore,

⁴³ See Arnold, 'Law and Fact' (above, n. 28), 274-77.

⁴⁴ See Donald W. Sutherland, *The Assize of Novel Disseisin* (Oxford, 1973), pp. 73-74, with citation to primary authorities. Neither this nor the fuller pleading referred to above was, of course, peculiar to prohibition cases. Questions put to the jury were in at least occasional use in trespass and other forms of action; e.g., *Lanama v. Prior of St. Swithin*, CP 40/92, m. 95 (1291); the jury was questioned about the authenticity of the seal of the Chapter of Winchester Cathedral in an action of debt on an annual rent.

⁴⁵ *Rex and Faure v. Wynmundham et al.*, CP 40/105, m. 24 (1294): 'Et quesiti de huiusmodi transgressionem etc. dicunt quod de adulterio. Et quesiti si aliquam pecuniam numeratam ab eis peccati dicunt precise quod non. Et ideo consideratum est quod predictus magister Simon eat inde sine die.' A similar example is *Rex and Payne v. Leylond et al.*, CP 40/107, m. 55 (1295).

⁴⁶ *Lovetot v. Romeyn et al.*, JUST 1/485, m. 1 (1281). No judgment is recorded on the roll.

⁴⁷ E.g., *Honylane v. Arderne et al.*, CP 40/118, m. 68d (1297), a case which combined a detailed verdict with the use of interrogatories.

⁴⁸ Examples from the plea rolls: *Rex v. Sprete*, KB 27/49, m. 41d (1279); *Lovetot v. Romeyn et al.*, JUST 1/485, m. 1 (1281); *Rex v. Richard parson of Drayton Beauchamp*, CP 40/135, m. 262 (1301); *Chyld v. Wramplingham*, CP 40/145, m. 279 (1303); *Rex v. Bray and Brian*, CP 40/211, m. 51 (1315); *Hastyng et al. v. Lidgate et al.*, CP 40/440, m. 531 (1370).

⁴⁹ Arnold, 'Law and Fact' (above, n. 28), 273.

although one cannot be certain, probably the trial of many prohibition cases involved a responsibility shared between judge and jury and a use of judicial probing to lay open the facts in each case, with the judges nevertheless allowing (or rather insisting) that the verdict must ultimately be a general one and that the jurors must take responsibility for it.⁵⁰

If this is so, it means that during the first part of the fourteenth century questions about the boundaries between the jurisdiction of Church and State were shared by judges and juries, but that ultimate responsibility fell to juries. This method of decision therefore gave considerable scope to shared community assumptions about the proper jurisdiction of the Church courts, and it did not guarantee that juries would not call close cases in favor of the Church. It could not result in strict vindication of the royal position. And it had the added disadvantage of uncertainty – not being able to predict whether many cases belonged to one forum or the other. That disadvantage, I think, was in part responsible for the shift to the third method of trial and decision, one which took place in the Chancery and which was determined largely by the libel from the Church Courts.

III

TRIAL BY CANONICAL LIBEL IN CHANCERY

During the thirteenth century, as Flahiff showed, writs of prohibition were issued by the Chancery of course, that is at the suit of the Church court defendant 'without any attempt ... to ascertain the true state of affairs.'⁵¹ The new method allowed such an attempt to be made at some stage of Chancery proceedings.⁵² It probably grew as part of the procedure for obtaining a writ of consultation.⁵³ Authorized from at least 1290, this writ allowed a party who

⁵⁰ E.g., *Brun v. Dammas*, JUST 1/740, m. 25d (1292), a case involving a writ of prohibition for suing over lay chattels; the jury gave a fairly detailed verdict to the effect that the suit was actually about the abetting of fornication, but the plea roll adds that the jury also found generally that the defendant was not guilty of suing contrary to the prohibition.

⁵¹ Flahiff 2. 233.

⁵² Thus the modern doctrine is that although a writ of prohibition is a writ of right, it is not a writ of course. H. R. Curlew and D. S. Edwards, *The Law of Prohibition at Common Law and under the Justices Act* (London, 1911), pp. 11-12.

⁵³ See 'Statutum de Consultatione' (1289-90), 1 *Statutes of the Realm* (Record Commission; London, 1810), p. 108. Presumably the practice of issuing such orders antedates the so-called Statute of Consultation, since Bracton mentions the practice of consultation of the royal justices by ecclesiastical judges in cases of doubt. See Bracton, fols. 405b-406. Discussion of the nature of the writ of consultation is found in G. O. Sayles, Introduction to *Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench* 3 (Selden Society 58; London, 1938), pp. lxxiv-lxxv; G. D. G. Hall, *Commentary to Early Registers of Writs*, ed. Hall and Elsa de Haas (Selden Society 87; London, 1970), pp. cxi-cxiv.

had received a writ of prohibition, but believed that the original suit had been properly brought in Court Christian, to go before the Chancellor or Chief Justice, show his libel from the Church court, and upon a favorable ruling obtain a writ of consultation allowing him to proceed. In other words, the procedure authorized a fuller determination in Chancery of the jurisdictional question than had been possible before. Whether it occurred after or at the time the original writ of prohibition was issued, its essence was argument and substantive decision short of a jury trial.

Various sources make clear that decision in Chancery became the normal course in the later medieval period. A Yearbook case of 1422 reports that a plea involving tithes was 'debated at length in the Chancery.'⁵⁴ The Parliament rolls of 1414 contain a Commons petition mentioning the need to expedite process in Chancery in disputes over prohibitions and consultations.⁵⁵ A prohibition case heard in 1346 contains an order of supersedeas because of reasons proposed in Chancery.⁵⁶ An ecclesiastical court record of 1468 contains a prosecution of a litigant for having sent ecclesiastical documents to Chancery for use in a prohibition hearing.⁵⁷ And Chancery records themselves include files used in the hearing of prohibition cases.⁵⁸

Probably the clearest piece of evidence of the shift to Chancery is the scarcity of pleaded prohibition cases on the plea rolls during the latter half of the fourteenth century. The new procedure meant that fewer genuinely disputed cases would appear as entries pleaded to issue in the records of the common law courts. More would be decided or settled in Chancery. The plea rolls show that this happened. The Common Pleas roll for Michaelmas term 1301, for example, has nine cases pleaded to issue;⁵⁹ the same roll for Michaelmas term 1370 has only one.⁶⁰ The change was not sudden or absolute. Throughout the century occasional entries in the old form of attachment on prohibition do

⁵⁴ '[U]n prohibitioun fut prie en le chauncerie, et la le mater fut longement debatu' (Y. B. Hil. 9 Hen. V, pl. 5, in *Year Books of the Reign of King Henry the Fifth: Year Books 9-10 Henry V (1421-22)*, ed. R. V. Rogers [1948], p. 46).

⁵⁵ The complaint was that the ecclesiastical court judges were refusing to grant a copy of the libel to the party seeking the prohibition (4 *Rotuli parliamentorum* 20a [no. 17]; see also 2 Hen. V, st. 1, c. 3).

⁵⁶ CP 40/346, m. 73. See also Prynne's *Records* 3. 1137-38, the record of a plea about the rightful possession of a cross heard before the Chancellor in 1306.

⁵⁷ Ex officio c. Thomas at Wode, Canterbury Act book Y.1.11, fol. 7v (1468) [Canterbury Diocesan Archives, Canterbury Cathedral Library].

⁵⁸ P.R.O. C 270/27 (temp. Ric. 2-Hen. 6).

⁵⁹ CP 40/135, mm. 72d (two cases), 164, 181, 262, 309, 335 (two cases), 363.

⁶⁰ Hastyng et al. v. Lidgate et al., CP 40/440, m. 531. I owe the reference to this roll and case to the kindness of Professor William McGovern, who examined it thoroughly. Professor Arnold and Dr. Robert Palmer have also confirmed that their work on fourteenth-century plea rolls substantiates this conclusion.

appear on the plea rolls. But if we think in terms of prevalence, it is clear that most substantive decisions about whether a prohibition lay took place in Chancery.

The result of this change was doubtless to minimize the problem of uncertainty and subjective interpretation inherent in wager and jury trial. However, it did not increase the effectiveness of the writ of prohibition as a curb on ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The Church court records give evidence of no diminution of activity in the disputed areas. In fact they show the reverse.⁶¹ The culprit was, I believe, an unwillingness in Chancery normally to look beyond the ecclesiastical libel in deciding whether or not the prohibition was warranted.⁶² And these libels were virtually worthless as indicators of the real nature of many suits in the Church courts. They disguised rather than revealed the underlying facts. The libel in a suit brought to enforce a promise to pay a debt, for instance, typically alleged only that the defendant had incurred the guilt of perjury by violating his oath and asked that he be punished by canonical sanctions for his guilt.⁶³ Only documents subsequently introduced in Church court practice would show that an ordinary commercial debt lay at the heart of the case.⁶⁴ Thus, if the libel alone were regarded, and if the Church were granted *any* jurisdiction over the sin of perjury, it would have been difficult to keep the Church out of cases involving promises to pay lay debts. That is exactly what happened.

This seems very hard to believe. That the royal officers should have hit upon a method for deciding cases of disputed jurisdiction which allowed one side to camouflage the true nature of prohibitable litigation seems unlikely. Even if we take account of possible favoritism by Chancellors who were themselves ecclesiastics, and of the formalism said to be characteristic of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,⁶⁵ the conclusion at least demands proof. However, there is proof.

For one thing, the records all speak of the libel as determinative. Under the Statute of Consultation, the Chancellor was to issue a writ 'having seen the

⁶¹ The point is illustrated graphically in Woodcock, *Medieval Ecclesiastical Courts* (above, n. 4), p. 84.

⁶² I am grateful to Mr. J. L. Barton, who first drew my attention to the importance of the libel in prohibition cases.

⁶³ The libel for a suit to enforce a contract set out in a fifteenth-century English ecclesiastical formulary (London, British Library Royal ms. 11.A.xi, fols. 5v-6), for example, asks only that the defendant be declared and pronounced a violator of his oath and perjurer and consequently be punished by canonical sanctions. It mentions nothing of the actual nature of the underlying contract or specific canonical penalty to be applied.

⁶⁴ On the subject generally, see my 'Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio' (above, n. 4).

⁶⁵ See Flahiff 2. 231.

libel'.⁶⁶ Defendants in common law courts also sometimes pleaded specifically that they had received a writ of consultation by showing their canonical libel in Chancery.⁶⁷ Libels with writs of consultation written on the dorse sometimes found their way into evidence in the royal courts,⁶⁸ and the Chancery records contain writs of consultation on the same membrane with the libel.⁶⁹ If we believe the records, that is, the libel is the document that counted.

Moreover, William Lyndwood, the fifteenth-century English canonist and dean of Arches, a man who must have known, in fact tells us that the method worked to secure ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Compose your libels without demanding payment of the debt, he advises ecclesiastical lawyers, and you will avoid a writ of prohibition – advice incompatible with anything but a procedure normally restricted to examination of the libel.⁷⁰ When the Commons complained to the king in 1333 that consultations were being granted all too easily, this procedure very likely lay behind their complaint.⁷¹

Most importantly, this method of decision fits and explains the circumstantial evidence. The decline in prohibition entries on the plea rolls, the habitual use of uninformative libels by the Church courts, and the ability of those courts to continue hearing cases which might have been prohibited had the facts been fully known, all these are explicable if we give credence to what the records say about the dominant importance of the libel. One need not imagine, of course, that prohibition cases never involved more than a hearing in Chancery based on the libel. That would be to deny the ingenuity and the efforts of litigants and their lawyers. Pleading prohibition cases do occasionally appear on the plea rolls in the late fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries,⁷² and attempts were made to

⁶⁶ See 1 *Statutes of the Realm* 108 (above, n. 53).

⁶⁷ E.g., *Rex et al. v. Barnet et al.*, CP 40/462, m. 162 (1376): 'Et postmodum idem Robertus accessit ad cancellariam domini regis et monstravit ibidem libellum de prosecutione et habuit ibidem quoddam breve domini regis de consultatione super materia sua predicta.'

⁶⁸ E.g., *Peres v. Pyrton and Poynz*, CP 40/145, m. 135d (1302): 'Et profert quendam libellum qui testatur quod predictus Nicholaus in curia christianitatis, ..., qui quidem libellus consultatione predicta indorsatur et qui testatur quod procedendum est ad cognitionem huiusmodi mortuarii'

⁶⁹ C 270/27, *passim*. See also the ecclesiastical record nos. 125-127 (1377), in *John Lydford's Book*, ed. D. M. Owen (London, 1974), pp. 69-70. The libel is included in the consultation.

⁷⁰ *Provinciale (seu Constitutiones Angliae)* (Oxford, 1679), p. 315, s.v. 'perjurio': 'Ex praedictis colligi potest Practica libellandi in causa perjurii, ad evitandum prohibitiones regias.'

⁷¹ *Rotuli parliamentorum Anglie hactenus inediti MCCLXXIX-MCCCLXXIII*, ed. H. G. Richardson and George Sayles (Camden Third Series 51; London, 1935), p. 226, no. 9: 'tiels consultations sont ore grauntez trop legerement.' The petition for a remedy was unsuccessful (*ibid.*, p. 229).

⁷² E.g., *Cawod v. Stokton*, CP 40/464, m. 268 (1376).

circumvent the procedural obstacles of writs of prohibition.⁷³ As with trial by jury and wager of law, we must speak only of the predominant practice.

That it was the predominant practice, however, is shown also by the end of the story. When a serious attack on ecclesiastical jurisdiction was mounted in the 1490's and early 1500's, it was accomplished not through use of writs of prohibition, but through an expanded use of the Statute of Praemunire.⁷⁴ By reading that fourteenth-century statute to apply to Church courts within England as well as the Roman court, litigants brought actions based upon it which allowed them to plead all the facts which had occurred in the Church court. It permitted them to get behind the bare ecclesiastical libel and so put the real nature of the suit before the royal justices. It provided an 'end run' around the writ of prohibition.

IV

CONCLUSION

The necessity for circumventing the writ of prohibition reiterates, therefore, the conclusion drawn from the post-1285 plea rolls: that although the medieval writ of prohibition doubtless kept many litigants from pursuing Church court remedies, its formal availability was never the single determinative factor in deciding jurisdictional questions. Procedural obstacles stood in the way of effective vindication of royal claims. Trial and decision in prohibition cases involved three successive but overlapping methods: wager of law, trial by jury, and determination in Chancery based on the canonical libel. Each of these methods left room for variation, experiment, and argument. But each also contained procedural features which in practice allowed the Church to retain a good bit of jurisdiction denied to it in theory.

⁷³ E.g., *Sturdy v. Richard parson of W.*, KB 27/393, m. 5 (1358), apparently an attempt to form an action on the case against one alleged to have sued over trespass and felony in a Church court; KB 27/381, Rex. m. 19 (1355), a criminal prosecution against the bishop of Hereford for violating jurisdictional rules in refusing to heed certain writs of prohibition against excommunicating trespassers in his woods and parks. See also Y.B. Mich. 9 Hen. VI, fol. 56, pl. 42 (1430).

⁷⁴ See J. H. Baker, Introduction to *The Reports of Sir John Spelman* (Selden Society 94; London, 1978), pp. 66-70; Ralph Houlbrooke, 'The Decline of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction under the Tudors' in *Continuity and Change. Personnel and Administration of the Church of England 1500-1642*, ed. R. O'Day and F. Heal (Leicester, 1976), pp. 239-57, especially pp. 240-43; R. L. Storey, 'Clergy and Common Law in the Reign of Henry IV' in *Medieval Legal Records Edited in Memory of C.A.F. Meekings* (London, 1978), pp. 347-51; Michael Kelly, *Canterbury Jurisdiction and Influence during the Episcopate of William Warham, 1503-1532*, pp. 100-10 (unpublished Cambridge University Ph. D. thesis, 1964).

Of course, no one would argue that a way around these procedural obstacles was beyond the capacity of medieval men. The study of procedure cannot reveal the underlying reasons that contemporary society found tolerable the situation described in this article. But one cannot help speculating. That an effective curb on ecclesiastical jurisdiction was not found until the end of the medieval period suggests the existence of a widespread but unspoken consensus about the permissible role for the Church courts in medieval society, one wider than the strict royal position allowed.⁷⁵ It may have seemed unwise to push royal claims too far.⁷⁶ Community acceptance of the place of the ecclesiastical courts and generally shared agreement about the proper jurisdictional boundaries may have stood behind the procedural features which kept the writ of prohibition from being determinative. Theory was not abandoned. None of the methods of proof described involved ideological concessions. But theory was not pushed. A later age would look back, with William Prynne, and conclude that the ecclesiastical courts 'perpetually encroached [and] usurped upon the Temporal Jurisdiction ..., notwithstanding all Regal Prohibitions attachments Informations and Suits against them.'⁷⁷ A study of procedure can tell us how this happened. But the unarticulated consensus which made it possible, and even reasonable, we can only dimly perceive.

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⁷⁵ Donahue, 'Stubbs vs. Maitland' (above, n. 4), 701 concludes that, viewed from the perspective of the ecclesiastical records at York, 'the prohibition system, ..., may be seen as the product of a working, probably tacit, compromise.' See also the remarks of C. R. Cheney, *From Becket to Langton: English Church Government 1170-1213* (Manchester, 1956), pp. 117-18.

⁷⁶ See also the warning of Sheehan, 'Canon Law and English Institutions' (above, n. 4), 394: '[T]he mere statement of law is not a satisfactory description of the social situation it regulates.'

⁷⁷ Prynne's *Records* 3. 1187-88.

THE SEQUENCES *DE SANCTIS RELIQUIIS* AS SAINTE-CHAPELLE INVENTORIES

Karen Gould

ALTHOUGH the cult of relics had always been an important force shaping medieval history and religion,¹ the Fourth Crusade that culminated in the capture of Constantinople in 1204 marked a significant shift in the accumulation and veneration of relics in Western Europe. Both the immediate spoils of pillage and the continued period of Latin domination in Constantinople facilitated the transfer of ancient and precious relics from the East, many of which were directly associated with Christ.² The French king, Louis IX, acquired the most famous and prestigious group of these relics from his cousin Baldwin II, the Latin emperor of Constantinople.³ The translation of the relics, which

¹ On the importance of relics in the Middle Ages see J. Sumption, *Pilgrimage, An Image of Mediaeval Religion* (Totowa, N. J., 1975), pp. 22-40, and P. J. Geary, *Furta Sacra: Thefts of Relics in the Central Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1978), pp. 3-30.

² For a summary of the history of the Fourth Crusade see E. H. McNeal and R. L. Wolff, 'The Fourth Crusade' in *A History of the Crusades*, vol. 2: *The Later Crusades, 1189-1311*, ed. R. L. Wolff and H. W. Hazard (Madison, 1969), pp. 153-85, and D. E. Queller, *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople, 1201-1204* (Philadelphia, 1977). On the historiography of the Fourth Crusade see D. E. Queller and S. Stratton, 'A Century of Controversy on the Fourth Crusade', *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History* 6 (1969) 233-77, and D. E. Queller, ed., *The Latin Conquest of Constantinople* (New York, 1971). Among the contemporary accounts of the sack of Constantinople, Robert de Clari, *La conquête de Constantinople* 81.1-34 presents a vivid picture of the wealth and extent of the spoils. See the edition by P. Lauer, *Robert de Clari, La conquête de Constantinople* (Paris, 1924), pp. 80-81, and the English translation by E. H. McNeal, *The Conquest of Constantinople Translated from the Old French of Robert of Clari* (New York, 1936), pp. 101-102. Two scholars, in particular, have recognized the importance of the Constantinopolitan relics among the motivations for the deviation of the Fourth Crusade. Paul E. D. Riant in 'Des dépouilles religieuses enlevées à Constantinople au XIII^e siècle', *Mémoires de la Société nationale des antiquaires de France* 36 (1875) 1-214 and *Exuviae sacrae Constantinopolitanae*, 2 vols. (Geneva, 1877) discussed the significance of the relics and collected source materials related to them. More recently, A. Frolov, *Recherches sur la déviation de la IV^e Croisade vers Constantinople* (Paris, 1955), pp. 46-71 has called attention to the place of these relics among the causes for the deviation of the Fourth Crusade.

³ S.-J. Morand, *Histoire de la Sainte-Chapelle royale du palais* (Paris, 1790), p. 11.

included the most important physical remains of Christ's passion, the Crown of Thorns and a portion of the True Cross, to Paris between 1239 and 1241 occasioned the construction of a palace chapel for St. Louis, the Sainte-Chapelle, which formed, in effect, a large-scale reliquary to house these sacred treasures. The relics themselves, enclosed in a great reliquary, the Grande Châsse, were placed behind and above the high altar, forming the focal point for the structure.⁴

Because a full understanding of the impact and influence of any relics cannot be achieved without first establishing documentation for their presence in a particular place at a particular time, it is important to consider thoroughly any evidence that contributes to an historical identification of a single relic or group of relics. For the relics that Louis IX had translated to the Sainte-Chapelle, a close examination of written sources is necessary since the Grande Châsse and most of its contents were destroyed during the French Revolution.⁵ A variety of documents enumerating the relics is available in published sources, but these materials have never been analyzed individually or compared collectively to elucidate the problems of determining precisely which relics came to the Sainte-Chapelle around 1240 and of tracing their subsequent historical fate.

One piece of evidence, a group of sequences *De sanctis reliquiis*, composed in the mid-thirteenth century for the feast of these relics' translation on 30 September, has been especially overlooked as a source for identifying the Sainte-Chapelle relics.⁶ The sequences are important for two reasons. First, they

⁴ Pope Innocent IV implied the idea of the Sainte-Chapelle as a great reliquary in a bull of 1244 placing the chapel under the protection of the Pope: 'Cum igitur, sicut ex parte tua fuit propositum coram nobis, capellam Parisius, infra septa domus regiae, opere superante materiam, ut ibidem praedicta Corona sanctissima, aliae pretiosae reliquiae quas de ligno S. Crucis et aliis sacris habere dignosceris, sub veneranda custodia conserventur, tuis sumptibus duxeris construendam ipsamque ...' (Morand, *ibid.*, 'pièces justificatives', pp. 2-3; Riant, *Exuviae* 2. 128-29). For an analysis of this passage see R. Branner, 'Westminster Abbey and the French Court Style', *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 23 (1964) 16-17. The placement of the Grande Châsse with access provided from a tribune with twin spiral staircases was added probably after 1254; see R. Branner, 'The Grande Châsse of the Sainte-Chapelle', *Gazette des Beaux-Arts* 77 (1971) 13-15. Branner believed that the Châsse originally stood alone on a high platform behind the altar, rising 'as the supreme point of the entire work'.

⁵ See pp. 319-20 below.

⁶ The text of the first sequence is published in G. M. Dreves, ed., *Analecta hymnica medii aevi*, 55 vols. (Leipzig, 1886-1922), 8.90 (No. 109) (hereafter cited as AH). The nine remaining sequences are edited in R.-J. Hesbert, *Le prosaire de la Sainte-Chapelle* (Monumenta musicae sacrae 1; Mâcon, 1952), pp. 65-73. Two scholars have acknowledged the value of the sequences as documentation for the Sainte-Chapelle relics. Riant, *Exuviae* 2.48 knew only the sequence published in AH, and he recognized its importance by including it in a group of liturgical documents concerning the relics taken from Constantinople after the Fourth Crusade. When Hesbert edited the other nine unpublished sequences, he pointed to the similarity between the relics named in the sequences and the relics listed in the later Sainte-Chapelle inventories. He also

provide a list of the relics shortly after their translation to Paris, and a comparison of the relics named in the sequences with two other contemporary sources concerning the relics' translation clarifies the identification of specific relics that Louis IX obtained. In addition, the sequences, unlike the other two contemporary witnesses or later inventories, place the relics in a broader context by elaborating on their religious and political meaning. An analysis of the sequences for their value as an inventory of the Sainte-Chapelle relics therefore will form the focus of this study. Not only the text of the sequences themselves but also a comparison with other documents and inventories, both earlier and later, will identify the relics and demonstrate their spiritual significance.

I

The documents listing the Sainte-Chapelle relics fall into three categories. The first group concerns the transfer of the relics, and the second consists of later inventories of the Grande Châsse. The sequences form the third group. In the first category, the most well-known piece of evidence is the official act in which Baldwin II ceded the ownership of the relics to Louis IX. In this act, dated June 1247, Baldwin first gave up his possession of the relics to Louis ('absolute concessimus et ex toto quitavimus et quitamus'). A list of twenty-two relics followed. Finally, Baldwin attested the document with his imperial signature and sealed it with his golden *bull*a. This act no longer exists, but several editions of the text have been published.⁷ It was still extant when Morand published his *Histoire de la Sainte-Chapelle* in 1790 since, in addition to giving the text, he reproduced a facsimile of Baldwin's signature and a plate with the emperor's seal.⁸

Two narrative accounts describe the translation of the relics to Paris. The *Historia susceptionis sancte corone* written by Gauthier Cornut, archbishop of Sens, records the separate reception of the Crown of Thorns in 1239.⁹ A monk, Gérard of Saint-Quentin-en-l'Isle, wrote a more complete narrative known as the *Translatio sancte corone*. This account not only describes the translation of

stated that these compositions were the equivalent of inventories drawn up in the Sainte-Chapelle's earliest years. (See Hesbert, *Le prosaire*, p. 66 n. 1.) However, these scholars did not identify the individual relics, nor did they compare the text of the sequences with the other sources cataloguing the objects.

⁷ For the text of this document with references to other editions see Riant, *Exuviae* 2.134 and A. Vidier, 'Le trésor de la Sainte-Chapelle', *Mémoires de la Société de l'histoire de Paris et de l'île-de-France* 36 (1909) 257-58.

⁸ Morand, *Histoire*, 'pièces justificatives', pp. 7-8, plate opposite p. 68.

⁹ For an edition see Riant, *Exuviae* 1.45-56.

the Crown of Thorns but also tells how the remaining relics were brought in two separate groups to Paris. A knight named Guy arrived in Paris in 1241 with twelve of the relics including a portion of the True Cross while two friars brought the other nine relics probably in 1241 also.¹⁰

A comparison of Gérard's *Translatio* and Baldwin's act of cession (see the comparative chart in the Appendix) reveals several interesting points. First, although both sources mention most of the same relics, there are two discrepancies. The act of cession lists three cross relics (Appendix, Nos. 2, 5, 12) while Gérard names only two, omitting the second part of the True Cross (No. 5). Gérard's account, however, includes a part of the Virgin's veil (No. 23) that does not appear in Baldwin's act of cession. These two sources also differ somewhat in their description of the relics. In some cases such as the Crown of Thorns, the first part of the True Cross, and the Holy Face (Nos. 1, 2, 8), Gérard's identification of the relic provides more information about the object. In most cases, however, the description in the act of cession is more complete. The terminology used for individual relics is usually consistent, but a few items differ. For example, in Gérard's *Translatio*, 'vestimenta' is used for Christ's swaddling clothes and 'vestis' for the scarlet cloak (Nos. 4, 13) while the act calls these items 'pannos' and 'clamidem', respectively. Thus, although the combined evidence of the two sources provides a reliable list of the relics at the time of their removal from Constantinople and their journey to Paris, the additional enumeration of these relics in the sequences clarifies the discrepancy in the specific objects and contributes more information about description and terminology for the relics.

The second group of documents, the inventories, begins about 300 years later. The earliest extant inventory of the Grande Châsse (L) was made in 1534 when, by order of the king, François de Montmorency, sire de La Rochepot, 'bailli et concierge' of the palace, received the keys to the great reliquary from the widow of Florimond Robertet, the previous keeper of the keys.¹¹ In this

¹⁰ This text was first noticed and edited in E. Miller's review article of Riant, *Exuviae* in *Journal des savants* (May 1878) 292-309. For other editions see N. de Wailly, 'Récit du treizième siècle sur les translations faites en 1239 et en 1241 des saintes reliques de la passion', *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 39 (1878) 401-15, and F. de Mély, *Exuviae sacrae Constantinopolitanae* 3 (Paris, 1904), pp. 102-12. Vidier, 'Le trésor', 254 n. 1 excerpts the relics listed in Gérard's *Translatio*.

¹¹ There are earlier inventories of objects in the Sainte-Chapelle, but not specifically of the Grande Châsse. A. Vidier published all the inventories and documents relating to the Sainte-Chapelle treasury in 'Le trésor de la Sainte-Chapelle', *Mémoires de la Société de l'histoire de Paris et de l'île-de-France* 34 (1907) 199-324, 35 (1908) 189-339, 36 (1909) 245-395, 37 (1910) 185-369. He cites the original source and previous bibliography for the inventories, and also identifies each inventory by a capital letter. These identifications are noted in my text and comparative chart (Appendix). An edition of Inventory L appears in Vidier, 'Le trésor', 35 (1908) 189-92.

proceeding, the relics were first enumerated according to an earlier inventory, and observations and descriptions concerning the present state of the relics followed. Another inventory (M), probably dated between 1534 and 1573, provides a simple list of the relics and adds brief information about the physical condition of their individual reliquaries.¹² A similar inventory (O) was made on 8 October 1575.¹³ There are no extant inventories of the Grande Châsse from the seventeenth century, but in 1740 another inventory (R) was made.¹⁴ Unlike the earlier documents, this inventory contains a full description of each reliquary in addition to the identification of each relic.

The final inventories date between 1791 and 1793. On 12 March 1791, King Louis XVI reclaimed seventy-four metalwork objects from the Sainte-Chapelle, including the twenty reliquaries from the Grande Châsse, and had them moved to the treasury at Saint-Denis. Two inventories (CC and DD) record the proceedings of this transfer.¹⁵ On 12 November 1793 (22 brumaire an II), the commune of Saint-Denis, known as Franciade, brought the objects from the Saint-Denis treasury to Paris where they were deposited in rooms for the Comité des Inspecteurs de la Salle.¹⁶ A final inventory of the relics from the Sainte-Chapelle (II) was made on 18 November 1793 (28 brumaire an II) before the gold and silver objects were taken to the foundry where, after removal of the gems, the precious metals were melted down.¹⁷

The chart in the Appendix records in columns four through seven the identification of the objects in the Grande Châsse based on the inventories.

This chart omits Inventories O and DD because the identification of relics in the inventories is almost identical to Inventories M and CC, respectively. Inventory II was omitted because it does not name the relics, but only describes their reliquaries. In all cases, the chart gives only the identification of the relic and not a description of the state of its individual reliquary. The numbers in parentheses after each entry indicate the position of the relic in each particular inventory.

Comparison of all the inventories and the earlier sources concerning the transfer of the relics demonstrates that the relics which St. Louis obtained from Constantinople and had placed in the Grande Châsse of the Sainte-Chapelle remained almost completely intact until the French Revolution. Inventory L

¹² Vidier, 'Le trésor', 35 (1908) 192-93.

¹³ *ibid.*, 278-79.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, 293-98.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, 323-32; B. de Montesquiou-Fezensac, *Le trésor de Saint-Denis. Inventaire de 1634* (Paris, 1973), pp. 37-44.

¹⁶ Montesquiou-Fezensac, *ibid.*, pp. 44-49.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 44.

and the succeeding inventories show that four objects were removed from the Grande Châsse. The observations following Inventory L indicate that the king's mother had requested the removal of Item 5, a second part of the True Cross.¹⁸ By the time Inventory L was made in the mid-sixteenth century, Items 20, 21, and 22, the heads of Saints Blaise, Clement, and Simeon, had also been taken out of the Grande Châsse, but they remained in the Sainte-Chapelle treasury.¹⁹ Five of the relics probably survived the Revolution, and one reliquary is still extant.²⁰

The third category of evidence documenting the Sainte-Chapelle relics, the sequences, differs from the first two groups and fills an important lacuna between the first two sets of materials. The accounts relating to the relics' translation and the later inventories simply list, identify, and, in some cases, briefly describe the objects. In the sequences, in contrast, the relics form an integral part of the compositions whose purpose was to honor the relics and place them in their spiritual context. Although the sequences are closely related in date to the first category of sources, they represent the earliest enumeration of the relics *in situ* at the Sainte-Chapelle, not in the course of their translation.²¹ In this

¹⁸ Vidier, 'Le trésor', 35 (1908) 191.

¹⁹ These relics are listed in the following inventories of the Sainte-Chapelle treasury: K (1480), Nos. 346, 347, 359; N (1573-75), Nos. 10, 11, 23; Q (1740), Nos. 3, 5, 28; U (1783), Nos. 3, 5, 28. See Vidier, 'Le trésor', 34 (1907) 294-95; 35 (1908) 216, 218, 284, 286, 301-302. Inventories CC and DD record only the relics of Saints Clement (Nos. 4, 24) and Simeon (Nos. 21, 41) among the reliquaries not contained in the Grande Châsse. See Vidier, 'Le trésor', 35 (1908) 325-26, 330-31.

²⁰ Most of the relics were destroyed after their reliquaries had been used for the value of their precious materials. See the notes of Morand dated 15 April 1806 in Vidier, 'Le trésor', 37 (1910) 361-62. Morand says, '... après départ fait de l'or, de l'argent et des pierres dont elles étoient enriches ... la majeure partie des dites reliques ayant été détruite.' A document dated 26 October 1804 records the state of the relics without reliquaries that had been retained in the Cabinet des antiques at the Bibliothèque Nationale. The relics from the Grande Châsse included a piece of the True Cross, the Crown of Thorns, a piece of the sponge, a small container with Christ's blood, and a stone (probably the part of the tomb). At this time, the relics were transferred to Notre-Dame Cathedral. (In 1806, Morand attested that the sixth relic listed in 1804, a wooden peg, had not been part of the Sainte-Chapelle relics.) See Vidier, 'Le trésor', 37 (1910) 358-62. B. de Montesquiou-Fezensac, 'Le reliquaire de la "Pierre du Sépulcre" de la Sainte-Chapelle du palais à Paris', *Fondation Eugène Piot. Monuments et mémoires* 32 (1932) 89-106 identifies two Byzantine metalwork plaques in the Louvre as part of the reliquary of Christ's tomb from the Grande Châsse of the Sainte-Chapelle. They were detached from the reliquary in 1793 to preserve their inscriptions.

²¹ For the date of the manuscript in which the sequences appear see p. 323 below. Because the manuscript includes the dedication of the Sainte-Chapelle which took place on 26 April 1248, the manuscript must be dated after 1248. The composition of the sequences could be earlier, but they probably were composed around this time, possibly for the dedication itself. For the date of the dedication of the Sainte-Chapelle see M. Aubert, 'La date de la dédicace de la Sainte-Chapelle de Paris', *Bulletin monumental* 106 (1948) 141-43. Baldwin II's act of cession is dated 1247. Gérard's *Translatio* is not dated, but was probably composed not long after the translation in 1241.

respect, the sequences bridge the 300-year gap between the evidence relating to the relics' transfer and the later inventories of the Grande Châsse.²² Thus, an examination of the relics named in the sequences provides an important early inventory of the contents of the Grande Châsse in the Sainte-Chapelle.

II

The sequences known as *De sanctis reliquiis* are found in a manuscript in the Biblioteca capitolare of San Nicola in Bari.²³ Two scholars have been responsible for the publication of the manuscript and for the investigation of problems related to it. In 1952, Dom René-Jean Hesbert published a facsimile of the San Nicola manuscript accompanied by an introduction that related the history of the manuscript, along with an analysis of its localization, date, physical composition, and contents.²⁴ Robert Branner also examined questions concerning this manuscript in an article published in 1969.²⁵ Since the text of the sequences can be understood only in the context of the manuscript and its history, a brief description of the manuscript and a summary of the scholarly

²² There is other less specific evidence about the contents of the Grande Châsse between the dedication of the Sainte-Chapelle in 1248 and Inventory L of 1534. The two foundation charters dated 1246 and 1248 state that the Crown of Thorns, the True Cross, and the other relics were to be placed in the Sainte-Chapelle ('in qua eadem sacrosancta corona Domini, crux sancta, et aliae quamplures pretiosae reliquiae repositae continentur') (Morand, *Histoire*, 'pièces justificatives', pp. 3, 8-11). Pope Innocent IV in two bulls of 1244 concerning the Sainte-Chapelle also mentioned the Crown of Thorns, the True Cross, and the other relics; see n. 4 above and Vidier, 'Le trésor', 36 (1909) 255-56. There are also records of donations of fragments of the relics, most often a thorn from the Crown of Thorns, to other churches (Vidier, 'Le trésor', 36 [1909] 259, 261-67). For particular cases where recipients of fragments of relics imitated the Sainte-Chapelle in either architectural structure or clerical organization see I. Hacker-Sück, 'La Sainte-Chapelle de Paris et les chapelles palatines du moyen âge en France', *Cahiers archéologiques* 13 (1962) 243-57. The Grande Châsse was mounted so that it could be turned around to have its contents displayed. Joinville describes seeing Louis IX on the tribune opening the Châsse to take out the reliquary of the True Cross (M. R. B. Shaw, trans., *Joinville, The Life of St. Louis* [Harmondsworth, Eng., 1953], p. 345; see also Branner, 'The Grande Châsse', 7, 14). Later kings also displayed the relics (Vidier, 'Le trésor', 36 [1909] 308-10, 321, 330, 332-35). None of these sources, however, specifically enumerates all of the relics. The inscription of the paschal candle of the Sainte-Chapelle, dated 1327, and a poem composed in 1451 by Antoine Astesan describing the Sainte-Chapelle give more complete lists of the relics (Vidier, 'Le trésor', 36 [1909] 290-91, 321-22).

²³ The manuscript does not have a shelf mark. See R. Branner, 'Two Parisian Capella Books in Bari', *Gesta* 8.2 (1969) 19 n. 1. The observations in my paper are based on the use of the facsimile in Hesbert, *Le prosaire*.

²⁴ Hesbert, *Le prosaire*.

²⁵ Branner, 'Two Parisian Capella Books', 14-19, and R. Branner, *Manuscript Painting in Paris during the Reign of St. Louis: A Study of Styles* (Berkeley, 1977), pp. 5, 140, 237.

opinions about problems related to it provide the necessary background to examine the relics named in the compositions.

The present volume in the San Nicola library contains two separate manuscripts, a gradual and the sequencer bound together.²⁶ The sequencer consists of thirteen gatherings of twelve folios each for a total of 312 pages, but the text of the sequencer proper ends in the middle of p. 303. The manuscript contains thirty-seven sequences for the temporal and 156 compositions for the sanctoral. Each piece is rubricated on the right side of the text space. A large painted initial filling two lines of text and music begins the major feasts. The other compositions begin with a penwork initial filling one line of text and music, while flourished initials of one text-line in height begin each verse of the sequences.

Both the contents and the illumination of the sequencer localize and date the manuscript. The large number of pieces honoring Parisian saints or commemorating Parisian feasts associates the composition of the manuscript with Paris.²⁷ The illuminations which Branner attributes to an important Parisian atelier further support its Parisian localization.²⁸ Several of the pieces identify more precisely the institution for which the sequencer was composed. The presence of compositions for the translation of the Crown of Thorns (11 August) and the translation of the other Constantinopolitan relics (30 September) to Paris, as well as the dedication of the Sainte-Chapelle (26 April), associate this manuscript with King Louis IX and the chapel in which the famous relics were housed, the Sainte-Chapelle. Hesbert, indeed, attributes the manuscript to the Sainte-Chapelle itself and concludes that it is possibly the earliest manuscript of this type composed for the chapel.²⁹ Branner, however,

²⁶ A gradual contains the parts of the Mass sung by the choir, including fixed chants of the Canon and Ordinary of the Mass as well as variable chants for the Temporale, Sanctorale, and Common of Saints. A sequencer is a supplementary chant book for the Mass. It contains the compositions called sequences sung after the Alleluia and before the Gospel. See J. Plummer, *Liturgical Manuscripts for the Mass and the Divine Office* (New York, 1964), pp. 9-10, 21-22. As Hesbert has shown by an analysis of the gatherings, the two manuscripts were not originally connected, although both were made in Paris, probably for the royal family, around the middle of the thirteenth century: see Hesbert, *Le prosaire*, pp. 29-35 and Branner, 'Two Parisian Capella Books', 14.

²⁷ Hesbert, *Le prosaire*, pp. 11-12, 25-26. Saints honored include Geneviève, Denis and the invention of his relics, Germain and his translation, Marcel and his translation, Landry, Gendulphe, and Severin. Parisian feasts are the Miracle 'des Ardents' (of the burning fever), the translation of the relics of Notre-Dame, the translation of the Crown of Thorns and of the other Sainte-Chapelle relics, and the dedication of the Sainte-Chapelle.

²⁸ Branner, 'Two Parisian Capella Books', 18-19 and *Manuscript Painting*, pp. 122-30, 236-37. Branner places the Bari sequencer initials stylistically in the Sainte-Chapelle Main Line Group of which one of the most well-known examples is the Sainte-Chapelle Evangeliary (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 17326).

²⁹ Hesbert, *Le prosaire*, p. 12.

argues that the inclusion of the feast of the translation of the relics of Notre-Dame (4 December), a feast that the Sainte-Chapelle could not celebrate, indicates that the sequencer was made for Louis IX's *capella*, an institution distinct from the palace chapel in Paris.³⁰ Thus, although the manuscript probably was not made specifically for the Sainte-Chapelle, the sequences were connected not only with the Sainte-Chapelle relics but also with the royal ownership and patronage of these sacred objects.

There are also varying opinions about the manuscript's date. Hesbert places the sequences around 1250. He bases this date on the inclusion of the dedication of the Sainte-Chapelle, which took place on 26 April 1248, and the omission of the feast of the canonization of St. Peter of Verona on 29 April 1253.³¹ Branner does not date the sequencer more precisely than after 1248.³² However, the datable manuscripts stylistically associated with the sequencer's initial decoration fall in the decade between 1250 and 1260, so it is possible that the Bari manuscript could be later than 1253.³³ A date of around 1250-60 best reflects the possible period of its production.

Another question concerns the reason for the presence of a mid-thirteenth-century Parisian royal manuscript at San Nicola in Bari. The familial connections between the ruling houses of France and the kingdom of Naples probably explain the presence of this sequencer in Italy. In 1304, Charles II of Anjou, king of Naples and nephew of Louis IX, transformed the Benedictine abbey of San Nicola at Bari into a collegiate church.³⁴ In the 1304 foundation charter, Charles II established the Parisian rite at San Nicola, specifically the rite of the royal *capella*.³⁵ He also mentioned a number of liturgical books that he had given to the church which could be used in celebrating this rite. An inventory of the San Nicola treasury dated 1296 confirms Charles II's donation. The inventory includes a number of liturgical manuscripts designated as being of Parisian usage. Among the books is a small sequencer ('Item sequenciarium unum parvum').³⁶ Hesbert believes that the sequencer mentioned in this

³⁰ Branner, 'Two Parisian Capella Books', 14. For the distinction between the royal *capella* and the Sainte-Chapelle in Paris see R. Branner, 'The Sainte-Chapelle and the *Capella Regis* in the Thirteenth Century', *Gesta* 10.1 (1971) 19-22.

³¹ Hesbert, *Le prosaire*, p. 13.

³² Branner, *Manuscript Painting*, p. 237.

³³ Branner, 'Two Parisian Capella Books', 18 and *Manuscript Painting*, pp. 122-30, 236-37.

³⁴ Hesbert, *Le prosaire*, pp. 17-23.

³⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 17-26. Hesbert identifies the royal *capella* with the Sainte-Chapelle, although, according to Branner's distinction between the two institutions, the foundation charter and the liturgy at San Nicola may have conformed to the usage of the royal *capella*. Hesbert, however, points out that San Nicola had received a thorn from the Crown of Thorns, and portions of the True Cross and the sponge from the Sainte-Chapelle relics, so that San Nicola may have been regarded, as Hesbert says, as 'un double de la Sainte-Chapelle de Paris'.

³⁶ Hesbert, *Le prosaire*, pp. 26-31.

inventory is the manuscript now at the San Nicola library. The sequencer probably came from Louis IX's *capella* to either his brother Charles I or his nephew Charles II, both kings of Naples.³⁷ This manuscript now in south Italy thus preserves an important example of royal Parisian ecclesiastical usage in the middle of the thirteenth century, just after Louis IX's acquisition of the Constantinopolitan relics of the passion and the completion of the chapel to house the sacred objects.

The sequences that mention the Sainte-Chapelle relics were composed to commemorate two feasts: the translation of the Crown of Thorns celebrated on 11 August and the translation of the other relics from Constantinople on 30 September. There are eight sequences in honor of the Crown of Thorns and ten compositions commemorating the other relics.³⁸ The Crown of Thorns sequences concern this particular relic alone while the other group of sequences mentions all the relics, including the Holy Crown. Accordingly, only the pieces composed for the feast of the relics on 30 September, which provide the most complete catalogue of these objects, will be considered to identify the individual relics.

The group of ten sequences, *De sanctis reliquiis*, are among the most important compositions in the manuscript for two reasons.³⁹ First, the format of the manuscript itself emphasizes their significance. Besides the initial that begins the sanctoral section and the initials at two feasts honoring the Virgin, the initial commencing the first sequence in this set of pieces commemorating the relics is the only other large painted initial in the sanctoral.⁴⁰ The choice of the infrequently used large initial alerts the reader to the importance of the following text. The accordance of an octave and the provision of ten sequences for the feast, more compositions than those for any other feast in the sequencer, also demonstrates the prominent place of these pieces in the manuscript. Second, surviving liturgical compositions honoring the Sainte-Chapelle relics are rare.⁴¹

³⁷ *ibid.*; Branner, 'Two Parisian Capella Books', 14.

³⁸ The sequences commemorating the translation of the Crown of Thorns are found on pp. 166-183 of the Bari sequencer. Hesbert, *Le prosaire*, pp. 37-60 edits the texts of the unpublished sequences in this group. Texts of the remaining sequences are in AH 8. 21-22 (Nos. 16-17) and 54. 204-205 (Nos. 133-134). The sequences honoring the translation of the other Constantinopolitan relics are on pp. 231-253 of the Bari manuscript. Hesbert, *Le prosaire*, pp. 65-73 edited nine of the sequences. The remaining composition is published in AH 8.90 (No. 109).

³⁹ The first sequence in this group is rubricated 'De sacrosanctis reliquiis'. The other compositions are referred to as 'alia', 'feria IV', 'feria VI', or 'de reliquiis'. Hesbert and Dreves title these sequences 'De sanctis reliquiis'.

⁴⁰ The large initials are found in the Bari Sequencer on p. 70 (St. Stephen, beginning of the Sanctoral), p. 101 (Purification of the Virgin), p. 196 (Assumption of the Virgin), p. 232 (translation of the Sainte-Chapelle relics).

⁴¹ Although many Parisian liturgical manuscripts mention some of the Sainte-Chapelle feasts, both Hesbert and Branner point to the paucity of extant liturgical manuscripts composed for the

Only one of the ten pieces commemorating the relics in the sequencer had been published before Hesbert's work on the Bari manuscript.⁴² The sequences thus add important new material concerning the Sainte-Chapelle relics and the liturgical usage associated with them.

Before identifying the individual relics, the place and function of the objects must be considered in their textual setting.⁴³ The sequences vary in verse form and in content, particularly concerning the number of relics named in each composition and the manner in which the objects are treated. Two of the sequences do not mention specifically any of the relics. Composition XVII is a hymn of praise to God the Father, Christ, and the Virgin for Christ's sacrifice and the victory of the crucifixion, but it contains some general references to the relics. In verse 3b, 'Pro vexillis victoriae / Tuae laetamur hodie', the word 'hodie' shifts the element of time to the present, to the feast of the Sainte-Chapelle relics that is being celebrated on that day. In this context, the 'vexillis victoriae tuae' are the relics themselves, most of which were physical remains associated with Christ's passion. Verse 8a indirectly evokes an association with the Crown of Thorns, referring to Jesus as 'nostra gloria, / Spes, corona'. Although 'corona' is used here in a more general sense, the importance of the Crown of Thorns among the relics that the sequence celebrates enriches the meaning of 'corona' in this composition. Sequence XXIII expresses sorrow and contrition for Christ's death on the cross. Like sequence XVII, the composition refers to the relics collectively as 'vexilla'. Stanza 1a-b speaks of the relics or symbols remaining from the crucifixion as true exemplars and reminders of Christ ('Vexilla reliquit / Vera exemplaria, / Ut ejus vestigia'). Verse 8b creates an image of Christ hanging on the cross, 'Pendentem in Cruce'. The particular reference to this central object in the crucifixion also evokes the two portions of the True Cross that were among the Sainte-Chapelle relics. While both sequences mention the relics as a group and allude to the two most important objects, the Crown of Thorns and the portion of the True Cross, neither composition names any individual relics directly.

Sainte-Chapelle itself. Hesbert and Branner each identify five manuscripts composed for the Sainte-Chapelle. However, only one manuscript, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 13238, a fifteenth-century breviary, is on both lists. See Hesbert, *Le prosaire*, pp. 13-14, and Branner, 'The Sainte-Chapelle', 21 n. 33. The difference in the identification of Sainte-Chapelle manuscripts probably arises from Branner's criterion of the absence of the feast of the relics of Notre-Dame in liturgical manuscripts composed for the Sainte-Chapelle. Determination of the liturgical usage of the Sainte-Chapelle and identification of manuscripts composed for this institution needs further study.

⁴² See n. 38 above.

⁴³ I will refer to the sequences by the Roman numeral with which they are numbered in Hesbert's edition. The first sequence will be referred to as AH 8.109 (for *Analecta hymnica* 8, No. 109, p. 90).

Sequence XX approaches Christ's passion and crucifixion from a narrative standpoint and relates a summary of the events in their Biblical order from the kiss of Judas to the entombment. Eight of the passion relics in the Sainte-Chapelle are woven into this description of the crucifixion. In stanza 2b, the figurative reference to the iron chain binding the old order ('Synagogae ferreo vinculo / Nunc ligatur') can be associated with the relic of the chain in this treasured collection. Verses 4b, 5a, and 5b describe the mocking of Christ with the regalia of the scarlet cloak ('Dum purpura regali tegitur'), the reed scepter ('arundo'), and the Crown of Thorns ('Inter spinas dum spinas lilium / Coronatur'). Christ is nailed to the cross ('cruci affigatur', 6a) where he is given the sponge soaked in vinegar ('Acetosa potatur spongia', 6b). Verse 8a refers to the blood, 'sanguis', while the last verse mentions the tomb, 'tumulo'. The only Sainte-Chapelle relics connected with Christ's passion not mentioned in this sequence are the lance and the shroud.

The seven remaining sequences contain the most complete enumeration of the relics. The first sequence (AH 8.109) and sequences XXI and XXV list the various relics as objects to be honored and commemorated. The first sequence which mentions twenty-one of the relics contains the most complete catalogue. There are twenty items in sequences XXI and XXV.

Sequences XVIII, XIX, XXII, and XXIV include most of the relics in their verses, but these four texts also comment on the meaning and interpretation of the objects. Sequence XVIII divides into two parts. The first two stanzas (1a-2b) list twenty of the relics. The following six stanzas (3a-8b) describe the humiliation and pain that Christ suffered through the passion and the necessity of this act for human salvation. The Crown of Thorns and the Cross are singled out in this section as instruments of Christ's persecution that save humanity from the pain of sin. Christ was crowned, not in majesty, but in scorn ('Coronatur, non ut imperio / Sit serenus, sed ut opprobrio / Repleatur', 3b). His suffering from the pricks of the thorns frees humanity from this pain ('liberat / Nos a spina', 5a). Likewise, the Son of God was crucified ('Dei Filius / Cruciat', 3a), but hope and salvation triumph ('Non descendit de Cruce mors pia / Super ligna', 5b). This sequence sets the relics, especially the Cross and the Crown of Thorns, in their context for the ultimate purpose of the crucifixion.

In sequence XIX, some of the relics represent aspects of Christ's life and character. The cross is the tree of life and the sign of Christ's triumph ('Ligno vitae et vitali / Pomo, Cruce triumphali', 1b).⁴⁴ The Crown of Thorns, the

⁴⁴ The image of the cross as a tree, tree of life or the fruit of the tree is one of the most recurrent themes in Christian literature. See G. B. Ladner, 'Medieval and Modern Understanding of Symbolism: A Comparison', *Speculum* 54 (1979) 236-38. For the use of the 'flowering' cross

scepter, and the scarlet cloak represent Christ's priestly and regal character ('Esse Dei Filium / Sacerdotem regium', 2b).⁴⁵ The swaddling clothes and the shroud are evidence that the Son of God became man (stanza 6). He was cruelly pierced with the lance as he was crucified, but his wounds and death give the keys to heaven and to the new Church (stanzas 7 and 8). In this composition, as in sequence XVIII, the relics become an integral part of Christ's mission.

In sequences XXII and XXIV, the relics are equated with certain characteristics.⁴⁶ In sequence XXII, the relics are presented in the first five verses (1a-3a). The remainder of the composition renames the relics in the same order while describing them in terms of various abstract qualities such as penitence for the cross, grace with the crown, or purity for the Virgin's milk and veil. The relics mentioned throughout sequence XXIV represent similar types of concepts, but they differ from the specific ideas associated with the relics in sequence XXII. For example, in composition XXII, the swaddling clothes and the blood represent love ('Panni, sanguis caritas', 5a), while in sequence XXIV the swaddling clothes stand for new life and the blood for martyrdom ('Panni vitae novitas', 3a; 'Sanguis est martyrum', 4a). Collectively, the ten sequences present the Sainte-Chapelle relics as objects to be honored and celebrated both as evidence of Christ's place in the drama of human salvation and also as examples of Christian virtues.

as an iconographic theme for reliquaries of the True Cross see A. Frolov, *Les reliquaires de la Vraie Croix* (Archives de l'orient chrétien 8; Paris, 1965), pp. 178-85.

⁴⁵ Christ as priest-king was also part of a long tradition. See for example Rabanus Maurus, *De laudibus sanctae crucis* 1.1: 'et ideo Christus unctio appellatur, qui rex et sacerdos est' (PL 107.152). Allegorical interpretations of the Mass reinforced the idea of Christ as priest by identifying the bishop and the celebrant with Christ at various points in the Mass; see O. B. Hardison, Jr., *Christian Rite and Christian Drama in the Middle Ages: Essays in the Origin and Early History of Modern Drama* (Baltimore, 1965), p. 47. Writings on medieval kingship also pointed to the role of Christ as *rex et sacerdos* in explaining how the king was placed in the image of Christ; see G. H. Williams, 'Part IV: *Regnum et Sacerdotium* in the Thought of the Anonymous of Rouen' in *The Norman Anonymous of 1100 A. D.: Toward the Identification and Evaluation of the So-Called Anonymous of York* (Harvard Theological Studies 18; Cambridge, Mass., 1951), especially pp. 128-32 and E. H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton, 1957), pp. 55-61.

⁴⁶ Connecting virtues with the cross or arms of the cross was not uncommon; see Rabanus Maurus, *De laudibus sanctae crucis* 1.6 where the cardinal virtues are connected with the cross, and the cross is the fruit of all virtues (PL 107.171-74). A sermon by Innocent III, *Sermo IV, In communi de uno martyre* (PL 217.609-14), not only assigns virtues to the four arms of the cross ('nam quatuor crucis ligna sunt quatuor mentis virtutes, fides, spes, perseverantia, patientia'), but also associates virtues with some of the instruments of the passion. The four nails represent the four cardinal virtues; the lance is love ('charitas'); the Crown of Thorns stands for penitence. None of these virtues, however, correspond to the virtues or characteristics assigned to the relics in the sequences.

Identification of the individual relics mentioned in the sequences must follow two approaches. The sequences themselves are the first and most important source for establishing the relics' identity. The immediate textual context provides description, definition, and commentary, and comparison with terminology used in the other sequences adds further information and clarification. The documents relating to the relics, the accounts of their translation, and the later inventories form a second source for identifying the relics named in the sequences. Comparison of the sequences with these documents gives additional descriptions of the objects and helps to explain the variety of terminology found in the sequences. The chart in the Appendix summarizes this comparative information, and the relics will be referred to by their number in the chart.

Several of the relics present no problem in identification because the terms used for the objects are consistent throughout the sequences as well as the comparative documents. Item 4, Christ's swaddling clothes, are always *panni*.⁴⁷ They are associated with Christ's humanity (XIX.6), with love (XXII.5a), and with newness of life (XXIV.3a). *Lac virginis* (10) is used throughout for the Virgin's milk. It stands for sweetness and purity (XIX.11a; XXII.5a). The sponge (15) is *spongia*. Sequence XX.6b further relates how it was soaked with vinegar, a description that Gérard's *Translatio* and Baldwin's act also provide ('Spongiam quam porrexerunt ei sitiendi in cruce, aceto plenam'). The sponge is associated with ideas of love (XXII.4b; XXIV.5b). The sequences refer to the shroud (16) as *sudarium*. The other documents qualify this object as a part of the shroud and specify that it was the cloth that was wrapped around Christ's body when he was placed in the tomb ('Partem sudarii quo involutum fuit corpus ejus in sepulchro'). This relic is associated with Christ's human flesh (XIX.6), and with clarity and glory (XXII.5a; XXIV.6b). The *linteum* (17) consistently mentioned in the sequences can be identified from the other documents as the cloth which Christ used when washing the disciples' feet at the Last Supper ('Linteum etiam quo praecinxit se quando lavit pedes discipulorum ...'). Sequence XXIV.6a describes the cleansing effect of the cloth.

The sequences vary the terminology for some of the relics by employing two or more synonyms for some of the objects. As Baldwin II's act states ('Catenam etiam, sive vinculum ferreum ...'), the iron chain (7) is *catena* or *vinculum* with or without the description of its material, *ferrea* (-um). Christ's victory broke the chains of Adam's bondage of sin (XIX.9a; XX.2b), and the chain represents compassion (XXII.4b) and truth (XXIV.3a). The portion of Christ's tomb (9) is called either *tumulus* or *pars sepulchri*. The accounts of the relics' transfer add

⁴⁷ Gérard's *Translatio* calls this relic 'vestimenta infancie ipsius'. See Appendix, No. 4.

that it was made of stone ('Magnam partem de lapide sepulchri ...'). This relic stands for rest and for the penalty of death (XXII.5b; XXIV.4a). Three words, *lancea*, *mucro*, and *gladius*, identify the lance (11). The combination of these terms in stanza 7 of sequence XIX associates the lance with the sword of Simeon's prophecy.⁴⁸ The relic also represents suffering (XXII.4a) and Christ's sacrificial death ('mors amoris', XXIV.6b). The scepter (14) given to Christ by the soldiers is called either by the general term, *sceptrum*, or by the word for reed, *arundo*, describing its material. The scepter is associated with order (XXII.4a) and tears of suffering (XXIV.6a). The rod of Moses (18) is usually *virgula* or *virgula Moysi*. In one case, Moses' character as a lawgiver is substituted in *virgula legis* (XVIII.2b). The part of the Virgin's veil (23), the only object not listed in the act of cession, is called *peplum*, as in Gérard's *Translatio*, or *velum* in the sequences. The veil represents purity, especially the purity and piety connected with the Virgin (XXII.5a; XXIV.5a).

The sequences employ an even wider range of terms for two of the relics, the scarlet cloak and the Crown of Thorns. In the case of the scarlet cloak in which the soldiers dressed Christ after his arrest (13), the two accounts of the relics' translation to Paris use only two nouns, *vestis*, garment, and *chlamys*, cloak, modified by the same adjective for scarlet, *coccineus*, to identify this relic. The sequences repeat the word, *vestis*, but do not use *chlamys*. Instead they substitute three other nouns: *pallium* (AH 8.109.2b; XIX.6a; XXV.5a), *purpura* (XIX.2a; XX.4b), and *mutatoria* (XIX.5b). *Pallium* means cloak or mantle, but it also is associated with liturgical usage as an altar cloth and as part of an archbishop's vestments and evokes the idea of death as a funeral pall.⁴⁹ *Purpura* and *mutatoria* convey a meaning of a regal or precious garment.⁵⁰ The robe's color is described by three different adjectives: *coccineus* (XVIII.1b; XXI.1b), *purpureus* (XXIV.6b), and *rubeus* (XIX.5b). In sequence XXIV, the deep red color represents the fire of the spirit ('Vestis est purpurea, / Spiritus incendium',

⁴⁸ Luke 2:35. Simeon, prophesying the crucifixion to the Virgin, says that a sword will pierce her own soul ('et tuam ipsius animam pertransibit gladius'). Sequence XIX.7a reads: 'Adest ille gladius / De quo tuam ipsius / Animam pertransiet'.

⁴⁹ C. Du Cange, *Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae latinitatis*, 10 vols. (Niort, 1883-87), 6.111-19. As a mantle the *pallium quadrangulum* was worn by the king, especially in coronation ceremonies. The liturgical meaning would have been known through allegorical interpretations of vestments and objects on the altar. See J. A. Jungmann, *The Mass of the Roman Rite, Its Origins and Development*, trans. F. A. Brunner, rev. C. K. Riepe (New York-London, 1959), pp. 81, 84; Hardison, *Christian Rite*, pp. 59, 63. In the later Middle Ages, the pallium came to be associated with the sufferings of Christ, especially because of the four crosses which formed its decoration. See J. Braun, *Die liturgische Gewandung im Occident und Orient* (Freiburg, 1907; rpt. Darmstadt, 1964), pp. 723-24.

⁵⁰ Du Cange, *Glossarium* 5.561-62; 6.575-76.

6b). While all of the words refer to a red garment, their multiple connotations enrich the significance of the relic in relation to Christ's role as priest-king.

A variety of words also describes the Crown of Thorns (1). Sometimes this relic is called simply a crown, *corona* (AH 8.109.1a; XXIV.1b; XXV.2a). It is also called a crown or wreath of thorns ('sertum spineum', XVIII.1b, XIX.2a; 'flos de spina', XVIII.5a; 'corona spinea', XXII.1a). In sequence XXII, the crown stands for grace (3b). Sequence XIX devotes several verses to the wreath of thorns, the *sertum spineum* (2a-5a). The verses emphasize the transformation of the crown of thorns from an instrument of Christ's passion into a symbol of Christ as king of glory. The crown of thorns, as well as the reed scepter and the scarlet cloak, signify that Christ, the Son of God, was a regal priest ('sacerdotem regium', 2b). The following verses designate the crown as a diadem and a tiara ('Et videte, filiae / Sion, Regem gloriae / In hoc diademate', 3a; 'Diadema nobilis', 4a; 'Ecce munda cidaris', 5a). The choice of the words, *diadema* and *cidaris*, enhances the regal nature of this relic.

In addition to the relics connected with Christ's life and passion, the group of objects that Louis IX acquired included the heads of four saints: John the Baptist, Blaise, Clement, and Simeon (19-22). The names of Saints Blaise and Clement always identify their relics in the sequences. The compositions, however, utilize a variety of terms not found in any of the comparative documents for John the Baptist and Simeon. John is the herald of Christ ('Praeco Christi praevius', AH 8.109.5b), and his martyrdom was a forerunner of Christ's crucifixion at Calvary ('Calvaria Baptistae praevii', XVIII.2b, XIX.12b; 'Calvariam Praecursoris', XXI.4a).⁵¹ Simeon, the man who would not die until he saw Christ, prompts the words referring to his advanced age and the idea that the Lord had selected him ('senex eximius', AH 8.109.5b; 'Simeon eximius', XXV.4a).⁵² Because he held Christ when the child was brought to the temple to be circumcised, Simeon was also called the bearer of Christ ('Bajuli Christi', XIX.12a).⁵³

Unlike the previous examples where two or more words appear interchangeably for one object, the similarity of two of the relics presents the problem of careful distinction between the two objects. Item 3 is a relic of Christ's own blood, while the sixth relic is blood that flowed from an image of

⁵¹ Some of the stained-glass windows in the apse were devoted to scenes from the life of John the Baptist (Bay G, left). This window calls attention both to the presence of a relic of the saint among the relics in the Grande Châsse and emphasizes John the Baptist's dual role as a precursor of Christ, the last of the prophets, and as an Evangelist, the first witness to Christ. See L. Grodecki, *Les vitraux de Notre-Dame et de la Sainte-Chapelle* (Corpus vitrearum Medii Aevi, France I; Paris, 1959), p. 82.

⁵² Luke 2:25-26.

⁵³ Luke 2:27-28; Hesbert, *Le prosaire*, p. 68 n. 4.

Christ when an infidel struck this image.⁵⁴ Christ's blood is always called simply *sanguis*, while *imagineis* usually qualifies the blood produced from the image. In sequence XIX, verse 10a demonstrates the close union of the terms for the two relics. In this single reference to the blood, the word 'sanguinem' must refer both to Christ's blood and also to the blood from Christ's image as related in the following line ('Et quem per imaginem / Fudit'). Sequence XXII also conflates the two relics of the blood. Each item is named separately in the first part of the composition ('Sanguinis profluvium', 2b; Sanguisque imagineis', 3a), but the second part of the sequence in which the relics are attributed with various characteristics mentions 'sanguis' only once in verse 5a where it represents love ('caritas'). Sequence XXIV, in different verses, associates two qualities with the blood. In verse 3b, the blood is the hope and power of thought and understanding ('Sanguis est imagineis / Spes et robur mentium'), while in verse 4b blood represents martyrdom. Although neither verse specifies the exact relic intended, the choice of the word 'imagineis' in verse 3b associates this relic with the blood produced from Christ's image. The connection of blood with martyrdom in verse 4b evokes the idea of physical wounds that would be appropriate when referring to Christ's own blood.

A different question of identification arises with the eighth relic because the sequences use two terms of very different meaning, *tabula*, board, and *mappa* or *mappula*, cloth, in reference to this object. The origin and history of the relic explain the choice of two such distinct words. The object was the Image of Edessa, a portrait of Christ made, according to legend, when he pressed his face against a cloth that, when taken to Abgar, king of Edessa, healed the ailing monarch.⁵⁵ After the image's translation to Constantinople in 944, the cloth

⁵⁴ Icons that shed blood when attacked and wounded were common in Byzantine traditions, and usually the attacker was a Jew or Saracen; see E. Kitzinger, 'The Cult of Images before Iconoclasm', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 8 (1954) 101, especially n. 59, and G. Galavaris, 'The Mother of God, "Stabbed with a Knife"', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 13 (1959) 231. The blood produced from an image of Christ in the Sainte-Chapelle may be from the famous icon of Christ of Beirut which Jews subjected to the entire passion of Christ and which shed blood and water when pierced. Around 975, this icon was brought to Constantinople where it was placed in the Oratory of the Saviour located in the main gate to the Great Palace; see J. Ebersolt, *Constantinople. Recueil d'études d'archéologie et d'histoire* (Paris, 1951), 20-21. I have not been able, however, to find other instances of the blood from an icon being preserved as a relic, but there are possible instances of seals commemorating such icons; see Galavaris, 'The Mother of God', 230-31.

⁵⁵ E. von Dobschütz, *Christusbilder. Untersuchungen zur christlichen Legende* (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur 18; Leipzig, 1899), p. 102-40; S. Runciman, 'Some Remarks on the Image of Edessa', *Cambridge Historical Journal* 3 (1931) 240-45. The story is also told in the *Legenda aurea* in chapter 159 on Saints Simon and Jude (Th. Graesse, ed., *Jacobi a Voragine Legenda aurea vulgo Historia lombardica dicta*, 2nd edition [Leipzig, 1850], pp. 706-707).

with the picture was attached to a board.⁵⁶ Gérard's narrative calls the relic a board ('tabula') that Christ's face touched during the deposition. Although this account of the relic's origin is inaccurate, it suggests that an image of Christ's face was on the board. Baldwin's act of cession adds other information about the relic's form. This document calls it a holy cloth ('sanctam toellam') joined to a board ('tabulae insertam'). The later inventories clarify the presence of an image of Christ's face on the relic, as in Inventory L which says: 'La sainte trelle inserée à la table [où est la face de Nostre Seigneur Jesus Christ]'.⁵⁷ The sequences do not mention a picture of Christ's face on this object. Rather, they identify the relic, as in Baldwin's act, by either of its component parts, the board, *tabula*, or the cloth placed on the board, *mappa* or *mappula*.

The cross is the most complex object to identify for two reasons. First, the cross as the universal symbol of Christ's victory over sin and death was significant for its physical presence among the Sainte-Chapelle relics and as an expression of Christ's central position in Christian theology. The cross is the standard ('Et pro crucis / vexillo', AH 8.109.1b) and the sign of triumph ('Cruce triumphali, / Signo Christi coelico', XIX.1b). It represents penitence and brotherly love (XXII.3b; XXIV.4a). After the crucifixion Christ is taken from the *patibulum* (XX.8b).⁵⁸ Because the crucifixion provided the means of human redemption, the cross is also the tree of life, *lignum vitae* (XIX.1b; XXIV.4a). In addition to specific references to the cross, many of the sequences describe the crucifixion and comment on its consequences and meaning (XVII, XVIII, XIX, XXII).

A second problem concerns the presence of three crosses among the group of Sainte-Chapelle relics. Item 2, which both Gérard's *Translatio* and the act of cession name, was a large part of the True Cross. The fifth relic listed in Baldwin's act was another large portion of the cross of Christ's crucifixion. Gérard's account does not mention this second relic of the cross, but it appears in the 1534 inventory (L): 'Une autre grande partie du bois de la sainte Croix'.⁵⁹ The third cross was not part of the True Cross but was a smaller cross described as triumphal because the emperors carried it into battle to bring victory (12). It appears in the *Translatio*, the act of cession, and the later inventories. Although

⁵⁶ A. Grabar, *La Sainte Face de Laon; le Mandylion dans l'art orthodoxe* (Prague, 1931), p. 16 n. 3.

⁵⁷ The other inventories identify this relic by the representation of Christ's face as either 'la sainte face' or 'la Véronique'. See Appendix, No. 8.

⁵⁸ The use of the term *patibulum* for cross in sequence XX recalls the phrase from the *Vexilla regis* by Venantius Fortunatus: 'Suspensus est patibulo' (*Carmina* 2. 6 [MGH *Auctorum antiquissimorum* 4. 1; Berlin, 1881]).

⁵⁹ This relic of the cross had been removed from the Grande Châsse as noted in Inventory L. See p. 320 above.

the documents demonstrate that there were three different cross relics, the sequences never distinguish these objects. The term *lignum* in sequences XIX.1a and XXIV.4a recalls the description of item 5 in the act of cession ('*Aliam magnam partem de ligno sancte crucis*'), while sequence XIX mentions a triumphal cross (1b). In the textual context, these terms refer to the cross in general rather than to the name of a specific relic. Thus, terms for the cross in the sequences can be understood as collective references to the three cross relics.

III

An evaluation of the sequences *De sanctis reliquiis* as inventories of relics in the Grande Châsse of the Sainte-Chapelle must consider the purpose of the compositions and the consistency with which the relics are named in the sequence texts. Although the sequences nowhere state that the relics were the objects housed in the Grande Châsse, the pieces were composed to commemorate the feast of the translation of the Sainte-Chapelle relics. Furthermore, the compositions are found in a manuscript probably made for use in the *capella* of Louis IX, the king who had the relics brought to Paris. Considering that the relics named in the sequences match almost exactly the other documents that enumerate these items, it is reasonable to assume that the sequences from a manuscript apparently made for St. Louis' chapel accurately reflect the state of the relics when the Bari manuscript was produced.

Analysis of the treatment of the relics in the sequences themselves confirms their reliability. With the exception of the failure to distinguish between the three cross relics, the sequences name every object mentioned in the other documents six or more times. Two of the sequences, the first and sequence XXIV, include all of the relics. In two instances, sequences XVIII and XXI, the only missing relic is the blood produced from Christ's image (6). Like the cross, the word *sanguis* may have been used as an inclusive term for the two similar relics of blood. The content of some of the other sequences explains the absence of certain relics in these compositions. Sequence XX, for example, narrates the events of the passion. Since not every object in the Sainte-Chapelle group was connected with Christ's passion, this piece would not include the relics unrelated to its theme. Sequence XXII omits the four saints' relics since its primary concern is to associate characteristic virtues with the impersonal objects connected with Christ's life. In other pieces such as XIX and XXV, the exigencies of composition or meter, or a simple slip, may have caused the omission of a single relic. Collectively, the sequences enumerate the relics consistently and accurately. The inclusion of the Virgin's veil which is not found in the act of cession makes them, in some ways, more complete than this official document.

The sequences *De sanctis reliquiis* are important as more than a straightforward catalogue of objects because they provide, as no inventory can, an idea of the relics' significance in the political ideology and the religious beliefs of this period. In the sequences the selection of words connoting the regalia of kingship, *purpura* and *mutatoria* for the scarlet cloak and *diadema* and *cidaris* for the Crown of Thorns which, with the exception of *diadema*, do not occur in the other documents, was meant to associate these prestigious relics with Louis IX. Pope Innocent IV implied the equation of the Crown of Thorns with the crown of France in a bull of 1244 according privileges to the Sainte-Chapelle, and some of the sequences composed for the feast of the reception of the Crown of Thorns echoed this idea.⁶⁰ Visually, the Sainte-Chapelle's stained-glass windows repeated coronation themes by placing the crowning with thorns at the focal point of the passion window located in the apse of the chapel and by the choice of an unusually large number of coronation scenes in the Old Testament windows.⁶¹ The addition of these particular words in the sequences for the feast of the relics at the Sainte-Chapelle thus underscored the political implication of the relics, especially the crown, in relation to the king of France.

The sequences, above all, stress the religious meaning of the relics. The sequences demonstrate that the relics were powerful, tangible reminders of the most important manifestation of God's love for humanity through the life and death of his son, and, in the composition of the sequences, all of the relics revolve around this central theme. The use of the physical objects as a means of concentrating on the meaning of Christ's life and the emphasis on the redemptive value of the crucifixion show how the sequences provide a literary interpretation for the relics that parallels the visual iconography of the Sainte-Chapelle. In the chapel, the enclosing walls placed Christ's redemptive purpose in the complete history of the church in the Old Testament antecedents shown in the stained-glass windows and in the continuing sacrifice of the apostles and martyrs depicted in the sculptural figures and painted medallions placed on the

⁶⁰ In the bull, Pope Innocent IV said that the Lord has crowned you (Louis) with his Crown of Thorns ('quod te [Ludovicum] Dominus in sua Corona Spinea, cuius custodiam ineffabili dispositione tuae commisit excellentiae, coronavit'). See n. 4 above. One sequence for the reception of the Crown of Thorns says: 'Ludovice rex Francorum / Sub te vigent antiquorum / Regum diademata / Dum corona coronarum / Spina crucis, flos spinarum / Tua praefert scimata' (AH 8. 22 [No. 16]). Another reads: 'Coeli gaudet unctione / Rex Francorum et Coronae / Dei privilegio' (Hesbert, *Le prosaire*, p. 58 [No. VIII.2b]).

⁶¹ See Grodecki's discussion of the iconography of the Sainte-Chapelle windows in *Les vitraux*, pp. 78-84, and especially pp. 83-84 for the themes connected with royalty and coronation. Grodecki points to the sacred and sacerdotal aspects of French royalty of this period as part of the reason for stressing the connection between the Crown of Thorns relic and the crown of France. Sequence XIX, stanza 2, reflects this idea in relation to Christ: 'Signant sertum spineum / ... Esse Dei Filium / Sacerdotem regium'. See n. 45 above.

architectural dado beneath the windows.⁶² The Grande Châsse containing the physical relics of Christ's passion, the means of human redemption, was placed behind and above the main altar and became the visual focus of the structure.⁶³ The depiction of the crucifixion on the Châsse's front side and the stained-glass window with scenes of the passion rising directly behind the Châsse re-emphasized the meaning of the entire chapel – that Christ's sacrificial death on the Cross redeemed mankind from the bondage of sin.⁶⁴ While these sequences form an important documentary record of the relics as individual objects, they are, along with the Sainte-Chapelle itself, a witness to the spiritual meaning of the relics in thirteenth-century France.

⁶² For the unity of the iconographic program of the Sainte-Chapelle see Branner, 'The Grande Châsse', 13-15; for the iconography of the stained-glass windows see Grodecki, *Les vitraux*, pp. 78-84, 296-303; for the painted medallions see R. Branner, 'The Painted Medallions in the Sainte-Chapelle in Paris', *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* N. S. 58.2 (1968) 5-42, especially 11-15.

⁶³ See n. 4 above.

⁶⁴ For a reconstruction of the Châsse which was destroyed in the French Revolution see Branner, 'The Grande Châsse', 6-13. The two side faces contained representations of the flagellation and the resurrection. With the original placement of the Châsse, the sides also would have been prominently visible (Branner, 'The Grande Châsse', 15). The back of the Châsse could be opened to gain access to the relics. The flagellation represented Christ's passion. The crucifixion and resurrection were closely linked by the idea that from the moment Christ was crucified, he broke the bonds of sin, as Rabanus Maurus indicates: 'Et cruce confixus noxia vincula rupit' (*Carmina* 55.5 [MGH *Poetae latini aevi carolini* 2.220; Berlin, 1884]). For the use of crucifixion-resurrection cycles on reliquaries of the True Cross see Frolow, *Les reliquaires*, pp. 204-208.

Appendix

THE RELICS IN THE GRANDE CHASSE

	Gérard of Saint-Quentin- en-l'Isle, <i>Translatio</i> after 1241	Baldwin II, Act of Cession June 1247	Bari Sequencer <i>De sanctis reliquiis</i> c. 1250-60
1. Crown of Thorns	Gloriossimam Domini coronam, gloriossimum dyadema quod milites de spinis plectentes sanctissimo salvatoris imposuerunt capiti	Sacro sanctum spineam coronam Domini	corona (AH 8.109.1a, XXI.1a, XXIV.1a, 1b, 7a, XXV.2a) sertum spineum (XVIII. XIX.2a) diadema (XIX.4a) cidaris (XIX.5a) corona spinea (XXII.1a) flos de spina (XVIII.5a)
2. A large part of the True Cross	Frustrum magnum crucis Domine, non tamen ad formam crucis redactum, de quo imperatores Constantinopolitani amicis et familiaribus suis dare consueverant	Magnam portionem vivificae crucis Christi	crux (AH 8.109.1b, XVIII. XIX.1a, 1b, XX.6a, XXII. 3b, XXIV.1b, XXV.5a) lignum (XIX.1a, XXIV.4a) lignum vitae (XIX.1b) patibulum (XX.8b)
3. Christ's blood	Sacro sanctus sanguis Domini et Salvatoris nostri Jhesu Christi	Item de sanguine domini nostri Jesu Christi	sanguis (AH 8.109.2a, XVIII.1b, XIX.10a, XX. XXI.2b, XXII.2b, XXIV. XXV.2b)
4. Christ's swaddling clothes	Vestimenta infancie ipsius	Pannos infantie salvatoris, quibus fuit in cunabulis involutus	pannus (AH 8.109.2b, XVIII.2a, XIX.6a, XXI. XXII.2b, XXIV.3a) panni Jesu parvuli (XXV.3)
5. Another part of the True Cross		Aliam magnam partem de ligno sancte crucis	See No. 2
6. Blood produced from an image of Christ	Sanguis etiam qui, mirabili prodigio, de ymagine Domini percussa effluxit	Sanguinem qui de quadam imagine Domini ab infideli percussa, stupendo miraculo, distillavit	thesaurus sanguinis / Percusae imaginis (AH 8.109.5a) Testamenti sanguinem / quem per imaginem / .Fu (XIX.10a) Sanguis imaginis (XXII. XXV.3b) Sanguis est imaginis (XXIV.3b)
7. Iron chain	Cathena qua idem salvator ligatus fuit	Catenam etiam, sive vinculum ferreum, quasi in modum annuli factum, quo creditur idem Dominus fuisse ligatus	cathena ferrea (AH 8.109. XXII.2a) vinculum ferreum (XVIII. XX.2b) catena (XIX.9a, XXI. XXII.4b) vinculum (XIX.9a) catenae vincula (XXIV.3a)

Inventory L March 1534	Inventory M between 1534 and 1573	Inventory R August 1740	Inventory CC March 1791
sainte couronne d'espines Nostre Seigneur Jesus rist (1)	La sainte couronne (1)	La sainte Couronne d'épines de Notre Seigneur (1)	La couronne d'épine de Jésus Christ (1)
sainte Croix (2)	La sainte Croix double (2)	Une partye considerable de la vraye croix de Notre Seigneur (2)	Une grande partie du bois de la croix (2)
Le sang de nostre sauveur (3)	De sanguine Christi (13)	(inscription on relic) DE SANGUINE CHRISTI (13)	Du sang de Notre Seigneur (9)
Les drapeaux d'enfance de nostre sauveur, esquels il fut envelopé en son jeune age (4)	Les drapeaux d'enfance (4)	Les drapeaux d'enfance de Notre Seigneur Jésus Christ (4)	Des drapeaux de son enfance (11)
Une autre grande partie du bois de la sainte Croix (5) (qui n'a été trouvée)			
Le sang qui par miracle mer- veilleux [fut] distillé d'une image de Nostre Seigneur, qui a esté frappée par un infi- delle (6)	Du sang miraculeux (11)	Du Sang miraculeux de Notre Seigneur (11)	Du sang miraculeux sorti d'une image de Notre Sei- gneur, frappé par un infidelle (10)
La chaine ou lien de fer faite à maniere d'anneau, duquel il croit que nostre sauveur est lié (7)	Le carquan (14)	(inscription) DE CATENA QUA LIGATUS EST CHRISTUS (14)	Les menottes (7)

	Gérard of Saint-Quentin- en-l'Isle, <i>Translatio</i> after 1241	Baldwin II, Act of Cession June 1247	Bari Sequencer <i>De sanctis reliquiis</i> c. 1250-60
8. Holy Face (Image of Edessa)	Tabula quedam quam, cum deponeretur Dominus de cruce, ejus facies tetigit	Sanctam toellam, tabulae in- sertam	tabula (AH 8.109.4b, XIX.10b, XXIV.3a, XXV.3 mappa (XVIII.2a) mappula (XXI.2a, XXII.2 4b)
9. Part of Christ's sepulcher	Lapis quidam magnus de se- pulchro ipsius	Magnam partem de lapide sepulchri domini nostri Jesu Christi	Pars de Christi tumulo (A 8.109.4a, XXV.3a) pars sepulchri (XVIII.2 XXI.3a, XXIV.4a) tumulus (XIX.12a, XX.8 XXII.3a, 5b)
10. Virgin's milk	De lacte quoque gloriosissime Virginis matris ejus	De lacte beatae Mariae Virgi- nis	lac virginis (AH 8.109.5 XVIII.2a, XIX.11a, 11b, XXI.2b, XXII.3a, 5a, XXIV.3b, XXV.3b)
11. Iron from lance	Gloriosissimum lancee ferrum	Item ferrum sacrae lanceae quo perforatum fuit in cruce latus domini nostri Jesu Christi	lancea (AH 8.109.3a, XIX.7 XXII.2a, 4a, XXIV.6b, XXV.5a) mucro (XVIII.1b, XIX.7b) sacrum gladium (XXI.2a) See No. 2
12. Smaller triumphal cross	Quedam crux mediocris que dicitur triumphalis	Crucem aliam mediocrem, quam crucem triumphalem veteres appellabant, quia ip- sam in spem victoriae consue- verant imperatores ad bella deferre	
13. Scarlet cloak	Vestis coccinea qua milites illudentes induerunt Domi- num	Clamidem coccineam quam circumdederunt milites do- mino nostro Jesu Christo in illusionem ipsius	pallium (AH 8.109.2b, XIX.6a, XXV.5a) vestimentum Christi coci- naeum (XVIII.1b, XXI.1b) purpura Domini (XIX.2a) rubea vestis (XIX.5b) purpura regali (XX.4b) vestis (XXII.2a, 4a) vestis est purpurea (XXIV.6 mutatoria (XIX.5b)
14. Reed scepter	Arundo preciosa quam in ejus posuerunt dextra in sceptri similitudinem	Arundinem quam pro sceptro posuerunt in manu ipsius	arundo (AH 8.109.2a, XX.5 XXIV.6a) sceptrum arundineum (XVIII.1b, XIX.2a, XXI.1 XXV.5b) sceptrum (XXII.2a, 4a)
15. Sponge	De spongia que salvatori in cruce salutem nostram sitiendi fuit porrecta	Spongiam quam porrexerunt ei sitiendi in cruce, aceto ple- nam	spongia (AH 8.109.3b, XVIII.2a, XIX.10b, XXI.2 XXII.2a, 4b, XXIV.5b, XXV.5b) acetosa potatur spongia (XX.6b)

Inventory L March 1534	Inventory M between 1534 and 1573	Inventory R August 1740	Inventory CC March 1791
sainte trelle inserée à la e [où est la face de Nostre neur Jesus Christ] (8)	La veronique (19)	La représentation de la sainte face de Notre Seigneur, ou la Véronique (19)	Une sainte face (18)
e grande partie de la pierre sepulchre de Nostre Sei- ur Jesus Christ (9)	La pierre du sepulchre (18)	Un morceau de la pierre du sepulcre de Notre Seigneur (18)	Un morceau de la pierre du sepulcre (19)
lait de la benoite vierge rie (10)	De lacte Virginis (12)	(inscription) DE LACTE VIRGINIS (12)	Du lait de la Vierge (13)
fer de la sainte lance, quel fut percé en la croix le té de Nostre seigneur Jesus rist (11)	Le fer de la lance (17)	Un morceau du fer de la lance qui a percé le costé de Notre Seigneur (17)	Un morceau de fer de la lance (3)
e autre croix moyenne, uelle les anciens appelloient mphale, parce que les em- eurs avoient de coustume la porter en bataille en erance de victoire contre rs ennemis (12)	La croix de victoire (5)	Une croix, appelée la croix de Victoire (5)	La croix de Victoire (8)
mantel de pourpre que les valiers baillèrent à Nostre gneur en se mocquant de (13)	La robe de pourpre (3)	Un morceau de la robe de pourpre de Notre Seigneur (3)	Du manteau de pourpre (4)
runce qu'ils mirent à la in de Nostre Seigneur au 1 de sepre (14)	Le sceptre (7)	Un rozeau qui a servy de sceptre à Notre seigneur (7)	Du roseau (5)
sponge qu'ils luy baillèrent a croix plein de vinagre and il dit <i>sitio</i> (15)	L'esponge (10)	Un morceau de l'éponge qui fut présentée à Notre Seigneur (10)	De l'éponge (6)

	Gérard of Saint-Quentin- en-l'Isle, <i>Translatio</i> after 1241	Baldwin II, Act of Cession June 1247	Bari Sequencer <i>De sanctis reliquiis</i> c. 1250-60
16. Part of the shroud	Pars quedam sudarii quo in sepulchro positum corpus Christi obvolutum fuit	Partem sudarii quo involutum fuit corpus ejus in sepulchro	sudarium (AH 8.109.2b, XVIII.2a, XIX.6a, XXI.2a, XXII.2b, 5a, XXIV.6b, XXV.5a)
17. Cloth for washing disciples' feet	Preciosum lintheum quo precinctus in cena Dominus, peracto humilitatis obsequio, pedes discipulorum extersit	Lintheum etiam quo praecinxit se quando lavit pedes discipulorum, et quo eorum pedes extersit	lintheum (AH 8.109.3b, XVIII.2a, XIX.10b, XXI.2a, XXIV.6a, XXV.5b)
18. Rod of Moses	Virga Moysi qua eduxit aquam de vena silicis	Virgam Moysi	virgula Moysi (AH 8.109.2a, XIX.10b, XXI.2b, XXII.2a, XXIV.6a, XXV.5a) virga Legis (XVIII.2b)
19. Head of John the Baptist (upper part)	Superior pars capitis Baptiste et precursoris Christi	Superiorem partem capitis beati Johannis Baptiste	praeco Christi praevious (/ 8.109.5b) calvaria Baptistae prae (XVIII.2b, XIX.12b) calvariam Praecursoris (XXI.4a) (caput) Baptistae (XXIV.4a, XXV.4a)
20, 21, 22. Heads of Saints Blaise, Clement, Simeon	Caput sancti Blasii, caput etiam sancti Clementis, cum capite beatissimi Symeonis	Capita sanctorum Blasii, Clementis et Simeonis	sacra Clemens, Blasius ... senex eximius (AH 8.109.5) capita obvii Simeonis, Clementis, Blasii (XVIII.2a, XXI.3b, XXIV.4b) capita Bajuli Christi, et Clementis, Blasii (XIX.12a, 12) Simeon eximius, Clemens que Blasius (XXV.4a) peplum virginis (AH 8.109.5a, XIX.11a, XXI.2a, XXII.3a, 5a) velum virgineum (XVIII.2a, XXV.5b) Maria peplum (XXIV.5a)
23. Part of Virgin's veil	Pars quedam de peplo gloriosissime Virginis		

Inventory L March 1534	Inventory M between 1534 and 1573	Inventory R August 1740	Inventory CC March 1791
Une partie du suaire auquel est enveloppé son corps au pulchre (16)	De sindone Domini (9)	(inscription) DE SINDONE DO- MINI	Du saint suaire (17)
Le linceul que Nostre Sei- neur avoit ceint quand il lava les pieds de ses disciples, et auquel il essuya leurs pieds (17)	Le saint linceul (8)	Un morceau du linceul qui a servy au lavement des pieds des apostres	Du linge dont il se servoit au lavement des pieds (12)
La verge de Moyse (18)	La verge de Moyse (16)	La Verge de Moyse (16)	La verge de Moÿse (20)
La haute partie du chef du saint Jean Baptiste (19)	Le chef de saint Jean (6)	Un buste d'or representant le chef saint Jean (6)	Le haut du chef de Jean Baptiste (16)
Les chefs de saint Blaise, saint Clement, saint Simon (20)			See above, p. 320 n. 19.
Et neantmoins, outre le con- tenu audict inventaire, a esté trouvée le voile de Nostre Dame, mere du Redempteur, en une petite boîte de fin or, ouvrage neeslé.	Peplum Virginis (15)	Partie du voile de la Vierge (15)	De son voile (15)

THE INFLUENCE OF ACADEMIC PROLOGUES ON THE PROLOGUES AND LITERARY ATTITUDES OF LATE-MEDIEVAL ENGLISH WRITERS*

A. J. Minnis

IN recent years, several scholars have tried to relate medieval literary theory to medieval literary practice. The results have been somewhat disappointing, because the sophistication of the practice has seemed far to outweigh that of the theory. The *artes praedicandi* deal with the construction of sermons and so are very specialised; the *artes poeticae* are limited to practical teaching in the use of tropes, figures and other short-term poetic effects. Both types of source do throw some light on creative processes, but our literary-critical demands are far from being met. We are obliged to search again, in a different range of medieval writings, for a conceptual equipment which influenced the attitudes that major authors had towards such issues as the value (moral and aesthetic) of their creativity, the literary roles they had adopted, and the functions which they envisaged their works as performing. I suggest that such a range of writings is provided by the medieval introductions or 'prologues' to the texts prescribed for study in universities and schools of various kinds.¹ A common system of textual study was applied by both teachers of *artes* and teachers of theology; the same

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¹ It has recently been suggested that 'scholastic' literary theory should be considered as a temporary aberration from the medieval norm, which is defined (rather fantastically) as 'humanistic' literary criticism: see O. B. Hardison, 'Towards a History of Medieval Literary Criticism', *Medievalia et humanistica* 7 (1976) 1-12. In general, there has been a tendency to regard the arts faculties of certain medieval universities, and other schools in which classical authors were studied, as centres of nascent humanism and hence of viable literary criticism. Humanism is then supposed to have retreated before scholasticism, rhetoric and poetic before logic and dialectic. However, it is possible to interpret the evidence in a different way. The theologians' academic prologues indicate their considerable interest in sophisticated literary theory. Indeed, one can argue that the impact of logic and dialectic on such literary awareness, far from destroying it, enabled it to acquire a new prestige.

basic prologue-types were employed in both kinds of school. The prologue became an important vehicle for the advancement of literary theory. Successive generations of scholars developed its terms of reference into a precise and comprehensive 'critical idiom'. This idiom became widely disseminated, appearing in works of very different kinds, and – as I hope to show – was held in esteem by major medieval writers such as, in the case of England, John Gower, Geoffrey Chaucer and Thomas Usk. The prologues which Gower and Usk provided for their own works follow the traditional patterns of academic prologues; in academic prologues they had found an idiom sophisticated enough to provide the basis for their descriptions and justifications of their writings.

In the first two sections of this article the academic prologues characteristic of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries respectively are considered in some detail. The third section is concerned with certain applications and developments of both types of academic prologue in different kinds of literary work, written either in Latin or *in vulgari*. The prolegomena in John Gower's *Vox clamantis* and *Confessio amantis* are the subjects of sections IV and V. Chaucer's knowledge of the literary theory transmitted by academic prologues is considered in section VI, while the final section contains some general observations concerning the place which academic prologues occupy in the full context of changing attitudes to literature in the later Middle Ages.

I

Academic prologues introduced commentaries on *auctores*.² The term *auctor* did not mean simply 'writer'; it was an accolade bestowed upon an important writer by those scholars who, after his death, composed commentaries on his works and cited extracts from his works as *auctoritates*.³ Two criteria for the award of the accolade were applied: 'authenticity' and 'intrinsic worth'. A saying or a piece of writing had to be authentic;⁴ it had to be the genuine

² For medieval discussions of the term *auctor* see *Summa Britonis sive Guillelmi Britonis Expositiones vocabulorum biblie* 1, ed. L. W. Daly and B. A. Daly (Thesaurus mundi 15; Padua, 1975), p. 74; Joannes de Janua, *Catholicon*, s.v. 'auctor' (Venice, 1495), fols. 73v-74r; Hugutio of Pisa, *Magnae derivationes*, s.v. 'augeo' (Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Bodley 376, fol. 1r) which may be compared with Dante's *Il convivio* 4. 6.

³ For the medieval practice of arguing from *auctoritates* see M.-D. Chenu, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 2nd edition (Montreal-Paris, 1954), pp. 111-13, 117-25 and *La théologie au douzième siècle*, 2nd edition (Paris, 1966), pp. 360-65; J. de Ghellinck, 'Patristique et argument de tradition au bas moyen âge' in *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Suppl. 3. 1; Münster, 1935), pp. 403-26.

⁴ For the term *authenticus* see Chenu, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, pp. 109-11 and *La théologie au douzième siècle*, pp. 358-65.

production of a named *auctor*.⁵ Works of unknown or uncertain authorship were regarded as 'apocryphal', and they were supposed to possess an *auctoritas* far inferior to that of works which were the genuine productions of old and established *auctores*.⁶ Secondly, there was the criterion of intrinsic worth.⁷ An *auctor* had to say the right things; his work had to conform, in one way or another, to Christian truth. The writings of an *auctor* contained, or possessed, *auctoritas*.⁸

In the twelfth century, a type of prologue became widely used which was concerned with the *auctor* mainly as a source of *auctoritas*. In the thirteenth century, a more elaborate type of prologue emerged in which the emphasis had shifted, and the *auctor* was discussed as an agent engaged in a certain kind of literary activity. These two types of prologue shall be considered in turn.

One product of the systematization of knowledge which characterizes the twelfth century was the appearance of a single prologue-paradigm at the beginning of commentaries on textbooks of all disciplines.⁹ *Artistae* called it an *accessus* (though this is mainly a feature of German manuscripts).¹⁰ Scriptural exegetes called it an *introitus* and later an *ingressus*,¹¹ and glossators of the

⁵ For example, see Aquinas' comments on the unauthentic *Liber de causis* and *Liber de spiritu et anima*, quoted by Chenu, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, p. 111 n. 2. See also G. Geenen, 'S. Thomas et ses sources pseudépigraphiques', *Ephemerides theologiae Lovanienses* 20 (1943) 71-80; P. C. Spicq, *Esquisse d'une histoire de l'exégèse latine au moyen âge* (Paris, 1944), pp. 106, 146, 148, 151, 156.

⁶ See Spicq, *ibid.*, pp. 107-108, 146-52, 156-59.

⁷ Texts without sufficient worth were also regarded as apocryphal: see Spicq, *ibid.*, pp. 147-48, 150-51.

⁸ For discussion of the related concepts *auctor* and *auctoritas* see M.-D. Chenu, 'Auctor, actor, autor', *Archivum latinitatis mediæ aevi* 4 (1927) 81-86 and *Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, pp. 109-11.

⁹ For differing theories concerning the origin of this prologue-paradigm see G. Przychocki, 'Accessus Ovidiani', *Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności, wydział filologiczny*, 3rd Ser., 4 (1911) 65-126 (106-20), and E. A. Quain, 'The Medieval "Accessus ad auctores"', *Traditio* 3 (1945) 215-64 (261-64). See further P. Courcelle, *Les lettres grecques en occident de Macrobe à Cassiodore*, 2nd edition (Paris, 1948), pp. 270-72, and L. G. Westerink's introduction to his edition of *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Amsterdam, 1962). On the dissemination of this prologue-paradigm in the twelfth century see R. W. Hunt, 'The Introductions to the "Artes" in the Twelfth Century' in *Studia mediaevalia in honorem admodum reverendi patris R. J. Martin* (Bruges, 1948), pp. 85-112 (pp. 96-97); Quain, *ibid.*, 216-42.

¹⁰ See *Accessus ad auctores*; Bernard d'Utrecht; Conrad d'Hirsau, *Dialogus super auctores*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Leiden, 1970), pp. 2-6. On the texts used in the arts faculties of medieval universities see L. J. Paetow, *The Arts Course at Medieval Universities with Special Reference to Grammar and Rhetoric* (University of Illinois Studies 3, no. 7; Champaign, 1910); H. Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, 3 vols., rev. F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden (Oxford, 1936), I. 36-46, 440-43 and 3. 153-56; E. R. Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, trans. W. R. Trask (New York-London, 1953), pp. 48-54.

¹¹ *Introitus* is used by Petrus Comestor in the prologues to his commentaries on the Psalter and St. Matthew's gospel: see the extracts printed in F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium biblicum mediæ*

Roman Law called it a *materia*.¹² This paradigm consisted of the following headings:¹³

Titulus (or inscriptio) libri

The book-title. Discussion under this heading could involve complicated and often specious etymologies.

Nomen auctoris

The name of the *auctor*, which again could involve etymologies. The issue of authenticity was raised also, the commentator either affirming the identity of his *auctor* or recounting the theories concerning who the *auctor* really was. Sometimes a short *vita auctoris* was provided.¹⁴

Intentio auctoris (or intentio scribentis)

The moral aim or didactic purpose of the *auctor* in writing. Sometimes *finis* was used as an equivalent of this term, sometimes as an extension of it. Accounts of *intentio auctoris* were prescriptive rather than descriptive: there was rarely any attempt (at least, not until the very late Middle Ages) to relate an author's intention to his historical context, to describe a writer's personal prejudices, eccentricities and limitations. Instead the text was 'reverently expounded',¹⁵ the commentators being more interested in truth than in what we might call the true intention of the author. The *intentio auctoris* – the intended meaning piously interpreted and rendered unimpeachable – was considered more important than the *verba*, the humble medium for the conveyance of the profound message. Hence, literary analyses of texts could hardly emerge. The texts of secular *auctores* were expounded, and sometimes elaborately allegorized, so that they could be seen to contain nothing contrary to Christian truth.¹⁶ According to the commentators,

aevi, 11 vols. (Madrid, 1949-80), nos. 6564/1 and 6575. Peter of Poitiers employs this term in his Psalter-commentary: see P. S. Moore, *The Works of Peter of Poitiers* (Washington, D. C., 1936), pp. 95-96, 178. *Ingressus* is used, for example, by Praepositinus of Cremona in his Psalter-commentary: see Moore, pp. 95-96. Compare the prologue to the anonymous collection of *distinctiones* on the Psalter found in Cambridge, Corpus Christi College ms. 217, fols. 21r-22v and the prologue to Hugh of St. Cher's Psalter-commentary (*Hugonis cardinalis Postilla*, 6 vols. [Paris, 1530-45], 2, fols. 2r-3v).

¹² See H. Kantorowicz, *Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law* (Cambridge, 1938), p. 51.

¹³ Compare Hunt, 'Introductions to the "Artes"', 95.

¹⁴ For example, see the lives of Ovid discussed by F. Ghisalberti, 'Medieval Biographies of Ovid', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 9 (1946) 10-59.

¹⁵ On the practice of 'reverent exposition' see Spicq, *Esquisse*, pp. 10-14; Chenu, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, pp. 122-25.

¹⁶ For examples see the *accessus* printed by Przychocki, Ghisalberti and Huygens (references above). See further E. Jeuneau, 'L'usage de la notion d'*integumentum* à travers les gloses de Guillaume de Conches', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 24 (1957) 35-87; L. K. Born, 'Ovid and Allegory', *Speculum* 9 (1934) 362-79; F. Ghisalberti, *Arnolfo d'Orleans, un cultore di Ovidio nel secolo XII* (Milan, 1932); P. O. Kristeller, F. E. Cranz, eds., *Catalogus translationum et commentariorum* 1-4 (Washington, D. C., 1960-80).

Homer had intended to dissuade people from unlawful union, which – as in the case of Paris and Helen – incurs the wrath of the gods;¹⁷ Ovid had intended to reprehend in chastity and to commend legal and just love;¹⁸ Lucan had intended to discourage his readers from engaging in civil wars.¹⁹ In the case of sacred scripture, the human *auctor* was considered important in proportion to the extent that he had contributed to the vast pattern of meaning supposed to be hidden in the Bible.²⁰ It was this pattern which the scriptural exegete strove to describe, not the personal meaning of any single writer. Complex allegorical interpretations moved quickly from the husk of ‘the letter’ to the sweet kernel of the spiritual sense.

Materia libri

The material of the work. This heading introduced a description of subject matter and contents.

Modus agendi (or *modus tractandi*)

The method of didactic procedure employed in the work, the manner in which its material was organised.

Utilitas

The ultimate utility of the work, the reason why it was part of a Christian curriculum.

Cui parti philosophiae supponitur

The aspect of philosophy to which the work pertained. This heading was applied to all the ‘set’ texts studied by scholars of the arts. *Artistae* constantly remark, ‘fere omnes auctores ad ethicam pertinent’.²¹ Scriptural exegetes felt obliged to modify the heading *pars philosophiae* to fit the needs of their sacred texts: inspired scripture was far superior to writings produced by merely human agency. In one version of his commentary on the Song of Songs, Stephen Langton (who became archbishop of Canterbury in 1207) speaks of the ‘*pars philosophiae vel humanitatis*’;²² in another version he drops the awkward heading and describes the ‘*pars vite*’.²³ Twelfth-century commentators on the Psalter ignored the heading

¹⁷ Huygens, *Accessus ad auctores*, p. 26.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 29, 30, 32.

¹⁹ *Arnulfi Aurelianensis Glosule super Lucanum*, ed. B. M. Marti (Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome 18; Rome, 1958), p. 3.

²⁰ For fuller explanation of this point see my article, ‘Discussions of “Authorial Role” and “Literary Form” in Late-Medieval Scriptural Exegesis’, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* 99 (1977) 37–65 (37–40).

²¹ For example, this phrase occurs in two *accessus* printed by K. Young, ‘Chaucer’s Appeal to the Platonic Deity’, *Speculum* 19 (1944) 1–13 (5, 6).

²² Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Bodley 528, fol. 55r.

²³ Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Bodley 87, fol. 150r. See further, G. Lacombe and B. Smalley, ‘Studies on the Commentaries of Cardinal Stephen Langton’, *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 5 (1931) 1–220 (140–44).

altogether and discussed instead the 'pars prophetic' to which David's prophecies belonged.²⁴

Scriptural exegetes were therefore very conscious of the unique status of the Bible. This remark by a twelfth-century commentator on the Apocalypse seems to indicate a conscious transition which is being made with a certain reticence:

Sicut in saecularibus libris quaeritur quae sit materia, quae auctoritas, quae auctoris intentio, cui parti philosophiae supponatur, sic quoque in hoc prophetico quaeri solet.²⁵

However, the *introitus* soon became a standard feature of scriptural commentaries, and exegetes successfully exploited techniques of analysis which for generations had been employed in *accessus*. It is doubtful if we will ever ascertain the identity of the scholar who first transferred the academic prologue from the *artes* to theology. The suggestion that Anselm of Laon (d. 1117) was the innovator is attractive but impossible to prove;²⁶ we are on safer ground when we come to the scriptural commentaries of two of his pupils, Gilbert de la Porrée (c. 1080-1154) and Peter Abelard (1079-1142).²⁷

Here a Psalter-prologue is offered as a specimen of twelfth-century exegesis at its best, together with an *accessus* to Ovid's *Heroides*, a work which presented medieval scholars with problems of description similar to those encountered in their exegesis of the Psalter. In the *accessus*, it is stated that Ovid's *intentio* was to reprehend three kinds of love: infatuation, unchastity and mad passion.²⁸ The first is exemplified by Phyllis, the second by Helen, the third by Canace. Moreover, Ovid intended to commend chaste love by writing of noble Greek women like Phaedra. Caesar had accused Ovid of misleading the Roman matrons with erotic poetry; in reply he wrote the *Heroides*:

... unde librum scripsit eis, istum exemplum proponens, ut sciant amando quas debeant imitari, quas non.

The basic notion is that certain *exempla* within the collection work positively by describing chaste and legal love in such a way that the reader is made aware of its attractiveness, whereas unchaste and foolish loves are described in such a

²⁴ See, for example, the prologues to the Psalter-commentaries in the *Glossa ordinaria* (PL 113. 843) and Peter Lombard, *Magna glosatura* (PL 191. 58).

²⁵ Printed by H. E. Allen, 'The *Manuel des Pechiez* and the Scholastic Prologue', *The Romanic Review* 8 (1917) 434-62 (457 n. 60).

²⁶ For discussion see O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles* 5 (Gembloux, 1959), p. 173; cf. N. Häring, 'Two Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 27 (1960) 68 n. 12.

²⁷ See Hunt, 'Introductions to the "Artes"', 96.

²⁸ Huygens, *Accessus ad auctores*, p. 32.

way that they appear obnoxious. The anonymous commentator speaks of the general *intentio* of the whole work and the particular *intentiones* of the different verse-epistles:

Sciendum quoque est quod cum in toto libro hanc et supradictas habeat intentiones, preterea duas habet in hoc libro, unam generalem et aliam specialem: generalem delectare et communiter prodesse, specialem habet intentionem, sicut in singulis epistolis, aut laudando castum amorem, ... aut vituperando incestum amorem Et bene diversae epistolae diversas intentiones habent, quia dum quasdam de castitate <commendare>, alias de incesto amore reprehendere proposuit, diversa intendebat.

The epistles therefore work in a harmonious way to teach and delight. The *utilitas* of the work consists in its clear distinction between good and bad kinds of love:

Utilitas vel finalis causa secundum intentiones diversificantur, vel illicitorum vel stultorum amorum cognitio vel quomodo aliquae per epistolas sollicitentur vel quomodo per effectus ipsius castitatis commodum consequamur. Vel finalis causa est ut per commendationem caste amantium ad castos amores nos invitet vel ut visa utilitate quae ex legitimo amore procedit visisque infortuniis vel incommoditatibus quae ex illicito et stulto amore proveniunt, et stultum et illicitum repellamus et fugiamus et legitimo adhereamus.

Ethicae supponitur, because the work teaches us about just and correct love. Within a general moral framework, some epistles function to make us reject evil love, while others function to secure our approval for good love. The general moral *intentio* of the work is perfectly compatible with different *intentiones*, *materiae* and methods of instruction (*modi*) in different parts of the work; indeed, it is the very diversity of *intentiones*, *materiae* and didactic methods which brings about the moral *intentio*.

In a similar way, the Psalter-commentator describes diverse psalms with diverse *intentiones*, *materiae* and *modi* as contributing to a common *intentio*.²⁹ The Psalter is supposed to speak of Christ: sometimes with regard to his deity, sometimes with regard to his humanity, and sometimes with regard to his mystical body which is the Church. Considered as a whole, the work has *communis materia* and a *communis intentio*:

²⁹ PL 116. 196C-D. A. Wilmart thought that this commentator was Anselm of Laon, an opinion which has found little support: see especially the criticism by W. Hartmann, 'Psalmen-kommentare aus der Zeit der Reform und der Frühscholastik', *Studi gregoriani* 9 (1972) 315-66 (346-47). For a recent defence of Wilmart's theory see V. I. J. Flint, 'Some Notes on the Early Twelfth Century Commentaries on the Psalms', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 38 (1971) 80-88.

Communis materia totius hujus operis, Christus est tripliciter acceptus De hac vero materia hoc modo tractat, ostendit potentiam deitatis, perfectionem humanitatis Christi, universitatem sanctitatis membrorum, conversionem peccatorum. Item communis intentio est, ut nos Christo conformes efficiat

Individual psalms have diverse *materiae* and *intentiones*, but these diverse *materiae* and *intentiones* are subservient to the *communis materia* and *communis intentio* to which they all contribute:

Quod vero de contrariis, id est, daemonibus impiis interseritur, non ideo fit, quod sit de principali materia; sed ut principali materiei subserviat, per quasdam commoditates admiscetur: ut in primo psalmo de impiis adducit, ut per eorum poenam homines ab eorum conformitate deterreat, et ad Christi conformitatem reducat.

Therefore, the commentators could meet the ancient criticism (which goes back to Plato at least³⁰) that poetry inflames the passions, by arguing that certain poems can move the will in the right moral direction. This idea is a major feature of the Psalter-prologue produced by Gilbert de la Porrée (died 1154).³¹ Here the title *Liber hymnorum* is said to be a fitting *titulus libri* because the *intentio* of the Psalter is not simply to teach of Christ, but, by appealing to the *affectus* or will, to move carnal men to praise Him:

Intendit enim propheta non solum de Christo quae proponit docere, uerum etiam docendo affectum carnalium hominum ad eandem laudem trahere.

Hence, the psalms are in verse and are adorned with diverse kinds of speech. David praised the Lord with others in the presence of a multitude:

Unde etiam metricè scripsit et diuersis loquendi generibus opus ornauit et ante archam uoce et instrumentis et maxime cum psalterio ipse cum multis et coram multis cantauit.

From the twelfth century onwards, it could be argued that poetry, whether sacred or secular, had a commendable 'affective' quality which was the basis of its *utilitas* in a Christian society.³²

However, the type of academic prologue which we have been considering had certain limitations as a vehicle for literary theory. Twelfth-century com-

³⁰ Republic 10. 605A-607E in *Ancient Literary Criticism: The Principal Texts in New Translations*, ed. D. A. Russell and M. Winterbottom (Oxford, 1972), pp. 72-74.

³¹ Printed in [D. De Bruyne], *Préfaces de la Bible latine* (Namur, 1920), pp. 111-12.

³² For later notions of 'affective' writing see A. J. Minnis, 'Literary Theory in Discussions of *Formae tractandi* by Medieval Theologians', *New Literary History* 11 (1979) 133-45 and *Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages*, chap. 4 (forthcoming).

mentators were usually so impressed by the *auctoritas* of their texts that they neglected the integrity of the human *auctores* who had transmitted them.³³ Their systematic application of the traditional prologue-headings tended to establish the similarities between texts rather than to provide a basis for discrimination between texts according to genre or some other literary principle. This tendency was especially marked in scriptural exegesis. Despite the classification of scriptural texts provided by Hugh of St. Victor (died 1141) and others,³⁴ there was little variation in the critical vocabulary employed to describe the different classes of text. God had guaranteed the truth of holy scripture; his great *auctoritas* was manifest at every point. The commentators' emphasis was therefore upon the interdependence of the parts of scripture and the essential harmony of the different books of the Bible.³⁵

II

Change came in the thirteenth century. The older prologue-vocabulary was supplemented; its technical idiom was given greater precision and a more literary dimension.³⁶ The new methods of thinking and techniques of study which thirteenth-century scholars derived from Aristotle encouraged commentators to adopt and develop a new type of prologue, a prologue which was based on the Aristotelian concept of the four causes.³⁷ The headings characteristic of this type of prologue (hereafter referred to as the 'Aristotelian prologue') may be outlined as follows:

Causa efficiens

The 'efficient cause' or *auctor*. This heading replaced, or was used in conjunction with, *nomen auctoris*. Here the issue of authenticity was discussed.

Causa materialis

The 'material cause', or the material of the book under discussion. This heading replaced, or was used in conjunction with, *materia libri*.

Causa formalis

The 'formal cause' of the work. Commentators spoke of the *duplex forma*, the *forma tractandi* (which was the *modus agendi* or *modus procedendi* employed by

³³ For discussion of the points raised in this paragraph see Minnis, "'Authorial Role" and "Literary Form"', 37-40.

³⁴ See Spicq, *Esquisse*, pp. 147-48.

³⁵ See, for example, Hugh of St. Victor's praise of the unity of the Bible, in which he uses the metaphor of the cithar: *Hugonis de sancto Victore Didascalicon de studio legendi* 5. 2, ed. C. H. Buttner (Washington, D. C., 1939), pp. 95-96.

³⁶ See Minnis, "'Authorial Role" and "Literary Form"', 40-41.

³⁷ Hunt, 'Introductions to the "Artes"', 107-109; B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1952), p. 297.

the *auctor*) and the *forma tractatus* or *divisio* or *ordinatio* (under which heading the structure of the work was discussed).

Causa finalis

The 'final cause' or *raison d'être* of the work. Under this heading were combined the kinds of discussion which previously had been found under *utilitas*, *intentio* and often *cui parti philosophiae supponitur*.

During the first half of the thirteenth century, the 'Aristotelian prologue' became very popular among lecturers in the arts faculty at the University of Paris. In Jordan of Saxony's commentary on *Priscianus minor* (written around 1220) Priscian's *modus agendi* and the *forma* in which his *materia* was arranged were described as two aspects of a single thing, the *causa formalis*:

*Causa formalis huius doctrine est forma tractandi et forma tractatus. Forma tractandi est modus agendi qui est principalis, diffinitivus, divisivus, probativus, improbativus et exemplorum suppositivus; forma tractatus est forma rei tradite que consistit in separatione librorum et capitulorum et ordine eorumdem.*³⁸

The *causa efficiens* also had two aspects, *extra* and *intra*. The *causa efficiens extra* was the *auctor*, the *causa efficiens intra* was identified with the *causa formalis intra* and the *causa finalis intra*. The *causa finalis extra* was in its turn subdivided into the *causa propinqua* and *causa remota*.³⁹ For example, an anonymous commentary on Aristotle's *Praedicamenta* begins as follows:

Equivoca dicuntur etc. Causa efficiens extra huius libri, qui est primus de integritate logices, fuit Aristotiles. Causa efficiens intra et finalis et formalis est eadem, secundum quod dicit Aristotiles in phisicis quod tres cause incidunt in vnam. Causa autem finalis extra duplex [est,] scilicet propinqua et remota. Causa

³⁸ Quoted by B. Sandkühler, *Die frühen Dantekommentare und ihr Verhältnis zur mittelalterlichen Kommentartradition* (Münchner romanistische Arbeiten 19; Munich, 1967), p. 32, who corrects the transcription in M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, 3 vols. (Munich, 1926-56), 3. 234. Note, however, that for Sandkühler's 'principaliter' and 'ordinem' the manuscript (Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 1291) has actually 'principalis' and 'ordine' as given above. For a partial edition of the text, see M. Sirridge, *Notulae super Priscianum minorem magistri Jordani* (Copenhagen, 1980), especially p. 2.

³⁹ For discussion of such vocabulary in the logical commentaries of Robert Kilwardby (master of arts at Paris c. 1237-c. 1245) and his successors, see P. O. Lewry, *Robert Kilwardby's Writings on the Logica vetus Studied with Regard to Their Teaching and Method* (unpublished D. Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1978), especially pp. 215-28. For grammatical commentaries attributed to Kilwardby see S. H. Thomson, 'Robert Kilwardby's Commentaries In *Priscianum* and In *Barbarismum Donati*', *The New Scholasticism* 12 (1958) 52-65; J. Pinborg, O. Lewry et al., *The Commentary on 'Priscianus Maior' Ascribed to Robert Kilwardby* (Université de Copenhagen, Cahiers de l'Institut du moyen-âge grec et latin 15; Copenhagen, 1975).

propinqua est scire predicamenta, causa remota est demonstratio et ea que ualent ad demonstracionem ut diffinitio et diuisio.⁴⁰

Within the *causa finalis*, the *causa propinqua* was the specific didactic aim of the text while the *causa remota* was the more general way in which it could instruct and improve the human mind, as is made clear by the description of the final cause of Aristotle's *Topica* provided by a master 'Elyas' who may be Elias Brunetti, O. P.:

Causa finalis duplex est, intra et extra. Intra idem est cum forma, extra duplex est, scilicet propinqua et remota. Propinqua artificialiter sillogizare ad utramque partem problematis, remota tota philosophia et per consequens perfectio anime rationalis per virtutem, ad quam finaliter scientia est.⁴¹

This sophisticated analytical framework was soon taken over and adapted by the theologians.⁴² Richard Fishacre, O.P. (died 1248), who composed the first *Sentences*-commentary to issue from Oxford, distinguished between the diverse instrumental efficient causes of *theologia*, namely, its human *auctores*, and its principal efficient cause, namely, God:⁴³

Licet ergo aliquid Sacrae Scripturae videatur Moyses scripsisse, aliquid similiter prophetae, aliquid evangelistae, aliquid apostoli, tamen non ipsi sed Deus per eos et scripsit et locutus est, tamquam principalis efficiens per instrumentum.

A similar distinction is found in Robert Kilwardby's *Sentences*-commentary, which has a much more elaborate introduction. The framework of Kilwardby's 'Aristotelian prologue' is as follows:

Sapientia aedificavit sibi domum, excidit columnas septem. Prov. 9.1. In his verbis attendi possunt quattuor causae huius doctrinae et omnino totius Sacrae Scripturae. Efficiens per nomen 'sapientiae' Materialis causa attenditur in significatione dictionum. In nomine enim 'sapientiae' materia vel subiectum primi

⁴⁰ Cited by Lewry, *Robert Kilwardby's Writings*, p. 91, who proceeds to dismiss the suggestion that this was the work of Kilwardby.

⁴¹ Quoted by Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* 3. 148.

⁴² The prologues of *artistae* usually began with a discussion of the *causa materialis*: their main interest was in the subject matter and its proper definition. The *causa efficiens* was usually discussed last, and often received cursory treatment (I am indebted to Fr. O. Lewry for this information). By contrast, the theologians – because they were dealing with divinely inspired texts – had a special interest in the *causa efficiens*, and adapted the 'Aristotelian prologue' accordingly.

⁴³ Quoted by F. Stegmüller, ed., *Roberti Kilwardby O. Pr. De natura theologiae* (Opuscula et textus historiam ecclesiae eiusque vitam atque doctrinam illustrantia, Series scholastica 17; Münster, 1935), p. 32 n. 1. See further R. J. Long, 'The Science of Theology according to Richard Fishacre: Edition of the Prologue to His *Commentary on the Sentences*', *Mediaeval Studies* 34 (1972) 71-98.

libri Causa formalis pro parte patet ex ordine verborum in auctoritate praedicta. Secundum enim ordinem verborum est et ordo librorum Causa finalis aliquo modo attendi potest in hoc quod dicitur: *Aedificavit sibi*.⁴⁴

The 'Aristotelian prologue' made its appearance in scriptural exegesis in the commentaries on St. Mark and the Acts of the Apostles ascribed to Hugh of St. Cher, O.P., who produced his *Postillae in totam Bibliam* at Saint-Jacques, Paris, between 1230 and 1236.⁴⁵ St. Mark's gospel is described as a *summa* of what was said more fully in St. Matthew's gospel: in his first nine chapters Mark employed an abbreviating style (*modus abbreviationis*). Then the *cause introductorie* are explained:

Causa efficiens est ipse Marcus, vel gratia Dei, vel rogatus discipulorum Petri, ad quorum petitionem scripsit Evangelium, quod et Petrus confirmavit. ... Causa materialis est Christus et opera eius. Causa formalis [vel] modus agendi: multus enim est in sententijs, sed paucus in verbis. Causa finalis assumitur Ioan. 20.g. vbi dicitur, 'Haec autem scripta sunt, ut credatis, et vt credendo vitam habeatis'.

Hugh's younger contemporary, Guerric of St. Quentin, O.P. (who held the second chair of theology at Saint-Jacques between 1233 and 1242), was perhaps the first exegete to apply the 'four causes' in exegesis of the Old Testament.⁴⁶ Guerric begins his commentary on Isaiah by quoting Ecclesiasticus 48:27, 'in the power of the spirit he saw the last things, he comforted the mourners of Sion'. Here one may perceive the text's two levels of authorship, the human and the divine, which Guerric describes as the *duplex causa efficiens*:

... duplex est causa efficiens, scilicet movens et operans. Causa operans est Isaias, qui intelligitur per suppositum huius verbi *vidit*. Est etiam causa efficiens movens et non operans, que notatur ibi: *spiritu*, sancto scilicet, qui movit Isaiam ut scriberet. Ipse vero non scripsit, quod notatur, in hoc quod dicit *spiritu*.⁴⁷

The Holy Spirit is the 'moving' efficient cause, who inspires the 'operating' efficient cause, namely, the prophet Isaiah, to write:

In twelfth-century prologues to scriptural commentaries, the heading *modus agendi* had usually introduced discussion, conducted with little interest in literary issues, of the way in which the deep divine meaning of the work had been formulated: the *modus* was regarded as the property of the Holy Spirit

⁴⁴ Kilwardby, *De natura theologiae*, pp. 7-12.

⁴⁵ *Hugonis Postilla* 5, fol. 82r; 6, fol. 252v.

⁴⁶ See Smalley, *Study of the Bible*, pp. 273, 296-98 and 'A Commentary on Isaias by Guerric of Saint-Quentin, O.P.' in *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati* 2 (Studi e testi 122; Vatican City, 1946), pp. 383-97.

⁴⁷ Transcribed from Oxford, New College ms. 40 by Smalley, 'A Commentary on Isaias by Guerric of Saint-Quentin', 388-89.

rather than that of the human *auctor*.⁴⁸ But in the 'Aristotelian prologue', the *modus agendi* was redefined as the way in which the individual human *auctor* had chosen to express his personal revelation. The *causa formalis* became the heading under which exegetes discussed both (1) the *formae tractandi* or modes of writing which made the work of one human *auctor* different from that of another, and (2) the *forma tractatus* or *ordinatio* in accordance with which the human *auctor* had structured a given text.

The 'Aristotelian prologue' therefore enabled exegetes to include both theoretical justification and literary analysis in their discussion of a Biblical text, a point which may be illustrated from the prologue of the Psalter-commentary of Nicholas of Lyre, O.F.M. (c. 1270-1340).⁴⁹ The *causa efficiens principalis* is God, the *intentio libri* is divine praise, the *causa finalis* explains how efficacious the Psalter is in leading men to salvation. Paralleling this abstract justification is a concrete procedure of literary analysis. Lyre discusses the diverse *intentiones* and activities of all the contributors who were the instrumental efficient causes of the Psalter; his definition of the *causa finalis* provides the basis for an examination of the particular literary style (the *modus laudis*) which is a means to that end. Once readers have been assured of that divine rapprochement which guarantees the Psalter's *auctoritas*, the literary issues can emerge.

III

Both types of prologue described above continued to be used in many kinds of literary work – written either in Latin or in one of the vernaculars – throughout the later Middle Ages. When, in the fourteenth century, Richard Rolle provided glosses to his English Psalter, he rendered in Middle English a simplified version of the prologue which had been developed by such twelfth-century commentators as Gilbert de la Porrée and Peter Lombard. Rolle describes the Psalter's *mater* (*materia*), *entent* (*intentio*) and *maner of lare* (*modus agendi*) thus:

Pe *mater* of þis boke es Crist and his spouse, þat es, haly kirk, or ilke a rightwys mans saule. Pe *entent* es to confourme þo þat ere fyled in Adam tille Crist in newnes of lyf. Pe *maner of lare* es swilke: vmstunt he spekys of Crist in his godhede, vmstunt in his manhede, vmstunt in þat þat he vses þe voyce of his servauntes. Als so he spekys of haly kirk in thre maners: vmwhile in þe persone of parfite men, summe tyme in persoun of vnparfit menne, summe tyme of ille

⁴⁸ This paragraph is based on Minnis, "'Authorial Role" and "Literary Form"', 41, 52-64.

⁴⁹ *Biblia sacra cum Glossa ordinaria et Postilla Nicolai Lyrani*, 6 vols. (Lyons, 1586), 3. 415-20. For discussion see Minnis, *ibid.*, 47-49, 63-64.

menne. þe whilke are in haly kirk be body noght be thoght, be name noght be dede, in noumbyr noght in merite [*italics mine*].⁵⁰

In the thirteenth century, a prologue to the Apocalypse, ascribed to Gilbert de la Porrée, became one of the standard set of prologues in the 'Paris Bible'.⁵¹ The continuing popularity of this prologue is indicated by its translation into several vernaculars.⁵² The fourteenth-century Middle English version proceeds as follows:

... specialich þe *Matier* of þis book draweþ to þe chirches of Asye. And comunelich of al holy chirche namelich þat it suffreþ in þis lyue & þat it shal resceyue in þat opere. His *entent* is to amonesten to be pacient for þorouz þouzt alle þe tribulaciouns & þe anguisshes ben hard & stronge forto suffren sumtyme. & þefore þe mede is endeles. His writyng is on þis *manere*. on þe first he setteþ a litel prolouge. ... And after þis he telleþ his tale whareof he makeþ þis book þat is departed in seuen sigttes. so þat vche man may vchon by hym one onlich vnderstonden & tellen [*italics mine*].⁵³

In the fourteenth century, 'Aristotelian prologues' introduced commentaries on works as diverse as the *Summula pauperum* (a verse paraphrase of St. Raymond of Peñafort's *Summa poenitentiae*)⁵⁴ and the prophecies ascribed to 'John of Bridlington'.⁵⁵ Of more fundamental importance is the development of commentaries on texts used for teaching in grammar schools, such as the *Liber Catonis*, the *Ecloga* of Theodolus, the *Liber cartulae* or *De contemptu mundi* falsely ascribed to St. Bernard, the *Tobias* of Matthew of Vendôme, the *Parvum doctrinale* or *Liber parabolarum* of Alain de Lille, the *Fabulae* of Aesop and/or Avianus, and the *Floretus sancti Bernardi*.⁵⁶ Of special interest are the glosses to

⁵⁰ *English Writings of Richard Rolle, Hermit of Hampole*, ed. H. E. Allen (Oxford, 1931; rpt. 1963), p. 7.

⁵¹ S. Berger, *Les préfaces jointes aux livres de la Bible dans les manuscrits de la Vulgate* (Extrait de Mémoires présentés par divers savants à l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, première série. 11. 2; Paris 1902), pp. 1-78 (p. 28). For the 'Paris Bible' see H. Denifle, 'Das Exemplar Parisiense', *Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* 4 (1888) 277-92; Smalley, *Study of the Bible*, p. 63.

⁵² For the French translation of the prologue ascribed to Gilbert see S. Berger, *La Bible française au moyen âge* (Paris, 1884; rpt. Geneva, 1967), pp. 87-88.

⁵³ *An English Fourteenth-Century Apocalypse Version with a Prose Commentary*, ed. E. Friðner (Lund Studies in English 29; Lund-Copenhagen, 1961), pp. 4-5.

⁵⁴ *Summula pauperum* (Cologne, 1502), unfoliated.

⁵⁵ *Political Poems and Songs*, ed. T. Wright, 2 vols. (RS 14; London, 1859-61), I. 123-215.

⁵⁶ For the *Auctores octo*, widely used on the continent until 1500, see N. Orme, *English Schools in the Middle Ages* (London, 1973), pp. 103-104. See further, G. L. Hamilton, 'Theodolus, a Medieval Textbook', *Modern Philology* 7 (1909) 1-17; R. Hazelton, 'The Christianization of Cato', *Mediaeval Studies* 19 (1957) 157-73. For English 'teaching collections' see Orme, pp. 104-106; E. Rickert, 'Chaucer at School', *Modern Philology* 29 (1931-32) 257-74.

another text used for elementary teaching, the *Liber hymnorum*,⁵⁷ because their terminology and concerns often resemble those found in commentaries on the Biblical *Liber hymnorum*, the Psalter.⁵⁸

Moreover, various writers took the 'Aristotelian prologue' from its original context in commentary on *auctores* to provide the basis of introductions to their own works. The writers of *artes praedicandi* were especially fond of describing the *causae* of their works. For example, Robert of Basevorn states that the four causes of his *Forma praedicandi* (completed in 1322) are intimated by 2 Timothy 4:17, 'The Lord stood with me, and strengthened me, that by me the preaching might be accomplished'.⁵⁹ The *causa finalis* is designated when it is said 'The Lord stood by me and strengthened me', because a right-thinking man ought to establish as his end the Lord who restores consolation in tedium, provides satisfaction of desires, establishes an alliance in friendship, and furthers delight in studies. Secondly, the *causa efficiens* is designated when it is said 'by me'. May God, who is also the end, be the primary efficient cause who influences the whole work. John dares not attribute anything to himself as proceeding from himself alone: he must say with the Apostle, 'I dare not speak of any of those things which Christ works in me' (Romans 15:18), and 'And I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me' (Galatians 2:20). John identifies himself as the instrument who has put the task into execution. Third, the *causa materialis* is designated when it is said 'preaching', because the form of preaching is here considered as the matter. Fourth, the *causa formalis* is designated implicitly in the words 'may be accomplished'. Something is formally transmitted and taught when what the beginning of the work promises for investigation is continued through the work in an orderly way, and brought to a conclusion at the end. Anyone who deals with the divine word – indeed, with any orderly treatise – should make sure that in discussing a subject he has an organised *modus procedendi*. John's method of procedure is treated and taught in fifty chapters, which he outlines in a table of contents.

The prologues to such great compilations as the *Speculum maius* of Vincent of Beauvais, O.P. (c. 1190-1264)⁶⁰ and the *Reductorium morale* of Pierre Bersuire, O.S.B. (died 1362) also show the influence of the new paradigm. In the

⁵⁷ For full discussion see H. Gneuss, *Hymnar und Hymnen im englischen Mittelalter* (Tübingen, 1968). In his *Prioress's Tale*, Chaucer shows his familiarity with the stock procedure for expounding hymns: see Gneuss, p. 196.

⁵⁸ For example, see the text printed by Gneuss, *ibid.*, p. 110, which may be compared with the Psalter-prologues of Gilbert de la Porrée and his successors.

⁵⁹ *Artes praedicandi: contribution à l'histoire de la rhétorique au Moyen Age*, ed. Th.-M. Charland (Publications de l'Institut d'Études Médiévales d'Ottawa 7; Paris-Ottawa, 1936), pp. 233-35.

⁶⁰ *Speculum maius*, 4 vols. (Venice, 1591), 1, fols. 1r-3v.

prologue to the *Reductorium morale*, the *causae* function as part of an elaborate protestation of humility in which Bersuire decorously ascribes all that is useful and worthwhile in his work to its primary *causa efficiens*, God:⁶¹

...dico quod in isto opere proprietates rerum, figmenta poetarum, aenigmata scripturarum sint pro materia, applicatio vero ad mores, est pro forma; Deus est ibi pro causa efficiendi, salus vero animarum est ibi pro causa finali.

A similar procedure is followed in the prologue to the Anglo-Norman *Lumiere as Lais*.⁶² The anonymous writer identifies himself as an instrument employed by the principal *auctor*, God:

[D]e ceste liver si est autur
Principalment (de) nostre Seignur,
Kar a ceo ne sui veraiment
For sun notur e estruement,
Ke ceo ke enpense me fet lier
Mis en ceste liver par escriver.
Ki ke neut enquer mun nun
Un cler sui de petite resun,
De poi de value veraiment
En dreit delcors e de l'entendement
Mes pur ceo ke priere me puet valer
De bone gent, si me volunt nomer,
Dunt jeo pri pur l'amur Jhesu Crist
Pur Pier prier ke ceste liver fist,
Kant l'em l'ot n'en grevera mie,
Pater noster et ave Marie.

(ll. 493-508)

A highly organised account of the causes of the work is then provided:

Cinc choses sunt en ja enquere
Au comencement en liver fere:
Ki fut autur e l'ent[ite]llement
E la matiere e la furme ensement,
E la fin, par quei ceo est resun
Fu fete la composiciun.

(ll. 487-92)

The description of 'La furme ou la cause furmele' is particularly detailed. The subject of each of the five principal parts or books is defined; it is also explained that each book is divided 'Par chapitres et destincciuns'.

⁶¹ *Reductorium morale* (Venice, 1583), p. 1.

⁶² Text printed by P. Meyer in *Romania* 8 (1879) 328-32. See further, Allen, 'The *Manuel des Pechiez* and the Scholastic Prologue' (cited in n. 25 above).

Thomas Usk (died 1388) put the 'Aristotelian prologue' to good use in his Middle English *Testament of Love*. There are in fact three prologues in Usk's work: the prologue of the first book functions as a general prologue to the whole work; the first chapters of books 2 and 3 function as prologues to their respective books. In the general prologue, a celebration of God's 'makinge' – in which Usk invokes both Aristotle and David – leads into an explanation of his own 'makinge' in the *Testament*. One can move lovingly from knowledge of the *proprietas rerum* to knowledge of their creator: thus, the causes of things are comprehended. Usk's work is mainly concerned with the causes of love, which explains the *titulus libri*:

Wherof Aristotle, in the boke *de Animalibus*, saith to naturel philosophers: 'it is a greet lyking in love of knowinge their creatour; and also in knowinge of causes in kyndely things'. Considred, forsoth, the formes of kyndly thinges and the shap, a greet kindly love me shulde have to the werkman that hem made. The crafte of a werkman is shewed in the werke. Herfore, truly, the philosophers, with a lyvely studie, many noble thinges right precious and worthy to memory writen; and by a greet swetande travayle to us leften of causes [of] the propertees in natures of thinges And bycause this book shal be of love, and the pryme causes of sterenge in that doinge, with passions and diseses for wantinge of desyre, I wil that this book be cleped THE TESTAMENT OF LOVE.⁶³

In the prologue to the second book, Usk discusses the theory of the *causa finalis* in general, then explains that the final cause of his work is to teach about love. Though his book may be unlearned, it does have this noble end:

Every thing to whom is owande occasion don as for his ende, Aristotle supposeth that the actes of every thinge ben in a maner his final cause. A final cause is noblerer, or els even as noble, as thilke thing that is finally to thilke ende; wherfore accion of thinge everlasting is demed to be eternal, and not temporal; sithen it is his final cause. Righte so the actes of my boke 'Love', and love is noble; wherfore, though my book be leude, the cause with which I am stered, and for whom I ought it doon, noble forsothe ben bothe.⁶⁴

Discussions of the *causa formalis* by commentators, compilers and others provide a major source for medieval ideas of literary form, style and structure. Especially interesting is the fact that the scriptural exegetes seem to have 'discovered' and provided the literary theory for new literary forms, forms for which there was no basis in traditional rhetoric or poetic. For example, some exegetes found in prophetic writings certain literary properties which, in their

⁶³ *Chaucerian and Other Pieces*, ed. W. W. Skeat (Oxford, 1897), p. 3.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, p. 49.

opinion, constituted a literary form.⁶⁵ Their discussions of the *forma prophetialis* seem to have influenced commentaries on non-scriptural writings: for example, the 'Aristotelian prologue' which begins an anonymous commentary on the prophecies of 'John of Bridlington' draws heavily on exegetical discussion:

Secundum notabile est circa causam formalem hujus libri; pro quo est notandum quod modus procedendi auctor[is] est forma hujus libri qui in tribus consistit. Primo in modo scribendi, qui est metricus Secundo in modo intelligendi, qui est obscurus et prophetialis, quia dat alia intelligere quam termini secundum communem usum loquenti significant. Tertio in modo ordinandi partes hujus prophetiae, quia ordinat partes secundum ordinem gestorum quae facta sunt et fiendorum quae futura sunt⁶⁶

IV

Exegetical discussion of that most enigmatic of all prophetic writings, the Apocalypse, may have influenced the way in which John Gower regarded the final recension of his *Vox clamantis*. In the general prologue to this work, Gower appeals to his namesake, St. John, for guidance.⁶⁷

Insula quem Pathmos suscepit in Apocalipsi,
Cuius ego nomen gesto, gubernet opus.
(ll. 57-58)

Gower seems to have believed that he shared with St. John not only a name⁶⁸ but also a *forma tractandi*: both men composed works in the form of visions. Naturally, Gower does not presume to claim the same *auctoritas* as that enjoyed by the *auctor* of the Apocalypse, but he does suggest a similarity of literary procedure – a perfectly proper suggestion in an age which appreciated the literary virtuosity of the human *auctores* of scripture.

This hypothesis may be substantiated by reference to the Apocalypse-prologue ascribed to Gilbert de la Porrée which, as one of the 'Paris set' of prologues, received the attention of generations of commentators. Gilbert's prologue and Gower's general prologue are alike in basic structure. Both discuss the definition of *visio* first, then move to examine the human writer and his method of writing. Gilbert distinguishes three kinds of *visio*:

⁶⁵ See "'Authorial Role" and "Literary Form"', 58-59.

⁶⁶ Wright, *Political Poems and Songs* I. 125.

⁶⁷ *The Complete Works of John Gower*, ed. G. C. Macaulay, 4 vols. (London, 1899-1902), 4. 22. All references to the *Vox clamantis* are to this edition.

⁶⁸ There is a similar wordplay with names in the Dedicatory Epistle to Archbishop Arundel, where Thomas Arundel is hailed as successor to Thomas Becket (*The Complete Works of John Gower* 4. 1).

Visio enim alia corporalis, quando videlicet corporalibus oculis aliquid videmus. Alia spiritualis seu imaginaria, cum videlicet dormientes, vel etiam vigilantes, imagines rerum cernimus, quibus aliquid aliud significatur. Sicut vidit Pharaon spicas, et Moyses rubum ardere, ille dormiens, iste vigilans. Alia intellectualis, quando videlicet spiritu sancto reuelante, intellectu mentis veritatem mysteriorum sicut est capimus. Quomodo vidit Ioannes quae in libro referuntur. Non enim figuras tantum vidit spiritu, sed et earum significata mente intellexit.⁶⁹

Gower is concerned with the second and third kinds of *visio*. While asleep a man may see *signa rei*, images which signify other things, with his mind's eye. Like Gilbert, Gower cites the example of the dream of Pharaoh which Joseph interpreted, to which he adds the example of the dreams of Daniel:⁷⁰

Ex Daniele patet quid sompnia significarunt,
Nec fuit in sompnis visio vana Ioseph:
Angelus immo bonus, qui custos interioris
Est hominis, vigili semper amore fauet;
Et licet exterius corpus sopor occupet, ille
Visitat interius mentis et auget opem;
Sepeque sompnifero monstrat prenostica visu,
Quo magis in causis tempora noscat homo.
Hinc puto que vidi quod sompnia tempore noctis
Signa rei certe commemoranda ferunt.

(ll. 7-16)

Perhaps Gower's introduction of the *angelus bonus* who guards the inner man was influenced by the traditional view of the angel who inspired St. John on Patmos. Gilbert de la Porrée wrote:

Reuelauit autem tota Trinitas Christo secundum humanitatem: Christus vero Ioanni per angelum, Ioannes ecclesiae.⁷¹

Later commentators interpreted this passage as referring to the *quadruplex causa efficiens* of the Apocalypse: God, Christ, the angel and St. John. The angel was described as the mediate *causa efficiens* of the Apocalypse:

⁶⁹ *Praefatio Gilberti Pictaviensis in Apocalypsim Ioannis*, printed in *Biblia sacra* 6. 1449-50. The ultimate source of this distinction is book 12 of St. Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram*. It was very widely disseminated in the later Middle Ages: see D. Knowles, *The English Mystical Tradition* (London, 1961), p. 125; E. Wilson, 'The "Gostly Drem" in *Pearl*', *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* 69 (1968) 90-101.

⁷⁰ Compare the prologue to the *Confessio amantis*, ll. 585-662.

⁷¹ *Biblia sacra* 6. 1448.

efficiens quidem quadruplex est in hoc libro videlicet Deus, Cristus, Angelus et Ioannes. Deus principalis et primaria, Cristus secundaria, Angelus media, Ioannes immediata⁷²

Gower uses a much more general version of the idea found in the theologians: decorum required that he be more evasive than the commentators who, after all, were discussing a scriptural *auctor*. He does not claim that he received a *visio* through a major gift of grace which included a visitation by an angel. The point is made in an impersonal and indirect manner: the guardian angel who watches over everyone sometimes helps a man to understand the future by a special gift of insight. John Gower, it is strongly implied, is such a man.

In the second part of this general prologue, Gower discusses the *nomen scribentis*, *intentio* and *materia* of the work.⁷³ The *nomen scribentis* is given in the form of an acrostic, a practice favoured by writers of *artes praedicandi*⁷⁴ and by fourteenth-century commentators on theological texts.⁷⁵ Certain basic similarities exist between the way in which Gower describes his *intentio* and *materia* and the way in which Gilbert had described the *intentio* and *materia* of St. John. Here is the relevant part of Gilbert's prologue:

Est itaque materia Ioannis in hoc opere, status specialiter Asianae ecclesiae, nec non et totius videlicet quae in praesenti patiatur, et in futuro receptura sit. *Intentio* vero eius est monere ad patientiam, quae seruanda est, tum quia brevis labor, tum quia praemium magnum. *Modus tractandi* talis: primo praemittit prologum et salutationem, vbi reddit auditores benignos et attentos, quo praemisso accedit ad narrationem Postea accedens ad narrationem *distinguit* septem visiones ... [italics mine].⁷⁶

⁷² From the Apocalypse-commentary of John Russel, O.F.M. (flourished at the turn of the thirteenth century), in Oxford, Merton College ms. 172, fol. 52r. Compare the Apocalypse-commentary of Nicholas Gorran, O.P. (died 1295), *In Acta Apostolorum et singulas Apostolorum*, authore Nicolao Gorran (Antwerp, 1620), p. 178.

⁷³ For the *nomen scribentis*, see ll. 19-24; for the *intentio* and *materia*, see ll. 25-58. The first person to notice the academic origins of Gower's prologues in the *Vox clamantis* was Maria Wickert in her *Studien zu John Gower* (Cologne, 1953), pp. 87-109. However, her main interest is in the rhetorical *topoi* found in Gower's prologues, and in how such *topoi* were (in her opinion) altered and atrophied by the writers of religious treatises. My discussion and conclusions are fundamentally different from hers.

⁷⁴ For example, by Robert of Basevorn in his *Forma praedicandi*: for Robert's explanation of his acrostic see Charland, *Artes praedicandi*, p. 234.

⁷⁵ For example, by Robert Holcot in the prologue to his Wisdom-commentary: see B. Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Oxford, 1960), p. 135. For the commentators' practice of hiding their names in the text of the opening lecture, see D. Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century', *Augustiniana* 6 (1956) 146-74 (269-72).

⁷⁶ *Biblia sacra* 6. 1452.

Gower's *materia* is also concerned with contemporary events. The Apocalypse was concerned with the corruption of the Church in general and of the churches of Asia in particular; the *Vox clamantis* is concerned with the general corruption of the three estates (one of which is the Church) and with the corruption of England in particular.⁷⁷ Both writers write in sorrow rather than in anger; both encourage patience and warn of impending divine vengeance. The Apocalypse predicts the age of Antichrist; Gower believes he is living in it.⁷⁸ It may be added that the *capitulum* which is placed at the head of Gower's general prologue explains the *intentio*, *materia* and *modus* of the *Vox clamantis* in a way which reminds one of Gilbert's prologue:

In huius opusculi principio *intendit* compositor describere qualiter serviles rustici impetuose contra ingenuos et nobiles regni insurrexerunt. Et quia res huiusmodi velut monstrum detestabilis fuit et horribilis, fingit se per sompnum vidisse diuersas vulgi turmas in diuersas species bestiarum domesticarum transmutatas: dicit tamen quod ille bestie domestice, a sua deuiantes natura, crudelitates ferarum sibi presumpserunt. De causis vero, ex quibus, inter homines talia contingunt enormia, *tractat* vltius secundum distinciones libelli istius, qui in septem *diuiditur* partes, prout inferius locis suis euidentius apparebit [*italics mine*].⁷⁹

The *modus agendi* is said to take the form of a narrative about beasts which – like the beasts seen in the *visio* of St. John – have an allegorical function. Gower's basic *divisio libri* is into seven parts, and one wonders if his final choice of this number of books was influenced by the seven seals on the book which St. John saw in his vision,⁸⁰ and the resultant seven major divisions in the structure of the Apocalypse which were expounded by exegetes.

The prologue to the second book of the *Vox clamantis* discusses not merely the second book but the work in its entirety: in an earlier recension it probably constituted the introduction to the entire work.⁸¹ The *nomen voluminis* is given:

Vox clamantis erit nomenque voluminis huius,
Quod sibi scripta noui verba doloris habet.
(ll. 83-84)

⁷⁷ For Gower on the three estates, see *Vox clamantis*, books 3-6 (pp. 105-271). Gower's concern for England is expressed in the *Epistola*, ll. 43-49 (p. 2) and in the prologue to book 1, ll. 29-30 (p. 21).

⁷⁸ See *Vox clamantis*, book 3, ll. 1247-52 (p. 140).

⁷⁹ *The Complete Works of John Gower* 4. 3. *Capitulum* usually means 'chapter' but here it means 'chapter-summary'. For the development of techniques of chapter-summary in the thirteenth century, see D. A. Callus, 'The "Tabulae super Originalia patrum" of Robert Kilwardby, O.P.' in *Studia mediaevalia in honorem R. J. Martin*, pp. 243-70.

⁸⁰ Apocalypse 5:1; 6:1-8:1.

⁸¹ For this argument see Macaulay, *The Complete Works of John Gower* 4. xxxi-xxxii, lxvii.

The *materia libri* is discussed in ll. 1-2 and 77-82. Gower says that he has seen and noted many things which his reminiscent pen is now eager to write. As the honeycomb is gathered from the bud of various flowers and as the seashell is found and gathered from many a shore, so many different mouths have furnished the writer with the *materia* for his work. The *causae libri* (presumably Gower is thinking of the discussions of causality found in 'Aristotelian prologues') have been many. Lines 3-10 contain a discussion of *finis*. Gower refuses to sacrifice to the muses: his sacrifice is to God alone. God is asked to fire the innermost depths of his servant's breast. In Christ's name Gower will spread his net so that his mind may thankfully seize upon the things which it requires. May this work, begun with God's help, achieve a fitting end:

Inceptum per te perfecto fine fruatur
 Hoc opus ad laudem nominis, oro, tui.
 (ll. 9-10)

Thus the final cause of the *Vox clamantis* is established as being *laus domini*. One is reminded of exegetical discussions of the *causa finalis* of sacred poetry.⁸²

This prologue also contains a complex explanation of *intentio*, first in relation to Gower's *materia* and then in relation to his *modus agendi*. The reader is asked to forgive the writer's faults; to embrace the matter, not the man; to think of the intention (*mens*) and not the bodily form (*corpus*) in which it is expressed:

Rem non personam, mentem non corpus in ista
 Suscipe materia, sum miser ipse quia.
 Res preciosa tamen in vili sepe Minera
 Restat, et extracta commoditate placet
 (ll. 13-16)

Gower proceeds to apologise for the inadequacy of the corpus, a profession of humility which actually provides the occasion for a discussion of the relationship between his *materia* and *modus agendi*. The reader is asked to take what the writer's honest ability offers him and to refrain from demanding anything further (ll. 17-18). If the writer does not use well-chosen words to embellish his verses, at least the reader should notice what they mean (ll. 21-22). Whatever formalities of rhetoric the pages may lack, the fruit of the *materia* will not be the less for that (ll. 27-28). Outwardly the verses may be of moderate worth; their inner worth is the greater (ll. 29-30). In this way, Gower implies that anyone who fails to appreciate the quality of his *materia* is at fault, and draws attention to his skill in style and rhetoric.

⁸² For example, see Nicholas of Lyre's discussion of the final cause of the Psalter: *Biblia sacra* 3. 416.

Gower seems to be identifying himself as an instrumental *causa efficiens* working under the primary *causa efficiens*, God. Although these technical academic terms are not used, the idea of the *duplex causa efficiens* definitely seems to be there, lending substance and structure to the rhetorical 'modesty formulas'. It is explained that the man whom Christ's grace enriches will never be poor, that the man for whom God provides will possess quite enough. Sometimes, thanks to divine grace, lofty things are achieved by a quite ordinary intelligence, and a weak hand frequently manages great affairs:

Gracia quem Cristi datat, non indiget ille;
 Quem deus augmentat possidet immo satis:
 Grandia de modico sensu quandoque parantur,
 Paruaque sepe manus predia magna facit
 (ll. 67-70)

The elaborate nature of Gower's protestations of humility may be better understood if one is aware of the delicacy of his self-appointed position as instrumental efficient cause. Gower did not wish to appear to have made a personal claim for divine inspiration. This was the property of those writers with the greatest degree of *auctoritas*, the *auctores* of scripture and the *sancti*. Hence, Gower ascribes any *auctoritas* his work may have in the first instance to the primary *auctor*, God, and in the second instance to the ancient *auctores* who have disseminated truth. Many things in the *Vox clamantis* are, Gower explains, not written out of his personal experience but are derived from writers of the past (ll. 75-82). However, what comes across most strongly from the prologue to book 2 is the implication that Gower has not only channelled truth but has also contributed some personal, though God-given, insights to it.

The idea of the *duplex causa efficiens* also seems to lie behind the prologue to the third book of the *Vox clamantis*. In Aristotelian fashion, Gower says that everyone ought to consider happenings in the light of their causes (ll. 5-6).⁸³ The causes of his work are stated to be the reprehensible faults of people of all three estates. Then Gower disavows personal responsibility for the truths contained in his work: the voice of the people has reported them to him (ll. 11-13); he writes what others say and does not wish anyone to assume that this is a work of his own originality (ll. 27-28). Yet this disavowal of responsibility is balanced by the indirect claim for a degree of *auctoritas* which is made in the remainder of the prologue. Gower's procedure here is very reminiscent of a technique found in prologues to *artes praedicandi*, and so we must digress to discuss the delicate balance between the indirect claim of *auctoritas* and the ostentatious refusal of personal credit which is a feature of these works.

⁸³ For example, see *Metaphysica* I. 1 (981a-b).

Writers of *artes praedicandi* claimed a degree of *auctoritas* not on their own behalf but on behalf of their office. According to Humbert of Romans (who became Master General of the Dominicans in 1254), the office of preacher is the most excellent possible for man.⁸⁴ The apostles are the most excellent among the *sancti*, the angels are the most excellent among creatures, God is the most excellent being in the universe. How excellent, then, is the office of preacher, which is apostolic, angelic and godly! Humbert then extols the excellence of scripture, which is said to be superior to all other sciences from the point of view of its *auctor*, *materia* and *finis*:

Ab auctore, quia aliae scientiae ab humano ingenio sunt inventae, quamvis non sine Dei adjutorio: haec autem est a Deo immediate divinitus infusa. 2 Petr. I: Spiritu sancto inspirati, locuti sunt sancti Dei homines.

The preacher is the proper instrument of God; his *materia* is bound to be excellent because it is derived from scripture.

In the prologue to his *Ars componendi sermones*, Ralph Higden, O.S.B. employed the term *duplex causa efficiens* in attempting to explain the link between the *officium* of preacher and the *auctoritas* of God:

Causa efficiens duplex est, ipse Deus originaliter et ipse predicans ministralliter.⁸⁵

A similar explanation is provided in the *De quattuor praedicabilibus* of John of Wales, O.F.M. (died 1285).⁸⁶ After explaining that God is the prime mover of preaching, John turns to the human preacher:

Causa vero efficiens mouens et mota est quilibet predicator deuotus et sancto spiritu inbutus ad tante dignitatis officium tam vita quam scientia aptus et ydoneus.⁸⁷

In the prologue to Robert of Basevorn's *Forma praedicandi* (which has been described above) the *causa efficiens* is apparently threefold: God, the *amicus* who asked Robert to compose the work, and Robert himself:⁸⁸

Secundo tangitur causa efficiens cum dicitur: *per me*. Licet enim Deus, qui et finis, sit causa principaliter efficiens tanquam universale influens, et tu, amice, tanquam speciale alliciens, et instantia sociorum tanquam quoddam continue instigans, ego tamen instrumentum immediatius sum, istud executioni demandans.

⁸⁴ *Liber de eruditione praedicatorum, prima pars* in B. Humberti de Romanis Opera de vita regulari, ed. J. J. Berthier, 2 vols. (Rome, 1888-89), 2. 374-75.

⁸⁵ Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Bodley 5, fol. 1v.

⁸⁶ See Charland, *Artes praedicandi*, pp. 55-60.

⁸⁷ Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Bodley 571, fol. 162v.

⁸⁸ Ed. Charland, *Artes praedicandi*, pp. 233-35.

Robert explains that he had been moved by doubts about his ability to bring to perfection what he had begun. Then he thought of 2 Timothy 4:17 ('The Lord stood with me, and strengthened me, that by me the preaching might be fully accomplished'), and a great part of his sadness was dispelled. When he saw that the first part of this passage was fulfilled in him, namely, that the Lord stood with him, strengthening him, he had no doubts about its remaining part, and undertook to complete the work. Indeed, because he regards himself as an instrument of God, Robert can to some extent disavow responsibility for what he has written.

Quia tamen prima causa plus influit, non audeo mihi aliquid tanquam ex me attribuere; sed dico cum Apostolo, 15^o cap. ad Rom.: *Non audeo aliquid loqui eorum quae per me non efficit Christus*, et ad Gal. 2: *Vivo autem, jam non ego; vivit autem in me Christus*.

But then Robert informs the reader that if he wishes to know the writer's name it can be found in an acrostic. Robert has managed to combine decorous self-abnegation with an explanation of how he came to compose his work.

In the prologue to the second book of the *Vox clamantis*, Gower compares himself to an 'ancient' preacher, St. John the Baptist, the original 'voice crying in the wilderness' (ll. 83-84). In the prologue to the third book, Gower assumes the office of preacher and, by implication, claims that degree of *auctoritas* which – according to the writers of *artes praedicandi* – that office entailed. Like these 'modern' preachers, Gower identifies himself as an instrumental efficient cause. He prays that the merciful Christ may grant favour to the undertaking of his servant:

Si qua boni scriptura tenet, hoc fons bonitatis
 Stillet detque deus que bona scribat homo:
 Fructificet deus in famulo que scripta iuuabunt,
 Digna ministret homo semina, grana deus.
 (ll. 39-42)

May God make fruitful in his servant those writings which will be of use. Where the *sensus* of the human writer is too weak, may God impart his *sensus*:

Quo minor est sensus meus, adde tuum, deus, et da,
 Oro, pios vultus ad mea vota tuos
 (ll. 49-50)

Gower is implying that the *Vox clamantis* is the result of co-operation between himself and the primary efficient cause *tanquam universale influens*. God is addressed as ultimate wisdom, without whom the wisdom of the world is nothing. May the writer become wise in order readily to compose his verses and to write only in the true *modus*:

O sapiens, sine quo nichil est sapiencia mundi,
 Cuius in obsequium me mea vota ferunt,
 Te precor instanti da tempore, Criste, misertus,
 Vt metra que pecii prompta parare queam;
 Turgida deuitet, falsum mea penna recuset
 Scribere, set scribat que modo vera videt.
 (ll. 83-88)

May the meaning of the writer be true to God, who is absolute truth. In this way, Gower, like the writers of *artes praedicandi*, stressed the *auctoritas* of the *officium* of preacher and so avoided making a direct claim for personal authority.

Gower's virtuosity in the prologues of the *Vox clamantis* may be better appreciated by contrasting his achievement with the effort of a writer who handled the prologue-conventions with less literary acumen. Osbern Bokenham, O.S.A. (c. 1392-c. 1447) begins his *Legendys of Hooly Wummen* with a pedestrian explanation of the 'two thyngys' which 'owyth euery clerk':

To aduertysyn, begynnyng a werk,
 If he procedyn wyl ordeneelly:
 The fyrste is 'what', the secunde is 'why'.
 In wych two wurdys, as it semyth me,
 The foure causys comprehendyd be,
 Wych, as filosofys vs do teche,
 In the begynnyng men owe to seche
 Of euery book; and aftyr there entent
 The fyrst is clepyd cause efficyent,
 The secunde they clepe cause materyal,
 Formal the thrydde, the fourte fynal.⁸⁹

The fourteenth-century belief in the notion of the *duplex causa efficiens* as a means whereby writers could decorously describe themselves as mere instruments of the divine will has now been lost. Bokenham gives himself all the credit for his work. The fact that he refuses to reveal his name at this point does not strike one as being a particularly modest gesture, in view of the amount of autobiographical detail which is provided in this text and in others:⁹⁰

The efficyent cause is the auctour,
 Wych aftyr his cunnyng doth his labour
 To a-complyse the begunne matere

⁸⁹ Bokenham's *Legendys of Hooly Wummen*, ed. M. S. Serjeantson (EETS OS 206; Oxford, 1938), p. 1.

⁹⁰ For the information about Bokenham's life which is found in his writings, see Serjeantson's introduction to the *Legendys*, pp. xiii-xviii.

Certyn, the auctour was an austyn frere;
 Whos name as now I ne wyl expresse,
 Ne hap that the vnrurthynesse
 Bothe of hys persone & eek his name
 Myht make the werk to be put in blame

The life seems to have gone out of the idiom; its application has become mechanical.⁹¹ By contrast, Gower shows himself to have been very aware of the potential subtleties of traditional prologue-forms.

V

In the *Vox clamantis*, Gower assumed the roles of preacher and *propheta*; in the *Confessio amantis* he assumed the role of the moral philosopher who was wise in the secular sciences of ethics and politics. Gower set out to produce 'a bok for Engelondes sake';⁹² a veritable English classic, complete with 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' prologues in which a claim to a limited *auctoritas* was implied. In order to make this point clearly, we must examine the scholastic distinction between the 'extrinsic' prologue and the 'intrinsic' prologue, a distinction which concerns a difference in the object of analysis rather than differences of vocabulary or differences of kinds of interest in the *auctor*.

The common twelfth-century dichotomy between the *ars extrinsecus* and the *ars intrinsecus* seems to have its source in the commentary on Cicero's *De inventione* by the fourth-century Latin rhetorician Victorinus:

According to Victorinus, every art has a twofold aspect. Extrinsically considered it gives us knowledge alone, intrinsically it shows us the reasons by which we put into practice that which knowledge gives us.⁹³

In twelfth-century commentaries on *auctores*, the heading *extrinsecus* introduced a discussion of the place in the scheme of human knowledge occupied by the art or science relevant to one's text, while the heading *intrinsecus* introduced a discussion of the text itself. Thus an anonymous twelfth-century gloss on grammar which begins *Tria sunt* proceeds as follows:

⁹¹ However, not all fifteenth-century academic prologues are as pedestrian as Bokenham's: see the very sophisticated prologues of Reginald Pecock, in *Reginald Pecock's Donet*, ed. E. V. Hitchcock (EETS OS 156; Oxford, 1918), pp. 1-8; *Pecock's Folewer to the Donet*, ed. E. V. Hitchcock (EETS OS 164; Oxford, 1923), pp. 1-6; *Pecock's Reule of Cristen Religioun*, ed. W. C. Greet (EETS OS 171; Oxford, 1926), pp. 1-30 (especially pp. 9-22, 29).

⁹² *Prologus*, l. 24, in *The English Works of John Gower*, ed. G. C. Macaulay, 2 vols. (EETS ES 81-82; Oxford, 1900-1901), I. 2. All references to the *Confessio amantis* are to this edition.

⁹³ Hunt, 'Introductions to the "Artes"', 98. For a summary of the influence of Victorinus in the Middle Ages see J. J. Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages. A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance* (Berkeley, 1974), pp. 116-19.

... extrinsecus autem docetur quando ipsius artis naturam inquirendo docemus quid sit ipsa ars, quid genus eius, que materia, que partes, que species, quod instrumentum, quis artifex, quod officium, quis finis, [quare vocetur], quo ordine ipsa sit docenda et discenda Intrinsecus autem eam considerantibus primo perspicendum est que sit auctoris intentio in hoc opere, que sibi utilitas, que causa suscepti laboris sive operis, quis modus agendi, quis ordo, ad ultimum quis titulus.⁹⁴

The part of the preface which discussed an art or science in general – which may be called the ‘extrinsic’ prologue – was taken over by many of the writers traditionally associated with the ‘School of Chartres’. For example, it occurs in the *Summa super rhetoricam* of Thierry of Chartres and the *Glossa super Priscianum* of William of Conches.⁹⁵

Combinations of the ‘extrinsic’ discussion with our earlier type of prologue (described on pp. 344-47 above) occurred from the late twelfth century onwards, the more general methodology of the ‘extrinsic’ discussion preceding discussion of such characteristic ‘intrinsic’ headings as *auctoris intentio*, *utilitas libri* and *modus agendi*. Scholars wished to have parallel discussions of the art in general and the book in particular. As a result the ‘extrinsic’ headings came to be modified in accordance with the usual ‘intrinsic’ headings. *Artistae* like Petrus Helias, Gundissalinus and Thierry of Chartres treated the *intentio*, *materia*, *ordo* and *officium* of the *ars* before proceeding to consider similar headings in relation to the *liber*.⁹⁶

In the thirteenth century, Aristotelian science fostered a new kind of ‘extrinsic’ prologue in which the branch of philosophy relevant to a given text was related to the Aristotelian hierarchy of the sciences. It became necessary to define the branch of Aristotelian science relevant to the text, to assign its *pars sapientiae*. For example, Albertus Magnus, commenting on St. John’s gospel, discusses the *pars sapientiae* instead of the *pars philosophiae*, and his definition of *sapientia* is an Aristotelian one:

Ex jam dictis patent ea quae in principiis librorum solent inquiri, scilicet, Quae sit huius libri causa efficiens? Quae materia sive subjectum? Quae forma? Quis ordo? Quis finis sive utilitas? Quis titulus? Cui parti sapientiae supponatur?⁹⁷

The four causes could provide the basic framework for a discussion of both the ‘extrinsic’ and ‘intrinsic’ aspects of a text considered together. This is the case in the commentaries on the *Sentences* composed in the thirteenth century

⁹⁴ Printed by Hunt, ‘Introductions to the “Artes”’, 100-101.

⁹⁵ *ibid.*, 86-93.

⁹⁶ *ibid.*, 86-105.

⁹⁷ *Alberti Magni Opera omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet, 38 vols. (Paris, 1890-99), 24. 7.

by Robert Kilwardby, O.P.⁹⁸ and St. Bonaventure, O.F.M.⁹⁹ Alternatively, the 'extrinsic' aspects of the text could be considered first, then the 'intrinsic' aspects, the latter being discussed within the framework of the four causes.¹⁰⁰ This is the usual method found in thirteenth-century commentaries on scripture. By the fourteenth century, there were many possible permutations.

Nicholas of Lyre's *Postilla litteralis* begins with an 'extrinsic' prologue which discusses *sapientia* and *scientia*, the hierarchy of the sciences, and the corresponding hierarchy of the books which teach the various sciences.¹⁰¹ Then Lyre moves to an 'intrinsic' prologue, in which he describes his personal purpose and *modus procedendi* in writing.¹⁰² He has provided us with parallel discussions of the *intentio* and *modus* of the Bible and of his commentary. Whereas Lyre, in this general introduction to his entire *Postilla*, was concerned with *sapientia* as theological truth, commentators on the sapiential books were concerned with the *sapientia* of the philosophers. Solomon (traditionally regarded as the *auctor* of all the sapiential books) was held to be a *sapiens* in such philosophical disciplines as politics and ethics, and attempts were made to relate this wisdom to an Aristotelian definition of *sapientia*. For example, in the 'extrinsic' prologue to his commentary on Wisdom, Robert Holcot, O.P. (died 1349) explains how all the human arts and sciences contribute to God's glory.¹⁰³ Holcot lists the four virtuous dispositions which God, the divine *auctor*, requires in his audience. He then moves to state the supremacy of sacred scripture over philosophical wisdom: having done this, he feels free to concentrate on philosophical wisdom. The 'intrinsic' prologue focuses on the Book of Wisdom itself:

Circa librum istum, qui liber Sapientiae nuncupatur, sunt in principio tria notanda. Primo est de eius nomine, secundum de eius autore, tertium de eius fine.¹⁰⁴

In his commentary on Ecclesiasticus, Holcot follows a similar procedure: general discussion of *sapientia* precedes a discussion of *auctor* and *divisio libri*.¹⁰⁵ The same practice is found in the works of other 'classicizing friars' like Thomas Ringstead¹⁰⁶ and John Lathbury.¹⁰⁷

⁹⁸ Kilwardby, *De natura theologiae*, pp. 7-12.

⁹⁹ *S. Bonaventurae Opera omnia*, 10 vols. (Quaracchi, 1882-1902), I. 1.

¹⁰⁰ As, for example, in St. Thomas Aquinas' commentary on the Pauline Epistles: *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia*, 25 vols. (Parma, 1852-72), 13. 1-3.

¹⁰¹ See Lyre's *Generalis prologus* printed in *Biblia sacra* 1, unfoliated.

¹⁰² *Prologus specialis de intentione auctoris et modo procedendi*, printed in *Biblia sacra* 1.

¹⁰³ Holcot in *librum Sapientiae praelectiones* (Basel, 1586), pp. 1-6.

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁰⁵ *Robertus Holcot super librum Ecclesiastici* (Venice, 1509), fols. 2r-4r.

¹⁰⁶ Ringstead's Proverbs-commentary was printed under the name of Robert Holcot as well: cf. *In Proverbia Salomonis Roberti Holcoti, seu Thome Gualerii ... explanationes locupletissime* ... (Paris, 1515), fols. 1r-3r.

¹⁰⁷ *Latteburius in Threnos Ieremiae* (Oxford, 1482), unfoliated.

These procedures seem to have influenced both Usk and Gower. In the general prologue to his *Testament of Love* (which has been described above), Usk treats the 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' aspects of his work together. By contrast, the beginning of Gower's *Confessio amantis* resembles a commentary on a sapiential book, which first treats of the 'extrinsic' aspects of the book in the context of a discussion of wisdom in general, and then moves to discuss the book itself under such 'intrinsic' headings as *intentio auctoris*, *nomen*, *materia* and *utilitas*.¹⁰⁸ Gower's *prologus* is an 'extrinsic' prologue about *sapientia*; the treatise which follows is about *amor*:

For this prologe is so assised
That it to wisdom al belongeth
What the prologe is so despended,
This bok schal afterward ben ended
Of love

(*Prologus*, ll. 66-75)

Gower links *sapientia* and *amor* through the donnish joke that love 'many a wys man hath put under'. Hence it seems fitting that a *prologus* on wisdom should be followed by a treatise on love. Gower's declared intention is 'in som part' to advise 'the wyse man': hence the *prologus* warns of the ways in which the Church, the commons and the earthly rulers have ceased to follow wisdom. Gower admits that only God has the wisdom necessary for full understanding of worldly fortune:

... this prologe is so assised
That it to wisdom al belongeth;
What wysman that it underfongeth,
He schal drawe into remembrance
The fortune of this worldes chance,
The which noman in his persone
Mai knowe, bot the god al one.

(*Prologus*, ll. 66-72)

This point is echoed at the end of the *prologus*:

And now nomore,
As forto speke of this matiere,
Which non bot only god may stiere.

(ll. 1086-88)

¹⁰⁸ The following account of the prologues in the *Confessio amantis* is based on my article 'John Gower, *sapiens* in Politics and Ethics', *Medium aevum* 49 (1980) 33-55.

In his 'intrinsic' prologue (book 1, ll. 1-92) Gower proceeds to explain precisely what is within his compass:

I may noght strecche up to the hevene
 Min hand, ne setten al in evene
 This world, which evere is in balance:
 It stant noght in my sufficance
 So grete thinges to compasse,
 Bot I mot lete it overpasse
 And treten upon othre thinges.
 Forthi the Stile of my writinges
 Fro this day forth I thenke change
 And speke of thing is noght so strange,
 Which every kinde hath upon honde,
 And whereupon the world mot stonde,
 And hath don sithen it began,
 And schal whil ther is any man;
 And that is love, of which I mene
 To trete, as after schal be sene.

(book 1, ll. 1-16)

Thus Gower admits that he cannot solve all the problems which he canvassed in the *prologus*. A human *auctor* cannot reorganise the present world in accordance with those principles of order which the divine *auctor*, God, followed in his creation, but he can impose an appropriate order on his own creation, his treatise on love. The way in which Gower explains what is within his compass parallels the way in which a commentator like Holcot would move from *sapientia* in general to the particular branch of *sapientia* proper to the text; from the *causa causarum*, God, to the *causae* of the text.

The form of Gower's 'intrinsic' prologue is made absolutely clear by the Latin commentary, which employs the usual 'intrinsic' headings:

Postquam in Prologo tractatum hactenus existit, qualiter hodiernae condicionis divisio caritatis dilectionem superavit, *intendit auctor* ad presens suum libellum, cuius *nomen* Confessio Amantis nuncupatur, componere de illo amore, a quo non solum humanum genus, sed etiam cuncta animantia naturaliter subiciuntur. Et quia nonnulli amantes ultra quam expedit desiderii passionibus crebro stimulantur, *materia libri* per totum super hiis specialius diffunditur [*italics mine*].¹⁰⁹

The heading *modus agendi* is not mentioned in the Latin commentary, but the notion is found in the English text. Gower proposes to teach wisdom through

¹⁰⁹ Macaulay, *English Works of Gower* 1. 35-36.

exempla – just as, according to the commentators, both Ovid and Solomon had done:

... in good feith this wolde I rede,
 That every man ensample take
 Of wisdom which him is betake,
 And that he wot of good aprise
 To teche it forth, for such emprise
 Is forto preise; and therfore I
 Woll wryte and schewe al openly
 How love and I togedre mette,
 Wherof the world ensample fette
 Mai after this, whan I am go,
 Of thilke unsely jolif wo

(book 1, ll. 78-88)

The juxtaposition of Ovid (Gower's main *auctor* on love) and Solomon in the *Confessio amantis* is more understandable if it is realised that the works of both these writers were believed to pertain to ethics (*ethice supponitur*). Commentators on Ovid argued that the *intentio* of his poetry was to recommend good morals and to reprehend evil ways;¹¹⁰ commentators on the sapiential books argued that Solomon's *intentio* was to instruct in the ethical and political virtues and vices.¹¹¹ Gower was not original, or indeed unusual, in placing Ovid in a moral perspective: that had already been done. Many of Ovid's literal statements were often quoted as *auctoritates* on certain subjects (including ethics and natural science) which he was believed to share with scriptural *auctores*,¹¹² and medieval mythographers showed how allegorical interpretation of Ovid's myths could yield profound truths which were perfectly compatible with Christian doctrine.¹¹³ Elsewhere, I argue that the *Confessio amantis* works through a combination of materials which, although they may appear heterogeneous to us, would have been regarded as quite homogeneous by a medieval reader.¹¹⁴ Gower employed one of those organising frameworks

¹¹⁰ See above, pp. 347-48.

¹¹¹ For example, see Hugh of St. Cher's prologue to his commentary on Ecclesiasticus, printed in *Hugonis Postilla* 3, fol. 153v.

¹¹² On the use of Ovid made by the 'classicizing friars' see Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity*, pp. 102, 106, 152, 155-56, 189, 226. For a general account of the prestige of Ovid as a scientific *auctor* see S. Viarre, *La survie d'Ovide dans la littérature scientifique des XII^e et XIII^e siècles* (Poitiers, 1966).

¹¹³ See, for example, J. B. Friedman, *Orpheus in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 86-145; S. Manning, 'The Nun's Priest's Morality and the Medieval Attitude towards Fables', *Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 59 (1960) 403-16.

¹¹⁴ See 'John Gower, *sapiens* in Ethics and Politics'.

which made pagan *auctoritates* acceptable to Christians, namely, the framework of the seven deadly sins. While his concern 'seems to be with a lover's faults and failings, we are never allowed to forget that these reflect vices common to all mankind'.¹¹⁵ The work of 'moral Gower' clearly reflects the strong moral bias of the academic literary theory of his day.

VI

Academic prologues provided Gower with models for the composition of his own prolegomena; the literary theory channelled by these same prologues provided him with principles for the description and justification of his own works. By contrast, Geoffrey Chaucer did not employ any of the traditional prologue-paradigms, although many of his literary attitudes seem to have been influenced by academic literary theory.

Chaucer's knowledge of the Aristotelian causal scheme is indicated by a passage in the *Tale of Melibee*.¹¹⁶ While he never discusses the four causes in a specifically literary context, he does seem to have known various literary-theoretical terms which occur both in the stock twelfth-century type of prologue and in the later 'Aristotelian prologue'. Examples of Chaucer's use of *mateere* in the sense of *materia libri* are legion.¹¹⁷ *Maner* is used in the sense of *modus agendi* (to designate literary form or style) when, in the *Monk's Tale*, the 'maner of tragedie' is discussed.¹¹⁸ Chaucer may have picked up the term from a gloss on one of the *auctores* generally described as tragedians by medieval commentators, namely, 'Virgil, Ovid [of the *Metamorphoses*], Omer, Lucan and Stace'.¹¹⁹ In the *Merchant's Tale*, he speaks of a letter written 'in manere of a

¹¹⁵ J. A. W. Bennett, 'Gower's "Honeste Love"' in *Patterns of Love and Courtesy. Essays in Memory of C. S. Lewis*, ed. J. Lawlor (London, 1966), p. 110.

¹¹⁶ *The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, ed. F. N. Robinson, 2nd edition (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 178. All Chaucer references are to this edition.

¹¹⁷ See the *General Prologue* 1, l. 727 (p. 24); the *Miller's Prologue* 1, l. 3175 (p. 48); *Prologue to Melibee* 7, l. 958 (p. 167); the *Parson's Prologue* 10, l. 38 (p. 228); *Troilus and Criseyde* 1, l. 53 (p. 390), etc.

¹¹⁸ 7, l. 1991 (p. 189). The most sophisticated fourteenth-century discussions of the *modus tragoediae* are to be found in the commentaries on Seneca produced by the Oxford Dominican Nicholas Trevet: see *Il commento di Nicola Trevet al Tieste di Seneca*, ed. E. Franceschini (Orbis Romanus. Biblioteca di testi medievali ... 11; Milan, 1938); *Nicolai Treveti Expositio Herculis Furentis*, ed. V. Ussani (Biblioteca degli scrittori greci e latini; Rome, 1959); *Nicolai Treveti Expositio L. Annaei Senecae Agamemnonis*, ed. P. Meloni (Università di Cagliari, Facoltà di lettere e di magistero 3; Sassari, 1961); *Nicolai Treveti Expositio L. Annaei Senecae Herculis Oetaei*, ed. P. Meloni (Università di Cagliari, Facoltà di lettere e di magistero 7; Rome, 1962). However, there is no evidence that Chaucer knew any of these commentaries.

¹¹⁹ *Troilus and Criseyde* 5, l. 1792 (p. 479).

compleynt or a lay'.¹²⁰ A particularly interesting example of *entente* being used in the sense of *intentio* is provided by a passage in the prologue to the *Legend of Good Women*, where Chaucer distinguishes between an *intentio auctoris* and his own professed *intentio*. Defending himself against the charges brought by the God of Love, the narrator protests that a true lover

... oght me not to blame.
 Thogh that I speke a fals love som shame.
 They oghte rather with me for to holde,
 For that I of Creseyde wroot or tolde,
 Or of the Rose; what so myn auctour mente,
 Algate, God woot, yt was myn entente
 To forthren trouthe in love and yt cheryce.
 And to ben war fro falsnesse and fro vice
 By swich ensample; this was my menyng.
 (F, ll. 466-74)

This idiom seems to be dependent on the way in which commentators described the *utilitas* of love-poetry.¹²¹ The professed *utilitas* of *Troilus and Criseyde* and the *Romaunt of the Rose* is 'to forthren trouthe in love and yt cheryce'; the professed *intentio* of these works is to encourage readers to follow the good ('trouthe in love') and to flee the evil ('falsnesse' and 'vice' in love).

With reference to *Troilus*, the narrator seems to be saying that he held Criseyde up as an *exemplum* of the faithless lover: he taught the doctrine of virtuous love by speaking this 'fals love som shame'. This type of defence is found (as has been mentioned above) in commentaries on Ovid's *Heroides*:

Materia ipsius est amor illicitus et stultus. Intentio sua est quasdam puellas commendare in licito amore sicut Penelopem, alias reprehendere ab illicito sicut Phedram que dilexit Yppolitum privignum suum, alias reprehendere a stulto amore sicut Phillida et Oenonem.¹²²

The just love of Penelope appears even more attractive than it would be in isolation, because the reader is able to contrast it with the illicit love of Phaedra and the foolish loves of Phyllis and Oenone. Chaucer's point – or at least his narrator's point – seems to be that in *Troilus* he wished to recommend virtuous

¹²⁰ *Merchant's Tale* 4, l. 1881 (p. 121).

¹²¹ See above, pp. 347-48.

¹²² Printed by Ghisalberti, 'Medieval Biographies of Ovid', 44. For the argument that this commentary belongs to a class of text known in fourteenth-century England, see M. C. Edwards, *A Study of Six Characters in Chaucer's Legend of Good Women with Reference to Medieval Scholia on Ovid's Heroides* (B. Litt. thesis, Oxford, 1970), p. 41. For her grouping of *Heroides*-scholia into classes of text, see pp. 27, 41. For the class of text which Chaucer may have known, see p. 114.

love by pointing out the unpleasantness of faithless love: Criseyde functions as an *exemplum* of faithless love in the same way as (according to the commentators) Ovid's Phaëdra functions as an *exemplum* of illicit love and Ovid's Phyllis and Oenone function as *exempla* of foolish love. Readers may 'ben war fro falsnesse and fro vice/By swich ensample'. Concerning the implied claim that Jean de Meun's *Roman de la Rose* was translated in order 'to forthren trouthe in love', perhaps the narrator means that, just as Criseyde was an *exemplum* of the kind of woman the true lover ought to despise, so Jean de Meun's book is the kind of book he ought to despise.

At the end of *Troilus*, Chaucer had begged 'every gentil womman' not to blame him because Criseyde was untrue, and promised to redress the balance with stories which revealed the truth and goodness of other women:

... gladlier I wol write, yif yow leste,
 Penelopeës trouthe and good Alceste.
 (V, ll. 1777-78)

This promise was kept in the *Legend*, which Chaucer seems to have designed as a sequel and complement to *Troilus*. The *Introduction to the Man of Law's Tale* suggests that Chaucer regarded his *Legend* as a 'modern' and expurgated version of the *Heroides*. *Exempla* of really bad women have been excluded:

But certainly no word ne writeth he
 Of thilke wikke ensample of Canacee,
 That loved hir owene brother synfully;
 (Of swiche cursed stories I sey fy!)
 Or ellis of Tyro Appollonius
 (II.B, ll. 77-81)

The commentators regarded Canace as one of Ovid's main *exempla* of illicit love, a woman the exact opposite of Penelope, Ovid's main *exemplum* of legal and chaste love. The way in which Chaucer has formulated this literary and moral issue reminds one yet again of the idiom found in *accessus Ovidiani*.¹²³ However the exact significance of his use of this idiom is to be interpreted, it seems certain that, when Chaucer came to define the character of the *Legend*, his point of departure and terms of reference were provided by academic literary theory.

The belief that diverse and sometimes dubious *materiae* could be justified on the grounds of a common *intentio*, namely, that the will might be moved to do good, had influenced generations of clerks who commented on or compiled secular literature. Between 1316 and 1328, an anonymous Franciscan took the

¹²³ For examples see Huygens, *Accessus ad auctores*, pp. 29-33.

existing structure of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and recompiled its constituent parts, inserting explanations of the moral significance of each part. At the very beginning of this work, the *Ovide moralisé*, the friar justified his procedure by appealing to Romans 15:4:

Se l'escripture ne me ment,
 Tout est pour nostre enseignement
 Quanqu'il a es livres escript,
 Soient bon ou mal li escript.¹²⁴

All that is written is written for our doctrine, whether it is written in a good or bad fashion. A similar idiom was employed by Caxton in the prologue to his English 'Moral Ovid'.¹²⁵ Romans 15:4 is related to the principle (which is a commonplace of Ovid-commentary) that evil is described so that one might beware of it, while good is described so that one may follow it:

Alle scriptures and wrytyngis ben they good or evyll ben wreton for our prouffyt and doctrine. The good to thende to take ensample by them to doo well. And the evyll to thende that we sholde kepe and absteyne vs to do evyll.

This type of defence often appeared in introductions to works of rather different kinds. An interesting case in point is the prologue to the *Livre du Chevalier de la Tour* (completed in 1372), in which Geoffroy de la Tour-Landry gave a very articulate explanation of his *intentio* in providing a book of *exempla* for his daughters' education. This work was translated into English twice during the fifteenth century; in the version found in London, British Library ms. Harley 1764, the relevant passage proceeds as follows:

... I ... had grete desire that thei [my .iiij. doughters] shuld turne to good and worshipe therfor y purposed to make a litelle boke, in the whiche y wolde write the good condicions and dedes of ladies and gentille-women, ... to that entent that my doughtres shulde take ensauple of faire continuaunce and good manere. And also y wol make write the manere contrarie of goodnesse, the whiche is 'called the boke of hurtinge of euelle women, ...' to that entent that who so luste may kepe hem from harme ther thei might erre & for these causes aforesaid, y thought to make this litelle boke to my yong doughtres, wherupon thei might rede and studie,

¹²⁴ 'Ovide moralisé'. *Poème du commencement du quatorzième siècle* 1, ed. C. de Boer (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam, Afdeling Letterkunde, N. S. 15; Amsterdam, 1915), p. 61.

¹²⁵ *The Metamorphoses of Ovid, Translated by William Caxton, 1480*, 2 vols. (New York, 1968), 1, unfoliated. Caxton makes similar use of Romans 15:4 in the prologue to his second edition of *The Game and Playe of the Chesse*, ed. W. J. B. Crotch, *The Prologues and Epilogues of William Caxton* (EETS OS 176; Oxford, 1928), pp. 10-11, and in his preface to Malory's *Morte Darthur*, ed. E. Vinaver, *Malory: Works*, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1971), p. xv. In both these prologues the reader is urged to follow the good and flee from the evil.

to that entent that thei might lerne and see bothe good and euell of the tyme passed, and forto kepe hem in good clenness, and from alle euell in tyme comyng.¹²⁶

The Knight's 'litelle boke' consists of a patterned series of stories, some demonstrating the good which is to be practised and others demonstrating the evil which is to be avoided. He was fully aware of the 'affective' power of his *exempla*.

These justifications throw some light on Chaucer's declaration of *entente* in the 'retracciouns' which follow the *Parson's Tale*:

And if ther be any thyng that displese hem [in Chaucer's 'litel tretys'], I preye hem also that they arrette it to the defaute of myn unkonnyng, and nat to my wyl, that wolde ful fayn have seyde better if I hadde had konnyng. For oure book seith, 'Al that is writen is writen for oure doctrine', and that is myn entente. Wherefore I biseke yow mekely, for the mercy of God, that ye preye for me that Crist have mercy on me and foryeve me my giltes; and namely of my translacions and enditynges of worldly vanitees, the whiche I revoke in my retracciouns¹²⁷

This use of Romans 15:4 is similar to that found at the beginning of the *Ovide moralisé*, as quoted above. The anonymous Franciscan cites St. Paul in support of literature in general, whether it is well written or badly written: similarly, Chaucer excuses any imperfections in his 'litel tretys' (which must be the *Parson's Tale*) by appealing to the same *auctoritas*. The Franciscan then proceeds to argue that, although fables may seem false, to the person who understands them properly the truth contained in them is obvious. Chaucer had employed a similar idiom when, at the end of the *Nun's Priest's Tale*, he briefly related this beast fable to the literary genre of 'moral fable':

... ye that holden this tale a folye,
As of a fox, or of a cok and hen,
Taketh the moralite, goode men.
For seint Paul seith that al that writen is,
To oure doctrine it is ywrite, ywis;
Taketh the fruyt, and lat the chaf be stille.

(VII, ll. 3438-43)

But the 'retracciouns' are quite different in tone. Chaucer could have taken the stock justification of diverse items working together to implement a moral *intentio* (some of the collected items recommending the good while others

¹²⁶ *The Book of the Knight of La Tour-Landry*, ed. T. Wright (EETS OS 33; rev. edition London, 1906), pp. 2-3.

¹²⁷ Robinson, *Works of Chaucer*, p. 265.

reprehended the evil) and extended it to justify his 'collected works' in their entirety. Yet he chooses not to use the conventional idiom in this conventional way. Instead, Chaucer accepts full responsibility for the sinful material that he wrote, and hopes that Christ in his mercy will forgive his sins.

VII

It remains to say something about the place which academic prologues occupy in the full context of the changing attitudes to literature which characterise the later Middle Ages. The relevance of secular *accessus* seems perfectly obvious in the case of poets like Chaucer and Gower who employed details derived from them in their own poems; the relevance of prologues to theological commentaries may seem less obvious. However, while Chaucer and Gower were not trained theologians, they certainly had some interest in the major theological issues of the day. Chaucer seems to have made use of Robert Holcot's enormously popular Wisdom-commentary when writing his *House of Fame* and the *Nun's Priest's Tale*.¹²⁸ Holcot's theology would have interested Chaucer: Chaucer's translation of Boethius, and other writings, attest his interest in predestination and related subjects, and the person responsible for *Troilus and Criseyde* could have appreciated and would have approved of what Holcot had to say about the salvation of the 'good pagan'.¹²⁹ There is some evidence that Gower also knew Holcot on Wisdom.¹³⁰

It must be emphasised that such commentaries as Holcot on Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus, John Lathbury on Lamentations and Thomas Ringstead on Proverbs were among the 'bestsellers' of their day.¹³¹ These 'classicizing' commentaries interested the English writers because, quite apart from the theology, they contained many extracts from pagan writers, both philosophers

¹²⁸ K. O. Petersen has argued that Chaucer made use of homiletic material from this commentary in the *Nun's Priest's Tale*: see her *Sources of the Nonne Prestes Tale* (Radcliffe College Monographs 10; Boston, 1898), pp. 109 ff. R. A. Pratt believes that Holcot provided Chauntecleer and Pertelote with much of their information about dreams: 'Some Latin Sources of the Nonnes Preest on Dreams', *Speculum* 52 (1977) 538-70. W. O. Sypherd has found echoes of Holcot in the *House of Fame*: *Studies in Chaucer's House of Fame* (Chaucer Society Publications, 2nd Ser., 39; London, 1907), pp. 74-76.

¹²⁹ For Holcot's view of the 'good pagan' see H. A. Oberman, "'Facientibus quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam". Robert Holcot, O.P., and the Beginnings of Luther's Theology', *Harvard Theological Review* 55 (1962) 317-42 (317-30); Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity*, pp. 185-93. Many Middle English writers were interested in the fate of the 'good pagan': see T. G. Hahn, *God's Friends: Virtuous Heathen in Later Medieval Thought and English Literature* (Diss. California, 1974; University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1974).

¹³⁰ See the various arguments put forward by H. C. Mainzer, *A Study of the Sources of the Confessio amantis of John Gower* (D. Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1967).

¹³¹ Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity*, pp. 141-42, 214-15, 222-23.

and poets. In *La male regle*, Thomas Hoccleve took the story of Ulysses and the Mermaids from Holcot's commentary on Wisdom:

Holcote seith vp-on the book also
Of sapience/as it can testifie,
When þat Vlixes saillid to and fro
By meermaidis/this was his policie¹³²

Robert Henryson took the *moralitas* of his *Orpheus and Eurydice* from Nicholas Trevet's theological commentary on the *De consolacione philosophiae* of Boethius:

... maister trivat doctour nicholass,
quhilk in his tyme a noble theologe wass,
Applyis it to gud moralitie,
rycht full of fructe and seriositie.¹³³

The commentaries of the Oxbridge 'classicizing friars' are major repositories of the literary theory which we have examined above: to obtain the principles of this theory, Chaucer *cum suis* need have read no further than the prologues. It may be added that when two of these English friars, the Dominican Nicholas Trevet and the Franciscan John Ridevall, composed commentaries on profane *auctores*, they transferred to those *auctores* the literary-theoretical vocabulary which for generations had been developed in prologues to commentaries on scriptural *auctores*.¹³⁴ Trevet's commentaries on, for example, Seneca's tragedies cannot be understood aright unless they are placed in the perspective of the exegetical tradition of literary analysis.

Trevet's commentaries on the two Senecas and on Livy¹³⁵ are but one aspect of a general 'coming together' of sacred and profane *auctores* in the minds and treatises of late medieval academics. In the thirteenth century, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas had made a sharp distinction between scriptural and pagan uses of similar literary devices: it was one thing for scriptural *auctores* to communicate truths 'in the literal sense' by various kinds of figurative language;

¹³² *Hoccleve's Works: The Minor Poems*, ed. F. J. Furnivall and I. Gollancz (EETS ES 61, 73; rev. reprint Oxford, 1970), p. 33.

¹³³ *The Poems and Fables of Robert Henryson*, ed. H. H. Wood, 2nd edition (Edinburgh, 1958), p. 142. Chaucer made use of Trevet's commentary in his translation of Boethius: see K. O. Petersen, 'Chaucer and Trivet', *Publications of the Modern Language Society of America* 18 (1903) 173-93; B. L. Jefferson, *Chaucer and The Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius* (Princeton, 1917), pp. 9-15.

¹³⁴ Compare Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity*, pp. 59, 110-21.

¹³⁵ For Trevet's commentaries on Seneca see n. 118 above; for his Livy-commentary see R. J. Dean, 'The Earliest Known Commentary on Livy Is by Nicholas Trevet', *Medievalia et humanistica* 3 (1945) 86-98, 4 (1946) 110.

it was quite another for the pagan *auctores* to communicate their half-truths and lies by similar means.¹³⁶ The late medieval compilers played a major role in the breaking down of these barriers, through their juxtapositions of pagan and Christian *auctoritates* on common subjects.¹³⁷ Of course, there remained a firm hierarchy of *auctoritates* with scriptural *auctoritates* at the top and pagan *auctoritates* at the bottom,¹³⁸ but, this having been stated, one could concede that many pagan writers had considerable *auctoritas* in such subject areas as natural science, politics and ethics.¹³⁹ By the fourteenth century, the gap between sacred and profane poetry had narrowed considerably in the minds of some scholars, a change clearly indicated by the great popularity of the *Compendium totius Biblie* of Pierre Auriol, O.F.M. (died 1322). Auriol was inclined to regard poetry generically; he was prepared to admit that much of the stock-in-trade of the pagan *poetae* could be found in those three great scriptural codices of poetry, the Psalter, the Song of Songs and Lamentations.¹⁴⁰ Other fourteenth-century scholars were willing to claim that both kinds of poetry were often similar in content as well as in style.¹⁴¹ Scriptural *auctores* were read literally, with close attention being paid to those poetic devices which were part of the literal sense; pagan *poetae* were read allegorically or 'moralised' – and thus the twain could meet.

In such an intellectual climate a writer could justify his own literary procedure or *forma tractandi* by appeal to a scriptural model, without in any way offending against the great *auctoritas* of the Bible. We have seen above how, in the general prologue to his *Vox clamantis*, John Gower suggested that his literary procedure was similar to that employed by St. John in the Apocalypse. When Chaucer justified his practice of speaking 'rudeliche and large' after the manner of the Canterbury pilgrims, he was able to cite the precedent of a *modus loquendi* found in the writings of the Evangelists:¹⁴²

¹³⁶ St. Albert, *In prima parte Summae theologiae* 1. 5 (Borgnet, 31. 23-24); St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* 1. 1. 9. 1 Resp.

¹³⁷ Compare Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity*, pp. 47-55.

¹³⁸ According to Vincent of Beauvais, scripture has the greatest degree of *auctoritas*, then come the decretals and canons which have received papal approval, then the writings of the *sancti* and *patres*, then the works of *catholici doctores*, and finally the writings of the pagan philosophers and poets. See the *Speculum maius*, Generalis prologus 8-14, especially 11 'De impari auctoritate eorum, quae excerpta sunt' (Strasbourg, 1473, etc.: Douai, 1624, rpt. Graz, 1964).

¹³⁹ For discussion see Minnis, 'John Gower, *sapiens* in Ethics and Politics'.

¹⁴⁰ See the passage from Auriol's *Compendium* printed in Minnis, "'Authorial Role" and "Literary Form"', 58.

¹⁴¹ See the references given in n. 112 above.

¹⁴² This appeal has no precedent in Jean de Meun's *apologia* for his book (*Roman de la Rose*, ll. 15135-15302), an excursus which has many striking parallels with Chaucer's General Prologue.

Crist spak hymself ful brode in hooly writ,
 And wel ye woot no vileynye is it.
 (General Prologue, ll. 739-40)

When Chaucer wished to defend one of his translations on the grounds that it preserved the *sententia* of the original text, he could refer to the fact that, although the words of the four Evangelists often differ, their profound meaning is single and uniform:

... ye woot that every Evaungelist,
 That telleth us the peyne of Jhesu Crist,
 Ne seith nat alle thyng as his felawe dooth;
 But nathelees hir sentence is al sooth,
 And alle acorden as in hire sentence,
 Al be ther in hir tellyng difference.
 For somme of hem seyn moore, and somme seyn lesse,
 When they his pitous passioun expresse –
 I meene of Mark, Mathew, Luc, and John –
 But doutelees hir sentence is al oon.
 (VII, ll. 943-52)

The ultimate source of this argument is probably St. Augustine's *De consensu evangelistarum*,¹⁴³ but it had been reiterated in generations of commentaries on the Evangelists.¹⁴⁴ To have obtained all the ideas contained in this passage, Chaucer need have looked no further than the prologue to Nicholas of Lyre's commentary on St. Matthew.¹⁴⁵

If Chaucer, Gower and Usk turned to such prologues for patterns, idioms and principles, so should the modern critic. My *entente* in this article has been to argue that academic prologues provided both prologue-models and sources of literary theory for many of the creative writers of late medieval England. The corpus of literary theory transmitted by academic prologues was at once

¹⁴³ See especially *De consensu evangelistarum* 1. 2. 4 and 2. 12. 28-29, ed. F. Wehrich (CSEL 43; Vienna-Leipzig, 1904), pp. 4, 127-30.

¹⁴⁴ See, for example, Hugh of St. Cher's prologue to his commentary on St. Matthew's gospel (*Hugonis Postilla* 5, fol. 3r). Hugh uses the traditional symbols for the four Evangelists to explain and justify the differences among their writings. Nicholas of Lyre also uses the traditional symbols, in a discussion which emphasizes the harmony of the Evangelists: see *Praefatio in quatuor Evangelistas* (*Biblia sacra* 5. 5-8); compare his *Prooemium in evangelium Marci* 5. 473-74, *Prooemium super Lucam* 5. 663-64 and *Prologus super Ioannem* 5. 1009-10.

¹⁴⁵ Alternatively, Chaucer could have obtained these ideas from a medieval gospel-harmony like Clement of Lanthony's *Unum ex quattuor*. For the Middle English translation of this work see E. Salter, *Nicholas Love's 'Myrrour of the Blessed Lyf of Jesu Christ'* (*Analecta Cartusiana* 10; Salzburg, 1974), pp. 76-77. Chaucer's discussion is so general that it is impossible to identify an exact source for it.

contemporaneous with Chaucer, Gower, Usk and others, and eminently accessible to them. Therefore, this corpus can, I suggest, throw considerable light on the ways in which Chaucer *cum suis* approached various literary issues and on the 'ends' which they envisaged their writings to be serving. As for the 'final cause' of the present article, let it suffice to express the hope that others might be encouraged to take academic literary theory into account when discussing which critical concepts and terms are relevant in assessments of medieval English literature.

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AVERROËS AND THE THEORY OF EMANATION¹

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THE theory of emanation appears in Averroës' *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* as the Islamic philosophers' basic model for explaining efficient causality. Of the twenty discussions that comprise the work it is most conspicuous in the third discussion, which analyzes the philosophers' claim that God is the agent or efficient cause of the universe and the latter is His act. But we also see traces of it in the seventeenth discussion, in their views on necessary connection, specific acts, and the procession of forms from 'separate principles'. Our aim here is to determine whether Averroës subscribed to this model either wholly, in part, or not at all. In order to evaluate what role, if any, emanation played in his own account of causal efficacy, a brief review of the doctrine will be helpful.

To the question of how God brought the world into existence and continually maintains it, Avicenna offered emanation as the most adequate response.² Presupposing on both religious and philosophical grounds that the

¹ This study was engendered by a larger investigation of Averroës' doctrine of causal efficacy which is presently being prepared for publication. The initial research was aided in part by a generous grant from the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture, whose support is here gratefully acknowledged. A shorter version of this essay was presented to the annual meeting of the American Oriental Society in the section devoted to Islamic philosophy and science in Toronto, Ontario on 11 April 1978. In this connection, I would especially like to thank Professors George F. Hourani, Muhsin Mahdi, and Michael E. Marmura for their helpful comments and criticisms of my original draft.

² It is Avicenna's rather than al-Fārābī's formulation of the emanative scheme which both al-Ghazālī and Averroës reproduce in their respective *Tahāfuts*. They probably made this choice, because Avicenna's version was the more fully developed of the two and perhaps more widely circulated as well. The chief difference between them lay in Avicenna's distinction between celestial souls and Intelligences. Al-Fārābī combined the functions of both in the celestial Intelligences alone. By treating the two separately Avicenna was able to give a better account of the prognosticative powers ascribed to prophets than his predecessor, since souls as opposed to Intelligences were understood to have knowledge of particular images and events. The prophet, in turn, would be able to grasp the particular sequences of future events by receiving an emanation from these celestial souls. Cf. F. Rahman, *Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy* (Ethical and Religious Classics of East and West 21; London, 1958), pp. 11-45.

Deity was a unique and absolutely simple Being,³ he maintained that the effect of God's characteristic activity had to be consistent with His nature. Hence, it too would be unique and simple. In his typical formulation, this meant that from one thing only one thing could proceed.⁴ But because the universe was plainly a manifold system of particulars and relations, it could hardly be supposed to proceed from Him directly. The only plausible explanation he found, therefore, for deriving its multiplicity from a unitary cause was to envisage a continuous series of individuals of various kinds proceeding from other causally prior individuals. He supposed that the increasing scope and complexity of these intermediary causes and effects,⁵ ranging from the First Intelligence to the lowest of material things, would eventually account not only for the tremendous diversity of the world-system, but also its causal origin in and dependence upon God.

What distinguishes this account of causal efficacy as an emanative theory is Avicenna's preference for terms like procession (*ṣudūr, proventio*), overflow (*fayḍ, proventus*), and necessary consequence (*luẓūm, secutus*) to express causal relations. His preference reflects two assumptions: first, the view that the actuality of anything that is what it is, is a certain plenitude of being which expresses itself as an activity, and, second, that such activity is necessarily outgoing and communicative of itself. The activity of an existent will therefore not only belong *to* it, but will extend outward *from* it as well.

Accordingly, the resultant overflow of causes and effects will be continuous with its ultimate source in both a temporal and an ontological sense. Temporally, it will be coexistent with God's self-communicative activity, so that the causal series persists just so long as His activity does. This is why for Avicenna the eternity of God's existence necessitates a coeternal universe as the collective embodiment of the overflow.

Ontologically, the causal series will remain inseparable from the Deity, simply because it is an overflow of Himself. Although it is not identical with the Deity, it is presented as a projection out of divine plenitude. For that reason, it is compared, in al-Ghazālī's summary, with light extending from the sun or a shadow proceeding from an opaque body.⁶ The visible effect in terms of either brightness or darkness has its hold on existence only because of its continuous

³ Averroës, *Tahāfot at-Tahāfot (L'incohérence de l'incohérence)*, ed. M. Bouyges (Bibliotheca arabica scholasticorum, série arabe 3; Beirut, 1930), p. 148; *Destructio destructionum philosophiae Algazelis in the Latin Version of Calo Calonymos*, ed. B. Zedler (Milwaukee, 1961), p. 156. Henceforth, texts from these two volumes will be cited in the notes as coming from *TT* and *DD* respectively.

⁴ *TT*, p. 173; *DD*, p. 173.

⁵ *TT*, p. 177; *DD*, pp. 175-76.

⁶ *TT*, p. 150; *DD*, p. 158.

causal link with its source. For any particular effect, then, the emanation which produces it is a kind of lifeline to being. It is the ontological tie that binds cause and effect, and in this sense it has a distinctive role to play in causal explanation.

With this as his model, Avicenna's theory is put to work to map out and explain the structure of the universe. From the activity of the First Principle (*al-mabda' al-awwal*, *primum principium*) the First Intelligence (*al-^caql al-awwal*, *intellectus primus*)⁷ overflows in accordance with the rule of uniqueness that from one thing only one thing may proceed. Inasmuch as the first effect is an Intelligence, it may contemplate three things: (1) its cause or principle; (2) its own essence; and (3) its own possibility with respect to existence. Since it shares in the fullness and activity of its cause, the First Intelligence does all three, and in so doing it too overflows. But now the rule of uniqueness is applied to all three contemplative acts, not to the Intelligence taken simply. The result is that another celestial Intelligence overflows from its contemplating its cause. A celestial soul overflows from the contemplation of its essence, and the outermost celestial sphere overflows from the contemplation of its own possible existence. The process is repeated with each of the succeeding Intelligences until there is a total of ten Intelligences, nine souls, and nine spheres to account for the structure and behavior of the planetary system as understood by the medievals.

Two elements of this cosmological structure are of importance for our inquiry. The first is Avicenna's distinction between Deity or the First Principle and the First Intelligence, which is expressed by two easily confused terms, *al-mabda' al-awwal* and *primum principium* for God, and *al-^caql al-awwal* and *intellectus primus* for His effect.⁸ The second is Avicenna's identification of a tenth Intelligence 'below' the sphere of the moon as the Active Intelligence (*al-^caql al-fa^cal*, *intellectus agens*).⁹ Although it is too weak to continue the threefold emanation process which produces in turn an Intelligence, a soul, and a sphere, it is sufficient to overflow and confer specific forms upon suitably prepared recipients. The effects of its activity, therefore, are the actualized minds of individual human beings, the souls of all living creatures, and the full range of inanimate material bodies to be found in the sublunar sphere.

⁷ *TT*, p. 183; *DD*, pp. 178-80.

⁸ Harry A. Wolfson, 'Averroës' Lost Treatise on the Prime Mover', *Hebrew Union College Annual* 23.1 (1950) 683-710.

⁹ Consequently, the tenth or Active Intelligence is not identical with the mover of the lunar sphere itself. This will have direct bearing on our interpretation of Averroës regarding emanation. A comprehensive account of the exegetical and philosophical problems which prompted Averroës' predecessors to postulate such an Intelligence appears in Herbert A. Davidson's excellent study, 'Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect', *Viator* 3 (1972) 109-78.

From this summary several items emerge which we can now use as criteria for establishing Averroës' own position: (1) the rule of uniqueness, stipulating a one-to-one correspondence between cause and effect, i.e., 'from one thing only one thing may proceed' (this presupposes that God as an efficient cause has a single specific act, just as natural causes do, and accordingly a single effect); (2) the distinction between the First Principle and the First Intelligence, by virtue of which God does not preside over or move any celestial sphere; (3) the unidirectionality of God's causal efficacy extending outward and, from the geocentric perspective, downward to the sublunar world, so that Deity is the *terminus a quo* of emanation, while material recipients in the sublunar realm are its *terminus ad quem*; (4) the continuity of the causal bond expressed in the language of uninterrupted overflow, procession, necessary consequence, and, generally, action deriving from the cause; (5) the identification of the tenth or Active Intelligence as the source of the specific forms of things 'beneath' the sphere of the moon, as opposed to its presiding over the sphere of the moon as its mover.

There is clear evidence that, prior to writing the *Tahāfut*, Averroës accepted virtually the entire account outlined by Avicenna. Our source is his *Epitome of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, probably written between 1174 and 1178, and preserved in both Arabic and Latin versions.¹⁰ In the fourth and final section of the *Epitome*, which summarizes and evaluates Aristotle's theory of separate substances and the final causality which they exercise over all other existents, Averroës accepts without qualification at least the first four of the five points we have mentioned.

Citing the need to inquire into the nature of 'one first substance' as the cause of multiplicity in all others (including the multiplicity of intelligibles thought by the separate substances), he argues that it must be intrinsically simple or undifferentiated:

... since the multiplicity which exists in each one of these separate [substances] exists in them only insofar as they think a multiplicity [of things] essentially ... it therefore follows necessarily that the one [substance] in this case is indivisible in

¹⁰ Both E. Renan and M. Alonso maintain that Averroës' *Talkhīṣ Kitāb Mā Ba'd al-Ṭabī'a* was completed in 1174, whereas C. Quirós Rodríguez places the date of completion no earlier than 1178. Simon Van Den Bergh offers no information on the dating of the *Talkhīṣ* in his translation of that work. What emerges from the dates cited is an evident consensus that the *Talkhīṣ* preceded both the *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* and the *Tafsīr Mā Ba'd al-Ṭabī'a*: see E. Renan, *Averroës et l'averroïsme*, ed. H. Psichari (Paris, 1949), p. 61; M. Alonso, *Teología de Averroës (estudios y documentos)* (Madrid-Granada, 1947), pp. 51-98; C. Quirós Rodríguez, ed., *Averroës, Compendio de Metafísica* (Madrid, 1919), pp. xxxv-xxxvi; S. Van Den Bergh, trans., *Die Epitome der Metaphysik des Averroës* (Leiden, 1924), pp. i-xxxv.

what it thinks by way of its essence. Consequently, it thinks only one simple entity, namely, its essence, and *it cannot think any multiplicity at all, either within its own essence or as something external to its essence* [*lā fi-dhātihi, wa-lā khārijatan, neque in sua essentia neque extra suam essentiam*]. It is simple in its substance, whereas the others are one through it (emphasis added).¹¹

Having thus excluded even a multiplicity of internalized ideas as objects of God's thought, Averroës explicitly affirms the rule of uniqueness governing the relationship between causes and effects, and draws the inevitable consequence of that rule for divine causality. 'From that which is one simple [entity], insofar as it is one simple [entity], one [entity] proceeds. How therefore may a multiplicity proceed from it?'¹² To the objection that at least on the lower levels of the emanative scheme it appears that more than one effect proceeds from a single cause, he replies that the threefold structure of emanation is really preserved intact despite appearances. For the supposed surplus of effects results from a subsequent emanation of the last of the three original ones.¹³ In short, he vigorously defends not only the rule of uniqueness but Avicenna's distinctive application of it to cosmology.

Consistent with this understanding of the rule, Averroës likewise differentiates between the First Principle or God and the First Intelligence, which he identifies with the mover of the outermost sphere:

We say: it has already been shown from the preceding discourse that *the noblest of these movers is the mover of the sphere of fixed stars*,¹⁴ and that it is the first cause of those [other movers *qua* movers]. This is the full extent of what has been explained in this treatise [i.e., Aristotle's *Metaphysics*]. But when we make a comparison between the attributes proper to that First [Principle], that is, insofar as it is one simple [entity], which does not think any multiplicity at all by way of its essence, and the action of this mover, we find that their attributes do not correspond. This means that from the aforementioned mover it is necessary that

¹¹ Averroës, *Talkhiṣ Kitāb Mā Ba'd al-Ṭabī'a*, ed. Uthman Amin (Cairo, 1958), treatise 4, par. 53, p. 148; *Epitome in libros Metaphysicorum* (Venice, 1574), treatise 4, 8. 391vM-392rA.

¹² *Talkhiṣ*, par. 54, p. 149 (cf. par. 59, pp. 152-53); *Epitome*, fol. 392rD (cf. fol. 393rA-C).

¹³ *Talkhiṣ*, par. 57, pp. 151-52; *Epitome*, fols. 392vM-393rA. The objection takes as its example the overflow deriving from the celestial Intelligence governing Saturn, which appears to produce six rather than three effects. The same point, however, can be applied with equal facility to any of the essential causes in the emanative scheme. In fact, the first four of al-Ghazālī's five main criticisms of the theory employ this kind of objection with generally devastating effect. On the Ghazalian critique of emanation, see n. 31 below.

¹⁴ Averroës works with a simplified version of the theory of homiocentric spheres that eliminates the so-called diurnal sphere, which was believed to revolve in a westerly direction (from a terrestrial vantage point) and carry no stars or planets. In Avicenna's version of the theory, this was the outermost sphere out of a total of nine; according to Averroës' version, the sphere of the fixed stars is outermost in a system of eight.

more than one form proceed [*ṣadara ʿanhu, proveniūt*], because it is the very thing which bestows form on the stellar sphere and existence on the mover of the sphere which is next to it in rank. And [nevertheless] from that which is one and simple insofar as it is one and simple, only one entity necessarily proceeds This is because the mover [of the stellar sphere] is necessarily nobler than the form of the sphere, hence the essence from which these two beings necessarily follow [*lazima, proveniunt*] has parts, some of which are nobler than others. *This being the case with regard to the mover of the stellar sphere, it is necessarily an effect and thus has a cause for its existence ... and this is God* (emphasis added).¹⁵

Although Averroës notes in passing that Aristotle's *Metaphysics* establishes no cause beyond the mover of the outermost sphere, he nonetheless argues that it too must have a cause. For the multiplicity of its effects attests to its internal differentiation, and what lacks the attribute of absolute simplicity cannot be identified with Deity. His commitment to the Islamic philosophers' model could hardly be clearer.

Similarly, when Averroës examines the direction and order which characterizes the celestial scheme of causes and effects, he regularly describes the series as descending rather than ascending. The dominant problem is to derive the many from the One, not to begin with the many and relate it to the One. Accordingly, his discussion of divine causality begins with the question '... how are these principles ordered from the First?'¹⁶ The various stages of his reply follow the same presupposition about order.¹⁷

That Averroës or anyone else would follow such a course in explaining divine causality might seem so obvious as to be trivial. After all, where else can one begin? But the Commentator indicates at one point that the method is hardly Aristotelian. For if God is understood as a formal-final cause, the whole emanative analysis would be inappropriate or at best figurative. Indeed, he explicitly points to the Neoplatonic origins of the doctrine at the same time that he argues for its correctness:

The truth is that from what is one only one thing proceeds, while from a duality only a duality or what is less [than a duality] proceeds, and [the claim] that a duality inevitably proceeds from a duality does not necessarily follow. This is the doctrine of the modern philosophers of Islam such as Abu Naṣr [al-Fārābī] and others. It may also be thought to be that of Themistius and Plato among the ancients, and this [explanation], which I have stated, is the most reliable of the explanations on which they have based this doctrine. And [yet] there is something faulty [*khalal*],

¹⁵ *Talkhīṣ*, par. 54, pp. 149-50; *Epitome*, fol. 392rC-E.

¹⁶ *Talkhīṣ*, par. 55, p. 150; *Epitome*, fol. 392rK.

¹⁷ *Talkhīṣ*, pars. 60-65, pp. 154-56; *Epitome*, fols. 393rD-394rE.

dubium] in this doctrine.¹⁸ That is because *our* statement that from the one *only* one may proceed is a correct judgment only in regard to the agent *qua* agent but not insofar as He is a form and an end. Thus one may say only that form and end are agents by striking an analogy. But then the proper question in this matter is that one might say [the following], 'Is it possible that in relation to one simple [entity] there might be more than one thing and that more than one thing might be perfected by it?' Now if this is impossible, the discussion¹⁹ [as we have presented it] is true; but if it is possible, then it is false, and we have already discussed this elsewhere (emphasis added).²⁰

Averroës indicates here his awareness that divine causality for the Stagirite is really formal and final causality in which many effects proceed from the self-thinking Deity, but only in a figurative sense. Strictly speaking, 'the many' are dependent on the First Unmoved Mover as the prime analogate of all substance and the object of desire. No plenitude, however, really issues from such a Deity. This effectively reverses the direction of the causal relation so that the individual effects are the *termini a quibus* imitating Deity as *terminus ad quem*. Averroës grants too that if this is the proper description of divine causality, the emanative theory is essentially false. Still, at this point in his career, he merely notes the gap between the two theories and spells out its implications. Otherwise, he holds to the original version of emanation as 'our statement' and even tries to shore it up against objections. In fact, he characterizes his own arguments in support of the theory as stronger than the proofs his predecessors have adduced.²¹ Again, there seems to be no question about his personal conviction here. He clearly inclined to the emanative model.

Consistent with this view, he regularly uses the terminology of procession (*ṣudūr, proventus*) and necessary consequence (*luẓūm, secutus*) to express the causal relation,²² although references to emanation (*ḥayḍ, proventus*) are harder

¹⁸ The Latin translation 'dubium' or 'doubt' does not capture the full import of the Arabic term 'khalal' which can mean variously 'gap', 'interval', 'cleft', 'crack', and therefore a defective state like 'fault', 'flaw', or 'defect'.

¹⁹ Literally, the term 'mas'ala' (Latin 'petitio') would be rendered as a question or request. But questions and requests are not, properly speaking, true or false. If the proposition expressed by the question is meant here, i.e., that more than one thing might proceed from and be perfected by one cause, it is surely inconsistent of Averroës to regard its impossibility as an indication of its truth and its possibility as an indication of falsehood. The most plausible reading of the original Arabic 'mas'ala' would probably be 'discussion'. This receives additional support from the fact that each of the twenty discussions of the two *Tahāfuts* is called a 'mas'ala'.

²⁰ *Talkhīṣ*, par. 59, p. 153 including textual material cited in n. 8; *Epitome*, fol. 393rC-D. Amin chooses not to include this important passage in the text itself, even though it appears in three out of the five sources of the text he uses for his own edition. No justification for this decision is offered.

²¹ *ibid.*

²² *Talkhīṣ*, pars. 55-62, pp. 149-55 *passim*; *Epitome*, fols. 392rB-393rD *passim*.

to find. But here too he notes the contrast with Aristotle's view: if Aristotle's account of the separate substances as formal, final, and efficient causes is correct by itself, the suggestion that sensible substance proceeds from them must be interpreted as an expression of 'second intention' (*ʿalā al-qaṣd al-thānī, ex secunda intentione*), having only derivative or conceptual significance. It would thus be comparable to 'what we say about the lawgiver – that he teaches men virtue [by actualizing their capacities to attain it], not that he acquires virtue in his own soul [by receiving it as an overflow from an external source]'.²³ But while Averroës attempts to work out Aristotle's view here, he does not go so far as to accept it, for the point in the treatise at which this interpretation is recorded precedes his own outline and defense of emanation by fourteen paragraphs.

Finally, even Averroës' discussion of the Active Intelligence differs little from that of his predecessors. Its function remains that of bestowing forms on the various species of sublunar existents.²⁴ Such an agent is needed, he argues, because neither the attributes of the elementary bodies nor the generative powers of proximate efficient causes can wholly explain why most complex particulars, especially plants and animals, have specific acts which aim toward determinate ends. The specific acts of the elements are too restricted in scope to provide an adequate explanation. Proximate causes will not do either, because they are necessarily individual and can contribute nothing more than either the particular material stuff to receive the intelligible form or the individual instrument facilitating its reception, as for example in the case of sperm and a fertile egg.²⁵ Since individuals *per se* generate only individuals, as Aristotle argued, what is needed is an efficient cause of the immaterial, intelligible form, which is generated only *per accidens*. This, Averroës suggests, is precisely what the Active Intelligence is equipped to provide. It contains the intelligible forms of all things and introduces them into material bodies when the latter are suitably disposed.²⁶

If there is a noticeable difference between Averroës' discussion and the Islamic philosopher's model of emanation, it is in Averroës' identification of the Active Intelligence as the mover of the lunar sphere itself, as opposed to the Intelligence operating beneath it.²⁷ All else remains essentially the same.

The difference between Averroës and Aristotle, however, is far more evident. For while Aristotle maintained that a man is generated by another man

²³ *Talkhiṣ*, par. 40, p. 148; *Epitome*, fol. 389rB.

²⁴ *Talkhiṣ*, par. 62, p. 155; *Epitome*, fol. 393vH.

²⁵ *Talkhiṣ*, par. 64, p. 156; *Epitome*, fol. 394rA-B.

²⁶ *Talkhiṣ*, par. 65, p. 156; *Epitome*, fol. 394rC.

²⁷ *Talkhiṣ*, par. 62, p. 154; *Epitome*, fol. 393vH.

and the sun,²⁸ denoting thereby two orders of *physical* causes, Averroës accepted this only insofar as individuals were concerned. Since the form of humanity is not individual, it could only be generated in men by an immaterial counterpart, and this is precisely what the Active Intelligence contemplates. By locating the efficient cause of individuals being *what* they are in universals separate from matter, Averroës is clearly taking a major stride toward Plato and away from Aristotle. The Commentator himself recognized this, but he plainly considered the step entirely justified. For as he concludes his discussion of the Active Intelligence, he admits that 'this is the distinction between the doctrines of Aristotle and Plato with respect to form being efficacious, and in this way the remaining difficulties will be removed.'²⁹ The theory is obviously a source of pride to him.

Thus the picture we have of Averroës at this stage of his philosophic career, roughly a decade before completing the *Tahāfut*, is that of a devoted heir to the Farabian-Avicennian tradition on how divine and celestial causality operate. His model is emanative to the core. But if he is a devoted heir, he is nonetheless a self-conscious one. He cannot refrain from noticing and remarking on the differences between Aristotle's position and the one he espouses. Though he tries to reconcile the two by superimposing one system upon the other, he still sees gaps between them. Indeed, he is sufficiently forthright to identify these gaps as he goes along and to pose the relevant questions which will ultimately decide their compatibility or incompatibility. Thus, while there is conviction in what he says in the *Epitome*, it is a conviction that is searching enough to challenge itself.

By the time he had completed the *Tahāfut*, certainly no earlier than 1180³⁰ and perhaps several years later, Averroës displays a markedly different attitude toward the same theory. Following al-Ghazālī's point-by-point attacks on emanation and particularly the rule of uniqueness, Averroës is more often than not in the unusual position of agreeing with his opponent.

Al-Ghazālī had directed a veritable barrage³¹ of criticisms against the

²⁸ Aristotle, *Physics* 2.2 (194b13).

²⁹ *Talkhīṣ*, par. 65, p. 156; *Epitome*, fol. 394rE.

³⁰ *TT*, pp. xi-xii.

³¹ Al-Ghazālī levels one general criticism against the theory of emanation and supplements it with five specific objections that are developed at some length. His general criticism is that when the philosophers assume that the First Agent is an absolutely undifferentiated unity, that the world is a multiplicity, and that from one cause only one specific effect may proceed, they must conclude either that the universe is an aggregate of absolutely simple units or that at some point in the unfolding series of causes and effects many must proceed from one. The dilemma for the philosophers is that both alternatives are impossible. See *TT*, pp. 174-75; *DD*, p. 174.

The first of the specific objections proceeds from the modal notions of necessity and possibility. Al-Ghazālī asks if they are identical with existence or not. If they are not, then there

doctrine, which in their overall import emphasized two points: (1) that the principle of *ex uno non fit nisi unum* was violated at every stage of the emanative scheme, and, that if the philosophers could successfully show at any point that it was not violated, they would at the same time show that neither the First nor any other cause was absolutely simple; (2) that the very notion of a sentient being producing spheres, souls, and intellects by the act of contemplating various modal objects – its possibility in itself, its necessity through a cause, and ultimately the Necessary Existent itself – was patently absurd. There is simply no middle term to connect contemplation with production.

In response to these criticisms, Averroës generally conceded the specific point at issue and then attempted to show how the ancients, as opposed to the

must be duality even in God whom the philosophers call 'the Necessary of Existence'. But if they are identical, the distinction is purely verbal, and they must be equally identical in the First Intelligence. But if that is the case, it should not produce three effects by contemplating one and the same entity. Thus al-Ghazālī takes the principle that from one kind of cause only one kind of effect may proceed essentially and demands it be applied equally to both cause and effect. Unity in the one requires unity in the other, and similarly with multiplicity. See *TT*, pp. 195 ff.; *DD*, p. 187.

The second criticism focuses on the notion of cognition as a way of being. If the knowledge which the First Intelligence has of itself and of its cause is identical with its existence, then any distinction between them is purely verbal. The First Intelligence will be a pure undifferentiated unity as well. But then no multiplicity of effects may derive from it. If, on the other hand, they are not identical, then the First Intelligence is itself a multiplicity. In that case, parity requires that God too is a multiplicity, since the philosophers claim that He knows both Himself and others, if only in a universal way. See *TT*, pp. 202 ff.; *DD*, p. 190.

The third criticism develops this point further and ultimately rejects the notion of cognitional identity altogether. Al-Ghazālī argues that the self-knowledge of the First Intelligence is either identical with its essence or it is not. The first alternative is ruled out, because the knower and the known are always distinct if there is to be knowledge at all. But if the essence of the First Intelligence and its self-knowledge are distinct, then once again it is shown to be differentiated and manifold. Parity requires the same for the Deity. See *TT*, pp. 237 ff.; *DD*, p. 210.

The fourth criticism is based on the structural features supposed to characterize the outermost sphere. The body of the heavens is supposed to proceed from the First Intelligence thinking its own possibility. But the philosophers maintain that the heavens are composed of matter and form, so that out of one act two proceed, contrary to the rule which limits one kind of effect to one kind of cause. Other aspects of the sphere such as its size, the location of its polar points, and the disposition of the fixed stars it carries would all require additional causes which the emanative theory by its own principles is not equipped to provide. See *TT*, pp. 237 ff.; *DD*, p. 211.

Finally, al-Ghazālī argues that the whole notion of production through contemplation is absurd. There is simply no clear connection between an individual thinking about possibility of his own existence and his producing a sphere or anything else for that matter as a consequence of such thinking. One need only perform a mental experiment. Let a man think about his own possible existence as much as he wishes, no sphere will emanate from him. For al-Ghazālī possibility is nothing more than a modal concept, and a concept as such cannot make any material thing come into being or cease to be. See *TT*, p. 252; *DD*, pp. 220-21.

modern Islamic philosophers, never committed the errors which al-Ghazālī uncovers. However, the often ambiguous character of Averroës' replies, along with his continued and admittedly widespread use of emanative terminology throughout the rest of the *Tahāfut*, have left some doubt as to whether he retained the theory at all or simply modified it in accordance with the most important of al-Ghazālī's objections.

Scholarly opinion is divided on the question,³² and in view of Averroës' enthusiastic espousal of emanation in the *Epitome* (itself a demonstrative book) it is not surprising that this should be the case. Still, to determine which view is in fact correct, Averroës' various remarks on emanation should be judged against the same five criteria by which the main characteristics of the theory itself were established. Where doubt remains, references to the issue in the *Long Commentaries*, which superseded the *Epitome*, would once again count as Averroës' own preferred standard for judging his intention. How then does he reevaluate the doctrine?

Certainly the most obvious difference is his denial that the rule of uniqueness is applicable to *every* instance of causal efficacy. As in the *Epitome*, he attributes the principle of one-to-one correspondence between cause and effect to the modern philosophers of Islam, specifically al-Fārābī and Avicenna. But now he brands it absolutely erroneous as a means of explaining the operation of divine or celestial causality. He offers two reasons for this judgment. First, 'the fundamental error of this position is that they made the statement that from the one only one may proceed, and then assumed a multiplicity in the one entity which proceeds; therefore, they necessarily had to regard this plurality as uncaused'.³³ In other words, their use of the principle is self-contradictory. No sooner do they assert it than they deny it by introducing a multiplicity of acts to which they are not causally entitled; and by denying the rule, however unobtrusively, they leave the multiplicity they sought to explain both uncaused and unexplained.

³² Among those who hold that Averroës merely modified his view, but retained the emanative model are Léon Gauthier, *Ibn Rochd (Averroës)* (Paris, 1948), pp. 264-65 and Simon Van Den Bergh, trans., *Averroës' Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)*, 2 vols. (London, 1954), 2. 73 n. 104. 7.

Those who maintain that the whole model was jettisoned are H. A. Wolfson, 'The Twice-Revealed Averroës' and 'The Plurality of Immovable Movers in Aristotle, Averroës, and St. Thomas' in *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion* 1, ed. Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), pp. 376, 12; Majid Fakhry, *Islamic Occasionalism and Its Critique by Averroës and Aquinas* (London, 1958), p. 136 n. 91, although his general discussion is sometimes ambiguous on the subject; and Michel Allard, 'Le rationalisme d'Averroës d'après une étude sur la création', *Bulletin d'études orientales de l'Institut français de Damas* 14 (1952-54) 23-25, 49.

³³ *TT*, pp. 249-50; *DD*, p. 219.

Behind this, however, lies a hidden and, to Averroës, mistaken assumption. In noting it, he gives his second reason for rejecting the universal application of the rule. It is their view that God as an unobservable agent can be likened to observable agents.³⁴ The assumption is false, because the very unobservability of the Divine Agent consists in His separation from matter, in obvious contrast to the situation of any observable agent. But if they differ thus in constitution, there is no reason to suppose they must be comparable in their specific acts either. Hence, he states that 'one who tries to compare these two entities [material and immaterial existents] and supposes that the agent of the former acts in the same way as sublunar agents do is extremely confused, profoundly mistaken, and completely in error.'³⁵

This judgment on Averroës' predecessors is of course all the more forceful when we realize it is also a judgment on his original position. But does it imply total rejection of the emanative model? By itself, hardly. Other interpretations of how emanation unfolds are surely possible. In fact, Averroës goes on to note a currently accepted view, which he appears to share, namely: 'that from the One which is first all diverse existents proceed as one first emanation [*ṣudūran awwalan, prima emanatione*]'.³⁶ Here the emanative model is evidently retained; only the restriction on how many effects are directly attributable to it seems to be changed.³⁷ This had led to the opinion that he merely substituted one theory of emanation for another. But his attitude toward the rule of uniqueness cannot be the sole test. At the very least, then, it remains to be seen who is to be identified as 'the One which is first' and just what is meant by 'one first emanation'.

Here a problem arises. In the *Tahāfut*, Averroës generally refers to the Deity in an ambiguous or abbreviated manner. God is variously designated as 'the One who is first' (*al-wāḥid al-awwal, unum primum*) or 'the First Unity' (*al-waḥda al-ūlā, unitas prima*), 'the First Principle' (*al-mabda' al-awwal, principium primum*), 'the First Agent' (*al-fā'il al-awwal, agens primum*) or simply as 'the First' (*al-awwal, primum*).³⁸ The list is by no means exhaustive,

³⁴ *TT*, pp. 175, 179, 230; *DD*, pp. 175, 177, 206. Averroës himself seems open to the same charge insofar as he likens the human mind engaged in thought to the divine mind. Still, this does not appear to have troubled him.

³⁵ *TT*, p. 193; *DD*, p. 185.

³⁶ *TT*, p. 178; *DD*, p. 176.

³⁷ Averroës confirms this in a subsequent observation: 'The First Agent who is unobservable to us is an unrestricted agent, while the observable agent is a restricted agent. From the unrestricted agent, only an unrestricted act, which does not distinguish one effect to the exclusion of another, can proceed. By this means Aristotle proves that the Agent of human intelligibles is an Intelligence devoid of matter, since He thinks all things' (*TT*, p. 180; *DD*, p. 177).

³⁸ *TT*, pp. 178, 181, 311, 314, 321, 324; *DD*, pp. 175-78, 260, 263, 267-68, 270.

but it raises the following question: do these expressions name the undifferentiated One of al-Fārābī and Avicenna or the First Intelligence which emanates from it and moves the outermost sphere? With the exception of 'First Agent', each name could very well apply to both, and even the name 'First Agent' does not really identify the God of Averroës. The most it indicates is that *if* the One of the philosophers is God, the mover of the sphere would be the second agent, not the first. But *if* the One is not identical with the Deity, if in fact there is no such entity, then the mover of the sphere must be the First Agent.

There is one passage, however, in which Averroës is more explicit. After noting his predecessors' difficulty in explaining the derivation of multiplicity from a simple Godhead, he adds that the difficulty had one final consequence – to force them to distinguish between the First and the mover of the diurnal sphere. What compelled the distinction, of course, was their conviction that the latter had a composite nature, since it was able to think both itself and its cause and thereby produce two effects: the outermost sphere and the mover of the next sphere. None of this is new; indeed, Averroës himself had presented the same argument in the *Epitome*. But now his evaluation is exactly the opposite of what it was, for he concludes that:

this is an error according to the principles of the philosophers [literally, 'their principles'] for the thinker and the object thought are identical in the human intellect and all the more so in the separate Intelligences. Nor does this follow from the teaching of Aristotle, for the individual agent which is observable to us and from which only one act may proceed can only be compared with the First Agent in an equivocal manner.³⁹

Averroës now knows there is something fundamentally wrong in the argument of the philosophers, which he did not know before. But what precisely is the mistake? Is it that the First Intelligence is composite, or that the sublunar and celestial agents are comparable in terms of their modes of action? Both together? Or is it that their whole theology is mistaken because it fails even to identify the First Agent?

The thrust of the argument in the *Tahāfut* points to the last alternative by way of the other two. Still, Averroës does not say so explicitly. But in the *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, he leaves no doubt on the issue:

As for the claim of the modern philosophers to the effect that the First Substance is prior to the mover of the whole world – *it is false*. That is because every one of those [separate] substances is a principle of sensible substance insofar as it is a

³⁹ *TT*, p. 180; *DD*, p. 177.

mover and an end. Therefore, Aristotle says that if there were substances which did not move [others], their activity would be superfluous (emphasis added).⁴⁰

There can be no distinction between the First Principle and the First Intelligence, and the reason is that the former has no legitimate causal function to perform. What counts as such a function in the case of separate substances or Intelligences is simply their capacity to move spheres as final causes. By stressing their role as *moving* and *final* causes, moreover, Averroës seems to discount altogether the emanative model of efficient causality. For if an Intelligence does not move a planet, it is superfluous, and in the Aristotelian universe, at least, saying that is as good as saying that no such Intelligence exists, much less overflows. But if it does move a sphere, on the other hand, it does so only as form and end.

Averroës, in sum, has reversed himself again. The First Principle *is* the First Intelligence, and it has a clear role to play as a 'principle' in the cosmological scheme. But that role is not to overflow with spheres, souls, and separate Intelligences; it is to move the world as an object of desire.

This conclusion is supported by the way in which Averroës treats the direction of causation in discussing the emanative model. One would expect that, if he had merely modified the account to allow more than one effect to proceed from a single cause, these effects would continue to be described as projected outward from their cause, descending from it, or proceeding from it with no further qualification. For certainly the notion of uniform outward directionality is an intrinsic part of the model as formulated by al-Fārābī and Avicenna and reported by al-Ghazālī. But immediately after al-Ghazālī's summary of the emanative scheme and its cosmological import, Averroës dismisses the *whole* account as a complete 'falsehood fabricated against the philosophers by Avicenna, al-Fārābī, and others'.⁴¹

The assessment is as comprehensive as it is strong, and Averroës does nothing to qualify it in what follows. Instead he argues that the true theory of the ancients is that the celestial bodies have principles which move them in two ways: by ordering them and by being objects of love. In short, we are back to formal causality as a principle of order and final causality as a principle of movement.

⁴⁰ Averroës, *Tafsīr Mā Ba'd al-Tabī'āt*, ed. M. Bouyges, 3 vols. (Bibliotheca arabica scholasticorum, série arabe 5-7; Beirut, 1938-48), text. 44, 3. 1648C; *In 12 Metaph.* (1073b1-3), c. 4 text. 44 (Venice, 1574), 8. 327vH.

⁴¹ *TT*, p. 184; *DD*, p. 180. Elsewhere Averroës gives as his reason for this charge that the theory which al-Ghazālī relates in the name of the philosophers is without proof. It was also unknown to the ancients, by whom he meant primarily Aristotle and his commentators, Alexander and Themistius.

To be sure, Averroës continues to speak as if the separate Intelligences were the *termini a quibus* of causal efficacy, and in a way he must, because by his own admission they are principles, and, therefore, originating causes of celestial movement. But if he meant that the direction of their causal influence was unambiguously expressed in terms of overflow, consequence, procession, and the like, he would not qualify his use of emanative language by suggesting again and again that these causes and effects *ascend* (*tartaqī, yartaqī; ascendere*)⁴² to the separate principles. But this in fact is precisely what he does, even to the point of using the language of emanation interchangeably with that of ascent. To illustrate:

- (1) But it occurred to the people [i.e., the philosophers] to say that, although all these ruling principles which exist in the world [the celestial beings] proceed from [*ṣādīra* 'an, *proveniant ab*] the First Principle, only some of them proceed without an intermediary while others proceed through an intermediary, *by progressively ascending from the lower world to the higher*. For they discovered that certain parts of the sphere are for the sake of the movements of others (emphasis added).⁴³
- (2) According to the doctrine of the Philosopher, everything whose existence is verified only through a connection [*irtibāt, copulatio*] of parts with one another, as for example the connection of matter and form and the connection of the elementary parts of the world, receives its existence as a result of their connection. The bestower of this connection is therefore the bestower of existence. Since anything that is connected is connected only by virtue of an individual notion within it [i.e., the form], and the individual notion through which it is connected only derives from an individual that subsists by itself but together with it, then it is necessary that this individual be separate [from matter] and subsist by itself, and that this same individual only bestow an individual notion [form] through its essence. This unity is allotted to the various classes of existents according to their natures, ... *and all those unities ascend [tatarāqqī, ascendunt] to the First Unity as warmth which exists in all individual warm things arises from the primary instance of warmth which is fire and ascends to it*. In this way Aristotle connected sensible being with intelligible being, saying that the world is one and proceeds from one (emphasis added).⁴⁴
- (3) They [al-Fārābī and Avicenna] did not understand how the One is a cause according to the doctrine of Aristotle and the Peripatetics who followed him. Now

⁴² *TT*, pp. 175, 178, 180-81, 233; *DD*, pp. 175-76, 177-78, 208.

⁴³ *TT*, p. 233; *DD*, p. 208.

⁴⁴ *TT*, pp. 180-81; *DD*, pp. 177-78. I have not found this statement as Averroës quotes it in the Aristotelian corpus. But if my interpretation of Averroës' view on emanation is correct, the statement does express two genuine views of Aristotle – that there is but one interconnected universe and that all things within it are ultimately ordered to one end, the actuality of the First Unmoved Mover. See *Metaphysics* 12.7 (1072b10-15), 12.8 (1074a32 ff.), and 12.10 (1075a18 ff.).

Aristotle had expressed pride in this notion at the end of *book lambda* [*Metaphysics* 12. 10 (1075b34-37)] and stated that none of his own predecessors among the ancients were able to say anything about the matter. In the way in which we have reported this teaching, therefore, the statement that from the One only one proceeds [*vaşduru, provenit*] is true and the statement that from the One many proceed [*vaşduru, provenit*] is also true.⁴⁵

In each passage, Averroës treats the direction of overflow either explicitly or implicitly as moving upward from effect to cause. While his directional metaphors are admittedly mixed, it is not hard to see what Averroës is trying to convey – namely, how an external paradigm or desired end can be assigned responsibility for a given effect. The point is that neither a paradigm nor an end produces effects by projecting them fully formed out of its own substance. Paradigms and ends do nothing more than present the patterns of structure and activity which can be approximated to a greater or lesser extent by other particulars. To speak, therefore, of causes and effects ascending to the First Principle is to suggest at least two things: (1) that there is a chain of causal relations between sublunar particulars, celestial spheres, and separate Intelligences; and (2) that all existents measure up in varying degrees to the paradigms and teleological order contemplated by Averroës' self-thinking God.

The various celestial Intelligences reproduce this teleological order directly within themselves, although in varying degrees of comprehensiveness. The spheres in turn reflect its patterns of regular movement indirectly, first through the mediation of their own separate movers and then in the relation of their movements to each other. Thus, the fact that certain patterns of motion presuppose still others explains why the movements of some parts of the heavens are said to be for the sake of others. Again, the actual integration of form and matter and of the various proportions of elementary bodies in concrete particulars aims at approximating the concomitant paradigms of integration and continuous activity conceived by the Intelligences and ultimately by God. Hence their ascending unity. Lastly, both many effects and one effect can be said to 'proceed' from the one Final Cause of *Metaphysics lambda*, because the world is at the same time both a multiplicity of particulars and a causally and conceptually interconnected world-system.⁴⁶ The content of God's thought as a formal cause thus explains its diversity, while the order and continuity of His thinking, as a final cause, explain its unity.

According to this analysis, the notions of procession, emanation, and necessary consequence amount to mere concepts, perhaps even figments of the

⁴⁵ *TT*, pp. 250, 260; *DD*, pp. 219, 225-26.

⁴⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12. 10 (1075a19, 1075b25-37).

imagination. Averroës had alluded to this possibility in the *Epitome*, when he suggested that on the Aristotelian model of celestial causality, the procession (*ṣudūr*, *proventus*) of causes and effects only occurred in terms of 'second intention'.⁴⁷ But if he refrained there from endorsing this position, he appears to be fully committed to it in the *Tahāfut*. For he argues in the third discussion that Avicenna's explanation of principles proceeding from one another (*ṣudūr hādhihī-l-mabādī ba^cdihā min ba^cdin*, *proventione horum principiorum abinvicem*) was simply unknown to the ancients. They maintained only that the various celestial causes held certain known positions (*maqamāt ma^clūma*, *status tales*) vis-à-vis the First Principle, and that their existence was rendered complete by virtue of these positions.⁴⁸ Now the positions or statuses of the Intelligences, as we have seen, were distinguished by the various spheres which they moved, and their specific roles as movers were established in turn by the order and arrangement of all the existents contemplated by God. To say, therefore, that their respective positions vis-à-vis the First Principle render their existence complete is the same as saying that they exist in virtue of their end or function within a teleological framework, and not because of any overflow.

Averroës calls this framework of relations between the separate Intelligences and the spheres 'connection' (*irtibāṭ*, *copulatio*). Signifying as it does the fitting together of the world's constituent parts, it may be understood as the Averroian counterpart to continuous, unbroken emanation. But it is not identical with it, for Averroës only discusses the idea of connection after he has first dismissed *ṣudūr* or *proventio* as unknown to the ancients:

- (1) It is the connection which exists between them that makes it necessary that some are effects of others, and that all of them [are effects] of the First Principle. *Nothing more can be understood by 'agent' and 'effect', 'creator' and 'creature' with regard to that Existence than this notion* [of connection] *alone*, and what we have said about a connection of the existence of every existent with the One is something quite different from what is meant by 'agent' and 'act', 'artisan' and 'artifact' in the sublunar world (emphasis added).⁴⁹
- (2) The custom which exists among the modern philosophers [of Islam] in saying that such and such a mover proceeds from such and such a mover or emanates from it or necessarily follows from it or some such expression shows a misunderstanding with regard to these separate principles. For all of these [expressions] are about characteristics of agents taken at first glance, but not in reality, because nothing proceeds from an agent, as we have stated previously, unless [it be the act of] drawing forth that which is in potentiality to full actuality. But here [in the domain

⁴⁷ *Talkhīs*, par. 30, p. 148; *Epitome*, fol. 389rB.

⁴⁸ *TT*, p. 186; *DD*, p. 181.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

of celestial Intelligences, i.e., movers] there is no potentiality, and therefore [with respect to God] there is no Agent there, but only an Intelligence and its object of thought, something perfected and that which perfects, as is the case with certain arts that are perfected by others. That is [possible] because some of them take their principles from others, and all of these may be traced to taking their own principles from the universal art which comprehends them. Therefore, we see that the knowledge which is most appropriate to the First ... includes first philosophy [metaphysics].⁵⁰

Indeed, he goes on to compare the order and connection of movers and of all other existents to the order and connection of different arts, because both culminate in a single universal art: the intelligible content thought by the First Unmoved Mover. And while arts are not agents and thus do not perform tasks, they can nonetheless guide or direct the activity of agents by presenting them with standards and principles to be approximated in action by expressing the best way in which specific acts can be carried out. It is in this way that the God of Averroës may be said to make things happen. He is an agent insofar as He draws things forth from potency to act, but the manner in which He does so is that of a formal and final cause.

One last criterion remains for determining whether Averroës rejected or retained the emanative model, namely, the causal role he assigns to the Active Intelligence as a Giver of forms (*wāhib al-ṣūwar, dator formarum*). In the *Epitome of the Metaphysics*, it will be recalled, he identified the Active Intelligence as both the mover of the lunar sphere and the Giver of forms to sublunar particulars. This identification was part of his overall endorsement of the theory of emanation. In the *Tahāfut*, however, he twice mentions the causal role of the Active Intelligence in a very different light, which at least registers the possibility of a change in view.

In the first instance, he observes that all philosophers agree that sublunar causes require an external immaterial agent as the condition of both their activity and their existence. This agent is identified as God, and His efficacy is understood to affect sublunar particulars by means of an intermediary. But they differ as to the nature of this intermediary. Some identify it as the sphere alone, whereas others propose that it is another immaterial existent besides the sphere – the Giver of forms.⁵¹ While Averroës does not choose to elaborate on who the two groups of philosophers are, it is clear that he is contrasting once again the ancient Peripatetics and the modern philosophers of Islam. More important,

⁵⁰ *Tafsīr*, text. 44, 3. 1652H-I and cf. 3. 1648C-1649D; *In 12 Metaph.* (1073b1-3 ff.), c. 4 text. 44, 8. 328D-E and cf. 8. 327vI.

⁵¹ *TT*, p. 524; *DD*, p. 408.

however, is the fact that he now seems to challenge his own original identification of the Active Intelligence with the mover of the lunar sphere. For according to the first view causal efficacy traced to the sphere would in turn be traceable to its mover, but this is now set in direct contrast to the view that causal efficacy in the sublunar world is traceable to a Giver of forms. Averroës implies that there is no longer any middle ground.

He sharpens the contrast still further in the second passage where he recalls the case of fire burning cotton. Again the philosophers all agree that fire causes a piece of cotton to burn, but only by means of an external principle as the condition of the burning. They differ about the quiddity of the principle. Some suggest it is 'separate'; others that it is an intermediary *between* the event and the separate principle, and nonetheless different from the fire.⁵²

Generally, Averroës reserves the term *separate* (*mufāraq*, *separatus*) to signify an Intelligence associated with a celestial sphere. This would make the separate principle in question the mover of a sphere, presumably that of the moon. Here again the first alternative proposes that the mover of the sphere is the condition which accounts for the ongoing existence and activity of sublunar particulars. But if there is an intermediary between the separate principle, the fire, and the occurrence of the burning, there is nothing for it to be other than the Active Intelligence as understood on the Farabian-Avicennian model. One thing then is certain: the Giver of forms can no longer be identified with the separate mover of the lunar sphere. The remaining question is which of the two views Averroës himself maintained at this juncture.

While neither of these references to the Active Intelligence establishes his position as such, he expresses it plainly enough in the third discussion, where he identifies himself with the Peripatetics against both his predecessors and his earlier view:

The forms of what lies beneath the celestial bodies are acquired from (*mustafāda min*, *emanant ab*) the celestial bodies and from one another, irrespective of whether they are the forms of the elementary bodies in prime matter, which is neither generable nor corruptible, or the forms of bodies composed of the elements. *Indeed, composition in these things is on account of the heavenly bodies* (emphasis added).⁵³

It is now clear that in the *Tahāfut* Averroës neither retained nor even modified the theory of emanation in any meaningful sense. By every one of the five criteria which identify the theory, we have seen that he effectively rejected it as a model of efficient causality. If emanative terminology nonetheless

⁵² *TT*, p. 529; *DD*, p. 411.

⁵³ *TT*, p. 179; *DD*, p. 177.

reappears throughout the book, it does so only as a survival of his previous view, or perhaps as a mere linguistic convention much like the English word 'influence'. But he accords it no technical or explanatory force whatever.

To ask, therefore, as we did initially, whether Averroës subscribed to the theory of emanation is really to ask an incomplete question. For we must specify the point in his career to which the question applies. Before 1174, there is more than adequate evidence in his *Epitome of the Metaphysics* to show that he indeed subscribed to the emanative model. But by the time he completed the *Tahāfut* in or some time after 1180, he had changed his view completely, even if he did not entirely alter his way of expressing it. Emanation was now rejected in favor of a purely formal/finalistic model of divine causality as the *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* also attests. This would remain his considered view.

One can only speculate as to what prompted the change, for the Commentator by and large offers no comments on his own intellectual development. It seems certain, however, that it was not merely the result of his growing familiarity with the Aristotelian *corpus*, for he displays a very sound grasp of the Stagirite's views even in the *Epitome*, where he still accepted and defended the emanative doctrine. A more plausible explanation is his probable reaction to al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut-al-Falāsifa*. For the latter's persistent critique of every aspect of the doctrine would surely have added to the doubts Averroës already had regarding it in the *Epitome* and forced him to reevaluate whether the Aristotelian account of divine causality suffered from the same faults as that of al-Fārābī and Avicenna.⁵⁴ Certainly, the *Tahāfut* displays a persistent attempt to disengage the views of the former from the latter. If this is correct, it suggests that Averroës was not always the convinced Aristotelian that many have supposed, but something of a philosophical convert; and what convinced him to convert, ironically enough, was not so much the teaching of Aristotle by itself but the attacks of his implacable opponent, al-Ghazālī.⁵⁵

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⁵⁴ I do not assume here that Averroës first read al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut* only after having completed the *Talkhīṣ*, although this may have been the case. I assume only that, regardless of when he read the *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*, Averroës' careful reflection on al-Ghazālī's criticisms of emanation, in conjunction with his awareness of discrepancies between the Peripatetic doctrine of divine causality and that of al-Fārābī and Avicenna probably convinced him that the latter's doctrine was untenable. The most plausible time for this to have occurred would have been during Averroës' preparations for writing his own *Tahāfut* in response to that of al-Ghazālī.

⁵⁵ One might legitimately object here that the sequence of Averroës' different views on emanation in the *Epitome of the Metaphysics*, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, and the *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* (the *Tafsīr*) does not by itself establish that he gradually came to jettison the

doctrine. One could argue, for example, that he was confused about the matter and simply contradicted himself. Or again, even if the sequence of these writings is correct, it is possible that his purpose in the *Epitome* differed from his purposes in the other two works. The *Epitome*, for example, could be construed as a political document, and Averroës' aim in writing it would have been to outline a metaphysical map of the universe which was serviceable for the governance of cities. According to this interpretation, Averroës probably rejected the doctrine of emanation all along in philosophical terms, but nonetheless recommended it to his Almohad patrons as a philosophic rationale and paradigm for the natural right of the political hierarchy to rule. The hierarchical organization of society thus emerges as a mirror image of a hierarchy in nature, while the proposed ideal of political governance becomes one of intellectual rulers literally providing those ruled with their forms or patterns of proper functioning by a kind of administrative overflow. On the other hand, Averroës' aims in the *Tahāfut* and the *Long Commentary* would have been more strictly philosophical according to this theory, and this would explain his rejection of the emanative model in those works.

While I do not wish to claim that the developmental hypothesis is conclusively established, it is nonetheless more plausible than the alternatives. The confusionist interpretation strains credibility. Averroës is far too subtle a thinker to fall easily into confusion and contradiction on a key question, and, even if he had, there is no reason to assume he persisted in this state for nearly twenty years.

The political interpretation, though ingenious and duly cognizant of Averroës' skills as both a political thinker and esoteric writer, also fails on several counts. As a rule, Averroës speaks his mind quite openly in his exegetical works, whether in relation to Aristotle, the Greek commentators, the Mutakallimūn, or the 'modern' philosophers of Islam. Moreover, his aim in these works is avowedly scientific exposition and explanation. The *Epitome of the Metaphysics* is plainly such a work. In addition, Averroës tells us at the beginning of the work that 'our aim in this discourse is to collect Aristotle's scientific [and] general statements from the discourses set down on the *Metaphysics* in keeping with our customary procedure in the previous [exegetical] books' (*Talkhiṣ*, par. 1, p. 1; *Epitome*, fol. 356rB). Thus given the explicit character and aim of the *Epitome* and the absence of the conventional indicators of esoteric writing, which abound in other works of Averroës, there is little reason to suspect him of disguising his genuine views here for the sake of giving useful political instruction.

Secondly, the one passage in Averroës' discussion of emanation in the *Epitome* which explicitly uses a political analogy does so in illustration of Aristotle's conception of formal/final causality and in direct contrast to the emanative model. Yet *ex hypothesi* emanation was supposed to be the more adequate theory for illustrating political concerns, assuming that they play a role in the *Epitome*.

Third and finally, the fact of the matter is that the *Tahāfut* offers far more evidence of political concern and esotericism than either of the two commentaries. Yet in the *Tahāfut*, as we have seen, Averroës grants virtually all of al-Ghazālī's criticisms of emanation and adumbrates a doctrine far closer to that of Aristotle's account of divine causality. In the *Epitome*, on the other hand, the Farabian-Avicennian model of emanation is described and defended openly. According to the political interpretation, the reverse should have occurred. The more 'political' work, the *Tahāfut*, should have defended the theory of emanation vigorously, while the scientific, exegetical text, the *Epitome*, should have dismissed it. In cases such as this, when the available facts and a possible interpretation of them conflict, the facts clearly take precedence. Thus, in the absence of further evidence, I see no reason to question either the clarity of Averroës' thinking on emanation, the sincerity with which he upheld the doctrine in the *Epitome*, or the likelihood of his having changed his position in subsequent works.

LES *BURSARII OVIDIANORVM* DE GUILLAUME D'ORLÉANS*

Hugues-V. Shooner

§ 1. *Le titre*

P ARMI les nombreux documents qui attestent le prestige intellectuel d'Orléans, au rang des principaux centres scolaires du monde latin, à la fin du XII^e et au début du XIII^e siècle, l'un des plus curieux est celui qui concerne les études que poursuivirent, hors du sol natal, les frères frisons Émon et Addon. Le premier, qui devait fonder en 1209 l'abbaye des Prémontrés de Bloemhof, près de Groningue, et compiler une chronique qui va de 1204 à 1237, année de sa mort, eut pour biographe son successeur et continuateur, l'abbé Menkon. Après avoir énuméré les auteurs et les œuvres, en premier lieu les poèmes d'Ovide (*Ovidianos*), qu'Émon et son frère transcrivirent au cours de leurs études, Menkon ajoute: 'Quos omnes [auctores] ipsi ambo Parisius, Aurelianus et Oxonie audierunt, et ex ore magistrorum glosaverunt et etiam glosas diversas et bursarios retulerunt.'¹

* En plus des manuscrits des *Bursarii*, pour lesquels nous utiliserons les sigles indiqués ci-dessous au § 4, deux manuscrits contenant des gloses d'Arnoul d'Orléans seront désignés par les sigles suivants:

F = Freiburg i. Br., Universitätsbibl. 381

W = Wolfenbüttel, Herzog-August-Bibl. Gud. lat. 4^o 155 (4459).

Cet article a été rédigé dans le cadre d'un projet de recherche concernant les commentaires médiévaux aux *Carmina amatoria* d'Ovide, projet subventionné par le Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada et entrepris en collaboration avec Bruno Roy, professeur à l'Institut d'études médiévales de l'Université de Montréal. Une édition des gloses d'Arnoul d'Orléans sur les *Amores*, l'*Ars amatoria* et les *Remedia amoris* est en voie d'achèvement. Je remercie M. Roy, qui m'a amicalement invité à présenter ici quelques-unes de nos découvertes communes.

¹ *Menkonis Chronicon*, éd. L. Weiland, dans *MGH Scriptorum* 23 (Hanovre, 1874), p. 524. M. Grabmann a plus d'une fois attiré l'attention sur ce texte, en dernier lieu dans *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* 3 (München, 1956), p. 126. Sur Émon et Menkon, voir N. Backmund, *Die mittelalterlichen Geschichtsschreiber des Prämonstratensordens* (Averbode, 1972), pp. 169-82.

Le mot *bursarios*, dans ce contexte, a intrigué certains lexicographes qui, tout en suggérant une faute de copiste pour *breviarios*, lui ont supposé le sens de sommaires.² Ce sens est effectivement confirmé par le titre 'Bursarii super eundem Ovidium' mis en tête d'une analyse abrégée des *Amores*, extraite des gloses d'Arnoul d'Orléans³ et contenue dans un manuscrit du milieu du xiii^e siècle: Paris, B. N. lat. 8320, ff. 27va-28rb. Mais il semble bien qu'ici le vocable ait été emprunté au titre d'un écrit antérieur, où il avait une signification assez différente. En effet, tous les autres cas connus d'emploi du mot en liaison avec les œuvres d'Ovide (et l'on n'a pas signalé son utilisation pour d'autres *auctores*) visent un recueil de gloses déjà étudié par E. H. Alton⁴ et demeuré jusqu'ici anonyme et d'origine incertaine. Le prologue de ce recueil décrit le sens très particulier attribué à *bursarius*:

'Rumpere, Livor edax, magnum iam nomen habemus' [*Rem.* 389]. Quoniam in Ovidianis ex bursariorum ambiguitate et continuatione sententie difficultas invenitur, compendiose explanare decrevimus quid super hoc nostre videtur opinioni. Et quia de bursariis tractandum est, videndum est quid sit [versus] bursarius. Bursarius a bursa dicitur quia in eo diverse inveniuntur replicationes sicuti in bursa; vel quia in bursa reponitur ut si forte aliquis legentem⁵ invenerit, ipsius super hoc opinionem recognoscat. Vel bursarius dicitur quia potius in bursa, id est in memorie abscondito, quam ceteri debet reservari. Videndum est ergo de primo opere Ovidii, videlicet de opere Heroidum (A² 119ra).⁶

² *Mittelateinisches Wörterbuch bis zum ausgehenden 13. Jahrhundert* 1 (München, 1967) 1627; *Lexicon latinitatis Nederlandicae medii aevi* 1 (Leiden, 1977), pp. 534 et 520; on renvoie, dans les deux cas, à P. Gerbenzon, *Emo van Huizinge, een vroege decretalist* (Groningen, 1965), p. 17. Le *Glossarium* de Du Cange enregistre trois sens pour *bursarius* en latin médiéval: fabriquant de bourses, trésorier, boursier (dans le sens actuel d'étudiant bénéficiaire d'une bourse).

³ Ces gloses, dont on avait soupçonné l'existence mais qui avaient jusqu'à présent échappé aux recherches, sont conservées dans le ms. Freiburg i. Br., Universitätsbibl. 381, ff. 107v-125r (s. xiii^e), *inc.* 'Incipit Ovidius Amorum est titulus huius libri, teste Ovidio qui ait ...'; elles sont précédées des gloses d'Arnoul, déjà connues, sur les *Remedia amoris*. Il convient de noter que nous n'avons pas trouvé le mot *bursarius* dans les œuvres attribuées à Arnoul. Le titre dont nous parlons, 'Bursarii super eundem Ovidium', est sans doute dû à l'abréviateur.

⁴ 'Ovid in the Mediaeval Schoolroom (continued)', *Hermathena* 95 (1961) 67-68 et 70-76: publie le prologue, les accessus et quelques scolies d'après A¹, A² et Ld. Dans un article précédent, le même auteur avait aussi publié le prologue et des extraits d'après un autre manuscrit (B): 'The Mediaeval Commentators on Ovid's *Fasti*', *Hermathena* 44 (1926) 121-22.

⁵ C'est-à-dire un maître, dont la fonction principale était de lire le texte en l'exposant.

⁶ Parmi les quelques variantes que présentent les autres manuscrits, nous avons retenu l'addition de [versus] qui se lit dans B 143ra et qui éclaire le texte. Le ms. Bern, Burgerbibl. 512, f. 97v (an. 1289), explicite davantage: '... videndum est quid sit bursarius et unde dicatur. Bursarius est versus in quo diverse possunt continuationes vel sententie reperiri. Bursarius enim a bursa dicitur quia' Sauf erreur, le mot *bursarius* n'apparaît plus dans le corps de l'œuvre: on ne le trouve que dans le prologue, qui semble avoir été ajouté après coup, une fois le recueil terminé. Le vers du début, 'Rumpere, Livor edax', qui n'est pas un *bursarius* et n'a aucun

Pris substantivement, comme du reste le mot *Ovidiani*, les *bursarii* désignent donc certains vers que des sinuosités, des replis, comme ceux d'une bourse, rendent ambigus et obscurs, et qu'on doit conserver dans sa bourse d'étudiant ou dans celle de sa mémoire pour être éventuellement en mesure de vérifier l'interprétation d'un maître. Quoi qu'il en soit d'une série d'images aussi inattendues, ce sont ces vers, les *cruces* des poèmes d'Ovide, qu'a voulu élucider l'auteur des *Bursarii Ovidianorum*. Tel est le titre que porte l'opuscule dans le ms. Leipzig, Universitätsbibl. Rep. I. 4° 48 (première moitié du xiii^e siècle), dont la souscription nous révèle, en outre, le nom de l'auteur: 'Expliciunt bursarii magistri Willelmi Aurelianensis super Ovidios'.⁷

§ 2. L'auteur et la date

Si le goût des belles-lettres et la large part faite à l'explication des auteurs classiques sont un trait dominant de l'enseignement dans les écoles au xii^e siècle et au début du xiii^e, il est tout à fait exceptionnel qu'on puisse attacher un nom à l'un ou l'autre des commentaires ou gloses qui furent alors produits. Les manuscrits sont presque toujours anonymes et le caractère impersonnel des scolies laisse rarement deviner le lieu de leur élaboration. Orléans, en particulier, dont la réputation pour ce genre d'études dépassa pourtant celle de tous les autres centres scolaires, ne possède encore qu'une histoire littéraire étonnamment pauvre à cet égard.⁸ Le répertoire en cours de publication, le *Catalogus translationum et commentariorum* entrepris sous la direction de P. O. Kristeller, a déjà consacré d'importantes notices à deux des poètes les plus estimés et commentés, Juvénal et Perse. Or, aucune des œuvres recensées n'a pu être rattachée à Orléans. Pour Juvénal, un Chartrain, Guillaume de Conches,

rapport avec ce qui suit, est un compliment que s'adresse l'auteur face à ses détracteurs; il suppose l'œuvre achevée et répond, en effet, à la finale où le même vers des *Remedia* est cité à propos du dernier vers des *Pontiques*.

⁷ Ici, par un glissement sémantique très normal, le mot *bursarii* ne signifie plus les vers difficiles, mais les gloses s'y rapportant. La souscription de Ld 18v peut s'entendre dans les deux sens: 'Expliciunt bursarii Ovidii de Ponto'. Le titre 'Versus Bursarii' donné par Alton ne se trouve tel quel dans aucun manuscrit; il a sans doute été inspiré par les additions citées dans la note précédente.

⁸ Dans une contribution récente et de grand intérêt en ce qui a trait au rôle d'Orléans dans la transmission des textes classiques, les auteurs observent: 'Although one has references to Orléans as a centre of classical studies, and one knows the names of a few individuals associated with the schools there, actual physical remains are few — works known to have been composed there, texts known to have been available there, manuscripts with an undisputed Orléans provenance' (R. H. Rouse et M. A. Rouse, 'The *Florilegium Angelicum*: Its Origin, Content, and Influence' dans *Medieval Learning and Literature. Essays Presented to Richard William Hunt* [Oxford, 1976], p. 79).

est le seul commentateur médiéval qu'on ait identifié. Pour Perse, à l'époque qui nous concerne, tout est anonyme et seule l'origine liégeoise d'un commentaire de la fin du *xr^e* siècle a pu être déterminée.⁹

En fait, Arnoul d'Orléans, ou Arnoul Rufus de Saint-Euverte (*fl.* 1170), était jusqu'ici l'unique maître orléanais connu par des gloses sur les poètes latins. Il faut toutefois souligner que, grâce à lui, les noms de deux autres scoliastes peuvent être mentionnés. A son dire, en effet, si les Orléanais excellent dans l'étude des auteurs, ils le doivent au premier d'entre eux qui s'y illustra, 'notre maître Hilaire'.¹⁰ Membre du cercle d'Abélard vers 1125, Hilaire d'Orléans a laissé un recueil épistolaire et des poèmes, mais le produit de son enseignement sur les auteurs n'a pas été retrouvé.¹¹ C'est avec moins d'égards et en le qualifiant d'ignorant qu'Arnoul cite un second glossateur, Foulques, écolâtre de la cathédrale d'Orléans vers 1170-80; nous apprenons qu'il a, au moins, annoté l'*Ars amatoria* et les *Remedia amoris*.¹² Il y a lieu, croyons-nous, de lui attribuer

⁹ *Catalogus translationum et commentariorum. Mediaeval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries* 1 (Washington, D. C., 1960), pp. 175-238: 'Juvenalis', par E. M. Sanford; 3 (Washington, D. C., 1976), pp. 201-312: 'Persius', par D. M. Robathan et coll. — Nous savons pourtant qu'Arnoul d'Orléans a commenté Juvénal, d'après le témoignage d'un disciple signalé par B. Lawn, *The Salernitan Questions. An Introduction to the History of Medieval and Renaissance Problem Literature* (Oxford, 1963), p. 35. Il a peut-être aussi écrit les gloses sur Perse auxquelles renvoie son commentaire aux *Métamorphoses* d'Ovide, 4. 607-611: 'Cuius fabule expositio in glosulis super Persium invenitur', ms. Venezia, Bibl. Marciana Lat. XIV 222 (4007), f. 42vb, et München, Staatsbibl. Clm 7205, f. 37ra ('Perseum' au lieu de 'Persium'). Ghisalberti, qui a découvert le commentaire d'Arnoul aux *Métamorphoses* ('Arnolfo' [v. infra, n. 27], 177-78), ne connaissait que le premier manuscrit, très mutilé (ff. 30r-49r, et non 1r-19r); le second est complet (ff. 29r-58v) et date de la fin du *xii^e* siècle.

¹⁰ *Arnulfi Aurelianensis Glosule super Lucanum* l. 584, éd. B. M. Marti (Rome, 1958), p. 72: '... de Tuscia fuit qui primus artem aruspicii inuenit, unde et homines illius terre magis quam alii in illa ualent arte, sicut nos Aurelianenses in auctoribus a primo patre magistro nostro Hylario.' Guillaume de Tyr mentionne Hilaire parmi les maîtres qu'il entendit au cours de ses années d'études, entre 1145 et 1165: 'Habuimus autem et in auctorum expositione seniore quendam, Ylarium Aurelianensem doctorem' (R. B. C. Huygens, 'Guillaume de Tyr étudiant. Un chapitre (XIX, 12) de son Histoire retrouvé', *Latomus* 21 [1962] 823).

¹¹ Cf. N. M. Häring, 'Hilary of Orléans and His Letter Collection', *Studi medievali*, 3^a Ser., 14 (1973) 1069-1122; idem, 'Die Gedichte und Mysterienspiele des Hilarius von Orléans', *ibid.* 17 (1976) 915-68. Hilaire est peut-être l'auteur d'une *Expositio hymnorum* très diffusée; cf. H. Gneuss, *Hymnar and Hymnen im englischen Mittelalter* (Tübingen, 1968), pp. 194-206; J. B. Allen, 'Commentary as Criticism: Formal Cause, Discursive Form, and the Late Medieval Accessus' dans *Acta Conventus Neo-latini Lovaniensis* (Leuven-München, 1973), pp. 31 et 42.

¹² Arnoul glose ainsi l'*Ars* au vers 3. 103: 'Forma, pulcritudine, quota queque superbit, hec est littera libri quam imperitus Fulco et alii gratia peiorandi emendant' (W 138r); la finale de ses gloses aux *Remedia* est, d'autre part, bien connue: '... hoc opus de Remediis, quod Arnulfus glosavit ad sanandos illos qui a FULCONE erant decepti' (W 145v). Sur Foulques, on peut voir E. Lesne, *Histoire de la propriété ecclésiastique en France*, t. 5: *Les écoles de la fin du VIII^e siècle à la fin du XII^e* (Lille, 1940), pp. 177 et 185-86, où il faut, cependant, corriger les confusions chronologiques qui ont fait distinguer deux Arnoul et deux Foulques.

une série de gloses anonymes sur Ovide, contenues en divers manuscrits, dont Paris, B. N. lat. 8207, ff. 63r-82v (s. xiii¹).¹³

A ces minces indications sur les maîtres d'une école qui fut le foyer du courant humaniste au moment de la naissance des universités, il est précieux qu'un nouveau nom vienne s'ajouter, d'autant plus que ce nom est lié à une œuvre ambitieuse, couvrant tout le corpus ovidien et dont le succès fut notable. Guillaume d'Orléans est ignoré des bibliographes comme des historiens d'Orléans. Pour le situer, il faut d'abord interroger les *Bursarii*. Une première observation nous est fournie par l'âge des manuscrits: les plus anciens d'entre eux ne paraissent pas antérieurs aux premières années du xiii^e siècle. A elle seule, cette constatation ne peut, bien sûr, nous amener à affirmer que l'œuvre date de ces années. L'auteur a pu appartenir au xii^e siècle, comme l'estimait Alton en le déclarant contemporain d'Arnoul.¹⁴ Cependant, un examen un peu plus poussé du texte nous permettra d'apporter quelques précisions.

Les extraits édités par Alton donnent déjà une idée suffisante de la méthode suivie par Guillaume et du caractère de ses gloses. Les différentes interprétations possibles d'un passage sont le plus souvent juxtaposées – distinguées sans plus par la formule 'Vel aliter' – comme si elles étaient de valeur égale. A l'occasion, toutefois, l'auteur indique un choix: 'melius est' (*Heroides* 9. 153 et 12. 207), 'hec sententia michi sedet' (*Amores* 3. 9. 23), 'sed parum apertior' (*Ars*

¹³ Nous dirons ailleurs ce qui autorise cette attribution. Notons seulement qu'en ce qui concerne les gloses sur l'*Ars* et les *Remedia*, nous n'en connaissons pas d'autres qui pourraient correspondre à celles qu'attaque Arnoul. Une brève notice du ms. 8207 a été donnée par B. Hauréau, dans *Histoire littéraire de la France* 29 (Paris, 1885), p. 577. Il renferme des gloses sur cinq œuvres d'Ovide: (a) ff. 63ra-67ra *Ex Ponto*, commençant à 2. 9. 1; le début, qui a été suppléé dans le quaternion précédent (ff. 55-62), est écrit par une main plus récente et appartient, en fait, à un autre commentaire; (b) ff. 67ra-70ra *Remedia amoris*, inc. 'Quoniam in libro de Amatoria arte tum viros tum puellas instruxerat ...'; (c) ff. 70ra-74rb *Ars amatoria*, inc. 'In principio cuiusque actoris hec *iiii*^{or} sunt inquirenda ...'; (d) ff. 74rb-76ra *Amores*, inc. 'Diverse dicuntur cause quare liber iste intitulatur Sine titulo ...' = même accessus dans la collection éditée par R. B. C. Huygens, *Accessus ad auctores* ... (Leiden, 1970), p. 36; (e) ff. 76rb-82va *Tristia*, inc. '[Parve, neque invideo.] Cum in exilium mitteretur Ovidius, videns ab amicis suis' – Parmi les autres manuscrits contenant l'un ou l'autre de ces commentaires, signalons: Paris, B.N. lat. 8302, ff. 67ra-72vb (s. xiii¹) mutilé, *Rem.*, *Ars*; Paris, B.N. lat. 5137, ff. 102ra-104vb (s. xiii¹) mutilé, *Ars*; Berlin, Lat. qu. 538, ff. 1ra-5ra (s. xiii¹), *Rem.*; Zürich, Zentralbibl. Rh. 76, ff. 1ra-4vb (s. xiii¹), *Rem.* avec quelques divergences, notamment pour l'accessus, inc. 'Incipiunt Ovidii de remedio amoris, ex titulo potest perpendi intentio auctoris ...'; København, Kongelige Bibl. Gl. kgl. Saml. 2015. 4^o, ff. 1r-24r (s. xii²), *Ex Ponto*, *Ars*; v. infra, n. 17 et 47.

¹⁴ 'Ovid in the Mediaeval Schoolroom', *Hermathena* 94 (1960) 30, si nous comprenons bien la fin du paragraphe consacré à Arnoul: 'I hope, however, to give you a glance later on at the work of a contemporary teacher' (il s'agit du texte d'une conférence datant de 1937 et édité, après la mort de l'auteur, par D. E. W. Wormell; les extraits des *Bursarii* sont publiés en appendice, v. supra, n. 4). Même opinion sur la date des *Bursarii* chez G. Glauche, *Schullektüre im Mittelalter* (München, 1970), p. 104, et P. Demats, *Fabula* (Genève, 1973), p. 119.

1. 231). Le jugement est parfois mieux marqué: 'non est dicendum', ou devient même polémique: 'littera ista falsa est' (*Fasti* 3. 851), 'quidam peccant legendo' (*Metam.* 2. 689), 'frivolum est' (*Heroides* 4. 137, *Metam.* 1. 83 et 4. 782, *Ex Ponto* 1. 1. 41). Même si, dans un domaine à peine exploré, l'enquête risquait d'être faussée, nous avons tenté d'identifier, parmi les scolies antérieures ou contemporaines, celles que Guillaume visait. En certains cas, il est apparu au moins probable qu'il s'agissait des gloses d'Arnoul ou de celles que nous attribuons à Foulques. Nous nous limiterons à donner trois exemples empruntés aux *Carmina amatoria*. Le test sur ces œuvres était à la fois plus facile et plus sûr, car les gloses s'y rapportant sont peu communes à cette époque.¹⁵

Amores 2. 18. 19

FOULQUES ne commente pas ce vers.

ARNOUL: *Profitemur partes amoris*, id est confitemur meam esse professionem tractare de proprietatibus amoris, tractando de illis in Ovidio de Arte; *quod licet*, id est in quantum licet: in Ovidio enim de Arte de licito tantum tractat amore, unde ibidem [1.31] dixit: 'Este procul vitte tenues' etc., et secundum hoc Ovidium de Arte fecerat ante hoc opus vel in proposito habebat (F 119r-v).¹⁶

GUILLAUME: *Quod licet ut partes teneri profitemur amoris*. Partes amoris vocat Ovidium Heroidum. Vel *ad partes*, et tunc sic lege: *profitemur ad partes amoris*, id est carmen quod respicit ad partes amoris. Non enim dicendum est *aut artes*, cum Ovidium de Arte non fecerit ante istum (A² 123ra).

Ars amatoria 1. 204

FOULQUES: *Alter est*, quia Mars, *alter erit*, Iulius, et ita liquescit <'s'> in metro. Vel tu quia *alter* es *ex vobis*, o tu Mars, *es deus*; o tu Cesar, qui es *alter* ex vobis, *eris deus* (København, Gl. kgl. Saml. 2015. 4^o, f. 17v).¹⁷

¹⁵ En fait, nous n'avons trouvé aucun autre commentaire qui puisse entrer en ligne de compte, à part les scolies sur l'*Ars* qui se lisent dans les interlignes et dans les marges du ms. London, B.L. Add. 14086 (s. xi-xii), et qui ont été étudiées par A. Boutemy, dans *Revue des études latines* 15 (1937) 98-102. Selon ce dernier, ces scolies, qui se distinguent nettement de celles que produisirent les glossateurs de classiques aux xi^e et xii^e siècles, pourraient appartenir aux vi^e-vii^e siècles. Quoi qu'il en soit, nous n'y avons rien lu qui puisse laisser croire que Guillaume d'Orléans les ait connues.

¹⁶ Dans le ms. London, B.L. Add. 49368 (s. xiii), qui contient en marge du texte des *Amores* (ff. 145r-167r) de nombreux extraits d'Arnoul, la glose citée ici se rattache à la leçon *aut artes*, rejetée par Guillaume.

¹⁷ Les autres copies, mentionnées à la note 13, ne présentent pas de glose au vers 1. 204. Le manuscrit de Copenhague a été daté 's. xi-xii' par E. Jørgensen, *Catalogus codicum Latinorum medii aevi Bibliothecae Regiae Hafniensis* (Hafniae, 1926), p. 307, mais, malgré l'allure ar-

ARNOUL: Si de Iulio legas *alter erit*, videtur esse contrarium, cum sit deus, utpote iam mortuus; sed forsitan post mortem suam non fuit deus statim habitus, quem postea pro deo fecit haberi Augustus ...; vel *alter est alter erit*, et hic liquescit 's' (W 133vb).

GUILLAUME: *Alter e vobis*, id est Mars, est *deus*, et *alter*, id est Iulius. *erit*. Quidam super hoc volunt opponere dicentes quod Iulius iam deus erat, quod falsum est, quia nos habemus quod Romani non habuerunt noticiam de deificatione ipsius donec ultus est a filio et donec Parthi devicti fuerant, ut habetur in Bucolicis (A² 123vb).

Remedia amoris 3

FOULQUES: O Cupido *celeris*, id est velox. Antiqui enim dicebant hic et hec *celeris* et hoc re ... sicut nos hic et hec fortis et hoc forte. Epiteton est Amoris quod sit velox, unde etiam dicitur alatus. Vel aliter: *sceleris* pro re, et est verbum legum (Berlin, Staatsbibl. Preussischer Kulturbesitz Lat. qu. 538, f. 1ra).

ARNOUL: *Celeris*, id est pennate, et est vocativus antiquitus declinatus: declinabant enim hic et hec *celeris* et hoc celere, sed modo dicitur celer, *celeris* in feminino. Vel sic construe: *dampnare sceleris*, id est pro scelere, et est constructio legum (F 98r).

GUILLAUME: *Dampnare* verbum est legale, et ideo construitur cum genitivo, unde Theodolus: 'Corvum perfidie dampnant animalia queque', et ita hic: *dampnare sceleris*. Alii dicunt: o *celeris* Cupido, sed male dicunt. Non enim dicitur hic et hec *celeris* et hoc re, immo hic celer, hec ris, hoc re. Sunt enim .x. nomina que ita declinantur:

Campester, celeber, alacerque saluber, equester,

Silvester, volucer, acerque celerque pedester.

His in bis quinque tenet hic er et hec is et hoc e (A² 125vb).

Ces vers, que cite Guillaume, nous dispensent d'insister. Ils confirment que son œuvre est postérieure à Arnoul, car ils sont empruntés au *Doctrinale* d'Alexandre de Villedieu, dont on sait qu'il fut publié en 1199.¹⁸ Cette date permet de situer les *Bursarii* au début du xiii^e siècle, époque à laquelle appartiennent leurs manuscrits les plus anciens.

chaisante de l'écriture, plusieurs traits appartiennent nettement à la seconde moitié du xii^e siècle, entre autres: rareté du *e* cédillé, soulignement des lemmes, signes diacritiques sur le double *ii* et même sur l'*i* simple. Si le début du commentaire est différent (f. 15v *inc.* 'Circa hunc auctorem hec sunt inquirenda ...'), et cela jusqu'au vers l. 171, à ce point (f. 17r), sans que rien ne signale le fait, les gloses reprennent à l. 89 et coïncident avec celles des autres manuscrits, à part quelques variantes, dont l'addition que nous citons au vers l. 204.

¹⁸ D. Reichling, *Das Doctrinale des Alexander de Villa-Dei* (Berlin, 1893), p. 41, vers 583-585; pour la date, pp. xxxvi s.

C'est alors qu'Alexandre Neckam († 1217) adresse aux poètes et aux glossateurs d'Orléans l'éloge dithyrambique bien connu:

Non se Parnassus tibi conferat, Aurelianus,
Parnassi vertex cedet uterque tibi.
Carmina Pieridum, multo vigilata labore,
Exponi nulla certius urbe reor.¹⁹

Or, le nom d'un maître Guillaume d'Orléans est précisément lié à celui de Neckam dans un célèbre recueil de poèmes, le ms. Paris, B.N. lat. 11867 (s. XIII²). Ce manuscrit contient, à partir du f. 189v, la plus grande partie de l'œuvre poétique de Neckam. Vers la fin du volume, au f. 238rb, on lit ce titre écrit en rouge: 'Versus Magistri Willelmi Aurelianensis et Magistri Alexandri Neckam'.²⁰ Suivent deux lettres versifiées, que seul un crochet alinéaire distingue. Dans la seconde, Neckam s'adresse à un maître Raoul pour lui confier l'éducation de son neveu.²¹ La première lettre, celle de Guillaume, loue pesamment l'éloquence et les vertus d'un Alexandre, que le contexte nous invite à identifier avec Neckam. Comme ces vers sont inédits²² et qu'ils ont de bonnes chances d'appartenir à l'auteur des *Bursarii*, on nous permettra de les citer ici. On soupçonnera toutefois, en les lisant, que ce n'est pas à Guillaume que Neckam songeait lorsqu'il haussait les poètes d'Orléans au-dessus du Parnasse. Nous reproduisons servilement le texte du manuscrit, sans tenter de résoudre les obscurités ou les corruptions:

Cum breve quid tibi quis dederit, non conice dantem,
sed dantis mentem, non hominem, sed opus.
Non stater accuset quid portet ponderis, immo
quid desiderii, non quid hic, immo quid hoc.
Nec quid, sed de quo, nec quantum conice, quanto
fiat res animo, pondere pingue tuo.
Res animi precium rerum determinat, actus
ponderat, a mentis pondere pendet opus.

¹⁹ *De laudibus divinae sapientiae* 5. 607-610, éd. T. Wright (London, 1863), p. 454, composé aux environs de 1213; cf. A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500* 2 (Oxford, 1958), p. 1343.

²⁰ Cette rubrique est précédée de trois chants en l'honneur de la Vierge, portant le titre 'Incipiunt orationes de sancta Maria'; on s'accorde pour les attribuer à Neckam, sous le nom de qui ils ont été édités par G. M. Dreves, *Analecta hymnica medii aevi* 48 (Leipzig, 1905), n^{os} 275-277. C. Oudin (*Commentarius de scriptoribus ecclesiae antiquis* 3 [Lipsiae, 1722], p. 5) a cependant interprété notre rubrique comme se rapportant à ces chants, qu'il a intitulés: 'De sancta Maria Dialogus inter Guillelmum Aurelianensem et Alexandrum Neckam'.

²¹ Ce poème (*inc.* 'Quem tibi transmitto, doctor Radulfe, nepotem ...') a été publié par É. Du Méril, *Poésies inédites du moyen âge* (Paris, 1854), pp. 170-71 en note.

²² Il en existe cependant une transcription dans la dissertation non imprimée de R. W. Hunt, *Alexander Neckam* (Oxford, 1936; Bodleian Lib. ms. D. Phil. C. 101), p. 200.

Mitis Alexander, et si tibi nomen Alexis
 formet in Andrea, non minus ore vir es.
 Ore vir es quia mente vires, roburque virile
 a virtute viri mentis et oris habes.
 Mens meminit virtutis opes (vel opus *in marg.*), os nectare lingue
 condit opus mentis, servit utrique favor.
 Lingua suis condita favis de mente fluentes
 spargit opes, et odor mentis ab ore fluit.
 Virtus larga tibi, sibi prodiga, parca futuris,
 tot tibi divicias, ut sit egena, dedit.
 In te tot diffudit opes, ut multus ab uno
 multarum flueret rivus et ager opum.
 Solus habes habitum morum, soli tibi nubit
 Ethica, solius ut sit amica tui.
 Te simulare tibi nequeo, Crisostome, quis, quod
 in titulis, quantus aut quotus esse soles.
 In quantis opere niteas, si niterer ore,
 non irent equis passibus os et opus.
 Pronior ut michi sis tibi prono, non ut Alexis,
 sic feror in titulos, aurea lingua, tuos.
 Vive, vale, memorisque memor; quid sit memorare,
 si studeat celerem ferre rogatus opem?

Coïncidence qu'il y a lieu de signaler, le nom d'Alexandre Neckam est associé à un autre écrit d'un maître Guillaume. Il s'agit d'un bref traité sur l'accentuation, dont une copie anonyme fait suite, dans le ms. Cambridge, Corpus Christi College 460, à un remaniement des *Corrogationes Promethei* de Neckam et qui, en raison de ce voisinage, a été attribué à celui-ci par T. Tanner.²³ L'auteur est en réalité un 'magister Willelmus' qui écrivait en France, probablement au début du xiii^e siècle. Parmi les noms de lieux donnés en exemple, la mention de Fleury (Floriacum) pourrait favoriser l'hypothèse d'une origine orléanaise.²⁴ Ce grammairien Guillaume serait-il à identifier avec l'auteur des *Bursarii*? Nous nous limitons à soulever la question, en reconnaissant la fragilité d'une hypothèse qu'a suggérée l'identité d'un nom aussi commun, à l'époque, que celui de Guillaume.

²³ *Bibliotheca Britannico-Hibernica* (Londini, 1748), p. 540 en note.

²⁴ Le traité a été édité par W. Desmense, 'Magister Willelmus, Regulae de mediis syllabis', *Vivarium* 11 (1973) 119-36 (127 'Floriacum'); cf. C. H. Kneepkens, *ibid.* 14 (1976) 156-58. Ch. Samaran, en éditant une 'Summa magistri Guillelmi' d'origine méridionale ('Une *Summa grammaticalis* du xiii^e siècle, avec gloses provençales', *Archivum latinitatis medii aevi* 31 [1961] 157-224), a retenu la suggestion de Thurot que cette œuvre soit du même auteur que les 'Regulae de mediis syllabis' (*ibid.*, 163), mais maintenant que les deux textes sont publiés en entier, l'hypothèse paraît peu vraisemblable.

§ 3. *Caractère et succès*

Une lecture, rapide il est vrai, des *Bursarii* n'a pas livré, à part l'emprunt au *Doctrinale* d'Alexandre de Villedieu, d'autres points de repère utiles pour la chronologie. On ne relève pas d'allusions à des personnages ou à des événements contemporains. Les citations, d'autre part, ne permettent pas d'attribuer à Guillaume un bagage littéraire important. Les auteurs nommément allégués sont peu nombreux, quelques poètes seulement parmi ceux qui étaient lus dans les écoles: Stace, cité cinq ou six fois, et, plus rarement encore, Virgile, Juvénal, Claudien, Avianus, Caton (i.e., les 'Disticha Catonis'), Theodolus. Parfois c'est un proverbe populaire qui est rappelé, mais alors qu'en pareil cas Arnoul a volontiers recours au français, Guillaume ne s'écarte pas du latin.²⁵

Heroides 20.157: *Tu habes altera verba pacti inhumani*, vere illud pactum inhumanum, quia numquam invenitur quod mulier duobus nubat maritis, iuxta illud vulgare proverbium: 'De filia numquam duo habendi sunt generi' (A² 121va). – Cf. Walther²⁶ 9498: 'Filiolus soli generos binos dare noli' (plusieurs variantes).

Ars 1. 642: *Hac una*, id est hac sola, *fraude*, quasi dicat: magis debetis erubescere observando fidem in amore quam infidelitatem, unde illud vulgare proverbium: 'Nulla fides in amore' (A² 124rb).

Metam. 4. 15: *Nictilius*, a nictin quod est nox, de nocte enim magis nandum (vagandum A¹) est potationi quam de die, unde illud vulgare proverbium: 'Secure bibit qui lectum videt' (A² 131rb). – Cf. Walther 27894: 'Secure potat qui sua strata notat' (plusieurs variantes).

Notons encore ce passage qui fait également appel à l'usage populaire:

Amores 1. 4. 24: *Ab extrema aure*, id est ab extrema parte auris. Vel *ab extrema aure*, id est a culo qui auris dicitur, non quia audiat set quia auditur, unde illa vulgaris castigatio: 'Ne pone manum auri' (A² 121vb).

Cette exégèse, pour le moins imprévue, nous confronte avec le fait déconcertant que certains maîtres des XII^e et XIII^e siècles – peu nombreux, il est vrai – n'ont pas craint de lire et de commenter pour de jeunes écoliers les œuvres d'Ovide que la Rome païenne avait jugées licencieuses, l'*Ars amatoria* et les *Amores*. A la différence d'Arnoul, cependant, qui donne facilement dans

²⁵ Exemples de proverbes français chez Arnoul, dans les gloses sur l'*Ars*: 'Qui n'a cheval, si aut a pié' (W 136rb), sur les *Amores*: 'Jenvre dame que non fot, certes pert sun segle tot' (F 114v). Le seul mot français que nous ayons noté chez Guillaume se lit dans la glose sur *Metam.* 7. 271: 'Lupi ambigui, illius scilicet qui dicitur garus, qui perfecte non est lupus nec homo' (A² 132ra); au lieu de 'garus', Lp 130rb porte 'garulf'; cf. *Les lais* de Marie de France, *Bisclavret* 4: 'Garulf l'apelent li Norman.'

²⁶ H. Walther, *Carmina medii aevi posterioris latina*, t. 2/1-6: *Proverbia sententiaeque latinitatis medii aevi* (Göttingen, 1963-69).

la grivoiserie, Guillaume omet le plus souvent de gloser les passages scabreux, ou, s'il le fait, son interprétation est édulcorée;²⁷ mais pas toujours, comme on peut le constater dans ces deux scolies qui se succèdent et dont la première sollicite le texte dans un sens poli, tandis que la seconde paraîtra audacieuse:

Ars 2. 686: Siccaque de lana cogitat illa sua. Construe: et ego odi illam que sicca, id est que pauper, pauper enim humore caret diviciarum, cogitat de sua lana, id est de suo humili officio. Vel *Siqua*. [708:] *Spicula tangit amor: spicula*, id est tentiginem cuius tactus promovet hominem ad libidinem. Vel *spicula tingit amor: tingit*, id est extinguit, *spicula*, id est veretrum; extinguitur enim ardor inguinis in illa fovea que humida semper invenitur (A² 125ra).

Autre sujet d'étonnement: les allusions chrétiennes, chez Guillaume, sont pratiquement inexistantes. Si l'on reconnaît, à l'occasion, une réminiscence biblique, elle est détachée de toute connotation religieuse, comme peut l'être le recours au psaume 103:15: 'Vinum letificat cor hominis', pour gloser *Metam.* 4. 14. Ailleurs (*Amores* 1. 2. 41), il est précisé que Cupidon a des ailes 'ut angeli depinguntur'. A propos d'un vers des *Pontiques* (3. 9. 43), on note cette référence au monde ecclésiastique:

An ne bis sensum. Continuatio: dico quod omnibus epistolis eundem sensum appono, sed hoc dicis esse vitium: deberem ego solummodo uni scribere et non diversis mittere eundem sensum; verbi gratia, ut si episcopus scriberet omnibus cardinalibus pro aliquo negocio suo, deberet solummodo rogare unum ne alius inveniret in litteris suis eundem sensum quem in aliis (Lp 139vb-140ra).

C'est donc en vain qu'on chercherait dans les 'unsophisticated'²⁸ *Bursarii* une interprétation christianisante ou allégorique des fables païennes. On est loin des transpositions de l'*Ovide moralisé*. Guillaume adhère au texte, sans se soucier des 'integumenta'. Son dessein était de donner aussi objectivement que possible, et avec les modestes ressources que la culture philologique et historique de son temps mettait à sa disposition, une initiation au corpus ovidien.²⁹ Pour chaque œuvre, un accessus expose brièvement les divers points qui, selon l'usage, introduisaient à un 'auteur': la matière, l'intention, l'utilité, le titre, etc. En outre, chaque partie de l'œuvre – livre, lettre ou élégie – fait l'objet d'un ré-

²⁷ Les gloses de Foulques sont aussi très discrètes. Voici tout ce qu'on lit à propos des vers 3. 781-788 de l'*Ars amatoria*: 'Quisque consulat peritos in hoc officio et ingenium suum, quia nemo, ut michi videtur, hoc bene potest glosare' (Paris, B.N. lat. 8207, f. 74rb; København, Gl. kgl. Saml. 2015. 4^o, f. 24r). De son côté, Arnoul ne se fait pas faute d'insister; cf. F. Ghisalberti, 'Arnolfo d'Orléans, un cultore di Ovidio nel secolo XII', *Memorie del Reale istituto lombardo di scienze e lettere* 24 (1932) 168-69.

²⁸ E. H. Alton, dans *Hermathena* 95 (1961) 69.

²⁹ Bien que mentionnés dans la liste des œuvres que contient l'accessus aux *Métamorphoses* (infra, n. 41), les *Medicamina faciei* et l'*In Ibin* ne sont cependant pas glosés.

sumé, suivi de l'examen des passages épineux, où une attention particulière est accordée aux variantes du texte. L'ensemble a constitué un manuel unique, dont l'utilité, pour les maîtres comme pour les écoliers, s'est vite imposée.

En plus du nombre relativement élevé des manuscrits, les indices d'utilisation qu'on peut déceler dans les commentaires postérieurs témoignent du succès des *Bursarii*. Nous avons limité les sondages aux *Métamorphoses* et aux *Remedia amoris* qui, parmi les poèmes d'Ovide, semblent avoir donné lieu au plus grand nombre de gloses. Pour les *Métamorphoses*, F. Ghisalberti³⁰ a observé qu'en plusieurs manuscrits chaque livre est précédé d'un sommaire des fables, sommaire dont il a pu distinguer trois types: l'un emprunté à Lactantius Placidus, un autre à Arnoul d'Orléans (*inc.* 'Mutationes huius libri sunt he'), un troisième, non identifié, commençant par les mots 'In hoc secundo volumine continetur' Ce dernier appartient, en fait, à Guillaume d'Orléans.³¹

L'un des rares commentaires aux *Métamorphoses* qui ne soient pas anonymes est celui d'un autre Guillaume, Guillermus de Thiegiis, conservé dans le ms. Paris, B.N. lat. 8010 (s. xiii^e). Il s'agit d'une compilation dont plusieurs éléments ont été pris chez Arnoul d'Orléans, dans les *Integumenta* de Jean de Garlande et dans nos *Bursarii*. Les emprunts à ceux-ci se trahissent dès les premiers mots, qui reproduisent presque à la lettre le début de l'accessus de Guillaume d'Orléans aux *Métamorphoses*: 'Ad maioris operis (!) evidenciam in maiori opere suo, de vita Ovidii primo tractandum est.'³²

A partir de la seconde moitié du xiii^e siècle, le texte des *Remedia amoris* fut incorporé au recueil scolaire qu'on est convenu d'appeler 'Liber Catonianus' depuis les études de M. Boas.³³ Dans plusieurs manuscrits de ce recueil, le poème d'Ovide est muni de gloses dont l'accessus commence par les mots 'Quoniam liber Artis amatorie multos traxerat in errorem' ou 'Quoniam auctor iste multos per Artem amatoriam traxerat in errorem'.³⁴ Malgré un incipit

³⁰ Giovanni di Garlandia, *Integumenta Ovidii, poemetto inedito del secolo XIII* (Messina-Milano, 1933), p. 10.

³¹ Les sommaires de Guillaume ne commencent qu'avec le deuxième livre. Deux des manuscrits décrits ci-dessous (A¹ et P) donnent aussi un sommaire du premier livre, mais il est emprunté à Arnoul: 'Mutationes huius primi libri tales sunt'

³² Cf. B. Hauréau, dans *Histoire littéraire de la France* 29. 582-83; F. Ghisalberti, 'Arnolfo' (supra, n. 27), 191-92; idem, 'Mediaeval Biographies of Ovid', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 9-10 (1946-47) 21 et 54-56: édite l'accessus de Guillaume de Thiegiis. Un second manuscrit du commentaire (Wolfenbüttel, Herzog-August-Bibl. Aug. 4^o 5. 4 [2952]) a été signalé par P. Demats, *Fabula* (supra, n. 14), p. 140.

³³ 'De librorum Catonianorum historia atque compositione', *Mnemosyne* N. S. 42 (1914) 17-46. L'expression a cependant été critiquée par R. Avesani, 'Il primo ritmo per la morte del grammatico Ambrogio e il cosiddetto Liber Catonianus', *Studi medievali*, 3^a Ser., 6.2 (1965) 475-83.

³⁴ Cf. E. Pellegrin, 'Les *Remedia amoris* d'Ovide, texte scolaire médiéval', *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 115 (1957) 172-79.

identique, ou presque, le texte de ces gloses, toujours anonymes, est très fluide et varie notablement d'un manuscrit à l'autre. En général, cependant, on reconnaît, plus ou moins modifiées ou mêlées à d'autres éléments, les scolies de Foulques et d'Arnoul, auxquelles viennent se greffer celles de Guillaume d'Orléans même quand elles font double emploi. Pour illustrer le procédé, nous reproduirons, à la suite des textes de Foulques, d'Arnoul et des *Bursarii*, une glose de l'un de ces commentaires 'Quoniam', celui qui se lit dans les marges du ms. Paris, B.N. lat. 8048, ff. 16r-32v (fin du ^{xiii}^e ou début du ^{xiv}^e siècle). La glose, concernant le vers 789 des *Remedia*, conjugue d'abord les interprétations d'Arnoul et de Foulques, et se termine par une citation explicite et littérale des *Bursarii*, qui s'inspiraient déjà d'Arnoul.

FOULQUES: *Lotophagos*. Lotos fuit quedam puella que mutata fuit in fagum.³⁵ Fagin grece, latine comedere, inde lotofagos, fructus illius arboris quos Circe habebat ad irritandum amorem (Paris, B.N. lat. 8302, f. 69va).

ARNOUL: *Illo Lotofagos, illo Sirenes esse puta in antro*. Lotofagi et Sirenes pericula sunt in mari, quasi dicat: cave tibi ab illa domo, sicut caveres a Lothofagis et Sirenibus in navigando. Vel lothofagos est quedam potio quam Circe fecit ad Ulixem detinendum, ut eum patrie sue faceret oblivisci, quam Ulixes potare noluit; et est lothofagos potio facta de succo lothos arboris, cuius succus confert oblivionem, unde et lothos, quasi lethos, a Lethe palude que interpretatur oblivio; unde lothofagos dicitur a lothos et fagin quod est comedere (F 106v-107r).³⁶

GUILLAUME: *Lothofagos*, id est pericula. Lothofagi proprie sunt pericula marina que consumunt naves, et dicuntur Lotophagi quasi lisofagi, a lison, quod est aqua, et phagin, quod est corrodere. Vel alii dicunt quod lotophagi fuerunt illa pocula que Circe dedit Ulixi ut amitteret memoriam patrie, a lethes, quod est oblivio, et phagin, quod est corrodere: illa enim pocula oblivionem conferencia curas consumpserunt (A² 127r).

ANONYME 'QUONIAM': *Lothofagos** ... *Syrenes*, id est illa pericula que sunt in mari, quasi dicat: cave illam domum sicut caveres illa pericula, scilicet Syrenes et huiusmodi, si navigares in mari ... § *Lothofagi** dicuntur a lete, quod est oblivio, et phagin, quod est comedere, quasi cibus obliviosus. Lothos enim fuit quedam puella que mutata fuit in arborem sui nominis;³⁷ phagin grece, comedere latine, inde lotophagi, fructus illius arboris quos Circe habebat ad irritandum amorem. Vel lothos est quedam potatio quam Circe fecit ad Ulixem detinendum, quam Ulixes noluit potare, et est facta* de succo lothos, illius arboris que confert oblivionem

³⁵ Parmi les autres manuscrits des gloses de Foulques, Berlin, Lat. qu. 538 confirme la leçon 'in fagum', tandis que Paris, B.N. lat. 8207 porte 'in arborem sui nominis'.

³⁶ W 145v (reproduit par Ghisalberti, 'Arnolfo' [supra, n. 27], 171) présente ici, comme ailleurs, un texte remanié, incorporant la glose de Foulques (avec la leçon 'in fagum'); cf. infra, n. 39.

³⁷ Cf. supra, n. 35.

potantibus. Totum hoc est BURSARIUM: Lothofagi sunt proprie pericula marina que consumunt naves, et dicuntur Lotofagi a lixon, quod est aqua, et fagin, quod est comedere. Alii dicunt quod lothophagi sunt pericula illa que Circe dedit Ulixi ut amitteret memoriam patrie sue, et dicuntur lothofagi a lotho, quod est oblivio, et fagin, quod est comedere: illa enim pericula oblivionem conferentia curas consumunt (Paris, B.N. lat. 8048, f. 32r).³⁸

Le type de commentaire auquel se rattache celui du manuscrit 8048 se rencontre surtout en des manuscrits d'origine française, peut-être parisienne. Quelques exemplaires sont datés:³⁹ 1282 ('s-Gravenhage, Koninklijke Bibl. 73 J 47), 1284 (Bern, Burgerbibl. 403), 1286 (Paris, B.N. lat. 8246¹), 1289 (Paris, B.N. lat. 15158). A cette époque, Orléans négligeait les études littéraires au profit de l'enseignement plus lucratif du droit. Quelques décennies plus tôt, Henri d'Andeli avait raconté la *Bataille des sept arts*, conclue par la victoire de Paris et de la dialectique sur Orléans et les belles-lettres. Victoire totale? Ovide et les auteurs classiques ont-ils été vraiment absents à l'âge d'or de la scolastique?⁴⁰ Si Aristote dominait, certes, la scène universitaire, les écoles de gram-

³⁸ Les astérisques signalent trois corrections: le manuscrit porte: '*Lathofagos*, lothofasi, facto'. — Une glose analogue se lit dans le ms. Amiens, Bibl. Mun. 436, f. 72r-v, où la citation des *Bursarii* est introduite par les mots 'Et totum bursarium est si hec est littera'.

³⁹ Dans le premier des manuscrits que nous citons, les *Remedia* (ff. 1r-16r) sont suivis, comme dans plusieurs 'Libri Catoniani', du *Tobias* de Matthieu de Vendôme (ff. 16v-18v incomplet). Bien que l'accessus soit différent (*inc.* 'Ovidius volens iuvenes Romanos et puellas instruere in amorem ...'), les scolies s'apparentent à celles des autres manuscrits et leur dépendance à l'égard de Foulques, d'Arnoul et de Guillaume est tout aussi marquée. Fait notable, la glose au vers 755, inspirée d'Arnoul, mentionne le *Pamphilus* comme une œuvre théâtrale: '*Illic assidue*, id est in theatro, *ficti amores*, bene dicit ficti quia fecte *cantantur*, sicuti Panphilus et alii poete cantantur, id est representantur, qualiter aliquis iuvenis deceptus fuit ab amica sua' (f. 15r); à propos de la comédie, au vers 376, le *Geta* de Vital de Blois est aussi rappelé: '*Versibus in mediis*, id est communibus versibus qui leguntur communiter de magnis et parvis, sicuti Geta et Panphilus et alii parvi libelli; in talibus autem habendus est *soccus*, id est versus exametri et penthametri' (f. 8v). Cf. B. Roy, 'Arnulf of Orleans and the Latin "Comedy"', *Speculum* 49 (1974) 258-66 (260); P. Dronke, 'A Note on Pamphilus', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 42 (1979) 225-30 (226). Ces deux articles citent Arnoul d'après le manuscrit de Wolfenbüttel (= W), qui offre un texte interpolé et farci d'emprunts au commentaire de Foulques (cf. supra, n. 36). D'après F 106v, la glose d'Arnoul au vers 755 se lit ainsi, sans plus: '*Illic*, in theatro, *ficti*, sicut Paphilus (!) et cetera que in comedia inducuntur persone'; ce qui suit dans W 145rb reproduit mal la glose que nous attribuons à Foulques et dont voici le texte correct: '*firmitur*, quia quanto plus canunt illa ludicra, tanto magis confirmatur amor eorum; vel *saltantur*, id est per saltationes et per gesticulationes representantur' (Paris, B.N. lat. 8302, f. 69rb; lat. 8207, f. 69vb; Berlin, Lat. qu. 538, f. 4vb).

⁴⁰ On connaît la brillante réponse de E. K. Rand, 'The Classics in the Thirteenth Century', *Speculum* 4 (1929) 249-69, complétée par H. Wieruszowski, 'Rhetoric and the Classics in Italian Education of the Thirteenth Century', *Studia Gratiana* 11 (1967) 169-208, article repris dans le recueil du même auteur: *Politics and Culture in Medieval Spain and Italy* (Rome, 1971), pp. 589-627.

naire n'en continuaient pas moins à proposer aux adolescents les 'Libri Catoniani' et, parmi eux, l'Ovide des *Remedia amoris*. Indice d'appauvrissement, toutefois: les glossateurs se contentaient souvent de marquer le pas et s'en remettaient aux vieux maîtres d'Orléans.

§ 4. *Manuscripts et incipit*

Les *Bursarii* se présentent dans les manuscrits soit sous forme d'opuscule autonome, soit sous forme d'annotations éparses en marge du texte d'Ovide. Nous ne décrivons ici que les premiers de ces manuscrits, nous limitant à signaler les seconds dans la liste d'incipit qui suivra.

Nous ne connaissons aucun manuscrit complet des *Bursarii*: ils sont mutilés ou ne contiennent que des extraits. A une exception près (Ld), tous font partie de recueils factices; les notices qui suivent ne décriront que la section qui nous concerne dans chacun de ces recueils. Guillaume a glosé les œuvres d'Ovide selon l'ordre chronologique qu'il indique dans son accessus aux *Métamorphoses*;⁴¹ seuls les manuscrits A² et Lp ont respecté cet ordre.

A¹ = Berlin, Staatsbibl. Preussischer Kulturbesitz Lat. qu. 219, ff. 82-118 (V [moins les folios 6 et 8] [89] + IV [97] + IV [moins les folios 5-8] [102] + 2 × IV [118]). – Première moitié du xiii^e s., parch., 195 × 130 mm. (ff. 82-102) et 228 × 125 mm. (ff. 103-118), 2 col. Contenu: *Metam.* (rubr. 'Glosule Ovidii Methamorphoseos'), *Her.*, *Amores* (début), *Fasti*, *Rem.*, *Tristia* (accessus seulement: 'Materia O < vidii > Tristium'), *Ars*, *Ex Ponto* (incomplet). Les trois folios enlevés à la fin du troisième cahier contenaient la suite des gloses sur *Amores*. Cette copie des *Bursarii* a été reliée avec une seconde, plus ancienne:

⁴¹ 'Mortuo fratre, videns Ovidius poetas ad honorem evehi per scripturam, Romam venit tempore Augusti et animum ad iuvenilia tractanda applicuit. Cuius *primum* opus, liber Heroidum, de quo habetur in Ovidio de Arte [3. 345]: "Vel tibi composita cantetur Epistola voce." *Secundum* opus, Ovidius Sine titulo, unde illud [ibid. 343 s.]: "Deque tribus libris titulus quos signat Amorum, elige quod docili molliter ore legas." *Tertium* opus, Ovidius de Medicamine faciei, unde illud [ibid. 205 s.]: "Est michi quod dixi vestre medicamina forme, parvus sed cura grande libellus, opus." *Quartum* opus, Ovidius de Arte, propter quem missus est in exilium, unde habetur in Ovidio de Ponto [2. 9. 73]: "Neve roges que sit stultam quam scripsimus Artem." *Quintum* opus, Ovidius de Remedio amoris, de quo habetur in eodem [12]: "Nec nova preteritum Musa retexit opus." *Sextum* opus, Ovidius Fastorum, in quo fecit xii. volumina quorum vi. habemus, de quo habetur in Ovidio Tristium [2. 549]: "Sex ego Fastorum scripsi totidemque libellos." *Septimum* opus, Ovidius Metamorphoseos, unde illud [Tristium 1. 1. 118 s.]: "Sunt michi mutata ter quinque volumina forme, nuper ab exequiis carmina rapta meis"; ipse enim exilio preventus opus suum emendare non potuit, unde ipse ait in Ovidio Tristium [1. 7. 35-40] quod isti vi. versus debent preponi: "Orba parente suo quicumque volumina tangis ... emendaturus si licuisset eram." *Octavum* opus, Ovidius Tristium, quem in itinere exilii composuit. *Nonum* opus, Ovidius de Ponto. *Decimum*, Ovidius in Ibin, id est contra invidum. Tragediam etiam composuit post Ovidium Sine titulo, quam non habemus, unde ait in Ovidio Tristium [recte Amorum 2. 18. 13]: "Curaque tragedia nostra crevit" (A² 130ra).

A² = Berlin, Staatsbibl. Preussischer Kulturbesitz Lat. qu. 219, ff. 119-134 (2 × IV). – Début du xiii^e s., parch., 227 × 142 mm., 2 col. Contenu: *Her.*, *Amores*, *Ars*, *Rem.*, *Fasti*, *Metam.*, *Tristia* (incomplet). Aucune rubrique ni couleur; les titres ont été ajoutés au xv^e s. (e.g., f. 123v: 'Glosule super de arte amandi'). Comme A¹, avec qui il est relié, cet exemplaire a appartenu à Amplonius Ratinck de Berka († 1435), qui en a donné une description détaillée dans l'inventaire de sa bibliothèque; il y a distingué les deux séries de 'glosule' en qualifiant la seconde de 'glosule longe' et en proposant cette attribution fantaisiste: 'et puto glosulas 7 ultimorum librorum in hoc volumine annotatorum esse venerabilis Hugonis de Sancto Victore, qui maximus in hac arte viguit'.⁴²

B = Bern, Burgerbibl. 411, ff. 142-145 (binion). – Deuxième moitié du xiii^e s., parch., 210 × 130 mm., 2 col. Ne contient que les accessus suivis de quelques gloses (ff. 142ra-143rb): *Ars*, *Rem.*, *Fasti*, *Tristia*, *Metam.* (+ sommaire des quinze livres), *Her.* Pas de titres. Ff. 143v-144r, d'une autre main, à pleine page, notes de logique: 'Silloquismus est oratio etc. positus et dispositus per modum et figuram' Ff. 144v-145v blancs. Le recueil, comprenant, parmi d'autres gloses sur les classiques, celles d'Arnoul d'Orléans sur Lucain (ff. 1-89), a appartenu au philologue Jacques Bongars († 1612) et vient probablement d'Orléans comme plusieurs manuscrits de ce collectionneur. Cf. H. Hagen, *Catalogus codicum Bernensium* (Bernae, 1875), pp. 369-70; E. H. Alton, dans *Hermathena* 44 (1926) 121-22; B. M. Marti, *Arnulfi Aurelianensis Glosule super Lucanum* (Rome, 1958), pp. l.xiv-l.xv.

Ld = Leiden, Bibl. der Rijksuniversiteit Lips. 39. – Première moitié du xiii^e s., parch., c. 230/220 × 140/130 mm., 24 folios (IV [8] + V [18] + VI [24]), longues lignes. Contenu: *Amores* (commence à 2. 16. 1), *Tristia*, *Ex Ponto* (f. 18v 'Expliciunt bursarii Ovidii de Ponto'), *Rem.* (377-fin), *Ars*. Un cahier manque entre les folios 18 et 19; il contenait *Her.* et le début de *Rem.*, d'après une table ajoutée au f. 24v: 'Glose ovidii de ponto. et o. epistolarum. et o. de remedio amoris. et de arte amandi'. Sous cette table, une autre main a écrit un modèle d'acte daté de 1255: 'Universis Christi fidelibus ... M. Suthollē decanus salutem' Manuscrit d'origine anglaise, d'après G. I. Lieftinck, dans *Scriptorium* 16 (1962) 384.

Lp = Leipzig, Universitätsbibl. Rep. I. 4^o 48, ff. 104-141 (4 × IV [135] + III [141]). – Première moitié du xiii^e s., parch., 218 × 155 mm., 2 col. Contenu: *Her.*, *Amores*, *Ars*, *Rem.*, *Fasti*, *Metam.*, *Ex Ponto*. F. 104r rubr. 'Incipiunt bursarii ovidianorum'. F. 141va souscription: 'Expliciunt bursarii magistri Willelmi Aurelianensis super Ovidios'. Suit: 'De ovidio tristium', *inc.* 'Ovidius in itinere suo existens ...' = accessus de Guillaume d'Orléans, mais interpolé de passages empruntés à un autre accessus qui pourrait être d'Arnoul d'Orléans (ms. Antwerpen, Museum Plantin-Moretus M 85 [Latin 71], f. 42r. *inc.* 'Materia Ovidii in hoc libro est relegatio sua ...');⁴³ les brèves gloses qui suivent s'interrompent ex abrupto à *Tristia* 2. 96: seule

⁴² P. Lehmann, *Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz* 2 (München, 1928), p. 15.

⁴³ Les ff. 38r-43r de ce manuscrit, dont le contenu est analogue à celui des ff. 27r-33v du ms. Paris, B.N. lat. 8320 (cité ci-dessus, § 1), renferment des extraits des gloses d'Arnoul sur

la première est de Guillaume, les autres coïncident avec celles du manuscrit d'Anvers. Dans les marges inférieures de plusieurs folios (120v, 121r, 125v-128v, etc.), une autre main a ajouté des recettes médicales et des proverbes. Cf. A. G. R. Naumann, *Catalogus librorum manuscriptorum qui in Bibliotheca Senatoria civitatis Lipsiensis asservantur* (Grimae, 1838), n° xciv (les manuscrits décrits dans ce catalogue sont maintenant déposés à l'Universitätsbibliothek).

P = Paris, B.N. lat. 15136 (ancien Saint-Victor JJJ 25), ff. 131-201 (4 × IV; foliotation erronée de Claude de Grandrue, qui a sauté les numéros 150-189). – Seconde moitié du xiii^e s., parch., 210 × 155 mm., 2 col. Contenu: *Her.*, *Rem.*, *Ex Ponto*, *Tristia*, *Metam.* (abrégé). Pas de titre. F. 201r accessus au *Tobias* de Matthieu de Vendôme. F. 201v vers effacés.

Ces six manuscrits contiennent les *Bursarii* sans le texte d'Ovide, si ce n'est sous forme de lemmes pour les passages examinés. Il n'est pas rare, cependant, de trouver les gloses de Guillaume en marge du texte de l'une ou l'autre des œuvres d'Ovide. Parfois seul l'accessus a été transcrit. En donnant ci-dessous l'incipit de chacune des parties des *Bursarii*,⁴⁴ nous ajoutons aux manuscrits déjà décrits, qui seront désignés par leur sigle respectif, les cotes de quelques autres manuscrits où, justement, les gloses apparaissent en marge du texte. Une enquête systématique permettrait assurément de compléter les indications.

Prologue: Rumpere, Livor edax ... (voir ci-dessus, § 1). Ce prologue accompagne presque toujours l'accessus aux *Heroides*.

Heroides: Ovidius in Peligno oppido existens, videns alios poetas per scripta sua ad honorem evehi, Romam venit et ibi animum suum ad iuvenilia tractanda applicuit (I) Hanc itaque primam epistolam scribit Penelope, filia Ycarii, Ulixi marito suo, filio Laertis, qui cum aliis Grecis ivit ad bellum Troianum, et ibi per decem annos moratus est et in reditu per alios decem

A¹ 95ra-102ra; A² 119ra-121va; B 143r prol. et acc.; Lp 104ra-109rb; P 131ra-137vb; Basel, Universitätsbibl. F IV 17 (s. xiv) gloses sans acc.; Bern 512, ff. 40r-97v (an. 1289); Leiden, Bibl. der Rijksuniversiteit B.P.L. 191 D, f. 139r (s. xiii) acc.; Paris, B.N. lat. 7996, f. 1r (s. xiii-xiv) prol. et acc.; Tours, Bibl. Mun. 881, ff. 1r-30r (s. xiii); Trier, Stadtbibl. 1088/28, ff. 48-101 (s. xiii); Vatican, Vat. lat. 2792, ff. 1r-54v (s. xiii ex.); acc. éditée d'après ce dernier manuscrit par Ghisalberti, 'Mediaeval Biographies' (supra, n. 32), 44.

plusieurs œuvres d'Ovide. Le commentaire entier sur les *Tristes* se trouve, sans nom d'auteur, dans le ms. Cambridge, University Lib. Add. 4456 (jadis Phillipps 11068), ff. 1ra-8vb (s. xiii¹). inc. 'Materia Ovidii in hoc opere est relegacio sua ...'; il s'agit précisément du ms. Phillipps dont E. H. Alton écrivait dans une note à propos d'Arnoul: '... this was sold in 1908, and I cannot trace it. It might be the work of the Orleans commentator', dans *Hermathena* 44 (1926) 128.

⁴⁴ D'après A² et, pour *Ex Ponto*, Ld. Quelques fautes évidentes ont toutefois été corrigées tacitement d'après les autres manuscrits, surtout A¹.

Amores: Executo primo opere, de secundo exequamur, de cuius titulo prius agendum est. A diversis diversi huic libro assignantur tituli (I) In istis primis quatuor versibus utitur auctor prosopopeia, que est informatio nove persone et tribus modis accipitur, scilicet quociens res animata ad inanimatam, ut ubi [Tristia 1. 1. 1]: 'Parve, nec invidio'; inanimata ad animatam, ut hic; inanimata ad inanimatam, ut in Apologis Aviani

A¹ 102ra-vb *mutil. des.* 1. 6. 43; A² 121vb-123va; Ld 1r-2r *inc.* 2. 16. 1; Lp 109rb-113rb; Paris, B.N. lat. 8245, f. 38v (s. XIII) acc.

Ars amatoria: Videns Ovidius ex amoris ignorantia iuvenes deviare, quasi eis compatiens, opus istud tractare proposuit in quo materia ipsius est amor (I) A propositione incipit dicens: *Si quis in hoc populo*, id est in Romano populo, ipse enim solummodo docet Romanos, unde illud [3. 195]: 'Non ego Caucasea doceo de rupe puellas.' Vel *in hoc populo*, id est in hoc mundo ita quod generaliter legatur

A¹ 111ra-114vb; A² 123va-125vb; B 142ra acc.; Ld 20v-24r; Lp 113rb-117rb; London, B.L. Add. 49368, f. 81r (s. XIII) acc.; Pommersfelden, Gräfl. Schönborn'sche Bibl. 196, f. 83r (s. XIII) acc.

Remedia amoris: Expleto opere de Arte, videns Ovidius iuvenes ex impatientia in amore deviare, opus istud tractare proposuit in quo materia ipsius est dare amoris remedium (I) Sciendum est quod Ovidius opus suum incepit ab hoc puncto [41]: 'Ad mea decepti'. Quod audiens Cupido, videns quod agebat contra amorem, cepit eum obiurgare. Unde Ovidius libro suo prologum premisit, in quo excusationem pretendit erga Cupidinem dicens: *Amor*, id est Cupido deus amoris, et ita possessum pro possidente

A¹ 108ra-110vb; A² 125vb-127rb; B 142ra acc.; Ld 19r-20v *mutil. inc.* 377; Lp 117rb-120ra; P 137vb-141rb; Bern, Burgerbibl. 478, ff. 148r-156r (s. XIII); Leiden, B.P.L. 191 D, f. 139r (s. XIII) acc.; Milano, Ambros. I 8 inf., f. 146v (s. XIII) acc.

Fasti: Ad annos discretionis iam proventus, Ovidius errorem suum recognoscens, cum dampnationis sue iam aliquantulum in ore Romanorum murmura pullularent propter nimiam Artis amatorie lasciviam, hoc opus incepit (I) A propositione incipit. Construe: *Canam*, id est metrice describam. Cano enim verbum est polissenum tria significans: laudare, ut in Eneide: 'Regemque canebant'; metrice describere, ut hic; cantare, ut in Catone: 'Fistula dulce canit'

A¹ 103ra-108ra; A² 127rb-130ra; B 142r acc.; Lp 120ra-125va.

Metamorphoses: Ad maiorem auctoris evidentiam in maiori opere suo, de vita ipsius tractandum est. Videndum est ergo unde et quis fuerit Ovidius et quid composuerit. Ovidius in Peligno oppido natus extitit Materia auctoris in hoc opere est mutatio rerum. Sed quia de mutatione mentionem fecimus, videndum est quot sint modi mutationis, tres scilicet: est enim ethica mutatio et theorica et magica. Ethica, sicut de animali rationabili ad irrationabile, ut mutatio Licaonis in lupum. Theorica est spiritualis, ut deificatio Herculis. Magica, ut de re inanimata ad animatam, sicut mutatio ymaginis quam fecit Prometheus (I) [A¹ P = Mutationes huius primi libri tales sunt. Mundus in quatuor secula a metallis denominata. Annus etiam in quatuor tempora. Gygantes in montes. Sanguis gygantum

in homines]⁴⁵ A propositione incipit dicens: *In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas corpora*. Construe: *Animus*, deliberatio voluntatis mee, *fert*, me scilicet, *dicere*, id est ad hoc ut dicam, *formas mutatas*, id est alternatas, *in corpora nova*, id est renovata per variationem forme. Dico quod renovata non quantum ad corpus, sed quantum ad notitiam, ut si de massa argenti fieret anulus, quodammodo renovaretur argentum incipiendo apparere aliter quam solet esse. Vel ibi potest fieri ypallage⁴⁶ (II) *Regia solis erat*. In hoc secundo volumine continetur domus solis descriptio. Phetontis petitio. Phebi dissuasio. Phetontis fulminatio. Climenes et Eliadum lamentatio

A¹ 82ra-95ra; A² 130ra-134rb; B 142rb-143ra acc. et sommaires; Lp 125va-135va; P 197vb-200vb abrégé; Basel, Universitätsbibl. F II 27, f. 23v (s. XIII) acc.; London, B.L. Add. 49368, f. 143v (s. XIII) acc.; Oxford, Bodl. Canon. Class. Lat. 9, f. 166 (s. XIII-XIV) acc.; Wrocław, Bibl. Uniwersytecka IV F 42, ff. 32vb-33vb (s. XIV) acc.

Tristia: Ovidius in itinere exilii existens, volens remedium aliquod malorum obtinere, opus istud tractare proposuit, in quo materiam habet exilium et amicos (I) In hac prima epistola instruit auctor librum quem mittit Romam, et est prosopopeia, informatio scilicet nove persone. Dicit ergo: o *liber parve*, arrogantiam vitat ubi vocat eum parvum, *ibis in Urbem*, id est Romam, et est antonomasia, quia per excellentiam vocat Romam urbem sine adiuncto

A¹ 110vb acc.; A² 134rb-vb *mutil. des.* l. 9; B 142rb acc.; Ld 2r-10r; Lp 141v acc. interpolé; P 148ra-197va; Leiden, B.P.L. 191 D, f. 139r (s. XIII) acc.; Oxford, Bodl. Canon. Class. Lat. 1, f. 219v (s. XIII) acc.

Ex Ponto: 'Rebus idem titulo differt, et epistola cui sit non occultato nomine missa docet' [I. 1. 18]. Nil enim distat inter librum istum et Ovidium Tristium, nisi quod iste intitulatur a loco, ille a miseria, et in hoc nominat amicos, in illo vero nullum nominavit. (I) Hanc itaque epistolam scribit ad Brutum, custodem armarioli Rome, monens eum ut benigne recipiat istum librum sicut et alios (II) *Huc quoque Cesarei*. Hic incipit secundus liber, cuius primam epistolam scribit ad Germanicum, ostendens ei se gaudere de hoc quod ei fama renunciavit Augustum triumphasse de Germanicis *Huc quoque* etc., quoque incoativum est et non continuativum. Vel, ut volunt alii,⁴⁷ sit continuativum et suppleantur ista: fama

⁴⁵ Cf. supra, n. 31.

⁴⁶ Nouvel exemple de l'utilisation des *Bursarii* par les commentateurs postérieurs, ce passage se retrouve dans les gloses du ms. København, Kongelige Bibl. Gl. kgl. Saml. 2008. 4^o, f. 3rb (s. XIII²), citées par P. Demats, *Fabula* (supra, n. 14), p. 188; tandis que le développement de l'accessus sur la 'materia' et les trois types de 'mutatio' est repris par le ms. Wolfenbüttel, Aug. 4^o 5. 4 (2952), f. 1rb (s. XIV¹), cité ibid., 189.

⁴⁷ Guillaume vise ici les gloses qu'on a attribuées à Arnoul, mais qui appartiennent peut-être à Foulques: '*Huc quoque*, continuatio: Cesar de hostibus triumphavit, cuius triumphus fama totum orbem replevit, nam *huc quoque*, id est in istas terras pervenit, *quoque*, id est similiter sicut in alias terras', ms. København, Gl. kgl. Saml. 2015. 4^o, f. 4v; de même W 141v, cité par Ghisalberti, 'Arnolfo' (supra, n. 27), 175.

triumphi Cesaris per totum mundum divulgata est, *quoque*, hoc est similiter, *huc* ... (4. 16. 52) *Non habet in nobis iam nova plaga locum*, opere enim expleto, non invidendum est magistro, unde idem [*Rem.* 389]: 'Rumpere, Livor edax, magnum iam nomen habemus.' [Lp = Expliciunt bursarii magistri Willelmi Aurelianensis super Ovidios.]

A¹ 114vb-118vb *mutil.* des. 3. 5. 12; Ld 10v-18v; Lp 135va-141va; P 141ra-147vb fin interpolée.

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L'identification de l'origine orléanaise des *Bursarii* et la reconnaissance de leur position intermédiaire entre l'œuvre des devanciers, Foulques et Arnoul, et celle de leurs héritiers de la fin du ^{xiii}^e siècle, permettent d'agencer plusieurs éléments d'une histoire des commentaires sur Ovide au cours de l'*aetas Ovidiana*. Le rôle des écoles d'Orléans dans cette tradition exégétique apparaît déterminant.

La production de ces glossateurs a parfois été jugée avec sévérité et mépris, et l'on a ridiculisé leur "scholarship", compounded autoschediastically from ignorance and feckless imagination'.⁴⁸ Certes, leurs efforts nous paraissent aujourd'hui simplistes et maladroits, mais on aurait mauvaise grâce à leur reprocher de ne pas avoir été de vrais 'scholars' au sens britannique du terme. Malgré ses limites, leur enseignement a éveillé l'intérêt pour les classiques, suscité l'imitation des modèles et stimulé la création littéraire, contribuant pour beaucoup à former le milieu culturel d'où est né un chef-d'œuvre aussi ovidien que le *Roman de la Rose*.

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⁴⁸ R. P. Oliver, 'Interpolated Lines in Ovid', *Gesellschaft, Kultur, Literatur. Beiträge Luitpold Wallach gewidmet* (Stuttgart, 1975), p. 24. R. R. Bolgar et B. Bischoff ont, par contre, souligné l'importance de l'étude et de l'édition des gloses médiévales, dans *Classical Influences on European Culture A.D. 500-1500* (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 1-25 et 83-94.

THE SITE CHANGES OF AUGUSTINIAN COMMUNITIES IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND AND WALES¹

David M. Robinson

IN a substantial number of religious foundations of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries a final site was not settled for some years after the initial convent had been established and a primary location chosen for the monastic buildings. Often sites were subsequently realised as merely temporary foundations, abandoned in later years in favour of fresh situations offering more suitable social or physical geographic conditions. This was true of a wide variety of religious orders including the Benedictines, Cistercians, Cluniacs, Premonstratensians and Augustinians. Site changes within the Cistercian order have been discussed by R. A. Donkin² and were shown to be due chiefly to adverse environmental conditions at the early locations. In this paper it is intended to trace those factors which lay behind similar moves among Augustinian communities.

It is generally accepted that purely in terms of the number of houses the canons regular of St. Augustine was one of the most popular religious orders in medieval England and Wales. The first was almost certainly St. Botolph's at Colchester established for the canons about 1104 and definitely before 1106.³

¹ I am indebted to Dr. S. H. Cousens for advice on the content and presentation of this paper.

² R. A. Donkin, 'The Site Changes of Medieval Cistercian Monasteries', *Geography* 44 (1959) 251-58. In a more recent account Dr. Donkin notes thirty Cistercian site changes: R. A. Donkin, *The Cistercians: Studies in the Geography of Medieval England and Wales* (Toronto, 1978), pp. 31-36, 179-80. In the following discussion a number of comparisons are made to the Cistercian material which may be regarded as unfounded, considering the amorphous nature of the Augustinians. The Cistercians were a cohesive unit with a central administration before they entered England and Wales, whereas the first general chapter of Augustinian canons was not held until 1217. Because of the diversity in the nature of early Augustinian communities, the order illustrates many of the general faults associated with the siting of twelfth- and thirteenth-century religious houses. On the other hand, Cistercian re-siting was chiefly a result of restricted upland situations, chosen initially for isolation, giving rise to a single category of site change, moving to more spacious and accommodating surroundings.

³ J. C. Dickinson, *The Origins of the Austin Canons and Their Introduction into England* (London, 1950), pp. 99-108; D. Knowles and R. N. Hadcock, *Medieval Religious Houses, England and Wales*, 2nd edition (London, 1971), p. 155.

Foundations continued into the middle of the fourteenth century by which time there were in the region of 200 autonomous houses in England and Wales.⁴ The greater number of these foundations occurred in the twelfth century 'when admiration for the monastic life verged on the hysterical',⁵ and it is here that the roots of Augustinian community transfers, in addition to those of other orders, must be sought.

The temporary sites later abandoned should not be considered in isolation but should be seen within the full spectrum of unsuccessful religious houses in medieval England and Wales. Within the Augustinian order alone, at several projected foundations the conventual life never actually began through a lack of adequate endowment.⁶ Many other houses initially taking root were later lost to the order before the Dissolution of 1535-40. Indeed, temporary sites form just one section of the 68 (34%) Augustinian establishments which, in some way, may be regarded as unsuccessful.⁷

The origin of these failures lay in an overindulgence in monastic patronage in the first half of the twelfth century. During the reigns of Henry I (1100-35) and Stephen (1135-54) there were more religious foundations in England and Wales than the sum total before or after those dates. It was within this period that the Augustinian order was most fashionable⁸ and was also the time when the bulk of Cistercian abbeys was established.⁹ The monastic life in England was at the height of its prestige and the desire to be associated with foundations attracted men and women from all ranks of society. However, certain basic essentials were all too often overlooked. The foundation of a monastic house at this time involved a number of basic necessities. To begin with, it was vital to secure a community of adequate size to settle the house. Secondly, a sufficiently spacious site to accommodate the extensive layout of buildings, with a suitable water supply, had to be chosen. Finally, the provision of adequate endowments to ensure the house would be a self-sufficient economic concern was needed. The tardy provision of the latter two frequently led to the abandonment of many sites in favour of new ones, or more drastically for the houses to be totally dissolved.

In the following discussion there is an attempt to illustrate that during the flood of monastic foundations in the twelfth century certain geographical

⁴ For a complete list with dates of foundation, see Knowles and Hadcock, *ibid.*, pp. 137-82.

⁵ J. C. Dickinson, 'Early Suppressions of English Houses of Austin Canons' in V. Ruffer and A. J. Taylor, eds., *Medieval Studies Presented to Rose Graham* (London, 1950), p. 54.

⁶ *ibid.*, 55-56.

⁷ See D. M. Robinson, *The Geography of Augustinian Settlement in Medieval England and Wales*, 2 vols. (British Archaeological Reports 80; Oxford, 1980), 1. 74-108.

⁸ *ibid.* 1. 41-45; Dickinson, *Origins*, pp. 117-39.

⁹ Knowles and Hadcock, *Religious Houses*, pp. 112-15.

considerations were often overlooked. It is hoped that Augustinian community changes demonstrate many of the faults which led to abortive monastic foundations in general. These site changes have not hitherto been considered in this light, though J. C. Dickinson, with his boundless energy for interpreting Augustinian affairs, has somewhat broached the subject in dealing with the first foundations of the canons in England.¹⁰

EXTENT, DISTRIBUTION AND LENGTH OF EXISTENCE

There are twenty-one recorded instances of Augustinian convents which had for a number of years settled particular sites later abandoned in favour of fresh locations offering more suitable conditions. This amounts to 10.5% of the total of 200 Augustinian foundations in England and Wales,¹¹ which was considerably less than in the Cistercian order 'where there is evidence that up to 29 houses (33%) were obliged to move'.¹² However, the proportion moving in other orders was generally a good deal smaller than either of these two cases.¹³ Minor Cistercian site changes were almost certainly more common and were probably thought not worth recording.¹⁴ This may well have been true of the Augustinian and other religious orders.

The recorded Augustinian site changes are listed in the Appendix and their distribution illustrated in Figure 1. They were not concentrated into the areas of densest Augustinian settlement,¹⁵ and although widely dispersed in most parts of England, none was to be found in Wales or the southwest. This may have been because there were so few foundations in those areas.

Two communities of canons noted in the Appendix moved more than once before finally settling. That established at Lilleshall¹⁶ had occupied two previous sites: Lizard, settled about 1143, was abandoned in favour of Donnington Wood about 1144 which, in turn, was deserted for Lilleshall between 1145 and

¹⁰ J. C. Dickinson, 'Les constructions des premiers chanoines réguliers en Angleterre', *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale* 10 (1967) 179-98.

¹¹ The figure of 200 is taken from Knowles and Hadcock, *Religious Houses*, pp. 137-45. It includes all foundations listed except those of lower than priory status and those of doubtful or uncertain origin.

¹² Donkin, 'Site Changes', 251.

¹³ Nevertheless, site changes did occur. The monks established at the Cluniac house of Preston Capes (N'hants.) c. 1090 had moved to Daventry by 1108. The Premonstratensians settled at Swainby (Yorks.) c. 1187 moved soon afterwards to Coverham and the Benedictine house founded at Lavingham (Yorks.) in 1078 had moved to York by 1086. For details of these and many other site changes, see Knowles and Hadcock, *Religious Houses*.

¹⁴ Donkin, 'Site Changes', 252.

¹⁵ Robinson, *Augustinian Settlement* 1. 22-73.

¹⁶ For locations of named houses see Figure 1; counties are given in the Appendix.




FIG. 1. – Augustinian community site changes.

1148.¹⁷ However, even this cannot compare with the peregrinations of the canons who finally settled at Wigmore between 1172 and 1179. They are known to have occupied at least three previous sites but possibly as many as five.¹⁸ Such occurrences were rare, even in the Cistercian order, where only Byland Abbey (Yorks.), which changed site three times, shared a similar distinction.¹⁹ Besides these two notable exceptions all other communities suffered only one change of site (Figure 1).

The periods for which Augustinian temporary sites were occupied varied enormously. In the case of the move from Haswell to Baxterwood the convent may only have been established one year at the earlier site. On the other hand, Embsay was occupied for thirty-five years before the canons moved to Bolton and the move from the temporary site at Rudham to Coxford was made after seventy-six years. Finally, the community that occupied Warbleton²⁰ in 1413 had previously been at Hastings for at least 214 years.²¹ The length of sojourn at a temporary site depended partly on the degree of inconvenience encountered, and the difficulties experienced in acquiring a suitable new site, free from the disadvantages of the first.

The degree to which the primary locations were developed depended to a large extent on how long the canons were there. At Haswell it appears permanent buildings were never constructed.²² Alternatively, at Portchester, a fine priory church was built, and recent excavations have revealed that extensive progress had been made with the construction of conventual buildings. Surprisingly, the community was only here for twenty years.²³ Naturally, at Hastings, a relatively mature Augustinian priory had developed by the time of its abandonment some two centuries later.²⁴

¹⁷ *V.C.H. Shropshire* 2. 70-71; R. W. Eyton, 'The Monasteries of Shropshire, Their Origin and Founders', *Transactions of the Shropshire Archaeological and Natural History Society* 11 (1888) 142-52.

¹⁸ The Wigmore chronicle records three: see J. C. Dickinson and P. T. Ricketts, 'The Anglo-Norman Chronicle of Wigmore Abbey', *Transactions of the Woolhope Naturalists' Field Club* 39 (1969) 413-45; Knowles and Hadcock, *Religious Houses*, p. 179 list five.

¹⁹ Dickinson and Ricketts, *ibid.*, 417.

²⁰ This house was also called the New Priory of Hastings.

²¹ See Appendix for references to these moves.

²² *V.C.H. Durham* 2. 109.

²³ There is, however, a possibility that the church was built before the foundation of the priory. For details, see D. Baker and A. Borg, 'The Outer Bailly - The Site of the Priory' in B. Cunliffe, *Excavations at Portchester Castle*, vol. 3: *Medieval* (London, 1977), pp. 97-120; also D. F. Renn, *Portchester Castle* (London, 1972), pp. 14-16.

²⁴ D. Martin, 'Hastings Augustinian Priory, an Excavation Report', *Hastings Area Archaeological Papers* 2 (1973).

The distances involved in these site changes were generally small (Figure 1). In several instances the final location was within a mile (1.6 km.) of the abandoned site as at Merton and Huntingdon.²⁵ A number of moves were of little more than a few miles such as Runcorn to Norton, approximately 2.5 miles (4 km.), or Portchester to Southwick, about 2.6 miles (4.2 km.). In the complicated series of site changes from Shobdon to Wigmore, the final location was still only 5.4 miles (8.6 km.) from the original site. Only two convents definitely moved more than ten miles. The canons at Hastings withdrew 12.2 miles (19.6 km.) inland to Warbleton and those from Witton moved about 10 miles (17 km.) east to Studley. There is possibly a third instance. The convent at Woodspring was originally at Dodlinch; however, the location of Dodlinch is not known with any degree of accuracy. It may have been close by²⁶ but it is possible that the site was close to Wells²⁷ in which case the move was almost 18 miles (30 km.).²⁸ Nevertheless, such a distance could still not compare to the long distances involved in the site change of a number of Cistercian houses. For example, the community at Calder I (Cumb'd.) eventually moved over 90 miles (150 km.) before finally settling at Byland and the monks at Farringdon (Berks.) moved up to 60 miles (96 km.) to Beaulieu (Hants.). Similarly, even with the relatively small number of site changes within the Premonstratensian order the convent at Brockley (Kent) travelled about 30 miles (48 km.) to Bayham (Sussex).²⁹ The site changes of Cistercian abbeys were consistently larger than those undertaken by the Augustinian canons, a feature which is revealed by the averages for each order. The average distance moved by Augustinian communities was just 3.7 miles (6 km.), whereas the Cistercian figure was at least 18 miles (30 km.). This was probably due to a different series of factors at work in each order, a point which will be expanded in a subsequent section.

FACTORS AFFECTING AUGUSTINIAN SITE CHANGES

It is extremely difficult to classify the twenty-one Augustinian community transfers, or place them in any mutually exclusive groups, since the subject

²⁵ All distances have been measured in a straight line, taken from the Ordnance Survey 1: 25,000 sheets.

²⁶ *V.C.H. Somerset* 2. 145.

²⁷ J. Overy, *Places of Interest around Weston and the West Country*, 9th edition (Weston-super-Mare, n. d.), pp. 8-10.

²⁸ This problem is difficult to resolve. As the location of Dodlinch near to Wells would make this the greatest distance travelled in Augustinian site change, a considerable degree of doubt remains.

²⁹ For details of these site changes, see Knowles and Hadcock, *Religious Houses*; on distances, see Ordnance Survey, *Map of Monastic Britain*, 2 sheets, 3rd edition (Southampton, 1978).

is encompassed by a series of complications and uncertainties. Basically, all temporary sites were lacking in one or other of the necessities required to maintain a secure foundation in the manner which the convent in question desired. However, tracing the exact grounds for the move is often impossible. To begin with, there is a basic lack of firm documentary evidence for many of the site changes since in only nine instances was any motive recorded, and even then it might not necessarily have been the major consideration of the convent at the time. Nevertheless, where documentary evidence survives it is useful in that it at least provides some indication of why certain sites were abandoned. Alternatively, where no such information is available, hypotheses have to be sought based on a comparison of old and new sites, on the assumption that the final site was free from the disadvantages of the primary location. It is, however, important to avoid the danger of reading too much into such observations.

Bearing in mind these problems, some attempt can now be made at explaining the site changes. After much deliberation, it was decided that for the sake of clarity in discussion, the twenty-one instances were best subdivided into four major groups: firstly, those transfers most conveniently attributed to a shortage of space; secondly, those motivated by some physical geographical disadvantage at the initial site; thirdly, those convents that moved because of certain social considerations; and finally, a group for which the reason is entirely speculative. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases, a combination of factors rather than any one motivated the site change.

(1) Site failures attributed to a shortage of space

One of the most important factors affecting a site change concerns those houses established in towns or the centre of villages. Most conveniently this factor is given as a shortage of space within the built-up area. However, other features of the urban environment such as noise and related factors detrimental to the contemplative life also played a part.

A high proportion of Augustinian houses was established in the towns of medieval England and Wales. Many of these such as Bodmin, Cirencester, St. Frideswide, Oxford and Southwark were on ancient collegiate sites.³⁰ Although there is no record of site changes at these particular houses, there were perhaps two factors in the abandonment of similar urban sites by Augustinian convents: firstly, a change in emphasis in the order's ideals and secondly, the growth of endowment. In the first case, although urban sites had been adequate for

³⁰ Robinson, *Augustinian Settlement* 1. 35-36, 333-40.

secular canons in collegiate churches, when such places were converted for the Augustinians, it was discovered they were unsuitable for certain convents. The emphasis in the two religious bodies was different. Although the Augustinians had secular duties to consider, there was a strong contemplative element in their life. Hence, the outskirts of a town were far more appealing than the centre. In the second instance a growth in endowment could also lead to a site change. Although a confined space within an urban area may have appeared adequate at the foundation of a house, subsequent growth in endowment may have led the convent to secure a new site with more room for the expansion of buildings. Both these points are illustrated with the following examples.

At Bedford, the convent first settled in the ancient collegiate church within the town. However, 'buildings of a different type and environment suited to the new life were necessary', hence the move to Newnham situated outside the town.³¹ Similarly, at Huntingdon, one of the earliest Augustinian foundations in England, the canons settled at the church of St. Mary in the town. They moved, soon after, to a less central site 'because of the noise of the town'.³² Although not a collegiate site, a similar situation is discernible for the foundation at Portchester. The priory, founded in 1133, was located within the walls of the Roman 'Saxon-shore' fort at Portchester, within 200 yards (183 metres) of the Norman castle. Although the canons suffered the situation for up to twenty years, the propinquity of the castle and the traffic associated with the rôle of Portchester as a leading channel port led the canons to move inland to Southwick.³³ Finally, at least one of the moves made by the convent that eventually settled at Wigmore was due to a shortage of space. The patron moved the canons from a site at Aymestrey to the village of Wigmore. However, they discovered the site was 'too narrow and too squalid to make a dwelling-place for them'.³⁴ Thus, soon after, they secured a suitable site to the north of the village.

The discussion, so far, has been concerned with site changes that took place as a result of the emphasis on the contemplative life. There are also examples of

³¹ *The Cartulary of Newnham Priory*, ed. J. Godber, 2 vols. (Publications of the Bedfordshire Historical Record Society 43; Bedford, 1963-64), I. x-xi.

³² W. Dugdale, *Monasticon Anglicanum*, ed. J. Caley, H. Ellis, B. Bandinel, 6 vols. in 8 (London, 1817-30), 6. 80 (hereafter cited as *Mon. Ang.*); Dickinson, 'Premiers chanoines', 181. There was a pre-Conquest church at Huntingdon to which the Augustinian house was related, but its nature is doubtful; see Knowles and Hadcock, *Religious Houses*, pp. 160, 461.

³³ Dickinson, 'Premiers chanoines', 181; Dickinson, *Origins*, p. 124. The Reverend Dickinson appears to have taken his details from a cartulary of Southwick in the British Library. The recent archaeological excavations on the site of Portchester have not thrown any fresh light on the reasons for the move; see Cunliffe, *Portchester Castle*, pp. 97-120.

³⁴ Taken from the Wigmore chronicle (Dickinson and Ricketts, 'Wigmore Chronicle', 431).

a shortage of space leading to migrations as the endowments of certain houses grew. At St. Giles, Cambridge, the regular canons established there about 1092 became Augustinian a little before 1108,³⁵ but were in danger of being disbanded by 1110. The priory, which was near the castle, was in the king's hands and was said to be 'desolate and reduced to nothing'.³⁶ The situation changed dramatically when the barony at Cambridge changed hands. The new patron planned to raise the number of canons to thirty; he also increased the endowment. However, the site at St. Giles was not sufficiently large for all the buildings that would be required by the new convent.³⁷ A new site, with adequate land, was chosen at Barnwell.³⁸ Unfortunately, the precise conditions at the time are impossible to detect. At present, the church of St. Giles lies at the foot of the Norman castle mound. It is bounded on two other sides by main roads.³⁹

The most recently discovered site change is that of St. Augustine's, Bristol,⁴⁰ and it appears this may well have been a move motivated by increased endowment. Through careful sifting of the documentation, the Reverend Dickinson has revealed almost certainly that between the decision of the founder to establish a house about 1140 and the dedication of that house in 1170, a site change took place. Nevertheless, the buildings at the first site do not appear to have been intended for temporary use as the founder, Robert fitz Harding, 'bielded the churche and other howses of offices according to the same bi the space of vi yeres'.⁴¹ Robert did not provide excessive endowment and, at first, appears to have been content with a 'smallish' foundation. However, from 1153 his benefactions increased and were extensively reinforced by the favour of King Henry II. As a result, about the same time the house acquired abbatial status.⁴² With the increase in endowment there was no doubt an increase in the size of the convent and Dickinson believes the original site 'would not be suitable for the conventual buildings of the largish monastery which the house

³⁵ Knowles and Hadcock, *Religious Houses*, p. 146.

³⁶ *Liber memorandorum ecclesie de Bernwelle*, ed. J. W. Clark (Cambridge, 1907), p. 41.

³⁷ *ibid.*, p. 41.

³⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 46, 64. The water supply was also a factor in the decision to move (*ibid.*, p. 41).

³⁹ There has been a slight re-siting of the church but no light has been thrown on the arrangement of conventual buildings; see Royal Commission on Historical Monuments, England, *City of Cambridge* (London, 1959), 2. 274-75.

⁴⁰ J. C. Dickinson, 'The Origins of St. Augustine's, Bristol' in P. McGrath and J. Cannon, eds., *Essays in Bristol and Gloucestershire History* (Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological Society, 1976), pp. 109-26.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, 115. Taken from: 'Abbot Newlands Roll of the Abbots of St. Augustine's Abbey by Bristol', ed. I. H. Jeayes in *Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological Society* 14 (1889-90) 117-30.

⁴² Dickinson, 'St. Augustine's, Bristol', 117-20.

was now becoming'.⁴³ The only option may have been to move to a new site outside the then expanding town.

Following on from these two examples, a similar situation can perhaps be discerned in other site changes. It was not uncommon for small Augustinian communities to be established, at first, in parish churches,⁴⁴ which were normally located in the centre of villages. If, in later years, such a situation proved unsuitable, a new parish church may have been constructed close by. On the other hand, if after the foundation of the priory its endowments were substantially increased, it was perhaps more convenient for the convent to move to a new site with adequate building space for the larger and more extensive construction that was then required.⁴⁵ Attention could also be given to other details such as an improved water supply and an adequate surrounding of arable land for the planting of gardens and orchards.

This may have been the reason for the move from Rudham to Coxford. A convent was established in East Rudham parish church about 1140; about 1216 the canons moved to Coxford.⁴⁶ Endowments to the canons from the founder ceased after his original grants.⁴⁷ However, in the second half of the twelfth century the convent at Rudham received substantial gifts of land and churches from other benefactors.⁴⁸ Thus, by 1210 the priory must have been in a healthy economic position. The canons may well have seen the need to extend the existing conventual buildings. The church was in the centre of the village; therefore, without extensively altering the plan of the settlement, the extent to which a precinct could develop was severely limited. This becomes more apparent in a study of the site of Coxford. The precinct was large and its remains are still scattered across an area of at least 6 acres (2.3 hec.).⁴⁹ Clearly, if the aspirations of any convent rose beyond a confined site in the centre of a village, the only answer was a transfer of site. Similar motives or circumstances may have led to other site changes. However, a major question raised by these

⁴³ *ibid.*, 119.

⁴⁴ Robinson, *Augustinian Settlement* 1. 38-41; J. C. Dickinson, 'The Buildings of the English Austin Canons after the Dissolution of the Monasteries', *Journal of the British Archaeological Association*, 3rd Ser., 31 (1968) 60-75.

⁴⁵ New buildings may have been not merely a prestigious thing but a necessity if the convent had extended beyond the founder's expectations.

⁴⁶ H. W. Saunders, 'A History of Coxford Priory', *Norfolk and Norwich Archaeology* 17 (1910) 284-370. It is interesting to note that the priory began with four priests living a common life at the church of East Rudham; see Dickinson, *Origins*, p. 149.

⁴⁷ Saunders, *ibid.*, 292.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, 288-301, 355-58. See, for example, charter no. 51 dated c. 1210 which was a large grant of land including a manor (*ibid.*, 357).

⁴⁹ As far as the author is aware there has been no serious archaeological investigation at Coxford.

instances concerns the Augustinian houses founded in urban locations that are not recorded as having changed site. These include St. Frideswide, Oxford, Holy Trinity, Aldgate, which was inside the walls of the city of London, and Southwark on the south bank of the Thames, close to London Bridge. There are at least three possible alternatives to explain this. To begin with, the site change, if one took place, has gone unrecorded. Secondly, the initial location proved to be sufficiently adequate despite the surroundings. That is, there may have been sufficient space for a high precinct wall, which would do much to attenuate the noise of busy city life even in the most turbulent of locations. Finally, personal preference may have been an important factor. Owing to the diverse nature of the order, a site which was acceptable to one prior and convent may have been considered unacceptable to another. Such situations seem feasible considering that during the early history of the order in England and Wales so much was left to local initiative.⁵⁰ Some convents were of a Cistercian character, others were more concerned with worldly affairs, predominantly the cure of souls. Therefore, if there was a change in emphasis at any house, early in its history, under a new abbot or prior, a site change may have been the result.

Thus, of the twenty-one Augustinian site changes, at least seven can be attributed in part to a shortage of space at the original location.

(2) *Site failures attributed to physical factors*

There is documentary evidence to illustrate the manner in which foundations were affected by adverse physical conditions. Foremost among such conditions was the lack of an adequate water supply, which was essential to a medieval monastery. It was required to supply the fish so important in the diet of religious communities. Although many houses had ponds for such purposes,⁵¹ running water was an added advantage. Water was also needed for domestic purposes in kitchens and finally, a good head of water was normally required to drive the abbey mill and to carry away refuse from the precinct.

The site change from Cambridge to Barnwell was noted above where a shortage of space at the original site and its propinquity to the castle were given as contributing factors. However, the location at Cambridge was also said to

⁵⁰ In connection with this matter see details on the accepted size of Augustinian convents: Dickinson, *Origins*, pp. 134-37.

⁵¹ Earthworks survive at numerous sites to testify the existence of Augustinian fishponds. They include: Kirby Bellars (Leics.), Notley (Bucks.), Thornton (Lincs.), Ulverscroft (Leics.); see D. Knowles and J. K. S. St. Joseph, *Monastic Sites from the Air* (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 200, 218, 220, 222. There are also good examples at Newark (Surrey): C. M. H. Pearce, 'An Account of the Buildings of Newark Priory', *Surrey Archaeological Collections* 40 (1934) 1-39.

have 'had no spring of fresh water'.⁵² It is not clear how important this consideration was in the decision to move since the site at Barnwell, at present, does not appear to have been any nearer a major water supply. However, the original site was north of the river Cam on its left bank. The move to Barnwell placed the priory on the right bank and may have facilitated the construction of subsidiary channels to the conventual buildings. Alternatively, the patron, with some ulterior motive, may have exaggerated the situation in order to secure a new site.⁵³

The community that finally settled at Wigmore underwent several site changes before arriving there about 1172.⁵⁴ Inadequate water supplies at several of the early sites had been foremost in the convent's decision to move. Whilst at Shobdon, the original site, a member of the community, a canon from the motherhouse of St. Victor of Paris named Henry, 'determined that the place was far from the water they sorely lacked' and proposed they move to a place called Eye near Aymestrey.⁵⁵ The Wigmore chronicle states that the patron was not content to allow the canons to remain at Aymestrey and made them move to the village of Wigmore.⁵⁶ However, the canons discovered the site 'above all was very short of water'.⁵⁷ The convent finally secured a suitable site to the north of the village. It is known that at Shobdon the canons were offered a site which had been intended as a parish church, and it seems likely that in Wigmore village the church was again to be the nucleus of the abbey. However, neither of these churches was situated conveniently for an adequate supply of running water. Although suitable for a parish church, neither site was sufficient to accommodate the complex array of buildings with the necessary water supply involved in a medieval monastery.

It appears that the desire to be within reach of an adequate water supply also encouraged the site changes at Nostell⁵⁸ and Merton⁵⁹ priories.

One further example where there is excellent documentary evidence to illustrate the rôle of adverse physical conditions in motivating a site change is

⁵² *Liber memorandorum*, p. 41.

⁵³ There seems little doubt that excavation would provide more information on this and many other site changes. There are also the colleges in the centre of Cambridge to consider. Many were founded in the medieval period and presumably had adequate water supplies.

⁵⁴ It was noted above that a shortage of space at Wigmore was a contributing factor in one move.

⁵⁵ Taken from the Wigmore chronicle: Dickinson and Ricketts, 'Wigmore Chronicle', 429.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, 431.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, 431. This site was also 'too narrow' to make a dwelling place.

⁵⁸ *V.C.H. Yorkshire* 3. 232; A. H. Thompson, *History of the Priory of St. Mary, Bolton in Wharfedale* (Thoresby Society Publications, 1924), pp. 24-27.

⁵⁹ Dickinson, *Origins*, p. 117; Dickinson, 'Premiers chanoines', 181.

the move from Hastings to Warbleton. The priory at Hastings was established between 1189 and 1199⁶⁰ and was situated within 250 yards (230 metres) of the coast.⁶¹ The canons remained here for over 200 years but in 1412 they were given a grant by Henry IV in which it was stated that 'the church of Holy Trinity, Hastings and habitation of the prior and convent of the said church at Hastings are inundated and wasted by the sea so that they cannot dwell there anymore'.⁶² It seems encroachment by the sea devoured profits more rapidly than benefactors could replace them. In a petition to the king to acquire lands to the value of £15, in about 1350, the prior stated: 'owing to the inundations three churches in Hastings, formerly worth £100, are now not worth 20s'.⁶³ The sea continued to encroach until 'the priory itself was in danger of being swept away'. The convent was given a new site at Warbleton in 1413.⁶⁴ However, recent excavations at the site of Hastings have revealed that the situation may have been exaggerated, since there are few signs of coastal inundation in the archaeological remains.⁶⁵ The buildings were apparently left idle when the canons withdrew in which time a layer of silt covered the floors of most rooms. This was not, however, a sand or beach deposit associated with inundation by the sea, but a mud silt. This silt was probably connected with the small stream that flowed to the east of the priory and fed a large expanse of inland water which bounded the eastern side of the priory precinct.⁶⁶ Though it is possible that the site was damp and occasionally flooded by high tides, this was nothing that could not be corrected by raising the floors or improving external drainage. It is more likely that the priory's desolate and windswept position encouraged the patron to exaggerate the situation to the king in order that a more hospitable site could be acquired.⁶⁷

In so far as documentary evidence is concerned, these are the only site changes for which some physical geographic motive is recorded. Nevertheless, at least two other moves can be attributed, in part at least, to the poor physical conditions at the initial sites: those of Embsay to Bolton and Snead to Chirbury. These observations are based on circumstantial evidence since the new sites had several distinct advantages over the old. They were less exposed, had better

⁶⁰ These dates correspond to the reign of Richard I: *V.C.H. Sussex* 2. 75-76.

⁶¹ Taken from a map of Holy Trinity parish, 1746, in Martin, 'Hastings Priory', 6.

⁶² *Calendar of the Patent Rolls 1408-13*, p. 451 (hereafter cited as *Cal. Pat. Rolls*).

⁶³ *V.C.H. Sussex* 2. 76.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, p. 76.

⁶⁵ Martin, 'Hastings Priory', 28. It should be pointed out that the excavations were limited to a small portion of the northeastern claustral buildings. The majority of the priory lay beneath modern housing development.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, 6.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, 27-28.

water supplies, provided more room for the expansion of domestic buildings and had more ample opportunities for arable farming. Knowles and St. Joseph suggest that the canons at Embsay 'transferred to a more sheltered and fertile site' at Bolton.⁶⁸ However, it is possible to be slightly more objective than this.




FIG. 2. – The move from Embsay to Bolton. A. The relationship of sites to agricultural land classification. B. The relationship of sites to physical geography.

In recent years, the Agricultural Development and Advisory Service of the Ministry of Agriculture has graded land according to the degree to which

⁶⁸ Knowles and St. Joseph, *Monastic Sites*, p. 197.

physical characteristics impose long-term restrictions on agricultural use.⁶⁹ Although there are problems in the degree to which classifications of today can be interpolated back to the Middle Ages, the general observations are of some value.⁷⁰ Embsay Priory, for example, was situated at approximately 620 feet (190 metres) on the edge of the Pennines (Figure 2B). On the basis of the above classification the site was located on grade IV land, or an area with severe limitations to agricultural development (Figure 2A). The new site at Bolton was only 340 feet (100 metres) above sea level, more sheltered with an excellent water supply, and was situated on land now classified as grade III, which has only moderate limitations to agricultural development. Such a view is supported by the fact that following the move to Bolton, the property at Embsay provided only meagre rents, whereas a good deal of land surrounding Bolton was put under demesne cultivation.⁷¹

At Snead, a relatively high site at 460 feet (140 metres), the initial grant of land to the canons was mainly pasture. The move to Chirbury was probably made in order to allow the canons to establish an arable home base.⁷² Although there were expanses of ground now put at grade III around the site at Snead, the priory itself was situated on grade IV. Chirbury, on the other hand, was situated on land now put at grade III and had areas of higher quality grade II surrounding it. Grade II land has only very slight limitations to any form of agricultural development. Therefore, at the new site the canons were in a more favourable position for the exploitation of arable land.

(3) *Site failures attributed to human factors*

A site change encouraged by somewhat different factors was that from Haswell to Baxterwood. There seems little doubt that in certain regions of England the Benedictines were extremely powerful and discouraged the foundation of religious houses of other orders too close to their own interests. Indeed, there is evidence to show the monks at Canterbury appear to have been instrumental in the removal of the Augustinians from Dover Priory.⁷³ Similar

⁶⁹ Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food, *Agricultural Land Classification Map of England and Wales: Explanatory Note* (London, 1968).

⁷⁰ Similar use of this information has been made by G. R. J. Jones in a recent study of early settlement in north Wales: G. R. J. Jones, 'Multiple Estates and Early Settlement' in P. H. Sawyer, ed., *Medieval Settlement. Continuity and Change* (London, 1976), pp. 15-40.

⁷¹ I. Kershaw, *Bolton Priory, the Economy of a Northern Monastery, 1286-1325* (Oxford, 1973), pp. 6, 22-47 and frontispiece.

⁷² *V.C.H. Shropshire* 2. 59.

⁷³ Robinson, *Augustinian Settlement* 1. 86; C. R. Haines, *Dover Priory* (Cambridge, 1930), pp. 61-69.

circumstances underlay the site change from Haswell to Baxterwood. Soon after 1180 Henry Pudsey decided to found a monastery at Haswell for canons, probably from Guisborough (Yorks.), but the site was changed soon afterwards to Baxterwood.⁷⁴ It has been stated that the new site was 'probably chosen in preference to Haswell on account of its greater natural beauty'.⁷⁵ However, considering the later events, this view is perhaps too naive. Both sites at Haswell and Baxterwood were very close to the Benedictine stronghold of Durham, and it appears the monks there were strongly opposed to the foundation from its inception.⁷⁶ The move to Baxterwood seems more likely to have been an attempt to escape their influence. The attempt was not successful, for the Durham monks would stop at nothing to eject the Augustinians. They wrote apostolic letters and used other legal means.⁷⁷ Finally, Henry Pudsey had to apologise for his presumption and make a new arrangement. The endowments intended for Baxterwood were given to a new Benedictine priory at Finchale, situated a few miles north of Durham.⁷⁸ Hence, this is one example of a site change which did little to improve the situation of the house.

The greater number of those site changes hitherto discussed occurred in the twelfth century when, as stated earlier, it was common for many of the important considerations to be overlooked. Even in much later foundations certain communities still found it necessary to move. The canons established at Cottingham in 1322, for example, discovered after settling that due to certain customs and statutes, the founder and his heirs had the right to clear the site and demolish the buildings whenever they chose.⁷⁹ Because a perpetual title could not be obtained to the site, the canons sought licence from the pope to move to a hamlet in the neighbourhood called Newton or Haltemprice.⁸⁰ The convent took less than two years to move, for in 1324, whilst at their new site, the canons were given licence to acquire various lands and rents.⁸¹

Finally, at a number of sites it seems likely that the canons knew the initial settlement was only a temporary arrangement. This was probably true of Hood where a convent settled while permanent buildings were under construction at Newburgh.⁸² Hood had previously been occupied by a Cistercian convent that

⁷⁴ Knowles and Hadcock, *Religious Houses*, p. 146.

⁷⁵ *V.C.H. Durham* 2. 109.

⁷⁶ H. Wharton, *Anglia sacra, sive Collectio historiarum, partim antiquitus, partim recenter scriptarum de archiepiscopis et episcopis Angliae* ..., 2 vols. (London, 1691), 1. 726.

⁷⁷ *ibid.*, p. 726.

⁷⁸ *ibid.*, p. 726; J. Raine, ed., *The Priory of Finchale* (Publications of the Surtees Society 6; London, 1836-37), introduction.

⁷⁹ *V.C.H. Yorkshire* 3. 213.

⁸⁰ *Mon. Ang.* 6. 519.

⁸¹ *Cal. Pat. Rolls 1324-27*, p. 76.

⁸² *V.C.H. Yorkshire* 3. 230-31.

eventually moved to Byland.⁸³ It seems the canons took over some kind of temporary structure left by the Cistercians but made no attempt to improve the situation, knowing the move to Newburgh was imminent. Hood remained in the possession of the Augustinians as a cell of Newburgh.

In so far as documentary or even firm circumstantial evidence is concerned, these are the only site changes for which some motive is discernible. Reasons for the remaining moves are purely conjectural.

(4) *Other Augustinian site changes*

It is not intended to spend a great deal of time in speculating about the reasons for the remaining site changes in that they probably all fit into categories similar to those already outlined.

The move from Derby to Darley may well have been the result of a shortage of space at the original site. Less than ten years after the foundation of Derby, new buildings were constructed to the north of the town. Most of the canons left Derby which became a cell of the new abbey at Darley. Eventually the cell was converted to a hospital, emphasising the Augustinian connection with secular duties in the centre of towns.⁸⁴

If the situation could arise where the Benedictines could bring pressure to bear on foundations of other orders as in the case of Baxterwood, then the possibility of a long distance move from Dodlinch to Woodspring falls into perspective. The more distant supposed site of Dodlinch was near Wells; the large Benedictine foundation at Glastonbury and the cathedral chapter at Wells may have persuaded the founder to re-site his establishment further west.

Similar motives or circumstances behind the move from Rudham to Coxford may have led to the site changes from Witton to Studley and Runcorn to Norton. Finally, the canons who settled at Lizard found the site unsuitable and eventually moved to Lilleshall. The original site was kept as a grange but the poor physical conditions there may have been the reason for the move: '... indeed the soil was poor and the revenue from Lizard Grange always remained low.'⁸⁵

THE EFFECT ON DISTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSIONS

Hence, the information concerning the details of Augustinian site changes varies considerably. Viewed in isolation the recorded percentage of all founda-

⁸³ Donkin, 'Site Changes', 253, 258.

⁸⁴ Knowles and Hadcock, *Religious Houses*, p. 156; *The Cartulary of Darley Abbey*, ed. R. R. Darlington, 2 vols. (Kendal, 1945), I. i-x.

⁸⁵ *V.C.H. Shropshire* 2. 70.

tions was small. Nevertheless, in one sense these were fortunate houses in that they were able to choose fresh locations and improve their general situation, thus saving themselves from the possible alternative of extinction. Other houses were not so fortunate in that they were unable to recover from unfavourable conditions and were prematurely dissolved.⁸⁶ The all too important precautions and prerequisites for establishing a monastic house, whether these be an adequate water supply or sufficient building space, were frequently disregarded. The major faults lay in the period of monastic expansion in the twelfth century. Far less than adequate care was taken in the siting and endowment of religious houses.

Donkin argues that in the case of Cistercian foundations most re-siting can be traced, in part at least, to a dissatisfaction with environmental conditions. He believes there was a major difference in the settlement pattern of Cistercian houses before and after the site changes.⁸⁷ It is difficult to assign all Augustinian community transfers to a dissatisfaction with physical conditions at primary sites. The canons were, in a sense, in less danger of choosing a poor physical site than the Cistercians. This stemmed from the nature of the Rules followed by the orders. The Cistercians followed that of St. Benedict which bade the monks seek out remote and isolated sites. All too often houses discovered, to their cost, that they had pushed too far into the margins of settlement and later found retreat more prudent. The Augustinians, following the Rule of St. Augustine, had no such clause to obey, and although some site changes have been shown to be motivated by similar circumstances, such as that of Embsay to Bolton, far more stemmed from a different series of factors.⁸⁸ The change in the emphasis of the Rule perhaps led to the abandonment of urban sites but also increased endowment may have illustrated the folly in choosing confined sites within built-up areas. Although the emphasis was different in the two orders, the basic causal factor was similar, that is, rashness.

A new site of course, it must be assumed, had to be free of the disadvantages of the old. The actual choice of the site and the distance the move entailed depended on what land was already available or that which was offered specifically for the purpose. The percentage of Cistercian communities changing site was larger than that of the Augustinians. The distances they travelled were also consistently greater. Considering the Cistercian situation, it does not come as a surprise that the distribution of houses was markedly altered by the site

⁸⁶ Robinson, *Augustinian Settlement* 1. 85-108; Dickinson, 'Early Suppressions', 54-77.

⁸⁷ Donkin, 'Site Changes', 255.

⁸⁸ As pointed out in an earlier note, the diversity of the order gave rise to a greater range of poor sitings than those of the Cistercian order.

changes. However, the relatively small average distance travelled by Augustinian communities and the fact that the percentage of houses changing site was smaller meant the actual distribution of monasteries was little altered (Figure 1). The importance of Augustinian community transfers is that they illustrate, to some extent, the basic ignorance or reluctance to accept geographical conditions, chiefly during the monastic expansion of the twelfth century.

Appendix

AUGUSTINIAN HOUSES CHANGING SITE

Full references are given in the notes to the text above.

Temporary site(s)	Final site	County	Authorities
Bedford c. 1166	Newnham c. 1180	Beds.	<i>Cartulary of Newnham</i> , pp. x-xi.
Cambridge - c. 1108	Barnwell 1112	Cambs.	<i>Liber memorandorum</i> , pp. 41-46; <i>Mon. Ang.</i> 6. 83; <i>V.C.H. Cambs.</i> 2. 235.
Runcorn c. 1115	Norton 1134	Ches.	<i>Mon. Ang.</i> 6. 312.
Calke c. 1131	Repton c. 1153-59	Derbs.	Knowles and Hadcock, <i>Religious Houses</i> , pp. 151, 171-72.
Derby 1137	Darley c. 1146	Derbs.	<i>Cartulary of Darley</i> 1. i-iv.
Haswell + 1180	Baxterwood + 1180	Durham	<i>V.C.H. Durham</i> 2. 109; <i>Anglia sacra</i> 1. 726.
Bristol c. 1140-46	Bristol c. 1159	Glos.	Dickinson, 'St. Augustine's Bristol', 109-26.
Portchester 1133	Southwick 1145-53	Hants.	<i>V.C.H. Hants.</i> 2. 164; <i>Mon. Ang.</i> 6. 243; Dickinson, <i>Origins</i> , p. 150.
Shobdon c. 1140	Wigmore 1172-79	Here'd.	Dickinson and Ricketts, 'Wigmore Chronicle', 413-45; Dickinson, <i>Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc.</i> , 5th Ser., 1 (1951) 71-89; Knowles and Hadcock, <i>Religious Houses</i> , p. 179.
Wigmore Village + c. 1150			
Beodune c. 1155?			
Shobdon + 1155?			
Huntingdon - c. 1108	Huntingdon - c. 1108	Hunts.	<i>Mon. Ang.</i> 6. 80; Dickinson, <i>Origins</i> , pp. 149-50.
Rudham c. 1140	Coxford c. 1216	Norfolk	<i>V.C.H. Norfolk</i> 2. 378; <i>Mon. Ang.</i> 6. 368.
Snead c. 1190	Chirbury c. 1195	Salop.	<i>V.C.H. Shropshire</i> 2. 59.
Lizard c. 1143	Lilleshall c. 1148	Salop.	<i>V.C.H. Shropshire</i> 2. 70-71; Eytton, 'Monasteries of Shropshire', 142-52.
Donnington c. 1144			

Temporary site(s)	Final site	County	Authorities
Dodlinch c. 1210	Woodspring – 1226	Soms.	<i>V.C.H. Somerset</i> 2. 144; Knowles and Hadcock, <i>Religious Houses</i> , p. 108.
Merton 1114	Merton 1117	Surrey	<i>V.C.H. Surrey</i> 2. 94; Dickinson, <i>Origins</i> , p. 117.
Hastings 1189-99	Warbleton 1413	Sussex	<i>Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1408-13</i> , p. 451; <i>Mon. Ang.</i> 6. 168; <i>V.C.H. Sussex</i> 2. 76.
Witton c. 1135	Studley c. 1151	Wors. to Warks.	<i>Mon. Ang.</i> 6. 185.
Embsay 1120-21	Bolton 1154-55	Yorks.	Thompson, <i>Bolton Priory</i> , pp. 50-60; <i>V.C.H. Yorks.</i> 3. 195.
Cottingham 1322	Haltemprice 1324-26	Yorks.	<i>Mon. Ang.</i> 6. 519; <i>V.C.H. Yorks.</i> 3. 213.
Hood 1142-43	Newburgh 1145	Yorks.	<i>V.C.H. Yorks.</i> 3. 230-31.
Nostell c. 1114	Nostell 1121-22	Yorks.	<i>V.C.H. Yorks.</i> 3. 232; Thompson, <i>Bolton Priory</i> , pp. 24-27.

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THE SPANISH INQUISITION AND A *CONVERSO* COMMUNITY IN EXTREMADURA*

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THE Spanish National Inquisition spread its net very slowly and carefully. Not until two years after Pope Sixtus IV had sanctioned its establishment in 1478 were Miguel de Murrillo and Juan de San Martín appointed as inquisitors, and only on 2 January 1481 did they issue their first decree to the relevant authorities in Seville.¹ The court was granted jurisdiction not only over Seville but over all Castile as well; Seville was its seat and the main locality for which it was responsible. As is well known, the initiative to establish this court was taken as a result of the hue and cry that was raised against the so-called judaizing heresy which had spread through the kingdom. Not a year had passed before Cordova had its own Inquisition tribunal. The next step was the appointment of twelve inquisitors, approved by the pope, among them Tomás de Torquemada. Another year went by and then, in 1483, the central court of Castile was founded, its seat located at first in the small provincial town of Ciudad Real.² The doors of the Ciudad Real court opened on 14 September with the declaration of a 'Period of Grace', and remained in session for two years.³ Public opinion thus became accustomed to its existence in a provincial town. In the autumn of 1485 the Ciudad Real tribunal was transferred to Toledo. The road to the extirpation of Judaism in Spain was paved.⁴

Already in the same year – 1485 – the Toledo tribunal had branched out into Extremadura, founding its first itinerant court in Guadalupe. This court sat for

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¹ See B. Llorca, *Bulario pontificio de la Inquisición española en su período constitucional (1478-1525)* (Miscellanea historiae pontificiae 15; Rome, 1949), pp. 48 ff.

² See H. Beinart, *Conversos on Trial by the Inquisition* (Tel-Aviv, 1965), in Hebrew (an English translation by Y. Guiladi will be published in 1981). See also H. Beinart, *Records of the Trials of the Spanish Inquisition in Ciudad Real* 1-4 (Jerusalem, 1974-81).

³ See Beinart, *Conversos*, pp. 85 ff.

⁴ On the files extant from this court see H. Beinart, 'The *Conversos* Tried by the Inquisition in Toledo' (in Hebrew), *Tarbiz* 26 (1957) 71-86.

a year, during which time it most probably succeeded in annihilating all the judaizers in the region. Forty-six files or *processos* are extant from this court. Thirty-four *conversos* were tried in person; nine were tried in absentia; and the remains of three more were exhumed and burnt after their posthumous condemnation. In all forty people were condemned; only six were reconciled and returned to the fold of the Church.⁵ In addition, the Jewish population was expelled from Guadalupe and prohibited from living there.⁶ The pace of the court was set by its members, whose names we know: Nuño de Arévalo, head of the Hieronymite monastery in Guadalupe,⁷ was appointed judge; Francisco

⁵ Twenty-one males and twenty-five females.

⁶ See J. de Sigüenza, *Historia de la Orden de San Jerónimo*, 2 vols., 2nd edition, publicada ... por Juan Catalina García (Nueva biblioteca de autores españoles 8, 12; Madrid 1907-1909), 2. 211 ff. See below, n. 7. Cf. as well the Expulsion of the Jews from Andalusia in 1483, which we learn from the Order of Expulsion from Spain (P. León Tello, *Judíos de Avila* [Avila, 1963], pp. 91 ff.).

⁷ On this court see H. C. Lea, *A History of the Inquisition of Spain*, 4 vols. (New York-London, 1906-1907), 1. 171, 367 and 3. 43, 88, 185. Nuño de Arévalo was present at the Auto-de-fé held on 13 February 1485. See the trial of Beatriz González, wife of Fernán Sánchez de la Barrera from Herrera (Madrid, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Inquisición Toledo, Leg. 153 No. 13 [formerly 337], fol. 11v). (In this article all references to records of trials will signify documents in the Archivo Histórico Nacional, 'Inquisición Toledo'; henceforth the material will be cited simply by shelf mark.) Sigüenza dedicated a whole chapter to his activities (ibid. 2. 212): 'Conociendo el valor del Prior fray Nuño, determinaron, entendida la necesidad, de cometerles el oficio de Inquisidor en aquella puebla, dandole por acompañados al Doctor Francisco Sanchez de la Fuente, que despues fue Dean de Toledo, y al Licenciado Pedro Sanchez [de la Calancha]. Hizieronse algunos autos publicos, donde huuo muchos quemados, mugeres y hombres que judayzauan y peruertian a muchos, alli a los ojos de la madre santissima del Messias, que ellos como ciegos y duros esperan miserablemente tambien se halló un religioso herege, que passo por la misma pena: desenterraron los huessos de muchos, para echarlos en la hoguera, porque no fuessen de mejor condicion que sus almas. Fueronse otros fugitiuos, que condenaron en ausencia y rebeldia, al mismo fuego; ensambenitaron otros, y otros desterraron, y ansi se limpio con la diligencia y industria del Prior aquella puebla, que auia escogido aquella perdida gente como por cueua y refugio de su apostasia, en gran desacato de la Reyna del cielo, traycion de su casa Real, injuria de deuocion de toda España. Hizo luego vn estatuto para el remedio de adelante, que no pudiesse morar alli ningun Iudio, y con esto quedó limpia aquella poblacion de alli adelante desta lepra: que quando el prudente varon no huuiera hecho otra cosa, merecia perpetuo agradecimiento. Fue esto en el año de mil y quatrocientos y ochenta y cinco; refierese en el libro de los milagros, que tiene aquella casa (son muchos volumines, y tan calificados, y autenticos, quanto se puede dessear en fe humana) que desseauan mucho los Inquisidores, el Prior y sus compañeros, hiziesse la Reyna Soberana en aquella sazón algunas de sus acostumbradas marauillas, en confirmacion del zelo que se auia tenido su honra y de la de su hijo Dios y Señor nuestro, de la santa Fè de sus mysterios, pues este era el mas principal fin de los milagros, para que con ellos se confirmassen los fieles, y los que no estauan tan assentados y seguros lo estuuessen. Sucedió como se desseaua, por ser la peticion tan justa, y fueron tantos los que la Reyna del cielo obro alli en pocos dias, que tomando a su cargo de escriuirlos y examinarlos el Doctor Francisco Sanchez [de la Fuente], se canso y no pudo escriuirlos todos, vencido de la infinidad de marauillas y señales que cada día acaecian de mil diferencias, bastante la menor dellas a confirmar en la Fè y a despertar y reducir a ella los mas duros infieles.'

Sánchez de la Fuente, who excelled himself in Ciudad Real,⁸ and Pedro Sánchez de la Calancha,⁹ both of them judges who had been sent from Toledo; Diego Fernández de Zamora, prosecutor; Antón del Castillo, *alguacil*, and his assistant, Cristóbal del Castillo.¹⁰ Juan Jiménez de Guadalupe and Diego de Ecija, both probably local inhabitants, served as notaries. The witnesses to the Auto-de-fé held on 13 February 1485 were Juan de Trujillo¹¹ and Luis Alonso, notary. Juan de Tejada served as *procurador*.

Now, if one counts and names the members of the court of the Condado de Belalcázar, it becomes clear that direct contact existed between these two courts. The court of the Condado functioned in 1486 and 1487. Its centre was in Puebla de Alcocer, but from time to time it went to Belalcázar. Doctor Pedro Rodríguez de Peñalver¹² and the *licenciado* Pedro Sánchez de la Calancha acted as judges;¹³ Diego Fernández de Zamora, prosecutor in the court of Guadalupe, prosecuted, with Alonso de la Calancha and Diego de Soto as his assistants. This court had a special adviser: Fernando de Trujillo, whose title was *Solicitador de la Santa Inquisición*. Rabbi to a *converso* refugee community in Palma del Rio in 1474, Fernando de Trujillo later converted to Christianity. On his arrival in Ciudad Real, he caused havoc among the *conversos* there, for he betrayed his former brethren and served the court of the Inquisition in that town.¹⁴ In the court of the Condado de Belalcázar he served in the special capacity of expert and adviser on Jewish matters.¹⁵ No doubt this appointment was made in acknowledgement of the former rabbi's services to the Inquisition in acting against his former brethren. He probably came from Trujillo and was familiar with the conditions of Extremadura. Gonzalo Guerrero,¹⁶ Enrique

⁸ See Beinart, *Conversos*, index, s.v. and *Records* 4, biographical notes. He continued in 1486 to serve in the Condado de Belalcázar court.

⁹ Sometimes the name is given as 'de la Calauheha'; perhaps the village of Calamocha near Teruel was his place of origin. Later he was very active in the Condado de Belalcázar court.

¹⁰ Both served in the court of Belalcázar as well.

¹¹ He was active in Guadalajara in the segregation of Jews and Christians into separate living quarters. See H. Beinart, 'Tomás de Torquemada's Memorandum to Queen Isabel' (in Hebrew) in *Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of Jewish Studies* 2 (Jerusalem, 1975), p. 13.

¹² On him see H. Beinart, *Trujillo: A Jewish Community in Extremadura on the Eve of the Expulsion* (Hispania judaica 2; Jerusalem, 1980), index, s.v. In 1488-89 he served in the court of Plasencia.

¹³ See above, n. 9. Francisco Sánchez de la Fuente returned to Toledo.

¹⁴ See Beinart, *Conversos*, index, s.v. and *Records* 1 and 4 (biographical notes).

¹⁵ See the trial of García Sánchez, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fols. 1r-13r). Cf. also the trial of María González, wife of Rodrigo Foronda from Herrera (Leg. 154 No. 31 [378], fol. 12v).

¹⁶ On 22 January 1501 he was named 'notary of property sequestrations' (*notario de sequestros*) in Toledo. On that day he was away in Cordova on a mission for the court of Toledo, copying the confession of Mari Alvarez, wife of Fernán García from Herrera (Leg. 134 No. 7 [69], fol. 11r).

Paz¹⁷ and Sancho de la Guardia¹⁸ served as notaries; Antón del Castillo was the *alguacil*,¹⁹ while Juan de Aguirre served as receiver of confiscated property.

This list of Inquisition functionaries demonstrates upon whose shoulders fell the task of implementing that institution's policies towards the *conversos*. They were the backbone of the Inquisition that was held in such dread by the population; it was they, the rank and file, who symbolized its cruelty and imposed the reign of terror for generations to come. Very little is known about their background and deeds: the files of the Inquisition contain only fragmentary information. A study of their activities may provide us with a more thorough understanding of the daily functioning of the courts and the manner in which one court or another worked.

How, then, did the court in Extremadura operate? All courts of the Inquisition were regional, so that the Extremadura tribunal covered a very wide area. It therefore had to choose its seat in as central a locality as possible in order to keep the entire region well within its iron grip. It also had to send out inspectors, known as *visitadores*, to various localities to collect information and testimonies from witnesses who could not be summoned to court to serve as its ears and eyes. Thus the Inquisition was omnipresent. In the case of the Condado de Belalcázar the court had to sit in proximity to the residence of the count,²⁰ so that the necessary link between religious and civil authority could be maintained. Another consideration governing the location of a court was the place where judaizing was strongest. But here the tribunal seems to have diverged from the obvious choice and, instead of Herrera del Duque, it chose Puebla de Alcocer for its central location. Nothing was left to chance.

This regional court had to arrest those *conversos* it intended to put on trial. It also had to organize and carry out Autos-de-fé, and order the exhumation and public burning of the bodies of condemned *conversos* tried posthumously. *Conversos* who were received back into the fold following their prescribed penance and the way they fulfilled the court's sentences, also had to be supervised. Thus an entire organization had to be created and many trustworthy persons had to be appointed to carry out all these tasks. Local considerations were taken fully into account when Autos-de-fé were organized and scheduled.

¹⁷ He read the sentences aloud at the various Autos-de-fé in Puebla de Alcocer. See, for instance, the trial of Ruy González de la Puebla (Leg. 155 No. 14 [398], fol. 15v).

¹⁸ He was witness to a series of procedures at the court and went to Herrera in search of heirs of condemned *conversos*.

¹⁹ See above on the court of Guadalupe.

²⁰ The count was Don Gutierre de Sotomayor and his wife the Countess Doña Teresa Enriquez y Velasco. She was the daughter of the Almirante de Castilla.

While we do not know all the details, the methods used in one place may indicate what was going on in others.

The court of the Condado de Belalcázar opened its doors in Puebla de Alcocer early in 1486. On 1 February 1486 María Alonso, wife of Ruy García from Herrera, confessed.²¹ We must remember that a 'Period of Grace' was always declared and that many *conversos* presented themselves before the court during that time to confess, thus obtaining the promised absolution of their sins.²² The 'Period of Grace' lasted a month and was declared in all local cathedrals.²³ Thus María Alonso probably went from Herrera to Puebla de Alcocer at the end of January, so that January 1486 is to be considered as the month in which this court began to function. The other centre of activity was Belalcázar.²⁴ We can only guess why one *converso* went to Belalcázar while

²¹ See her trial (Leg. 132 No. 8 [29], fols. 5r-6v).

²² María Alonso was reconciled with the Church in Belalcázar on 19 March 1486 in the Auto-de-fé held on that day. She was tried again in 1500-1501 as one of the adherents of the prophetess Inés from Herrera, and confessed in February 1505, but died in prison before the Auto-de-fé of 23 February 1501 was held. Her bones were exhumed and burnt. See Leg. 132 No. 8 [29], fol. 8v.

²³ Sometimes the 'Period of Grace' was extended for another month. Many considerations had to be taken into account before a court could start functioning. There were practical problems such as accommodation for the Inquisitors, the installation of a secret prison, a chancery, etc. All this was sometimes housed in the local monastery.

²⁴ On 10 February 1486 Mayor González, wife of Rodrigo de Cordova, appeared in Belalcázar. She was from Herrera. See Leg. 155 No. 6 [390], fol. 7v. On 17 February she appeared before the inquisitors for the second time (fol. 6r). She was reconciled on 19 March 1486 (fol. 7v). Mayor González was tried again in 1500-1501 and burnt in Toledo in 1501.

On 10 February 1486 María García, wife of Fernando Sánchez, smith, appeared in Puebla de Alcocer. She too was from Herrera. See her trial (Leg. 150 No. 11 [294], fol. 7r). She was reconciled on 19 March 1486, tried again in 1500-1501 and burnt in Toledo on 23 February 1501. Both women were adherents of Inés the prophetess from Herrera. F. Baer, *Die Juden im christlichen Spanien* 2 (Berlin, 1936), p. 531, published a summary of her trial.

On 12 February 1486 Ruy González from Talarrubias appeared before the court in Puebla de Alcocer. Two days later he made an additional confession. See Leg. 155 No. 15 (399), fol. 3r.

On 14 February 1486 Marcos García, cloth dyer, from Herrera appeared in Puebla de Alcocer before Pedro Rodríguez de Peñalvar (Leg. 150 No. 10 [293], fol. 2r). He was probably reconciled but later fled from Herrera, was tried in absentia, and condemned to be burnt in effigy. The sentence was carried out on 22 February 1487.

On 14 February Rodrigo de Cuéllar from Herrera confessed in Belalcázar (Leg. 140 No. 5 [159], fol. 19va). He was reconciled on 19 March 1486 in Belalcázar. His confession is of great importance. In 1500-1501 he was again tried as an adherent of Inés the prophetess. He was handed over to the secular arm and burnt on 22 February 1501 in Toledo.

On 15 February 1486 Rodrigo Rofos from Puebla de Alcocer confessed (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 2r). He was duly reconciled, but fled; tried again in 1486 in absentia and burnt in effigy on 22 February 1487 in Belalcázar (fol. 6r-v).

On 17 February 1486 García Sánchez from Puebla de Alcocer confessed (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 4r). For his trial see below, pp. 462-64.

another from the same village went to Puebla de Alcocer. As the court's activity started, in this initial stage, so did it end. On 19 March 1486 two great Autos-de-fé were held, one in Puebla de Alcocer, the other in Belalcázar. No data exists on the number of *conversos* who walked in the processions of the Autos-de-fé. But the sight of them no doubt left a deep impression all over Extremadura.

Early in April 1486 the trials in Puebla de Alcocer began.²⁵ The court had a precise evaluation of whose trial was to be held first and whose was to be postponed to a later date. Those who were to be tried posthumously came last, and those present first, for the amassing of the maximum quantity of information on *conversos* who led a Jewish way of life was not the sole consideration. The arrest of important or well-known personalities in the vicinity and the bringing back of fugitives made an enormous impression, striking terror into the hearts of those who vacillated in their attitude towards the Inquisition and all it stood for.²⁶

Here the role of the Auto-de-fé should be stressed. It seems that the greatest Auto-de-fé ever held in this part of Extremadura took place on 22 February 1487. It was held in two places – Puebla de Alcocer and Belalcázar. All those who had been tried in person mounted the scaffold to be burnt alive; effigies of those tried in absentia were set on fire, and the remains of those condemned posthumously were exhumed and burnt. It was common practice for the burnings to be witnessed by the local dignitaries; their names were registered in the files of the condemned by the notary present, and the entry was signed by him. This practice was strictly adhered to and is proof of the Inquisition's meticulous formality.

We have already examined elsewhere the *converso* community of Herrera del Duque.²⁷ Our intention here is to describe the accused from Talarrubias and Puebla de Alcocer. It is safe to assume that in all these villages *conversos* were related either by marriage or through the dispersion of families among them. Thus a family cell in one place can provide clues about *conversos* in other places and features common to their Jewish way of life. The Inquisition was well aware of this, and a family member who testified could inform on a whole group of people of the same family, whether they were dispersed throughout the area or lived in distant places. The pattern existed. In order to fulfill a

²⁵ Two trials started on 2 April 1486: one of Rodrigo Bruneto from Herrera (tried in absentia) (Leg. 137 No. 21 [116], fol. 1v); the other of Martín Fernández from Herrera. He was summoned to appear before the court together with many other *conversos* (Leg. 149 No. 8 [280], fol. 1v).

²⁶ See Beinart, *Conversos*, index, s.v. 'Trials'.

²⁷ See H. Beinart, 'Herrera del Duque: Jews and *conversos*' in *Proceedings of the Seventh World Congress of Jewish Studies* 2 (in press).

commandment the *converso* had to create the necessary conditions or exploit an existing situation. This was the case in the keeping of the Sabbath week after week, or in the observance of any Jewish holiday or any other precept or *Mitsvah*. Given this regularity, the judaizing *converso* could be easily observed, and so his Jewish way of life became known not only to the initiated but to any sharp-eyed onlooker as well. Village life in the open, and local gossip, played an important role in the evaluation of the information gathered, and the Inquisition knew exactly what was what; it evaluated every piece of information it received, and discarded what was irrelevant to the case. All this was an integral part of its system and *modus operandi*.

Three files are extant on the village of Talarrubias,²⁸ but only one of them dates from the period in which the court sat in Puebla de Alcocer.²⁹ Puebla de Alcocer is connected with the life and death of King Pedro the Cruel.³⁰ We have no knowledge of when Jewish inhabitants first settled there, but they probably came with Samuel ha-Levi, King Pedro's treasurer and builder of the famous synagogue of Toledo which later became known as the church of El Transito de Nuestra Señora. Nor do we know what happened in Puebla de Alcocer during and after the riots of 1391, but it did have a Jewish community until the Expulsion in 1492, and this community maintained close ties with the village's *conversos*. Vestiges of its synagogue can be seen near the altar of the church of Santiago and the upper part of the walls bears traces of the women's section of the synagogue.

For the period we are dealing with (the 1480's onward) there are three *procesos*,³¹ and from them we can gain deep insight both into the workings of the Inquisition and into life in the village. All those tried were most probably third-generation *conversos*, born and baptized as Christians. These *conversos* kept *Mitsvoth* and adhered to the tenets of the Jewish faith for many years. Ruy González from Talarrubias kept *Mitsvoth* from the time he was six, and when tried he was well advanced in age. Rodrigo Rofos and García Sánchez, both of

²⁸ About eight kilometers northwest of Puebla de Alcocer.

²⁹ Trial of Ruy González, oil distiller (*ollero*) (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399], fols. 1r-15r). He started keeping *Mitsvoth* at the age of six.

Of the later trials one is of Elvira Rodríguez, wife of Diego, *ollero* (oil distiller). She was Ruy González' daughter-in-law. Her file is Leg. 178 No. 2 (706), fols. 1-15r. The other is of Diego Mantero, a wool comber (*cardador*), who was acquitted. His file is Leg. 164 No. 5 (533), fol. 18r. We intend to publish this material at a later date.

³⁰ See G. Moya, *Don Pedro el Cruel* (Madrid, 1974), pp. 94-96. The church of Santiago of Puebla de Alcocer is in the diocese of Toledo and not that of Badajoz. The village belonged, like many in the vicinity, to the duchy of Osuna.

³¹ Seven more are extant for the period beginning 1500, when *conversos* from Puebla de Alcocer were tried in Toledo for adhering to the prophetess of Herrera. Among them are three children. We intend to publish these trials.

them from Puebla de Alcocer, had a long-standing record of keeping *Mitsvot*, as will be seen shortly. Indeed, García Sánchez, when forty-five years old, admitted that he had kept *Mitsvot* for about twenty years prior to the arrival of the Inquisition in Puebla de Alcocer. This adherence to a Jewish way of life is eloquent proof of the strength of their conviction concerning the wrong that Christian society in Spain had done them by forcing their forefathers to convert.

Let us now consider the Jewish way of life led by these *conversos* in order to evoke an image of the *converso* community in relation to its Jewish past and of its continuous contact with Jews. A key element was the *conversos*' effort to keep the Sabbath by first cleaning and embellishing their homes, preparing food on Friday for the Sabbath, then lighting the candles on Friday evening and not extinguishing them but allowing them to burn out by themselves, abstaining from work from the eve of the Sabbath until its conclusion (and if they actually did something on that day, it was because they wanted to allay any suspicion that they were observing the Sabbath, and not because they wanted to transgress the Sabbath rules of abstention from work) and wearing clean clothes in honour of the day. Some of them used to go out into the fields or vineyards to rest.³²

The Jewish holidays were also kept as strictly as possible without arousing the neighbours' suspicions. For Passover, the wife, often with her husband as 'accomplice', would bake *matsoth* in the utmost secrecy.³³ On the Seder night lettuce, parsley (*apio*) and other vegetables (*otras verduras*),³⁴ and *matsoth* were eaten. On other occasions a Jew, or another *converso*, would be asked for *matsoth*.³⁵ Sometimes the Seder was held in other *converso* houses, mostly outside Puebla de Alcocer, so that the *converso* family would be absent from home. Families would get together for this purpose.³⁶ Here the dating of the

³² '... a las viñas e al campo': testimony of Mari Fernández from Herrera, wife of Alonso García, *el rico*, in the trial of Ruy González from Talarrubias (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399], fol. 7v). Rodrigo Rofos sometimes did not keep the Sabbath, 'por mas no poder'. His wife did the same. Rodrigo Rofos was from Puebla de Alcocer (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 4r). García Sánchez and his wife Leonor García, from Puebla de Alcocer, worked sometimes on the Sabbath, because they felt obliged to stop the neighbours from gossiping, and not because he wanted to desecrate the day (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 2r). In his words: 'por complir con las gentes e no por el coraçon'. This was also the behaviour of Rodrigo García from Puebla de Alcocer: he was tried posthumously (Leg. 150 No. 13 [296], fol. 2r).

³³ '... lo mejor e mas secreto que podíamos': trial of Rodrigo Rofos (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 1r, his confession) and also his wife, Beatriz López (fol. 4r, testimony). See also the trial of García Sánchez (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 5r).

³⁴ See the trial of García Sánchez (*ibid.*). This term 'otras verduras' is a direct translation of the Hebrew שאר ירקות.

³⁵ See the prosecution in the trial of Rodrigo Rofos (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 3r). Pero Fernández Cuéllar once gave him *matsoth*. See García Sánchez' confession (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 2r) copied in the file of Rodrigo Rofos (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 4r).

³⁶ So García Sánchez once in the home of Juan Núñez, a shoemaker, and his wife in

holidays raises a question. However, it was easy to obtain information from Jews, and this was exactly what the *conversos* did.³⁷

Yom Kippur was the most important holiday among *conversos*, as it was among Jews. Crypto-Jews of the region did not wear shoes on that day, and they participated in readings from prayer books and the Bible in Romance. In honour of that day *conversos* made an ablution; they asked forgiveness from each other and forgave those who asked for their pardon.³⁸ The fast would be broken with a meal of meat and eggs. Husbands and their wives were parties to the strict observance of the fast.

Among the other precepts kept by *conversos* the laws of *Kashruth* should be stressed. *Conversos* would slaughter according to Jewish rules. When the *converso* Rodrigo Rofos from Puebla de Alcocer slaughtered a calf or a cow for his own use, he would check the sharpness of the knife by passing it over the nail, according to Jewish custom;³⁹ then he would turn back the head of the cow that was on the ground and give the traditional benediction for the slaughtering of a pure animal according to the custom prevailing in Spain:

Bendito Nuestro Señor el Criador que te crio para el mantenimiento del mundo.

When the Jew Yoce slaughtered a kid or a sheep for the use of Rodrigo Rofos and his brother Diego Rofos, he did so in the same way.⁴⁰ So did García


Esparagosa, and in the home of his mother-in-law in Siruela (Mencia López, wife of Fernando Alonso). See Leg. 183 No. 15 (782), fol. 10v. Fernando Alonso was her first husband. Her second husband was Martín *cardador* (wool comber), who was also from Chillón.

³⁷ This became a problem after the Expulsion, but the *conversos* had their sources which enabled them to verify the dates of the Jewish holidays. García Sánchez in his confession said that he kept the holidays *only when* he knew the dates. This clearly shows that he tried to minimize his observance of the holidays. He surely knew their dates, since there were Jews in Puebla de Alcocer.

³⁸ Ruy González from Talarrubias: '... aviandome bañado por çerimonia judayca otro día antes' (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399], fol. 3r, in his confession). So also Rodrigo Rofos, from Puebla de Alcocer (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 2r) and García Sánchez (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 2r 'vañandome otro día', probably the day before).

³⁹ '... testaua el cuchillo en la uña' (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 1v, his confession).

⁴⁰ There is only one file for the family of Rodrigo Rofos (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fols. 1r-7r). His wife Beatriz López was reconciled and returned to the fold of the Church. She testified against her husband (fol. 4r). The family came from the village of Zalamea de la Serena, some thirteen kilometers from Castuera (Extremadura). The genealogy of the family is as follows:



The family name Rofos indicates that one grandparent was a Rofos, the other Fernández. Andrés González and his wife lived in Belalcázar and Rodrigo was probably born there.

Sánchez, checking the knife before slaughtering. The meat that was eaten was cleansed from grease and sinew (*landrecilla*) and salted and washed before cooking. The *conversos* would abstain from eating *carne trefa*, as it was commonly called among them.⁴¹ When baking *hallah* women would take a piece of the dough and throw it into the fire,⁴² this with the agreement and consent of their husbands. *Conversos* had separate plates and vessels for their use, and would often buy new ones; others would purify the pots, knives and plates by passing them through a flame. Grace would be said after meals, and the person who was to give the blessing would drink wine before doing so.⁴³

Mourning rites for the dead were strictly observed, the deceased relative being cleansed and buried in shrouds. The mourners would eat fish and eggs sitting on the floor, eating the funeral repast on low stools. When a *converso* died in the neighbourhood, Rodrigo Rofos ordered all the water from the vessels in the house to be emptied.⁴⁴ García Sánchez did the same, insisting too that when someone entered his home with a vessel he empty it out.⁴⁵ He also agreed that, according to Jewish custom, his wife should not participate in the burial of one of their sons.

Family life deserves a more detailed description. When a *converso* woman gave birth to a child, as well as during her menstrual period, her husband would sleep apart from her, returning to her only after she had cleansed herself by immersion and cut her nails.⁴⁶ When García Sánchez' wife gave birth to a daughter, he performed the *Hadas* ceremony. Relatives came to stay at their house for six or seven nights, and on the seventh night the ceremony was performed. Among the guests were Jewish women who ate fruit in their home. García Sánchez returned this kind of visit to Jewish homes. He also performed some sort of magic to keep away evil spirits, putting some used clothing near the entrance to the room where his wife was lying.⁴⁷ Once when his wife gave

⁴¹ Testimony of Beatriz López, wife of Rodrigo Rofos (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 4r).

⁴² See the confession of Ruy González (Leg. 153 No. 15 [399], fol. 3r-v) and various testimonies in his trial, especially that of Diego Farelos from Puebla de Alcocer (fol. 7r).

⁴³ So Rodrigo Rofos in his confession (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 1v) and García Sánchez (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 5r).

⁴⁴ Leg. 181 No. 10 (756), fol. 4r. Those who partook in the repast were: Diego Muñoz and his wife Aldonza Rodríguez (she testified on this); Diego Láinez and his wife; two other sisters who lived in Puebla de Alcocer; Mencía Rodríguez, wife of Pero Rodríguez, smith; Diego Rofos. Pero Rodríguez was witness for the prosecution against García Sánchez (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 11r). On mourning in the family of García Sánchez see also the testimonies (fol. 10v) of Ruy González and Beatriz García (González), wife of García Fernández de Llerena.

⁴⁵ See his confession (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 2v). The expression used was: '... tirar agua de los cantaros en la casa'.

⁴⁶ In their words: '... quando le venia la regla'. So Rodrigo Rofos in his confession (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 1v).

⁴⁷ '... e ponía yo en vna alcoba a la puerta e vnas trendas o bragas a la puerta por adentro

birth to twin girls⁴⁸ and she had no milk to feed them, he hired a Jewish wet nurse who slept in their house.⁴⁹ This behaviour was considered a grave transgression of decrees issued to Jews and Christians. García Sánchez also agreed that a Jew should write a talisman in Hebrew letters for his wife, considering this a good deed. Unfortunately, the talisman was lost.

Parents used to bless their children in the Jewish way. When they approached their father and kissed his hand, he would not make the sign of the cross on their head but instead bless them by putting his hands on their head.⁵⁰

Prayers were said and readings were performed at *converso* gatherings, which were held during holidays, on the Sabbath and on special occasions. They were mostly in Romance, but *conversos* had Bibles and Jewish books in their possession. Rodrigo Rofos owned a *Siddur*,⁵¹ as did García Sánchez – González de Guadalupe had given it to him and read from it. This *Siddur* was later given to his brother-in-law, the tailor Fernán Sánchez.⁵² García Sánchez would read aloud to *conversos* passages from a Bible (*Brivia*) and other Jewish books.⁵³ Not only does this give us precious information about the *conversos*' Jewish education, their knowledge of the Bible and of prayers; it also bears testimony to the trust they had in their own, lending each other books, gathering for prayers and readings, and thus finding their consolation. Rodrigo Rofos had a special prayer for himself:

Guardame Señor Criador de malas gentes.

We believe that this is part of a verse from Ps 140:2. He must have meant here those who might harm him because of his Jewish ways.

The dealings of *conversos* with Jews had their special significance, aims and results. Firstly, such relations indicate the Jews' trust in the *conversos*' *Kashruth*

porque non le entrasen brugas (*sic*)' (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 2v). On *Hadas* see Beinart, *Conversos*, index, s. v. 'Hadas'. Rodrigo Rofos also kept the *Hadas* ceremony. 'Hadas' probably derived from *fatum* (*fadas* in Spanish and also *hadas*, as among the *conversos*). In Spanish Jewry it was probably connected with the Hebrew *Hadas* ('new'), hence the connection with the newborn and a ceremony to avert evil spirits especially during the last night before circumcision.

⁴⁸ '... dos fijas juntas' (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 2v).

⁴⁹ '... e tome vna jodia en mi casa çiertos dias dandole la teta a la niña e venia acostar algunas veses en mi casa' (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 2v).

⁵⁰ See the trial of Ruy González from Talarrubias: testimony of Pedro García, tinsmith from Herrera (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399], fol. 7v). Rodrigo Rofos (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 2v) and García Sánchez (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 3r-v) acted in the same way.

⁵¹ Testimony of García Sánchez (fol. 4r). Rodrigo Rofos gave him this *Siddur*.

⁵² Testimony of Catalina González, wife of Fernán Sánchez (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 10v).

⁵³ Testimony of Beatriz García (also Beatriz González), wife of García Fernández de Llerena (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 10v). García Fernández and Fernán Sánchez also read from these books; see the testimony of Mencía López, daughter of García Sánchez (fol. 10v). The book is called *Libro de Judios*.

when eating meals with them. Secondly, they involved teaching and instructing the *conversos* in *Mitsvoth* and Jewish rites and customs. In his confession Rodrigo Rofos told the court how a group of Jewish tailors from Alcalá de Henares were staying in his parents' house, sewing for the Countess Doña Elvira of Belalcázar. He brought them a cask of *kasher* wine and drank with them.⁵⁴ This was considered a grave transgression against the Church. From a Jewish point of view it clearly shows that he was considered by them to be a Jew. García Sánchez had close relations with Jews in Puebla de Alcocer and in Orellana.⁵⁵ Together with Gonzalo de Cuéllar and Gonzalo de Alcántara he donated money for oil for the synagogue lamp in Orellana.⁵⁶ Ruy González gave alms to poor Jews and donations for synagogues, and he also agreed to his wife's donations.⁵⁷ Supplying meat to one another, eating meals and drinking wine together were also daily practice. In these meetings the Law of Moses was praised and the *conversos* present were very content.⁵⁸ No doubt they all hoped to find redemption for their souls in this Law.

Some *conversos* in Puebla de Alcocer were circumcised. The prosecutor declared that García Sánchez had been secretly circumcised and was thus an avowed Jew. García Sánchez categorically denied this, and demanded that specialists, rabbis and alfaquis examine him and confirm his statement.⁵⁹ The court took up his challenge. However, it did not invite Jewish and Moslem

⁵⁴ '... vna bota de vino caser' (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 1v). He gave their names: Jaco Lope; Mose de Henares; a third, whose name he had forgotten, came from Guadarrama.

⁵⁵ He had close relations with a Jew named Çaguineto in Orellana, one Fernando de Cuéllar from Puebla de Alcocer, and Rodrigo Bruneto from Herrera. See the trial of Rodrigo Bruneto (Leg. 137 No. 21 [116]). They ate with him and drank his wine, and they prayed together. Fernando de Cuéllar remembered only the word Abraham from those prayers (137 No. 21 [116], fol. 4v); maybe it was Grace that they were saying. The *processo* of Fernando de Cuéllar is not extant. He also testified against García Sánchez from Puebla de Alcocer, and described the joy of the *conversos* when the Inquisitors left the Condado and their sorrow upon their return (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 15r).

⁵⁶ Both of them testified for the prosecution (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 10v). According to Gonzalo de Cuéllar another *converso*, Alvaro Cordon from Siruela, was with them. He too testified for the prosecution (fol. 11r). See also the accusation made by the prosecutor (fol. 5r).

⁵⁷ He added: '... y para otros honramientos dellos' (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399], fol. 2v, his confession); the prosecutor put it: 'y para otros ornamentos' (fol. 4r). Rodrigo Rofos gave alms to Jewish and *converso* poor (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 2v): '... daba limosna a vnas personas bobas de mi linaje' (fol. 1v); the prosecutor said that it was for Jewish poor (fol. 5r). Ruy González gave alms to 'pobres que auie entre nosotros' (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399], fol. 7v).

⁵⁸ '... que quando algunas veses oya algunos judios e otras personas ensalçar la Ley de Moysen e avia plaser dello' (trial of Rodrigo Rofos: Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 2v).

⁵⁹ '... y para esto mejor ser vista la verdad pyda e requiere a vuestras merçedes que lo mandan ver Rabies y Alfaquies que sepan que cosa es retajo e con lo que vean con otros christianos çirujanos que sean y sospechan. los quales sean de Trugillo, o de Medellin, o de [indcipherable], o de Mugasela, porque en estos lugares hay Rabies e Alfaquies' (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 6v).

experts, but asked for the opinions of Maestre Pedro, a surgeon from Guadalupe, of Fernando de Trujillo, the well-known convert, former rabbi and now special adviser to the court,⁶⁰ and of the doctor (*fisyco*) Maestre Alonso from Puebla de Alcocer. They all concluded that García Sánchez had signs of a scar on his male organ and that part of his foreskin was missing. This expertise no doubt helped the court to pass its sentence on García Sánchez: he was handed over to the secular arm.

García Sánchez' confession contains a very important description of *conversos* who tried to settle in Gibraltar.⁶¹ Since his intention was to go there with his family, he sold his business in Puebla de Alcocer, and bought a house together with Andrés Alonso and his brother Martín Alonso. He planned to live there with his wife according to the Law of Moses.⁶² As is well known this venture was launched between 1474 and 1476, gaining impetus after the anti-*converso* riots in Andalusia.⁶³ The suspicious attitude of the Catholic Monarchs to this resettlement is also known, and *conversos* were forbidden to settle in Gibraltar.

Of García Sánchez' involvement in other matters we learn from the testimony brought against him by his wife María Gutiérrez. She told the court that, in 1482, an order was issued that 'old' Christians should marry *converso* girls. García Sánchez talked this over with Inés González, wife of Alvaro González, and advised her to annul the betrothal of María Gutiérrez to an old Christian. Inés González rejected his advice.⁶⁴ This testimony is of exceptional value, for it indicates that certain measures were taken to further the assimilation of *converso* women through intermarriage with pure-blooded Christians. We may assume that this was an official order of the Crown, or of a certain Church body, perhaps the Inquisition itself. It may be seen as a further step in the segregation of Jews and *conversos* into the separate quarters that had been ordered.⁶⁵ It is very difficult to trace the results of this kind of intermarriage, but it seems as though somebody concluded that complete as-

⁶⁰ García Sánchez presented a *tacha* against him (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 8r). On Fernando de Trujillo see p. 447 above and n. 14.

⁶¹ On this see D. Lamelos, *La compra de Gibraltar, por los conversos andaluces (1474-1476)* (Madrid, 1976).

⁶² 'Digo señor mi culpa que quando nos yvamos a Gibraltar fuy alla a comprar vna casa con yntinçion de nos yr alla a biuir, y vendia mi fazienda. Lo qual fasia con yntinçion de estar alla mas subtilamente para fazer las çerimonias de la dicha Ley de los judios, e conpre alla yo e Andres Alonso e Martin Alonso su hermano vna casa, pido penitençia. E con esta voluntad lo fazia la dicha mi muger, yo era contento dello' (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 3v).

⁶³ See Y. Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain 2* (Philadelphia, 1966), index, s.v.; Beinart, *Conversos*, index, s.v. 'Anti-*converso* riots'.

⁶⁴ Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 10v.

⁶⁵ See Beinart, 'Torquemada's Memorandum' (n. 11 above), 3 ff.

similation between *conversos* and 'old' Christians could be achieved only in this way. There is no doubt that the Inquisition was aware of the situation. As for García Sánchez' reaction, it was probably a common attitude among *conversos*.

A different picture emerges from the description contained in the file of Rodrigo Rofos of the betrothal custom common among both *conversos* and Jews in Puebla de Alcocer, as elsewhere. He and his brother Diego Rofos arranged the engagement of their sister Isabel Fernández to a *converso* from Palma de Posar. By then their parents had died, so the ceremony was held at the home of a *converso* named Gonzalo Verde in Belalcázar.⁶⁶ During the supper Isabel was betrothed with a ring, according to Jewish custom.⁶⁷ Those present served as witnesses, as was the custom among Jews.⁶⁸

It is clear from all this what Jewish life meant for the *conversos*. From childhood they were taught to keep *Mitsvot*. Ruy González, for example, was taught by his mother, his aunt and another member of the family. Also among his teachers was Alonso González Donoso from Herrera, a very active *converso* who collected money for a Torah cover for the synagogue of Trujillo.⁶⁹ We would like to stress here the relationship between teacher and pupil, and the way Jewish knowledge was transmitted.⁷⁰ The Inquisition was very interested in this information and would follow it up to discover how deeply involved the accused *converso* was in Jewish ways, who were his teachers, at what age the *converso* was initiated into practising Judaism, and whether it was a family case or an instance of inveterate adherence to Judaism on the part of the accused.⁷¹ The visits of Jews to, and their stays in, *converso* homes served therefore as a proof of Jewish influence and of clear-cut judaizing. The Inquisition could thus point an accusing finger at Jews for having led the *conversos* astray from the path of Christianity.

The grudge *conversos* bore against Christianity found expression in many ways. They went to church to hear Mass or to confess merely to avoid being

⁶⁶ No details on him are available.

⁶⁷ '... estandonos los dichos guisando de çenar oymos desyr como se auia desposado con anillo como judios' (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 1v).

⁶⁸ This *converso* fiancé was famed for his knowledge of and erudition in Jewish books and prayers, and he read them constantly. The prosecutor mentions this (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 3r). After a short period of marriage Isabel's husband left her and the brothers brought her back to Puebla, where she lived until her death. She observed a Jewish way of life.

⁶⁹ See the trial of Martín Fernández Cachito from Herrera, testimony of Sasson (a Jew) (Leg. 147 No. 10 [256], fol. 3r-v). See also Beinart, 'Herrera del Duque'.

⁷⁰ See Beinart, *Conversos*, index, s.v. 'Education'.

⁷¹ See also the trial of Rodrigo Rofos who was taught by his parents (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 1v, his confession).

reprimanded.⁷² Confessions were made in a halfhearted way or only out of the obligation to confess.⁷³ The *conversos* abstained from making the sign of the cross, whether on going to bed, on rising, or on sitting down to a meal. García Sánchez did not kneel when the bells rang for the Ave Maria; when Christ's image was carried in procession he did not accompany it. Rodrigo Rofos did not accompany the sacramental vessels when he saw a priest going to give Extreme Unction, and if he did so it was because he had no choice. It was common to deny Christ as the Messiah,⁷⁴ to speak ill of Christianity, Christ, the Virgin and the saints,⁷⁵ and to harbour evil thoughts about the Inquisition.⁷⁶ Rodrigo García Bermejo, a first-generation *converso*, cursed the person who induced him and other Jews to convert.⁷⁷

Also in this category were a series of transgressions and sins against Christianity, such as eating meat, cheese and eggs and drinking milk during Lent and on other days of abstinence.⁷⁸ By abstaining from pork, hares, rabbits, and fish without scales and fins,⁷⁹ they maintained their Jewish precepts and thus transgressed Church rules. When pork was cooked in the home of García

⁷² So Ruy González: '... por no ser reprehendido y por parecer cristiano' (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399], fol. 2r) and also Rodrigo Rofos: '... por no ser reprehendido' (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 1r).

⁷³ So García Sánchez: 'con poca devoçion'; see the prosecution (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 5r). But some witnesses for the defence claimed that he went to church out of devotion to prayers and sermons. They were probably referring to the period that followed his reconciliation in 1486 (fols. 12r-13v). But one witness for the defence, Andrés de Perales, testified to the contrary (fol. 12v).

⁷⁴ When García Sánchez confessed before the Inquisition, he declared his belief in Christ as the Messiah and expressed his desire to live and die as a true Christian. See also the prosecution (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 5r).

⁷⁵ Rodrigo Rofos: '... dixe palabras odiosas contra el Señor Ihesu Christo, a Nuestra Señora Santa Maria e otros Santos e Santas de la Corte Celestial' (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 1v).

⁷⁶ *idem*: '... non pensando tanto bien que me por ella me avia de venir' (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 1v). García Sánchez spoke badly 'de los administradores della' (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 5r).

⁷⁷ He was tried posthumously. In his words, 'que mal syglo oviese el que le avia tornado christiano a el e a todos los otros del lugar': testimony of Pedro de Valencia, entitled 'dispensero de la señora Condesa de Belalcázar' (Leg. 150 No. 13 [296], fol. 4r).

His trial started on 16 July 1486. His son, Juan López, a shoemaker, was summoned to defend the memory of his father, but he claimed that he had nothing to say (in his favour, of course).

Juan López was declared a rebel against the Church, but no action was taken against him. The short time that elapsed between the opening of the trial until the execution of the sentence shows that the court acted in haste.

⁷⁸ García Sánchez, when returning from Guadalupe together with García Hernández de Llerena, Pedro Sánchez and Ruy Sánchez, tailor, ate eggs during Lent. García Hernández was an active *converso* and would read the Bible and Jewish books; see the trial of Rodrigo de la Peña from Herrera (Leg. 174 No. 11 [655], fols. 8v, 10v).

⁷⁹ García Sánchez abstained also from eating partridges and turtle doves (*palomas*). He ate them only when he could not avoid it: '... por mas non poder que por mi voluntad non las comiera' (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 2v).

Sánchez he agreed that his wife and daughters should clean, wash and burn the vessels and pots in which it had been cooked. Saturday nights and Sundays were free for work and travel, as were the Church holidays.⁸⁰

Two other matters deserve special mention. García Sánchez' daughter was baptized and not anointed. After a time Inés González, *la vieja* ('the old one'), wife of Puerto Peña,⁸¹ came and took the child, returning later and declaring that all was in order. Yet there were still rumours that the child had not been properly baptized.⁸² We may add here in parenthesis that *conversos* used to wash the newborn after baptism. They had a special term for this action: *descristianizar*.

Ruy González was accused by some witnesses of flogging a crucifix and keeping it in an unclean place,⁸³ and of keeping certain images in his home.⁸⁴ This accusation was considered by the Inquisitors to be very grave, but it also showed an intention to libel. The court knew exactly what this meant; it understood the face value of this kind of testimony, and knew when to omit it from the prosecution and sentence and when to make use of it.⁸⁵

Feeling against the Inquisition ran high. García Sánchez, like many *conversos* in the Condado de Belalcázar, expressed his joy when the *licenciado* Pedro Sánchez de la Calancha went to the royal court, for he hoped and believed that the Inquisition was going to be abolished.⁸⁶ He was very sad when he learned of the Inquisitors' return.⁸⁷ This brings us to the problem of the *conversos*' flight

⁸⁰ Ruy González would heat the oven for his work as an oil distiller; on Sunday afternoon wool was combed in the home of García Sánchez. Diego Gil, a witness in the trial of García Sánchez, reprimanded Ruy González for 'henchir un saco de lana' (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 10v).

⁸¹ His full name was Alvar González Puerto Peña. See the trial of Rodrigo de la Peña from Herrera (Leg. 174 No. 11 [655], fol. 8r).

⁸² See the testimony of Gil García de Sotomayor and of Mencía, daughter of Diego Baru (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 10r). Mencía López, daughter of García Sánchez, told this to the witness (fol. 2r). The name of the girl who was improperly baptized was Isabel, and she was born in Siruela.

⁸³ This kind of accusation is to be found in various *procesos*. See also H. Beinart, 'A Prophecy Movement in Cordova in 1499-1500' in *Y. Baer Memorial Volume*, Zion 44 (1979) 190 ff. In this case the court did *not* accept this testimony.

⁸⁴ Ruy González denied this very strongly, and said that they were his children's toys. The prosecutor claimed he also had moulds for playing cards (*moldes de naipes*). From his defence we learn that he also made clay vessels.

⁸⁵ The same may be said of various superstitions. García Sánchez was accused of believing in the evil eye and other kinds of superstitions, which he confessed. We would mention here '... catar por ojo a mi mujer e a mis fijas' and '... asimismo no consentia que pasasen por cerca de mis çapatines quando estauan en el suelo; y si alguno pasaua lo fazia tornar otra ves al contallo' (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 2v).

⁸⁶ See Beinart, 'Herrera del Duque'.

⁸⁷ The *conversos* Fernán Sánchez, tailor, and Fernando de Cuéllar confirmed this (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 11r). See also the testimony of Pero Fernández (*ibid.*).

from the Inquisition. In effect, there is no doubt that this institution struck terror into every heart.⁸⁸ Some *conversos* fled when news reached the region of the arrival of the Inquisition and the establishment of a court there, while others fled at a later date, after confession and reception back into the fold of the Church. This was the case with García Sánchez, who denied having fled for fear of the Inquisition, since he had confessed during the 'Period of Grace'. He went first to Chillón and from there to Herrera; at that point he took fright and began asking for news from Puebla de Alcocer.⁸⁹ Many *conversos* gathered there, and we may presume that, since the countess had posted guards on the roads, departure from the Condado became a dangerous undertaking. All the *conversos* were on their way to Portugal, and indeed a considerable number succeeded in finding a haven there. In certain Portuguese villages groups of refugees from the same hometown formed centres and helped each other out in time of need. These fugitives were tried *in absentia*; their flight was in itself a clear admission of guilt, and all of them were burnt in effigy.

Conversos tried in person were given defence counsel. Diego García, resident of Puebla de Alcocer, served the court of the Condado de Belalcázar as defence lawyer or *procurador*,⁹⁰ while Cornavala, or Cornalon, acted as *letrado*.⁹¹ Let us now evaluate their system in fulfilling the task entrusted to them: the defence of *conversos* from Puebla de Alcocer. Both were, presumably, considered trustworthy persons by the court of the Inquisition, and they served from time to time as witnesses to various procedural functions in trials held in Puebla de

⁸⁸ See on this point the pleading of the defence further below.

⁸⁹ Testimony of Pedro Siziliano from Almadén (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fols. 12r ff.).

⁹⁰ On 24 May 1486 Diego García was appointed *procurador* for María González, wife of Rodrigo Foronda from Herrera. On 30 May he presented the case for the defence (Leg. 154 No. 31 [378], fol. 3v).

On 14 August 1486 he acted as witness to the presentation of the prosecution and the decision to give a copy of the prosecution to the heirs of Rodrigo García Bermejo from Puebla de Alcocer (Leg. 150 No. 13 [296], fol. 2v).

On 31 October 1486 he appeared as defence lawyer for García Sánchez from Puebla de Alcocer (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fols. 6r-7r).

On 12 February 1487 he was invited to act as defence counsel for Ruy González from Talarrubias (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399], fol. 5r).

He is named as witness to a *tacha* presented by Alvaro Rico on 14 January 1502 in defence of his wife Mencía López against Alonso Ramírez, Diego Ramírez, Elvira Gutiérrez and others (Leg. 163 No. 11 [523], fol. 18v). He is also named as witness to a *tacha* against Romera Gómez, wife of Diego de Arguinares (Leg. 163 No. 11 [523], fol. 20r).

⁹¹ On 24 May 1486 María González asked that Cornalon be appointed as her *letrado* (Leg. 154 No. 31 [378], fol. 3v). He also prepared the defence which was presented in writing in the trial of García Sánchez from Puebla de Alcocer (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 7r), and acted as *letrado* in the trial of Ruy González from Talarrubias, which began on 12 February 1487 (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399], fol. 5r).

Alcocer. Their line of defence in García Sánchez' case was based on the assumption that he had confessed during the 'Period of Grace' and had been duly reconciled and received back into the fold of the Church – this out of recognition of his full and wholehearted confession, in which nothing had been hidden from the Inquisition. He had therefore no reason to cover up or conceal his deeds, since he was acknowledging Christ anew.⁹² Thus he knew he would be forgiven. In other words, his confession had been true and full, and if he was forgiven then, he should be forgiven now, when put on trial. If, the defence argued, he had not fully confessed at first, now, after having acknowledged and recognized Christ as the Truth, he should be forgiven for any omission in his confession, that is, for what the witnesses for the prosecution had brought forward concerning his way of life.⁹³ Moreover, when the court arrived in the Condado, García Sánchez had been in Llerena. He returned to Puebla de Alcocer immediately in order to appear before the Inquisition, certain that by so doing he would redeem his soul, which hitherto had been lost.⁹⁴ This took place during the 'Period of Grace', so the claim of the prosecution that García Sánchez did not fully confess was not valid.

After this general refutation of the defendant's Jewish ways, the defence denied that García Sánchez had been circumcised, and agreed to an examination by experts.⁹⁵ Once the fact had been proven, the defence attempted to reject Fernando de Trujillo's and Maestre Alonso's qualifications to give an expert opinion: Fernando de Trujillo because he was a member of the Inquisition, and Maestre Alonso for the same reason as well as for his lack of knowledge of surgery.⁹⁶ Thus it was claimed that the examination had not been

⁹² '... que no lo dexara por desir e manifestar ansi por el conoçimiento que alcanço de Nuestro Señor como porque conoçia e conoçio y supo y vio que de todo lo que confesava el fuera perdonado' (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 6r).

⁹³ The prosecutor presented twenty witnesses; in addition there is the testimony of Andrés de Perales, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer. For a full list of the witnesses see the Appendix, pp. 467-69 below.

⁹⁴ '... antes que sy en su poder estouiera el procurara vinier (*sic*) a la Santa Ynquisiçion, porque aquella hera redençion de su anima, que estaua perdida fasta entoces' (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 8r). Juan Sánchez testified that García Sánchez had fled for fear of the Inquisition and claimed that he returned when Pedro Sánchez de la Calancha went on a mission to the court (fol. 11r). The counsel for the defence said that García Sánchez left together with other *conversos*; see the questionnaire for the defence (fol. 9r). The countess of Belalcázar posted guards to catch the fugitives on their way. García Sánchez was caught and brought to Puebla de Alcocer. See the testimonies of Antón García and Pedro Fernández (fols. 12v, 13r), who testified for the defence and said that he was brought back from Villanova. According to Pedro Siziliano García Sánchez was caught in Medellín (fol. 12v); he was no doubt on his way to Portugal.

⁹⁵ See pp. 456-57 above for the circumcision examination made by Fernando de Trujillo and two other experts.

⁹⁶ '... porque el dicho mi parte pone sospecha en Fernando de Trujillo que dise ser parte de la Inquisiçion y en Maestre Alonso de la dicha cabsa e porque dis que non sabe nada de la çirugia ni

carried out by neutral persons and specialists. In effect, the defence was casting doubt on the specialists to whom the Inquisition had recourse, which in itself was a strong point in favour of the line of the defence.

The questionnaire for the defence witnesses was prepared so as to correspond with the same arguments. The defence was endeavouring to prove through the witnesses' testimony that the defendant was a faithful Christian who diligently carried out all the penances imposed upon him by the Inquisition after he had been accepted back into the fold of Christ. The fact that he had left the Condado was not denied in the questionnaire: many *conversos* had left the Condado because they could not earn a living there. The defence was thus trying to prove that García Sánchez did not flee for fear of the Inquisition. But the court had other information: first he went to Chillón and from there to Herrera, as already pointed out.⁹⁷ According to the defence it was García Sánchez who advised that it would be wise to return home. Some fugitives even did so. Here the defence was attempting to demonstrate the devotion of the accused to the cause of the Inquisition. Nevertheless, García Sánchez knew of some *conversos* who were reconciled and later relapsed into denying the Truth of Christ, i.e., they reverted to keeping *Mitsvoth*. He, for his part, never gave up hope that he would be absolved.⁹⁸

Four out of five witnesses for the defence testified in his favour.⁹⁹ The fifth, Andrés de Perales, though presented as a witness for the defence, actually served the prosecution. It is worth recalling that the Inquisition often turned defence witnesses into witnesses for the prosecution. But when *conversos* named their witnesses they could not always imagine that this might happen, so that, in the end, the accused never really knew if the witness had testified for or against him.¹⁰⁰ Andrés de Perales called García Sánchez a *grand herege*, 'a false person who made fun of the faith of Christ'.¹⁰¹ All the other witnesses characterised García Sánchez as a decent person who worked hard to support his family and diligently kept the laws of the Church.

del dicho caso para que pueda enteramente determinar lo que deue' (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 8r).

⁹⁷ See above and n. 89.

⁹⁸ All this was well known in a place called Hinojosa (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 9v). We may presume that he was there, but the questionnaire does not state this.

⁹⁹ For their names see the Appendix (p. 469 below).

¹⁰⁰ See Beinart, *Conversos*, index, s.v. 'Witnesses'. It sometimes happened that the same witness who testified for the prosecution was later named as witness for the defence. In such cases the questionnaire system enabled the witness to avoid answering the question asked by disclaiming all knowledge. Stress should also be laid on the kind of witness presented and his standing in local society.

¹⁰¹ '... onbre falso que burlaua mucho la fe de Ihesu Christo' (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 12r).

The defence was a complete failure: it was based merely on general assertions, in which the accused was presented in a positive light, and on a questionnaire for the defence witnesses who were not questioned by the defence but by special examiners or by the judges in the presence of the prosecutor. The defence should also have presented a list of people whom the defendant considered as his enemies and who might have testified against him. Only after this enmity to him had been proven, and after the witnesses had indeed testified against him, could the defendant in theory be absolved. He would then have to present compurgatory witnesses, whose number was decided by the court, and they, together with the defendant, would swear to his innocence and his true Christianity. In the case of García Sánchez none of this took place,¹⁰² nor were *tachas* presented. The court appears to have waived this, since it was convinced of the weakness of the defence witnesses and of the strength of those who testified for the prosecution. García Sánchez was condemned to be burnt at the stake, and he mounted the scaffold on 22 February 1487.

Diego García also served as *procurador* in the trial of Ruy González from Talarrubias. Cornalon (or Cornavala) acted as his *letrado*. His first plea for the defence took place on 12 February 1486, and he used the same tactics as in the trial of García Sánchez: a denial of the accusation and the claim that the defendant had been absolved following his confession during the 'Period of Grace'.¹⁰³ He again claimed that the accused should be absolved and acquitted of the accusations put forward by the prosecutor. The defendant had repented of his blindness to the Truth of Christ and was ready to live and die as a true and faithful Christian. The prosecution presented eighteen witnesses, whereas the defence had only five. All five testified to Ruy González' faith in Christ, to his decency as a person, and confirmed to the court that he had led a full Christian life since his reconciliation and return to the fold of the Church. In modern terms they would appear more as character witnesses than anything else.

Diego García appeared again before the Inquisition on 17 February. Once again he stressed Ruy González' devotion to the Church and denied that he had been circumcised, insulted a holy image or flogged a cross.¹⁰⁴ The figurine in his possession was a child's toy which served as a mould for playing cards or for making some kind of a vessel. Only one witness for the prosecution told the

¹⁰² The file lacks this part.

¹⁰³ Leg. 155 No. 15 (399), fol. 5v.

¹⁰⁴ The court did not accept the claims of the prosecution, and the defence won its case. See the sentence (Leg. 154 No. 15 [359], fol. 14r-v).

court that Ruy González had tried to convince *conversos* to keep *Mitsvoth*, and his testimony was not corroborated by other witnesses. Here the defence employed a principle common in the courts of the Inquisition, namely, to corroborate any information obtained by the testimony of more than one witness. Even if the defence succeeded in this, it did not succeed in rejecting the other points of the accusation, and no *tachas* were presented by the defence.¹⁰⁵ It looks as if the court acted in haste, since the date that had already been fixed for the Auto-de-fé – 22 February – was at hand. On 21 February the Consulta-de-fé voted unanimously that the accused be handed over to the secular arm. His suffering was at least brief, and he mounted the scaffold a martyr to his people.

The weakness of the defence in this case is manifest. Indeed, the Diego García-Cornalon tandem did not distinguish itself, as did *procuradores* of the calibre of Diego Tellez and Diego Mudarra, or *letrados* like Bartolomé del Bonillo, in the court of Toledo.¹⁰⁶ But the latter were all lawyers of Toledo. Diego García and Cornalon were either incompetent or cowardly – or perhaps merely a provincial pair.

The first principle of the system according to which the Inquisition operated was to build its case on the testimony of witnesses and on the confession of the accused. A testimony that was not corroborated by the accused's confession was a clear indication that the accused had not confessed fully and pure-heartedly. Here the basic principle of the secrecy of the witnesses' identity was of the highest significance,¹⁰⁷ and this not only because the family might silence the witness forever. The Inquisition attached great importance to the fact that witnesses should belong to the intimate family circle of the accused. Wives

¹⁰⁵ We have a third case in which Diego García served as *procurador*, namely, for María González, wife of Rodrigo Foronda from Herrera. See Leg. 154 No. 31 (378), fols. 1r-17r. Here too the defence continued to use the same line; the defendant confessed in Guadalupe, was accepted back into the fold of the Church and given a series of penances. She did not hide anything from the court. After her reconciliation she led a full Christian life and carried out all that she was ordered by the Inquisition. The questionnaire presented to the court was formed on the same lines, and four witnesses for the defence were presented. But there were fifteen (!) witnesses for the prosecution (two more names are entered in the file, but their testimony is lacking). Of the four witnesses for the defence *three* turned out to be witnesses for the prosecution. The only thing they said in favour of María González was that she gave alms for Christian causes. María González was party to her son's circumcision and she claimed that he was born circumcised. This happened to other children in Herrera. The witnesses said that they knew of such cases. María González was taken to the torture chamber, confessed there, was sentenced as a relapsed heretic, and burnt on 22 July 1486. The lukewarm behaviour of the defence is manifest. See Beinart, 'Herrera del Duque'.

¹⁰⁶ See Beinart, *Conversos*, index, s.v. 'Defence'.

¹⁰⁷ There were cases of vengeance on the part of the family.

were urged to testify against their husbands, children against their parents, and so on. As we have already pointed out elsewhere, the Inquisition placed the principle of loyalty to the family against the principle of fidelity to Christ.¹⁰⁸ The result was that whole families were accused of judaizing, suffered severely and were destroyed. Witnesses of this kind were sometimes forgiven and absolved as a reward for having betrayed their next of kin. In such cases no hatred or vengeance on the part of the witnesses could be claimed, since parents would not suspect their own children or next of kin. Generally the condemned would grope in the dark in an attempt to discover who had testified against him. The outcome of such cases was a foregone conclusion.

The Inquisition trials held in the Condado de Belalcázar are remarkable for the large number of witnesses for the prosecution.¹⁰⁹ Among them were Jews who testified after having taken a Jewish oath;¹¹⁰ this was accepted by the Inquisition. The significance of this testimony goes far beyond the proof it provides of day-to-day Judeo-*converso* relations. It demonstrates that Jews taught *conversos*, persuaded them to lead a Jewish way of life, and extended a helping hand to their return to Judaism. This kind of relationship was grist to the mill of those who demanded the expulsion of the Jews. There was no lack of witnesses of this kind in Puebla de Alcocer. It is well known that an order was issued by Fernando in 1484 requiring the rabbis of Spain to place under a ban all Jews who had knowledge of *conversos* keeping *Mitsvoth* and did not come forward and testify before the Inquisition.¹¹¹ Though many of these witnesses fulfilled *Mitsvoth* together with *conversos*, they were not summoned to stand trial, for the Inquisition had no jurisdiction over Jews. However, their testimony only served to seal the doom of the Jews of Spain.

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It is not our intention to defend the Inquisition or the methods it employed to achieve its aims. Nor is there any reason to defend the measures taken by one court or another to extirpate what was called the judaizing heresy. On the contrary, what must be condemned are the forced conversions and the exertion of pressure on Jews to abandon the faith of their fathers; what must be censured are the measures taken against those who did not agree to remain faithful to

¹⁰⁸ See H. Beinart, *The Converso Community in 15th Century Spain* (The Sephardi Heritage 1; London, 1971), pp. 448 f.

¹⁰⁹ See the Appendix.

¹¹⁰ See H. Beinart, 'Jewish Witnesses for the Prosecution of the Spanish Inquisition' in *Essays in Honour of Ben Beinart* (Capetown, 1978) [= *Acta juridica* (1976)], pp. 37-46.

¹¹¹ See Baer, *Die Juden im christlichen Spanien* (n. 24 above) 1. 911. Cf. also idem, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain* 2 (Philadelphia, 1966), pp. 71 ff.

their new faith, a faith they had accepted in a moment of weakness and in order to save their lives. All we have tried to do here is to describe the workings of a court of the Inquisition in a remote province, starting in 1485 in Guadalupe, moving in 1486 to the Condado de Belalcázar and thence to Plasencia in 1488.¹¹² The system implemented by Tomás de Torquemada and embodied in his *Instrucciones* was applied here, as elsewhere, to the letter.

The moral strength and courage of those tried in this, as in other courts, emerges in all its glory. Here the persecuted waged their valiant fight against religious oppression and the persecution that was to lead to their extermination. For hundreds of years the *conversos* spun dreams of their redemption and their return to the ancestral faith from which they had been torn by force. And it was in the Condado of Belalcázar and its surroundings that not long after the Expulsion emerged, as if out of the ashes, the messianic movement of Inés, daughter of the shoemaker Juan Estéban from Herrera del Duque – a messianic movement predicting redemption in the Promised Land for those *conversos* who maintained the precepts of Judaism.

Appendix

I

WITNESSES

A. Trial of Ruy González (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399])

(for the prosecution)

1. Juan Sacristan, inhabitant of Talarrubias.
2. Bartolomé Cabello, inhabitant of Talarrubias.
3. Mencia Fernández, inhabitant of Talarrubias.
4. Inés Sánchez, wife of Bartolomé García de Ledesma, inhabitant of Talarrubias.
5. Diego Farelos, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
6. Juan Martínez Cabello, inhabitant of Talarrubias.
7. Llorente Cabello, inhabitant of Talarrubias.
8. Lucia Martínez, wife of Miguel Sánchez, locksmith (*aserrador*), inhabitant of Talarrubias.
9. Marina Fernández, wife of Domingo García, tailor, inhabitant of Talarrubias.

¹¹² Doctor Pedro Rodríguez de Peñalver sat in Plasencia. See the trial of Gonzalo Pérez Jarada, inhabitant of Trujillo (Leg. 175 No. 1 [662]); Beinart, *Trujillo* (n. 12 above), pp. 287 ff. For Torquemada's instructions see Lea, *A History of the Inquisition of Spain* (n. 7 above) 1. 571-75.

10. Mari González, daughter of Martín González, inhabitant of Talarrubias.
11. Mari García, wife of Martín González de Ledesma, inhabitant of Talarrubias.
12. Mari Fernández, wife of Alonso García, *el rico*, inhabitant of Herrera.
13. Pedro García, tinsmith (*tinajero*), inhabitant of Herrera.
14. Juan Fernández Castaño, inhabitant of Talarrubias.
15. Inés Martínez, wife of Antón Sánchez Serrano, inhabitant of Talarrubias.
16. Isabel González, wife of Ruy González, oil distiller, inhabitant of Talarrubias (wife of accused).
17. Inés Sánchez, la Jonena, wife of Juan Sánchez Jonen, inhabitant of Talarrubias.
18. Juana González, wife of Juan de Talarrubias (daughter of accused), inhabitant of Las Casas.

(for the defence)

1. Juan García Paco, inhabitant of Talarrubias.
2. Alonso Fernández, limeburner and seller (*calero*), inhabitant of Talarrubias.
3. Lorenzo Sánchez, inhabitant of Talarrubias.
4. Alvar García, priest, inhabitant of Talarrubias.
5. Alonso de Guadalupe, inhabitant of Talarrubias.

B. Trial of Rodrigo Rofos (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756])

(for the prosecution)

1. Toribio Martín, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
2. Beatriz López, wife of Rodrigo Rofos, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
3. García, son of Pero Fernández de Cuéllar, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
4. Aldonza Rodríguez, wife of Diego Muñoz, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
5. Isabel Ramírez, wife of Alonso, cloth dyer (*tintorero*), inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.

C. Trial of García Sánchez (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782])

(for the prosecution)

1. Alonso García, inhabitant of Belalcázar.
2. Gil García de Sotomayor, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
3. Inés Díaz, wife of Alonso Murillo, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
4. Gonzalo Sánchez de Cuéllar, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
5. Gonzalo de Alcántara, inhabitant of Siruela.
6. Catalina González, wife of Fernán Sánchez, tailor, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
7. Mari Gutiérrez, wife of Gutierre, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
8. Beatriz García, wife of García Fernández de Llerena, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
9. Mencía López, inhabitant of Chillón, daughter of García Sánchez, the accused.
10. Ruy González, tailor, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
11. Diego Gil, wool comber (*cardador*), inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.

12. Alvaro Cordón, inhabitant of Siruela.
13. Mencía, daughter of Diego Baru, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
14. Juan Sánchez, priest, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
15. Maestre Pedro, surgeon (*cirujano*), inhabitant of Guadalupe.
16. Fernando de Trujillo, member of the court.
17. Maestre Alonso, physician, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
18. Fernán Sánchez, tailor, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
19. Fernando de Cuéllar, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
20. Pedro Rodríguez, smith, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.

(for the defence)

1. Alonso, son of Diego Fernández de Alcocer, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
2. Andrés de Perales, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer (his testimony served the prosecution).
3. Pedro Siziliano, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
4. Antón García, inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.
5. Pedro Fernández, mule driver (*acemilero de la condesa*), inhabitant of Puebla de Alcocer.

D. Trial of Rodrigo García Bermejo (Leg. 150 No. 13 [296])

(for the prosecution)

1. Pedro de Valencia.
 2. Mari Sánchez, wife of Juan de Guadalupe, *el mozo*.
 3. Inés Pérez, daughter of Gonzalo Pérez.
 4. Catalina González, wife of García Fernández, inhabitant of Herrera, daughter of accused.
 5. Catalina Rodríguez, wife of Juan de las Cabezas.
 6. Inés García, wife of Lope García.
- [All witnesses, except Catalina González, were inhabitants of Puebla de Alcocer.]

II

MEMBERS OF THE CONSULTA-DE-FÉ

Trial of Ruy González (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399])

The bishop de Bereto.

Juan de Miranda, guardian of the convent of San Francisco in Belalcázar.

Don Fadrique.

Fray Juan de la Puerta.

Maestre Juan de Sequel de Almagro.

Bachiller Gonzalo Muñoz (from the court of Ciudad Real).

The prior of Medina del Campo convent.

III

SYNOPSIS OF TRIALS DESCRIBED ABOVE

- 1486 12 February Ruy González confesses in Puebla de Alcocer (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399], fol. 3r).
- 14 February Ruy González makes an additional confession (*ibid.*, fol. 3r).
- 15 February Rodrigo Rofos from Puebla de Alcocer confesses in Puebla de Alcocer (*ibid.*, fol. 2r).
- 17 February García Sánchez from Puebla de Alcocer confesses in Puebla de Alcocer (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 4r).
- 16 July Opening of the trial in Puebla de Alcocer of Rodrigo García Bermejo from Puebla de Alcocer (Leg. 150 No. 13 [296], fol. 1v).
- 23 July Auto-de-fé in Puebla de Alcocer.
- 14 August Prosecution pleads in the trial of Rodrigo García Bermejo (Leg. 150 No. 13 [296], fol. 1v).
- 19 August The heirs of Rodrigo García Bermejo are accused of being rebels against the Church (*ibid.*, fol. 2v).
- 18 September Opening of the trial of García Sánchez from Puebla de Alcocer (Leg. 183 No. 15 [782], fol. 1r).
- 31 October Diego García appears as his *procurador* (*ibid.*, fols. 6r-7r).
- 4 November Diego García pleads on behalf of García Sánchez and presents witnesses for the defence who are examined on that day (*ibid.*, fols. 12r-13v).
- 15 November Witnesses for the defence are prosecuted in the trial of García Sánchez; Pedro Fernández, mule driver, testifies (*ibid.*, fol. 13r).
- 19 November Ruy González of Talarrubias is examined by the court (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399], fol. 8v).
- 16 December The prosecutor asks publication of the testimonies in the trial of Rodrigo García Bermejo. The court agrees and the sides terminate pleading; date fixed for the verdict (Leg. 150 No. 13 [296], fol. 5r).
- 18 December Sentence in the trial of Rodrigo García Bermejo is pronounced and carried out (*ibid.*, fol. 6r).
- 1487 2 January Trial of Ruy González from Talarrubias opens (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399], fol. 1v).
- 12 February Diego García pleads on behalf of Ruy González from Talarrubias (*ibid.*, fol. 5r-v).
- Pleading terminated (*ibid.*, fol. 12v).
- 13 February Diego García presents five witnesses for the defence of Ruy González (*ibid.*, fol. 11r-v).
- 17 February Diego García pleads in the case of Ruy González (*ibid.*, fol. 13r-v).

- 19 February The prosecutor asks for a verdict in the trial of Rodrigo Rofos (Leg. 181 No. 10 [756], fol. 4v).
- 21 February Consulta-de-fé held in Belalcázar in the case of Ruy González; unanimous vote to hand him over to the secular arm (ibid., fol. 13v).
- 22 February Auto-de-fé in Belalcázar and Puebla de Alcocer: Rodrigo Rofos burnt in effigy (ibid., fol. 5r); Ruy González burnt in person (Leg. 155 No. 15 [399], fol. 13v).

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MEDIEVAL LATIN POETIC ANTHOLOGIES (IV)

A. G. Rigg

IN the first article in this series I mentioned that one section of London, British Library ms. Cotton Titus A. xx (s. xiv) shared a number of poems with Bodleian ms. Rawlinson G. 109, and that both manuscripts probably drew on a common collection.¹ This present article describes Rawlinson G. 109 (referred to hereafter as Rg) in more detail. The manuscript consists of six sections, five of them poetic. Part I (itself divisible into three booklets) is a poetic miscellany, containing 150 short poems; the first 23 have been ascribed to Hugh Primas of Orléans; of the remainder, some have been ascribed to known poets (such as Hildebert, Pierre de Saintes) but most are anonymous. None of the poems in Part I is given an author in the manuscript. Parts II and III contain poems mainly by Simon Chèvre d'Or. Part IV contains the metra from book 1 of Bernard Silvester's *Megacosmus*. Part V contains Ovid's *Remedia amoris* and epistles *Ex Ponto* (ending incomplete at 2. 7. 73). Part VI (prose) contains an incomplete text of Ranulph Glanville's *De legibus Anglie*. The manuscript has been studied more or less incidentally, by scholars working on Primas, Hildebert, Simon Chèvre d'Or, Ovid, and Glanville, but has never been described completely.² Most of the short poems that have been published at all have been edited from manuscripts other than Rg. A short selection of poems from Rg was printed by Ellis,³ and some of the unique love poems have been edited by Dronke;⁴ isolated poems have been edited by Wilmart and Boutemy,

¹ 'Medieval Latin Poetic Anthologies (I)' [Cotton Titus A. xx and Rawlinson B. 214], *Mediaeval Studies* 39 (1977) 281-330.

² Previous descriptions of Rg, all partial, include: F. Madan, *Summary Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford* 3 (Oxford, 1895), no. 15479, pp. 432-33; J. Öberg, *Serlon de Wilton: poèmes latins* (Stockholm, 1965), p. 35; Meyer, *Primas* (cited in n. 40 below); Wilmart, 'Saint-Gatien', 171-73 (cited in n. 9 below); Boutemy, 'Quatre poèmes' (cited under No. 154 below); A. B. Scott, 'The Poems of Hildebert of Le Mans: A New Examination of the Canon', *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 6 (1968) 42-83, especially 49.

³ R. Ellis, *Texts, Documents and Extracts chiefly from MSS in the Bodleian and Other Oxford Libraries* (Anecdota Oxoniensia, Classical Ser. 1. 5; Oxford, 1885), pp. 17-20.

⁴ P. Dronke, *Medieval Latin and the Rise of European Love-Lyric*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1965), cited as Dronke, *MLRELL*.

but a large number remains unpublished. In this present article I print all previously unpublished poems of ten lines or less; this leaves eighteen longer poems for future attention.⁵

The first three articles in this series concerned primarily an English tradition of poetic miscellanies.⁶ With Rg we are taken into a tradition of anthologies either written in northern France or at least compiled by scribes with essentially Norman and northern French interests; Rg is textually on the fringe of the Hildebert collections and the early, more well-known anthologies such as the Saint-Gatien, the Saint-Omer, the Saint-Amand ('Elnonensis'), and the Saint-Martin.⁷ Although my principal interest remains in the later English tradition (to which I shall return in subsequent articles), this present excursion into the earlier Norman-Latin ('Anglo-Angevin') collections serves the purpose of drawing attention to the earlier models of the poetic anthology, from which the later English ones derived. The origin of Rg itself is uncertain (see below), but it was certainly in England (possibly at Bury St. Edmunds) by the fourteenth century, probably much earlier. Nothing is known of its later history until it came into the hands of the antiquaries Richard Graves and Thomas Hearne and thence, via Rawlinson, into the Bodleian Library.

DESCRIPTION OF THE MANUSCRIPT⁸

Parchment; 127 leaves (pp. 1-254: the manuscript is paginated, not foliated). Eighteenth-century brown leather binding and paper fly-leaves (pp. i-iv, 255-258). Medieval fly-leaves or wrappers (pp. 1-2, 251-254) from a fourteenth-century court roll: the first (pp. 1-2) is a half sheet, with its stub folded in after the first quire (p. 18); the last two (pp. 251-254) are formed from a single sheet folded into a bifolium. The leaves of the main text (pp. 3-250) measure approximately 162-166 × 100-105 mm. Writing area varies from one booklet to another: 120-135 × 56-75 mm. Framed and ruled in dry-point or pencil. Prick-marks visible in Parts I-IV. Writing above the top ruled line in all sections apart from Part V (pp. 143-200). Initial letters of poems (and sections within poems) in red, occasionally blue, occasionally red with blue work (but the blue ink has faded); in Part IV (pp. 125-142), red, green, and blue. Cue letters are visible in Parts II-IV, but not in Part I.

⁵ The following remain unprinted: Nos. 31, 41, 43, 45, 47, 50, 53, 54, 56, 59, 61, 63, 80, 98, 102, 105, 108, 128.

⁶ See n. 1 above; also 'Medieval Latin Poetic Anthologies (II)' [Bodley 851] and 'MLPA (III)' [Digby 166, Bodley 603, Cotton Vespasian E. xii], *Mediaeval Studies* 40 (1978) 387-407 and 41 (1979) 468-505.

⁷ For references for these anthologies, see below.

⁸ This section deals only with general characteristics: see below for details of each booklet.

Collation of leaves: I(a) i⁸-iii⁸ (pp. 3-50); I(b) iv⁸ (pp. 51-66); I(c) v⁸-vi⁸ (pp. 67-98); II vii⁸ (pp. 99-114); III viii⁵ (pp. 115-124: two bifolia, the fourth leaf an insert); IV⁹ (pp. 125-142: an eight-leaf quire plus a singleton); V x⁸-xii⁸ xiii⁵ (pp. 143-200: in the last quire, leaf 199/200 should follow p. 190, and another leaf is missing between the replaced 199/200 and p. 191); VI xiv⁹ xv⁸-xvi⁸ (pp. 201-250: in quire xiv leaves 3, 6 and 8 are singletons: the deficiencies in the text of Glanville do not correspond to physical features of the gatherings). There are no catchwords; quire signatures, numbered I to XVI, are written in red at the foot of the first recto page of each quire, complete and consecutive.

Compilation: booklets and scribes

Like many poetic anthologies, Rg was compiled in booklets. The evidence for the separate sections consists of worn leaves and changes of hands, layout and punctuation. Parts I-IV may have been written by the same scribe, but (for the reasons listed below) I have distinguished hand *A* (Parts I and IV) from hand *B* (Parts II-III); Parts V and VI were written by two different scribes.

Part I (miscellaneous poems, Nos. 1-150), quires i⁸-vi⁸, pp. 3-98; writing area 120-130 × 65 mm. (see below); 30 lines per page; ruled and framed in drypoint; double line on each side of frame; writing above top ruled line. Initials for each line of verse are set on the outer line of the left-hand double column. Each line has a final punctum at the right-hand edge of the writing frame; each poem concludes with a punctus versus. Initials for poems in red; after p. 14 blue initials occur; in pp. 67-98 blue and red alternate, inconsistently. Written by hand *A*, a small text hand, which uses only 'uncial' (sloping-back) *d*. There is clear evidence that Part I was compiled in three booklets: I(a), quires i-iii, pp. 3-50 (poems Nos. 1-49); I(b), quire iv, pp. 51-66 (poems Nos. 50-65); I(c), quires v-vi, pp. 67-98 (poems Nos. 66-150). There are signs of wear and usage between quires iii and iv (pp. 50/51) and iv and v (pp. 66/67); in Part I(a) the writing area is 120-123 mm. wide, but in Parts I(b) and (c) it is 130 mm. wide; the four proverbs (No. 65) on p. 66 were probably added later, at the same time as the proverbs (No. 160) at the end of Part II on p. 114. On p. 98, at the end of Part I(c), a fourteenth-century hand has written a 'single-sound' Leonine couplet: 'O uir dum flores uiuendi quere labores / Postea ne plores senex iterando me < rores >' (not recorded elsewhere).

Part II (poems mainly by Simon Chèvre d'Or, Nos. 151-160), quire vii⁸, pp. 99-114; similar to Part I, but writing area 130 × 70 mm. Initials to each line are set *within* the left-hand column. The punctuation comes after the final letter of each verse line (i.e., not at the margin). Decoration as in Part I. Written by hand *B*, which closely resembles *A* but uses both uncial and straight-backed *d*. There is some wear between quires vii and viii (pp. 114/115).

Part III (acephalous copy of Simon Chèvre d'Or's *Ylias*, No. 161), quire viii⁵ (two bifolia, with leaf 4 a singleton), pp. 115-124. Layout as in Part II, but vertical columns clearly drawn in pencil. Initials to each line set within column, as in Part II. Punctuation is placed not only after the final letter of each verse line (as in Part II) but also at the right-hand margin, as in Part I, except that here a punctus versus is used for each line. Decoration as in Parts I and II. Written by hand *B*, as Part II. There is some wear between quires viii and ix (pp. 124/125). Although the poem in this booklet is acephalous, the quire numbers run consecutively.

Part IV (Metra from Bernard Silvester), quire ix⁹ (an eight plus a singleton), pp. 125-142. Columns very faint but as in Parts I-III; 30-31 lines per page. Initials for each line set on outer line (as in Part I). Punctuation at margin only, as in Part I. The initials are in red, blue, and green. The hand seems to be that of *A*, with uncial *d* only. There is considerable wear between quires ix and x (pp. 142/143). Text ends at foot of p. 142.

Part V (Ovid), quires x⁸-xii⁸, xiii⁵, pp. 143-200. Writing area 135 × 56 mm.; 35 lines per page; ruled and framed with three lines on the left-hand side (forming two columns), one on the right; writing *below* top ruled line. Initials of each line are placed in the outer column; punctuation is after the final letter of each line. Some pages are heavily glossed and annotated in a contemporary hand. Initials for poems and sections in red only. Written by hand *C*, a very small text hand. The text of the *Remedia* ends on p. 165, leaving the rest of the page blank and most of it unruled. In the *Ex Ponto*, leaf 199/200 should follow p. 190, but the text still lacks 2. 3. 3-75 (i.e., a single leaf) between 199/200 and p. 191. The first page of the booklet (p. 143) is very worn, as is the last (p. 198, after the replacement of pp. 199-200 to its proper place before p. 191), which also has some later entries (see below). The text ends halfway down p. 198.

Part VI (Glanville), quires xiv⁹ xv⁸-xvi⁸, pp. 201-250. Writing area 120 × 75 mm. (prose); 29-36 lines per page. There are two outer lines on the left-hand side; writing is above the top line. Decoration is in red only (with some gaps). It is written by another hand, *D*. The text ends incomplete, abruptly at the foot of the page.

These six sections were originally written as six independent units; the sequence of compilation into a single 'book' remains uncertain. The consecutive quire numbers (thirteenth century?) show that at some time the collection in its present form was regarded as a single volume; on the other hand, the manuscript probably remained unbound, perhaps in a parchment wrapper (such as the present end-leaves, pp. 251-254), and its sections may have been used and handled separately – this would account for the wear at the beginning and end of each booklet. Part I can be interpreted as a three-part anthology of short poems. Parts II and III (Simon Chèvre d'Or, by hand *B*) should probably

be regarded as a unit. Part II includes a text of the 'Trojan Extract' of Simon's *Ylias*: this is a textually well-established poem, believed by some scholars to be Simon's first version, which ends at the Fall of Troy. The A-text, or Middle Version, of the *Ylias* covers also the arrival in Italy and the campaigns in Latium. Part III of Rg consists simply of the second half of the A-text of the *Ylias*, beginning abruptly at line 159: the five-leaf quire is not, however, an eight with the first three leaves missing; it consists of two bifolia with an inserted singleton. The scribe (hand *B*) probably added Part III to supply the 'missing' sequel to the story of the Fall of Troy. Part IV (Bernard Silvester) was written separately, with a different style of decoration: it ends abruptly at the foot of p. 142, at the end of Metrum ii, but there is no way of telling whether the text continued into a subsequent quire, now lost. Part V (Ovid) is 'finished', though textually deficient: writing ends halfway down the last page. The five poetic sections, Parts I-V, probably once formed a 'book': the original last page (p. 198) is very worn and full of later notes of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. At some time before the quire numbering a text of Glanville's *De legibus* was added; this breaks off incomplete at the end of quire xvi. The following quire(s) may have been lost before or after quire numbering. The sequence of compilation could have been something like this: (1) Part IV, by *A*, with red, green and blue decoration; (2) addition of Part I by *A*; (3) addition of Parts II-III by *B*; (4) addition of Part V by *C*; (5) addition of Part VI; (6) quire numbering.

Textual relationships

A textual analysis such as that attempted for earlier manuscripts described in this series would be impossible for Rg. It is one of a group of twelfth- and thirteenth-century poetic anthologies whose contents overlap with each other. Some of these anthologies contain a large number of short poems (the Saint-Gatien and Zürich anthologies each contain over three hundred items), but overlap in only twenty or thirty. The relationship between all these anthologies could only conveniently be shown diagrammatically, and any such table or diagram would be intolerably big. By a series of sigla after each entry in Rg I indicate some of the other anthologies in which the poem is found. The anthologies selected for comparison are as follows:

- (1) **Sg.** Tours, Bibliothèque Municipale 890 (s. xii ex., now lost; Saint-Gatien), fully described by Wilmart.⁹ Rg and Sg share eighteen items, all found elsewhere.

⁹ A. Wilmart, 'Le florilège de Saint-Gatien. Contribution à l'étude des poèmes d'Hildebert et de Marbode', *Revue bénédictine* 48 (1936) 3-40, 147-81, 235-58.

- (2) **F.** Copenhagen, Kongelige Bibliotek Fabricius 80 in 8^o (s. xii ex., Liesborn), fully described by Lehmann.¹⁰ Rg and F share twenty-two items, all found elsewhere except No. 122.
- (3) **Z.** Zürich, Zentralbibliothek C 58/275 (s. xii ex., perhaps written by a German student who had attended a French school), fully described by Werner.¹¹ Rg and Z share seventeen items, all found elsewhere (though only the first two lines of No. 42 are found outside RgZ).
- (4) **E.** Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 5129 (s. xii, Saint-Amand). This is Beaugendre's 'Elnonensis', fully described by Boutemy.¹² Rg and E share twelve items, of which Nos. 36, 39, and 95 are not recorded elsewhere (and No. 94 is only in RgE and Tx).
- (5) **O.** Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque Municipale 115 (s. xii ex.), described by Fierville and Boutemy.¹³ Rg and O share twelve items, all found elsewhere.
- (6) **Db.** Oxford, Bodleian Library Digby 53 (s. xii ex.: the ms. was in Bridlington, s. xv).¹⁴ Rg and Db share at least nine items, of which No. 32 is not recorded elsewhere; Sg contains an extract from No. 4, which is otherwise recorded only in RgDb.
- (7) **Ad.** London, British Library Add. 24199 (s. xii, Bury St. Edmunds), fully described by Boutemy.¹⁵ RgAd share eight items, all found elsewhere.
- (8) **Sm.** Brussels, Bibliothèque Royale II. 1029 (s. xii, Saint-Martin de Tournai), described by Boutemy.¹⁶ Rg and Sm share ten items, all found elsewhere.
- (9) **Ll.** Oxford, Bodleian Library Laud Lat. 86 (s. xiii).¹⁷ Rg and Ll share at least eleven items, all found elsewhere: Ll also contains a text of the *Megacosmus* (Rg Part IV).

¹⁰ P. Lehmann, 'Eine Sammlung mittellateinischer Gedichte aus dem Ende des 12. Jahrhunderts', *Historisches Vierteljahrsschrift* 30 (1935) 20-58.

¹¹ J. Werner, *Beiträge zur Kunde der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*, 2nd edition (Aarau, 1905), pp. 1-151; see also his earlier description 'Lateinische Gedichte des XII. Jahrhunderts', *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde* 15 (1889) 396-409.

¹² A. Boutemy, 'Le recueil poétique du manuscrit latin 5129 de la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris', *Scriptorium* 2 (1948) 47-55; see also Wilmar, 'Saint-Gatien', 164-65. The 'Elnonensis' was one of Beaugendre's main sources for the poems of 'Hildebert' reprinted in PL 171. 1381-1458.

¹³ C. Fierville, *Notices et extraits* 31.1 (1884) 49-145; supplemented by A. Boutemy, 'Notes additionnelles ...', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 22 (1943) 5-23.

¹⁴ Apart from the Bodleian *Quarto Catalogue* description by W. D. Macray (Oxford, 1883), pp. 49-54, the fullest accounts are by P. Meyer, *Documents manuscrits de l'ancienne littérature de la France conservés dans les bibliothèques de la Grande-Bretagne* (Paris, 1871), pp. 168-82 (reprinted from *Archives des missions scientifiques et littéraires*, 2nd Ser., 5 [1868]), and by Öberg, *Serlon*, pp. 14-16. A full study is being prepared by William Edwards of the Centre for Medieval Studies, Toronto.

¹⁵ A. Boutemy, 'Le recueil poétique du manuscrit Additional 24199 du British Museum', *Latomus* 2 (1938) 30-52; this manuscript is closely related to London, British Library Cotton Vitellius A. xii, described by Boutemy in *Latomus* 1 (1937) 278-313.

¹⁶ A. Boutemy, 'Analyse d'une anthologie poétique de l'abbaye de Saint-Martin de Tournai', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 17 (1938) 727-46.

¹⁷ In addition to the description in the Bodleian *Quarto Catalogue* by H. O. Coxe (Oxford, 1858-85), revised by R. W. Hunt (Oxford, 1973), pp. 37-40, see Scott, 'The Poems of Hildebert', 49.

- (10) **N.** Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 3761, Part V (fols. 62-75, a single quire, s. xiii), fully described in the *Catalogue général*.¹⁸ Rg and N share eighteen items, of which Nos. 142, 144, and 146 are not recorded elsewhere. N is the manuscript from which Pressel 'supplemented' the *Anthologia latina*, but most of the poems, if not all, are medieval.¹⁹
- (11) **Vt.** Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Reg. lat. 344 (s. xiii), frequently described.²⁰ Rg and Vt share nine items, all found elsewhere.
- (12) **Re.** Reims, Bibliothèque Municipale 1275 (olim 1043.743) (s. xiii ex.), described by Wattenbach and in the *Catalogue général Départements*.²¹ Rg and Re share eight items (and verses from the *Megacosmus*), of which Nos. 58 and 60 are not recorded elsewhere.
- (13) **Ds.** Oxford, Bodleian Library Digby 65 (s. xiii).²² Rg and Ds share at least twelve items, of which No. 84 is not recorded elsewhere.
- (14) **Tx.** London, British Library Cotton Titus A. xx (s. xiv).²³ See below on provenance of Rg.

This list does not exhaust the manuscripts that share items with Rg; it could be extended by including all the manuscripts of Hildebert's *Minor Poems*, and by the addition of other anthologies such as London, British Library Cotton Vespasian B. xiii, or Berlin, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek Theol. oct. 94 (now missing).²⁴

There is no suggestion of a direct, discoverable relationship between Rg and any of the manuscripts listed above (except Tx). In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries there must have been a kind of pool of short poems from which compilers made up their own anthologies, or, more probably, a 'circulation of many such collections, from which individual scribes and compilers would pick and choose their own selection'.²⁵

¹⁸ *Bibliothèque Nationale. Catalogue général des manuscrits latins* 6 (Paris, 1975), pp. 768-72.

¹⁹ Th. Pressel, 'Supplément à l'Anthologie Latine', *Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes* 1 (1845) 403-14. Some of the poems were accepted by the editors of the Teubner edition of the *Anthologia latina* (Leipzig, 1870-1906), ed. F. Buecheler and A. Riese, 1/1-2 (1870-94: 1/2, 2nd rev. edition, 1906), 2/1-2 (1895-97), and by E. Baehrens, *Poetae latini minores* 1-6 (Leipzig, 1879-86).

²⁰ Hauréau, *Notices et extraits* 29. 2 (1880) 231-362; A. Wilmart, *Codices Reginenses latini* 2 (Vatican City, 1945), pp. 279-91.

²¹ W. Wattenbach, 'Beschreibung einer Handschrift der Stadtbibliothek zu Reims', *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde* 18 (1892-93) 493-526; *Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France. Départements* (Octavo Series) 39 (Reims 4) (Paris, 1909), pp. 398-437.

²² The only full account is in the Bodleian *Quarto Catalogue*, pp. 67-71; see also Öberg, *Serlon*, p. 28. Some poems were printed by Ellis (n. 3 above).

²³ Described in 'MLPA (I)' (n. 1 above); see below, pp. 480-81.

²⁴ Described by W. Wattenbach, 'Beschreibung einer Handschrift mittelalterlicher Gedichte (Berl. Cod. theol. oct. 94)', *Sitzungsberichte der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* 1 (1895) 123-57.

²⁵ 'MLPA (III)', 505.

Date

Various dates, all meaning more or less the same thing, have been assigned to Rg: second half of the twelfth century (Boutemy), *c.* 1200 (*Summary Catalogue*), early thirteenth century (Wilmart). I do not propose to dispute these dates, which are all based on palaeographical evidence. Most of the datable poems in Part I concern events in the first half of the twelfth century or earlier; the latest identifiable poet is Serlo de Wilton (died 1181), and the poems by him in Rg may have been written quite early. The main anthology, therefore, Part I, seems to have been compiled originally some forty years before this copy of it. In Part II, the latest certainly datable epitaph is No. 157 (St. Bernard, died 1153); No. 154 *may* refer to Prince Philippe (died 1161), No. 155 to Peter Lombard (died 1160). Part VI, Glanville *De legibus*, was written 1187-89: the script of this part is early thirteenth century.

Provenance

Meyer suggested that Rg was written in France ('wohl in Frankreich geschrieben').²⁶ Wilmart, however, was clearly doubtful:

... florilège composé vers le commencement du XIII^e siècle, en France peut-être, mais *s'il en est ainsi*, apporté presque tout de suite en Angleterre La partie originale et *qui serait française* (c'est le sentiment exprimé par W. Meyer à propos des premiers feuillets) m'a paru ne comprendre que neuf cahiers, correspondant aux pages 3-142 [i.e., Parts I-IV] (my italics).²⁷

Boutemy, more neutrally, writes 'dans le royaume anglo-angevin'.²⁸ We must distinguish between provenience and provenance: the contents point to an origin in France, the external evidence points to circulation in England. On the one hand, the topical poems in Part I show an interest almost exclusively in France (Tours, Poitiers, Bayeux, Bordeaux, Saintes, etc.) and no interest at all in England or English persons, a surprising omission in a collection of 150 pieces. (Parts II, III, and IV can be discounted, as the poems of Simon Chèvre d'Or and Bernard Silvester circulated in both England and France). On the other hand, the quire numbering shows that Glanville's *De legibus Anglie* was attached quite early to the poetic sections; the end-leaves (pp. 1-2, 251-254) are from a fourteenth-century Suffolk court roll; and on p. 198 (at the end of Part V) there is a note about an exchange of property by Richard Kewil, dated 19 Edward II (1326). We might, then, cautiously infer that Part I at least, and perhaps Parts

²⁶ In his edition of *Primas* (n. 40 below), p. 82 (8), echoed by Dronke, *MLRELL* 2. 570.

²⁷ 'Saint-Gatien', 171-72 and n. 2, repeated by Scott, 'The Poems of Hildebert', 49.

²⁸ In his edition of Pierre de Saintes: see No. 125, below.

II-IV or II-V, were written in France and then soon brought to England, as Wilmart suggests. There is, however, another factor: sixteen of Rg's items are also found in Tx (Titus A. xx, late fourteenth century).²⁹ They are as follows, with Tx numbers in parentheses: Nos. 24 'Plurima cum soleant' (26), 37 'Nitor ad impar' (41), 38 'Roma nocens' (40), 41 'Pene Girarde' (33), 45 'Stella iubar' (35), 46 'Sol hodie' (36), 49 'Rufe doles' (44), 55 'Roma duos' (54), 85 'Pollicitis omnes' (37), 88 'Esto superba' (33, attached without break to 'Pene Girarde'), 90 'Parcus amans' (34), 94 'Hic situs' (45), 96 'O uates' (42), 111 'Sacrilegis monachis' (32), 114 'Thura piper' (38), 151 'Diuciiis ortu' (28). Of these, No. 45 (35) is not recorded elsewhere; the close textual relationship between Rg and Tx in Nos. 37 (41) and 151 (28) has already been mentioned,³⁰ and RgTx share the opening *Parcus* (for *Marcus*) in No. 90 (34). Most of these poems are in Part IV of Tx: in fact, of Tx Nos. 32-45 only two poems are *not* shared with Rg, Tx 39 'Milo domi', Tx 43 'Virginitas flos', and both are very common in these twelfth- and thirteenth-century anthologies, as the former is Hildebert's and the second has been ascribed to Marbod. Clearly, Rg and Tx share a very close relationship: the 'bunching together' of the shared items in Tx is especially significant. On the other hand, Tx was not copied directly from Rg: frequently, the Tx copy of a poem is fuller or better. We must conclude that Rg and Tx were copied from a common exemplar. As Tx was certainly written in England, its exemplar for this section must have been in England in the fourteenth century: it follows that Rg itself was almost certainly written in England.³¹ The 'Frenchness' of Rg is explained by the fact that it is a fairly faithful copy of a lost anthology compiled some forty or fifty years earlier, probably in France.

The end-leaves of Rg (pp. 1-2, 251-254) provide some evidence for its whereabouts in the fourteenth century. They are from a court roll, in which the following names occur frequently: Lackford, Hengrave, Fornham, Denham, Barrow, Chevington, Saxham, Horringer/Horningwerth, Pakeham, Fressingfield. These are all villages in the Hundred of Thingoe, Suffolk, and all contained property owned by the abbey of Bury St. Edmunds. Rg is not mentioned in any of the medieval catalogues of Bury St. Edmunds,³² nor does it

²⁹ See 'MLPA (I)', 326-27, 'MLPA (III)', 503 n. 33; the present account differs slightly: add Rg No. 88 to the shared items, but delete Rg No. 90 (Tx 34) from items not found elsewhere.

³⁰ 'MLPA (I)', 327.

³¹ Unless both Rg and its exemplar were written in France, and both were brought to England – a cumbersome, but not impossible, explanation.

³² M. R. James, *On the Abbey of St Edmund at Bury* (Cambridge Antiquarian Society Octavo Publ. 28; Cambridge, 1895) and 'Bury St Edmunds Manuscripts', *English Historical Review* 41 (1926) 251-60; N. R. Ker, *Medieval Libraries of Great Britain*, 2nd edition (London, 1964), pp. 16-22; R. M. Thomson, 'The Library of Bury St. Edmunds Abbey in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries', *Speculum* 47 (1972) 617-45. I should mention that Dr. Thomson, after examining Rg for me, disagrees with my localization and believes that Part I at least is French.

bear a Bury pressmark: this is hardly surprising, as anthologies of ephemeral, mainly secular, Latin verse are rarely dignified by inclusion in medieval catalogues. On the other hand, the words *ij^o fo* (= *secundo folio*) on p. 3 of Rg suggest that someone may once have prepared it for cataloguing.

None of this proves that Rg was written at Bury, though one might add that one of the anthologies listed above, London, British Library Add. 24199 (s. xii), was certainly written there. The origin of Tx itself is unknown: it was probably written in some large monastic house (St. Albans?) in the London area, probably not far from its other 'sister manuscript', Bodleian Rawlinson B. 214 (s. xv), which was written at Waltham. Certainly these anthologies seem to have travelled around. The history of the poetic collection in Rg illustrates the way in which Franco-Latin poetry penetrated the English tradition.

Later history

The manuscript shows signs of frequent handling and use. The thirteenth-century glosses in the Ovid (pp. 151-153, 166-167) may have been made before this section was incorporated into the manuscript. The fourteenth-century verses on p. 98 and the land exchange note on p. 198 have already been mentioned. On p. 198 there is also a note on grammar and some pen-trials. There are many sixteenth-century scribbles, including the following names: Whithale (p. 3), Hartwell (pp. 157, 161), Willame Collen (p. 159), Walter Vaughan (p. 119), Clere (p. 2, twice, with notes on the contents: 'Ouidius in suis Epistolis; Ouidius de remedio amoris cum alijs'), H. Guilmynus (p. 2), none of which I have traced.³³ The line 'dextra pars penne breuior leuior debet esse' is written on pp. 77, 236. There are too many scribbles to itemize, but the word *Pasquilla* (pp. 38, 41, 51), in a sixteenth- or seventeenth-century hand that has made many paragraph marks and textual notes, is interesting: it seems to refer to the legendary Pasquil or Pasquin, whose status in sixteenth-century Rome seems to have been akin to that of Primas in earlier times.³⁴

Nothing is known of the manuscript until it came into Thomas Hearne's possession. His ownership note on the modern paper fly-leaf reads: 'Suum cuique. Tho. Hearne 1723. Ex dono amici doctissimi Ricardi Graves de Mickleton³⁵ in agro Gloucestriensi'. We do not know where the antiquary Richard Graves (1677-1729)³⁶ obtained the manuscript. In two letters to Hearne in 1723 Graves says that he is sending money 'in a ms.', 'in an old book', which

³³ Ker, *ibid.*, p. 237, mentions a John Hartwell, Fellow of King's College, Cambridge (1508).

³⁴ See *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.vv. Pasquil, Pasquin, etc.

³⁵ Not Mickleham, as the *Summary Catalogue* has it.

³⁶ On Graves, see DNB; J. Foster, *Alumni Oxonienses 1500-1714* 2 (Oxford, 1891), p. 594.

he presents as gifts to Hearne;³⁷ no doubt Rawlinson G. 109 was one of these. Hearne died in 1735 and his library was dispersed in 1747, passing into the collection of Richard Rawlinson and, on Rawlinson's death in 1756, into the Bodleian Library.³⁸

The nature of the collection

The range of the anthology presented in Part I is considerable, and rivals any of the contemporary collections listed above. There are poems and epigrams from late antiquity – Claudian, Sidonius, and pieces from (and in imitation of) the oldest form of the *Anthologia latina* – and from the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Although there are no headings or colophons in Part I, many authors can be identified, including Primas, Hildebert, Marbod, Serlo de Wilton, Galo, and Pierre de Saintes. Pieces range in length from 79 lines to single-line proverbs. We find poems of praise (of kings, counts, countesses, bishops, and cities) and of vituperation (of bishops, doctors, monks, and individuals). There are many epitaphs (Robert of Arbrissel, Orieldis, Humbert of Lyons, the count of Flanders) and occasional poems. There are love poems, erotic adventures, silly stories, and satires against the *senex amans*. Not surprisingly, there are many religious and moral pieces. Many of the poems (including those of Primas and Hildebert) are personal and autobiographical: the authors are often very self-conscious of their status as poets. No particular themes dominate the collection, and there is no thematic organization into groups of poems on a particular topic. Most of the poems are in quantitative metres, usually hexameters, though there are some rhythmical lyrics (especially in the Primas section); internal and final rhyme is very common. This is, in short, very much a poet's anthology; indeed, the collection reads much like the collected short poems of individual writers such as Baudri of Bourgueil or Hildebert, but with even more diversity. The material added in Parts II-V complements the range of Part I, with Simon Chèvre d'Or's Trojan 'epic' and his series of epitaphs, Bernard's cosmological poems, and Ovid's *Remedia* and epistles. The collection can, however, be distinguished from later anthologies by two striking omissions: there are no sequences or 'musical' lyrics, such as are found in the *Codex Buranus* and the Bekynton Anthology (and even as early as the 'Cambridge Songs'); nor are there any poems in quatrains (rhythmical asclepiads or Goliardics), such as those which characterize the 'Goliardic' anthology, especially in England, from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. Rg is distinctively 'old style'.

³⁷ Bodleian Library, ms. Rawlinson letters 6, Nos. 139 (1 June) and 136 (21 September); synopses in *Hearne's Collections* 8 (Oxford Historical Society 50; 1907), 82. 117-18.

³⁸ W. D. Macray, *Annals of the Bodleian Library, Oxford* (Oxford, 1890), p. 250.

CONTENTS³⁹

Part I: pp. 3-98

I(a): pp. 3-50

1-23 **Primas: The 'Oxford poems'**⁴⁰

- p. 3 1. Hospes erat michi se plerumque professus amicum
Walther 8460. Meyer No. 1, Langosch, p. 202.
- p. 4 2. Pontificum spuma fex cleri sordida struma
Walther 14264. Meyer No. 2, Langosch, p. 184; Rigg, 'Golias', 98. **SgDb +**
- p. 5 3. Orpheus euridice sociatur amicus amice
Walther 13493. Meyer No. 3, Langosch, pp. 204-206. Unique.
- p. 6 4. Flare iube lentos et lenes eole uentos
Walther 6591 (12099, 12219b). Meyer No. 4, Langosch, p. 182; extract in Saint-Gatien
(Wilmart No. 217, p. 33 and note). **SgDb +**
- p. 7 5. Ulceribus plenus uictum petit eger egenus
Walther 19595. Meyer No. 5, Langosch, p. 188. Unique.
- p. 7 6. Idibus his Mai miser exemplo Menelai
Walther 8655. Meyer No. 6, Langosch, p. 190. Unique.
- p. 8 7. Quid luges lirice quid meres pro meretrice
Walther 15832 (10256, N²). Meyer No. 7, Langosch, pp. 192-94. In three manuscripts,
the poem begins at line 16 ('Lenonem lena').

³⁹ The method of presentation follows that of the earlier 'MLPA' articles. Only first lines are given; Rg has no titles or colophons, except in Parts III and VI. Words and letters in < > have been supplied; those in [] are to be deleted; punctuation has been supplied only in the edited poems. Indexes and reference works are used as in earlier 'MLPA' articles: the Appendix and four *Nachträge* to Walther's *Initia* are cited as A, N¹, N², etc. in parentheses. Reference is also made to D. Schaller and E. Könsgen, *Initia carminum latinorum saeculo undecimo antiquiorum* (Göttingen, 1977). Scott, *Hildebert* refers to *Hildeberti Cenomannensis episcopi carmina minora*, ed. A. B. Scott (Leipzig, 1969). **Misc. Ind** and **Suppl** refer to the *Carmina miscellanea*, *Carmina indifferentia*, and *Supplementum* in Beaugendre's edition of 'Hildebert' (PL 171. 1381-1485). Reference is also made to *Carmina Burana*, ed. A. Hilka – O. Schumann – B. Bischoff, 1/1-3, 2/1 (Heidelberg, 1930-70). Short titles are used for works already cited in these footnotes: manuscript studies are cited 'Lehmann, "Fabricius"', 'Werner, "Zürich"', etc. Tx numbers refer to items in Titus A. xx, described in 'MLPA (I)'. After each entry, where appropriate, the list of sigla indicates the other anthologies (of those listed above, pp. 476-78) that share this item with Rg; the symbol + after the list indicates that the item also occurs in other recorded manuscripts.

⁴⁰ These poems were first noticed and edited by W. Meyer, *Die Oxforder Gedichte des Primas* (Nachrichten von der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Phil.-Hist. Klasse; Göttingen, 1907, rpt. Darmstadt, 1970). The poems were re-edited by K. Langosch, *Hymnen und Vagantenlieder* (Basel-Stuttgart, 1954), pp. 148-217, 292-305. See also A. G. Rigg, 'Golias and Other Pseudonyms', *Studi medievali*, 3rd Ser., 18 (1977) 65-109.

- p. 10 8. Iussa lupanari meretrix exire parata
Walther 9986. Meyer No. 8, Langosch, pp. 196-98.
- p. 12 9. Urbs erit illustris quam belli clade bilustris
Walther 19715. Meyer No. 9, Langosch, pp. 208-10, *Carmina Burana* 1/2. 145 ff.
- p. 14 10. Annus erat decimus et mensis in ordine primus
Walther 1258 (14338 Post rabiem rixe). Meyer No. 10, Langosch, pp. 212-16.
- p. 16 11. Primas po < n > tifici bene quod audio [audio] dici
Walther 14607. Meyer No. 11, Langosch, p. 200. Unique.
- p. 16 12. Res erit archana de pellicia ueterana
Walther 16610. Meyer No. 12, Langosch, p. 186; Rigg, 'Golias', 75, 77.
- p. 17 13. Me ditauit ita uester bonus archileuita
Walther 10820. Meyer No. 13, Langosch, p. 186. Unique.
- p. 17 14. In cratere meo tetis est sociata lieo
Walther 8870 (N³). Meyer No. 14, Langosch, p. 200. *Carmina Burana* No. 194 (1/3. 28-31); Rigg, 'Golias', 97. **ZDbLiVtRe +**
- p. 17 15. Vir pietatis inops cordis plus cortice duri
Walther 20416. Meyer No. 15, Langosch, pp. 154-58. Unique.
- p. 19 16. Iniuriis contumeliisque concitatus
Walther 9355. Meyer No. 16, Langosch, pp. 160-68. Unique.
- p. 24 17. Alta palus mea parua salus etasque senilis
Walther 845. Meyer No. 17, Langosch, p. 188. Unique.
- p. 25 18. Ambianis urbs prediues quam preclaros habes ciues
Walther 5288. Meyer No. 18, Langosch, pp. 148-52; also in Cotton Vespasian B. xiii, fol. 29v (fragment).
- p. 26 19. Egregius dedit hanc iuuenis clamidem sine pelle
Walther 5288. Meyer No. 19, Langosch, p. 186. Unique.
- p. 27 20. A < u > xilio pellis clades inimica puellis (2 couplets)
Walther 1888. Meyer No. 20, Langosch, p. 186. Unique.
- p. 27 21. A ducibus primas petiit duo dona duobus
Walther 25. Meyer No. 21, Langosch, p. 186. Unique.
- p. 27 22. Dels ego .v. tulit solidos mulier peregrina
Walther 4240. Meyer No. 22, Langosch, p. 186. Unique.
- p. 27 23. Diues eram et dilectus inter pares preelectus
Walther 4619. Meyer No. 23, Langosch, pp. 170-80; Rigg, 'Golias', 73, 100.

24-150 Miscellaneous poems

- p. 30 24. Plurima cum (ms. con-) soleant sacros euertere mores
Walther 14193 (N²). Scott, *Hildebert* No. 50; **Misc** 110; see on Tx No. 26. Rg omits 3, 5-6, 21-22, 59-60. **FZOAdLiNReDsTx +**

- p. 32 25. Dum mea me mater grauida gestaret in aluo
Walther 4902. Scott, *Hildebert* No. 23; **Ind** 11. **SgFODbAdSmLINVtDs +**
- p. 32 26. Dum colo (ms. celo) miliciam dum uates desero musas
Walther 4844. Ellis, p. 17. Unique.
- p. 32 27. Lumina colla gene flauī flexura capilli
Walther 10471. Scott, *Hildebert* No. 48; *Anthol. lat.* No. 795 (Baehrens 5. 390). **AdN +**
- p. 33 28. Nuper eram locuples multisque beatus amicis
Walther 12488 (A, N¹). Scott, *Hildebert* No. 22; **Misc** 75; Rg places 7-8 after 10, as Scott's alpha group. **SgZOAdSmLINVtReDs +**
- p. 36 29. Dum simulacra deum dum numina uana placerent
Walther 4959 (A). Scott, *Hildebert* No. 38; **Misc** 64. **SgF +**
- p. 37 30. Par tibi roma nichil cum sis prope tota ruina
Walther 13668 (A). Scott, *Hildebert* No. 36; **Misc** 63; Rg, with some other manuscripts, omits 11, 23-24, and places 25-28 after 30. **SgFZLIN +**
- p. 38 31. Ius periit quia rex obiit pax debilitatur (17 lines)
Walther 9983. Unedited. Death of a king (Henry I?). Unique.
- p. 39 32. Insula Meldis aue, gens leta (grata *Db*) solumque suaue;
Si quod es exponas, melque deosque sonas
Walther 9423; also in *Db* fol. 48v (2 Si quod exponas mel tibi dulce sonas). **Db**
- p. 39 33. Sol cristallus aqua dant qualemunque figura
Walther 18369 (A, N¹). Scott, *Hildebert* Suppl. 1; **Misc** 51. **SgEDs +**
- p. 40 34. Morte professa solum teger hac Orieldis in urna
Walther 11292. Ed. A. Wilmart, 'L'építaphe d'Orieldis', *Revue bénédictine* 49 (1937) 381-84. Unique.
- p. 40 35. Virgo seni generosa nouo prelarga tenasci
Walther 20552 (A). Scott, *Hildebert* No. 52. **AdDs +**
- p. 40 36. Hactenus o muse sonno satis et satis use
Walther 7462. **Ind** 17 (PL 171. 1448). **E**
- p. 41 37. Nitor ad inpar opus et apolli[o]ne scribo sinistro
Walther 11814 (A). Öberg, *Serlon*, pp. 124-25; Tx No. 41. **Tx +**
- p. 41 38. Roma nocens exempla docens manifesta nocendi
Walther 16855 (N²). **Ind** 1 (PL 171. 1441-42); Tx No. 40. **FEDsTx +**
- p. 43 39. Astrorum cultorque dei merite astraque deum (*sic*)
Walther 1654 (A). **Misc** 27 (PL 171. 1391). Epitaph of Robert de Arbrissel: cf. Walther 20286 (Saint-Omer, Berlin Theol. oct. 94). **E**
- p. 44 40. Tela Cupido tene quoniam non ille sed illa
Walther 19098. Ellis, p. 17; Dronke, *MLRELL* 2. 465. Unique.
- p. 44 41. Pene Girarde Gualo scribo tibi pene Girarde (26 lines)
Walther 13561. Unedited; also in Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 8207, and Tx No. 33 (which consists of 54 lines, the last 4 of which = Rg No. 88). Galo regrets

Girard's absence and advises him not to work too hard. Galo and Girardus may be the friends of Baudri of Bourgueil to whom he addressed his poems Nos. 31, 231, and 44 (ed. P. Abrahams, *Les œuvres poétiques de Baudri de Bourgueil* [Paris, 1926], pp. 376-77, etc.). Tx +

p. 45 42. Vrbs pictauis aue sedes gratissima de qua (37 lines)
Walther 19727. Ed. Werner, *Beiträge* No. 19, p. 17 (9 lines only); first two lines in Vatican Reg. lat. 150. Z +

p. 46 43. Consolator abi quia luctu uincor et ira (13 lines)
Walther 3198. Unedited. Unique. The poet is unconsolable, and can only be comforted by 'molli mero'.

p. 47 44. *Erased in the manuscript*
Enough text remains visible to show that the poem involves rape or seduction.

p. 48 45. Stella iubarque poli lapsasque simillima soli (34 lines)
Not in Walther. Tx No. 35. Advice to a beautiful boy to avoid sin and too much solemnity and to heed advice. Tx

p. 49 46. Sol hodie nobis apparuit unus et alter
Walther 18377 (A). **Misc** 118 (PL 171. 1435); Tx No. 36; Rg omits line 10 (hypermetrical) and final couplet. FEDsTx +

p. 49 47. Heu sors quam subito uela beatis (20 lines)
Not in Walther. A widow's lament on her husband's death. Rhyming couplets.

p. 50 48. Tres in natali misse tria tempora signant
Christi seu legis atque quod ante fuit:
Nocte prior, sub luce sequens, fit tercia luce,
Distinguendo fidem tres habuisse gradus.
A paucis prius est, a multis postea notum,
A cunctis Christi denique uoce Deus.
Walther 19392 (A). Previously unprinted; see Hauréau, *Notices* 1. 320.

p. 50 49. 'Rufe, doles et flere soles (Rg solaes) quod pulcra Corinna
Te fugiat, me suscipiat, cum sit Ioue digna.
Me sequitur, mecum loquitur, me querit habere.
Negligitur – nec (ne Rg) te patitur – tua forma placere.' (place Rg)
'An doleam flens propter eam, uir lumine casse?
Qua melior, qua candidior uenundatur asse!
Quod potuit, tibi iuncta fuit, sed deteriori:
Non potuit – neque digna fuit – iungi meliori!'

Walther 16920 (N⁴). Previously unedited; Tx No. 44. LITx +

I(b): pp. 51-66

p. 51 50. Qui fugis infernum regnum querisque supernum (22 lines)
Not in Walther. Practice sobriety, flee pleasure.

- p. 51 51. Nulli fidus amor nulli fortuna fidelis
Walther 12379 (A). **Misc** 77 (PL 171. 1423). **Vt+**
- p. 52 52. Cum iuuenem super astra Iouem natura loquaret
Schaller-Könsigen 3041. Sidonius Apollinaris, *Carmina* 1; frequently edited.
- p. 53 53. Vix loquar aut scribo vix lingua manusque laborant (79 lines)
Not in Walther. Poem of praise, perhaps to a king; elegiac couplets, lacking one line.
The poet's name may be concealed in 76-77.
- p. 56 54. Nitor et in nisu succumbo uiribus impar (46 lines)
Not in Walther. Poem of praise to a religious leader (*relligionis apex*). Elegiac couplets.
- p. 57 55. Roma duos habuit res est non fabula uana
Walther 16848 (A), 11596a. Ed. Fierville, 'Saint-Omer'; Werner, *Beiträge* No. 137,
pp. 55-58; Tx No. 54. **ZOTx**
- p. 60 56. Etas forma genus reddunt plerosque superbos (12 lines)
Not in Walther. Against pride. Elegiac couplets.
- p. 61 57. Exposuere michi Pyerides Eliconem
 atque aditus aperit Philosophia suos.
 Non ars una tamen, non unus contulit auctor
 ut uates fierem philosophusque simul.
 Carmina Galo michi, Terricus philosophiam
 inspirat: nostrum pectus utrumque sapit.
 Lingua diserta sonat Terrici philosophiam,
 Galonis redolent carmina nostra stilum.
Not in Walther. Previously unprinted. The identity of a philosopher-poet indebted to
Galo (see on No. 41 above) and Thierry of Chartres (died 1155) is tantalizing.
- p. 61 58. Ut medici peribent mea febris in ossibus heret (22 lines)
Walther 19830. Ed. Wattenbach, 'Reims', 514: the Reims version correctly has only
lines 1-20, all rhyming on *-eret*. The poet's fever: this goes with No. 60, which follows it
directly in Reims. **Re**
- p. 62 59. Iudicio uatum facit inclita uita beatum (36 lines)
Not in Walther. Unprinted. The poet extols his own fame; the poem is addressed to
Bavius and Mevius (see Virgil, *Ecl.* 3. 90).
- p. 63 60. Flebilis hora redit reditum fleo flebilis hore (20 lines)
Walther 6601. Ed. Wattenbach, 'Reims', 515; all lines rhyme in *-ore*. The return of the
poet's fever: see No. 58 above. **Re**
- p. 64 61. Ne modo respue quas tibi patruē mando salutes (42 lines)
Walther 11692. Unedited. A begging letter to an uncle.
- p. 65 62. Pastor arator eques paui seui superaui
Walther 13779 (A). *Anthol. lat.* No. 800, in first edition No. 872 (Baehrens 4. 188).
- p. 65 63. Errant qui credunt gentem periisse ciclopum (12 lines)
Not in Walther. Unedited. A request to someone (named Hilary? a papal legate?) to
return and restore peace to the church in Bordeaux. The poem continues on p. 66 'Exhi-
laras mestos hilaris pater hilarienses' (8 lines).

p. 66 64. Constat et apparet quod amo nec amor michi paret
Not in Walther. Ed. Dronke, *MLRELL* 2. 465-66. Unique.

p. 66 65. (a) Vir constans quicquid cepit complere laborat
(b) Tristibus afficiat melius si leta recordor
(c) Omne manufactum consumit longa uetustas Sg
(d) Absentum causas con < t > ra maledicta tuere

Four single-line proverbs. (a) Walther, *Sprichw.* 33525; (b) *ibid.*, 31586; (c) Walther 13201, *Sprichw.* 19833; (d) *Sprichw.* 161.

I(c): pp. 67-98

p. 67 66. Viuere non possum sine te neque uiuere tecum
Walther 20741. Ellis, p. 17; Werner, 'Zürich', 401, *Beiträge* No. 65, p. 27. ZAd +

p. 67 67. Cum dubitat natura marem faceretne puellam
Natus es, O pulcher, pene puella, puer
Anthol. lat. No. 263, Codex Salmasianus (Riese 1. 1. 214). Sg +

p. 67 68. Imperat et tolerat, prohibet punitque potestas,
Sustinet et da < m > pnat, iubet et uetat equa potestas
Not in Walther.

p. 67 69. Cur infirmaris cur palles cur maceraris
Not in Walther. Ed. Dronke, *MLRELL* 2. 466. Unique.

p. 67 70. Aspice quam fragilis, quam fallax, quam sit inanis
mundus et ipsius gloria quam petimus.
Degener et genuus, sons, insons, diues, egenus,
insipiens, sapiens, mortis erit patiens.
Omnia concludens concludere fata nequiuat:
Mors argumentum falsificauit ei.

Not in Walther. Previously unprinted.

p. 67 71. Voce places, facie sordes, si queris amari
Canta, sed cantans ne uideare caue.

Walther 20781 (A). Printed by W. Wattenbach, *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde* 2 (1877) 401 (from Vorau, Stiftsbibliothek 33, olim CXI).

p. 67 72. Nec uolo nec uolui ditari turpiter unquam:
Pauperiem malo, dum sit honesta pati.

Walther 11707 (A), *Sprichw.* 16286. Often printed. ZOSmN +

p. 68 73. Poscis multa foris paucis contentus apud te,
Largus in alterius, parcus in ede tua.

Walther 14291 (2677 (A)), 17311, 17324, 17473a, *Sprichw.* 21961. Often printed; sometimes found as second couplet of 'Indicat hic uenter'; see Wilmart, 'Saint-Gatien', 20 n. 6. (Sg)ZODbSmLIN +

p. 68 74. Qui non est diues, si pauper nesciat esse,
Ille modum uite nescit habere sue.

Walther 15581, *Sprichw.* 24397. Werner, *Beiträge* No. 87, p. 37. FZ +

- p. 68 75. Quintilius celare uolens sua furta puellam
Walther 16043. Wilmart, 'Saint-Gatien', 21. Sg +
- p. 68 76. Lingua non oculo nestor lasciue loquaris
Walther 10339. Ellis, pp. 17-18: *senex amans*, cf. No. 77.
- p. 69 77. Quamuis canities te neuole nestora monstrat
Not in Walther. Ellis, p. 18; cf. No. 76. On 'Naevolus' epigrams, cf. 'Saint-Gatien', 5-7,
and Wilmart's note ad loc.
- p. 69 78. Pulcher pube Paris, Pirrus probitate probaris,
 Actibus Alchides, armis annosus Atrides
Walther 14912. First couplet of Serlo de Wilton, No. 36, Öberg, p. 109. Vt +
- p. 69 79. Dic homo responde quid homo sit cur sit et unde
Walther 4364. **Misc** 138 (PL 171. 1442). FE +
- p. 70 80. Parce meo Ioue digna deo Galatea labori (24 lines)
Not in Walther. A love poem to Galatea.
- p. 70 81. (a) Omne quod est rarum constat me iudice carum
 (b) Stercus regine uel regis, Gualo, Rufine,
 Quamuis sit rarum, credo ualere parum.
A single poem, but often separated: (a) Walther, *Sprichw.* 19863a (cf. 19864-6);
(b) *Sprichw.* 30338.
- p. 70 82. Nox abit in sonnis, non ista nec illa sed om < n > is:
 Astringor nodo. Quis michi nodus? Odo.
Not in Walther.
- p. 71 83. Qui uel que uel quod Polinici Tideia pridem,
 Hic nos iungat amor, pax ea, fedus idem.
Walther 15717, *Sprichw.* 24890: only one other occurrence.
- p. 71 84. Potus Milo sapis non potus desipis idem
Walther 14377. Ellis, pp. 18-19. Ds
- p. 71 85. Pollicitis omnes honeras Milo [sed] munere paucos
Walther 14223. **Ind** 15 (PL 171. 1447); Tx No. 37. ETx +
- p. 72 86. Copia tres hominum triplici prouexit honori
Walther 3292 (A). **Ind** 16 (PL 171. 1447); Rg omits 9-10. E +
- p. 72 87. Non est crimen amor, quia si scelus esset amare
 Nollet amore Deus etiam diuina ligare.
Walther 12025 (A), *Sprichw.* 17609. *Carmina Burana* No. 121a (1/2. 203) (see also 1/
3. 206).
- p. 72 88. Esto superba minus dum te prece uexo superba
Not in Walther. Ellis, p. 19; Tx No. 33 (written as last four lines of 'Pene Girarde' = Rg
No. 41). Tx
- p. 72 89. Cui tua me puero prefecit gracia, presul,
 Quod si < t > plus puero, concipe de puero.
Conueniunt in eo contraria federe miro:
 Spiritus est senior corpore, mensque uiro;

Nestor in Ascanio puer hic, in Nestore cano

Ascanius uiuit, Nestor in Ascanio.

Not in Walther. Previously unprinted.

p. 72 90. *Parcus amans puerum natum mentitur amare*
Schaller-Könsen 9287 (Marcus); Claudian, *Carmina minora*, App. 22; *Anthol. lat.*
No. 760 (Baehrens 3. 306); Tx No. 34 shares opening *Parcus*. **Tx +**

p. 73 91. *Sunt quorum sic noster amor fastidit amores*
Walther 18863 (A). **Misc** 137 (PL 171. 1441). **E +**

p. 74 92. *Iste pellicule uiderunt secula mille (6 lines)*
Walther 9610. Lehmann, 'Fabricius', 41 (4 lines only). **F +**

p. 74 93. *Mens scelus inuenit, suggessit lingua, peregit*
Dextra: malus, peior, pessimus iste fuit –
Inu < e > niendo malus, suadendo peior, agendo
Pessimus. Huic turpis uitaque morsque fuit.
Mors sua non habuit planctum, nec uita fauorem,
Nec facinus ueniam, nec cinis exequias.
Mors letam, tristem mora mortis fecerat urbem:
Cuius mors placuit, non bona uita fuit.

Not in Walther. Previously unprinted. The identity of the criminal is not known: the piece may be simply a rhetorical exercise. Cf. No. 94.

p. 74 94. *Hic < situs > est quem nil decuit nisi dedecus et que*
Walther 8111. **Misc** 47 (PL 171. 1399); Tx No. 45. Beaugendre's title is: *Epitaphium*
cuiusdam Simoniaci in excommunicatione defuncti. Cf. No. 93. **ETx**

p. 75 95. *Digne Milo uita tua mors anathemate digna est*
Walther 4470. **Misc** 33 (PL 171. 1394). **E**

p. 75 96. *O uates equitesque pii deflete sepultum*
Walther 13032a. Ed. Boutemy, 'Saint-Omer', 15; Tx No. 42. **OTx**

p. 75 97. *Mars obit in terris par deflent sydera sydus*
Walther 10706. Werner, *Beiträge* No. 99, p. 40. **ZLI +**

p. 76 98. *Flos geminus sydus gemineque colu < m > pne (12 lines)*
Not in Walther. The poem will be sent to two sisters, despite a prince's anger (?).

p. 76 99. *Abbatem laudant omnes sed nescio quare,*
Nam dum uiuebat nemo tam uixit auare.
Cum Christus iubeat dare cuncta nichil < que > tenere,
Hic abbas uoluit thessauros semper habere,
Cum sibi nummorum foret agger multus in arca,
In tribuen < d > o tamen fuit illi dextera parca.
Alterius rerum fuit abbas improbus emptor ...
(p. 77) *Hic cleri destructor erat, Symonemque secutus*
Emerat ecclesias. Mons hoc testatur Acutus.

Not in Walther. I have not identified this avaricious abbot. The scribe omitted a line on turning the page.

- p. 77 100. Augusti soboles serie sublimis auorum
Walther 1754. Scott, *Hildebert* No. 15; **Ind** 2 (PL 171. 1442). To Adela, countess of Blois: cf. Nos. 103, 115. **SgAd** +
- p. 77 101. Paucos pontifices aliquos tamen esse recordor (23 lines)
Walther 18164 (Sicut prerutilat): first two lines in RgN only. Ed. Boutemy, 'Saint-Omer', 10-11; Wattenbach, 'Beschreibung', 150, from Berlin, Theol. oct. 94. In N there are 16 lines. Praise of an unknown poet-bishop of Bayeux. **ON** +
- p. 78 102. Par est iuncta pari sata consule consule nato (18 lines)
Not in Walther. In honour of a noble couple.
- p. 78 103. Cum totus Blisis commissam predicat orbis
Walther 3852a. Ed. A. Boutemy, 'Deux pièces inédits du manuscrit 749 de Douai', *Latomus* 2 (1938) 123-30. On Adela, countess of Blois; cf. Nos. 100, 115.
- p. 80 104. Artibus ingenio maturis moribus olim
Walther 1543 (N²). Ed. Werner, *Beiträge* No. 84, p. 37. Epitaph of Humbert of Lyons. **FZN**
- p. 80 105. Legi multarum titulos hic ecclesiarum (15 lines)
Not in Walther. Apparently on seditious behaviour by the monks in some dependent house of Tours.
- p. 80 106. Legatos [querunt] mittit rex legatique requirunt
Walther 10227 (A, N²). Ed. Lehmann, 'Fabricius', 58. **FN** +
- p. 81 107. Dactile quid latitas exi cur publica uitas
Walther 4031. Serlo de Wilton, No. 2. Öberg, pp. 79-87; Rg ends at 123. **DbVt** +
- p. 85 108. Forte uiatores balbus fuit unus et alter (18 lines)
Not in Walther. Three stammerers each suspect that the others are mocking him.
- p. 86 109. Me tibi teque michi genus etas et decor ornant
Walther 10852 (A, N²). Often printed: see Walther, *Streitgedicht*, p. 140. **NVt** +
- p. 86 110. Non est persone sed prosperitatis amicus (4 lines)
Walther 12040a (A). Boutemy, 'Saint-Omer', 15 (2 lines). **OSm** +
- p. 87 111. Sacrilegis monachis emptoribus ecclesiarum
Walther 17011 (A). Often printed: see Tx No. 32 (Rg has all three sections, unlike some of the other anthologies listed here). **SgFOAdSmReDsTx** +
- p. 88 112. Occumbunt fixi iaculo mucrone sagitta
Walther 13118. Werner, *Beiträge* No. 222, p. 94; printed by Riese 1/2. lxiv-lxv to illustrate imitations of the *Anthol. lat.* **ZLI** +
- p. 89 113. Inter opes et delicias populique fauorem
Walther 9473 (A). Scott, *Hildebert* No. 4; **Misc** 139 (PL 171. 1442). **SgF** +
- p. 89 114. Thura piper uestes argentum pallia gemmas
Walther 19283. Scott, *Hildebert* No. 9; Tx No. 38. **SgLINTx** +
- p. 89 115. Desipit et peccat qui te mortalibus equat
Walther 4287. Scott, *Hildebert* No. 10; Rg has the first two lines only. To Adela, countess of Blois: cf. Nos. 100, 103. **Sg** +

p. 89 116. Non bene discernis qui prefers imma supernis
Walther 11974. Scott, *Hildebert* No. 25; **Misc** 61 and 126 (PL 171. 1408 and 1437). In
Rg it follows No. 115 without a break. **SgOSmDs +**

p. 89 117. Vt flos et fenum sic mundi transit amenum,
et quod est melius sepe cadit cicius.

Walther 19800 (one version has ten lines).

p. 90 118. <I> Ncassum metuens magnum uirguncula penem
ire maritatum noluit ad iuuenem.
Ille 'Duos' inquit 'habeo. Temptabo minori.'
Duxit eam facto federe lege thori.
Cum minus atque minus ea iam patiendo labore
et magis atque magis ianua trita foret,
quem modo laudauit dampnat; quem uituperauit
laudat, et exiguum denegat esse suum.

Not in Walther. The poem begins at the top of the page; in place of a rubric / there is simply a large *N*: the scribe may somehow have been attempting to 'hide' this very crude poem from other readers.

p. 90 119. Vim tulerat cuidam Neuius. Petit illa quis esset.
'Dicor' ait 'Cyrrus'; sed spado Cyrrus erat.
Impetit hec Cyrrus de stupro. Curia ridet;
Scitur quod falso crimine culpet eum.
Stuprum non latuit: latuit stuprator in illo.
Si non culpa placet, fraus tamen ista placet.

Not in Walther.

p. 90 120. Alea dulce malum, mala res, uia perdicionis:
uerba, minas, facinus, concitat, auget, agit.
Quem pietas, quem sancta fides, quem gloria rerum,
quem claris factis rumor ubique facit,
huius amor ludi de sancto consceleratum
conprobat ac inopem de locuplete facit.

Not in Walther.

p. 90 121. Marcus amat. Meretrix argentum poscit amantem.
Hic caret argento: plunbea marca datur.
Cura Iouis Danem caute decipit in auro:
decipit in plunbo cautius iste suam!

Not in Walther.

p. 90 122. Heredem nullum de coniuge flacus habebat
Walther 7720. Lehmann, 'Fabricius', 57. Flaccus gets his wife pregnant by proxy. **F**

p. 91 123. Versus mendicos et muse pauperis ausum
Walther 20250 (A). Arnulf of Lisieux (PL 201. 197).

p. 91 124. Thraso tuis si facta forent tua consona dictis
Not in Walther. Ellis, p. 19: unfulfilled promises.

p. 92 125. Vrbis Xantonice que comoditas sit amice
Not in Walther. Ed. A. Boutemy, 'Un éloge métrique inédit de la ville de Saintes attribué à Pierre de Saintes' in *Mélanges offerts à René Crozet*, ed. P. Gallais and Y.-J. Riou, 2 vols. (Poitiers, 1966), 2. 705-10.

p. 93 126. Ne uetitis cenis inhiet gula, comprime frenis:
Comprime, ni malis non caruisse malis.
Si michi cauisssem, si frena gule posuisssem,
in me quartanas non reuocasset anas.
Quod tot Cloto necat uexatque febris, gula necat:
ergo si sapias, frena gule facias.
Viscera torquentur, quia felle lutoque replentur:
ad medici nutum fel bibo, ceno lutum.
Hoc michi causa necis fit amare pocio fecis,
sed pereat per eam quod facit ut peream!

Not in Walther. In line 5 for *necat* (1) probably read *secat*. Line 7 links this poem with the next.

p. 94 127. Non se committit scurris medicina salutis,
Disertis medicus uiciorum sorte solutis.
Hinc timeo uitam medicis committere brutis.
Nil cum mensura faciunt horisque statutis,
Sed mortis subite manibus dant pocula tutis,
Haut aliter quam qui miscent aconita cicutis.
'Restituunt uerbo † non te † iocunda salutis;
Curant langores febribusque medentur acutis'.
Nulla fides adhibenda quidem tam magna locutis:
Langor et anxietas est et sua iussa secutis.

Not in Walther. For the theme and the single final rhyme throughout the poem, cf. Nos. 58 and 60 above. See also the next poem.

p. 94 128. Henea quam prauī sit odoris musa probaui (32 lines)

Not in Walther. The poet is sick and unable to write poetry; he attacks doctors. Cf. Nos. 126-127, 58 and 60.

p. 95 129. Si tibi grana placent spicas attunde flagellis (4 lines)

Walther 18007. Ellis, p. 19. The value of work. Unique.

p. 95 130. Lex Moysi celat quod Pauli sermo reuelat,
Nam data (ms. quanta) grana Syna per eum sunt facta farina.

Walther 10282, *Sprichw.* 13706c.

p. 95 131. Purpura cum bysso dignum te fecit (ms. facit) abyssō
et flammis grauibz splendidus ille cibus,
et quia de pleno nichil es largitus egeno,
qua tua lingua perit pena perhennis erit.

Walther 14941. Previously unprinted.

Db +

p. 96 132. Excute torporem, si celi queris honorem,
et longam requiem per paruū sume laborem.

Non sunt lentorum felicia regna polorum
Sed uiolentorum quibus est < hic > cura bonorum.

Not in Walther.

- p. 96 133. O signum magnum! Timet et colit angelus agnum
Et metuit tellus positum super ethera uellus.
Agnus enim Deus est, et ei seruire salus est;
Corpus diuinum uellus designat ouinum.

Not in Walther.

- p. 96 134. Cui satis est quod habet satis illum constat habere
Walther 3504, *Sprichw.* 3913 (with text). Marbod, *De ornamentis* (PL 171. 1689): often
printed. **ZOSmN +**

- p. 96 135. Lacto creatorem, saluum michi credo pudorem:
Res noua – uirgo parens et caro patre carens.
Walther 10070. Scott, *Hildebert* No. 12; **Misc** 55 (PL 171. 1407). **SgF +**

- p. 96 136. Vinea culta fuit cultores premia querunt
Walther 20357 (A, N³). **Misc** 132 (PL 171. 1440): often printed. **SgFDbSmRe +**

- p. 96 137. Consul Flandrensis quem nullus terruit ensis
Hac tegitur fossa que forcia continet ossa.

Not in Walther. On the death of the count of Flanders (cf. **Misc** 31 [PL 171. 1393]).

- p. 97 138. A mortis pena si pontificalis auena
Quemlibet eriperet, non sic equus iste iaceret;
Sed quoniam metas maturior attulit etas,
In bene prouecta resolutus morte senecta
Frater Ferandus adducitur excoriandus.

Not in Walther.

- p. 97 139. Unde, Rufine, tibi liuorque tumorque labelli?
Lasciui dentis suspicor esse notam:
Qui sic te lesit, qui sic tua labra momordit (ms. -is),
Aut puer aut (quod plus laudo) puella fuit.

Not in Walther.

- p. 97 140. Virginis insano Iulianus captus amore
Walther 20470. *Anthol. lat.* No. 912 (Baehrens 5. 408); Lehmann, 'Fabricius', 30, 54.
F +

- p. 97 141. Corrumpere duo Flauiam, parit illa gemellos (6 lines)
Walther 3375 (A). Ellis, p. 20. Flavia gives one twin to each of her seducers. Unique.

- p. 97 142. Et fugis et culpas, Quintine, superfluitatem:
Hoc uirtutis amor non facit, imo rei.
Walther 5920. *Anthol. lat.*, Riese 1/2. 391 (from N only). **N**

- p. 97 143. Maxima uenandi cura est tibi, nulla legendi;
brutus es et brutis, Quintiliane, uacas.
Walther 10804 (A), 5867. Ellis, p. 20. **OSm**

- p. 98 144. Iupiter astra, fretum Neptunus, tartara Pluto
Regna paterna tenent, tres tria quisque suum.
Schaller-Könsigen 8359. *Anthol. lat.* No. 793 (Baehrens 5. 388) from N only. **N**
- p. 98 145. Ad cenam Uarus me nuper forte uocauit
Walther 322 (A), 390. *Anthol. lat.* No. 796 (Baehrens 5. 390) from N only, but often printed. **FZNRe**
- p. 98 146. Grecinum uirgo, puerum Grecinus amabat
Schaller-Könsigen 5649. *Anthol. lat.* No. 797 (Baehrens 5. 390) from N only. **N**
- p. 98 147. Non re sed uerbis est Sextus amicus: amici
Si sit opus, poscit; ferre recusat opem.
Walther 12152 (A). Ellis, p. 20.
- p. 98 148. Annis forma se feruens celeberrima diues
Walther 1097. Werner, *Beiträge* No. 91, p. 38. **ZN +**
- p. 98 149. Linquite deuia, clamitat anxia diua Sophia,
Terrea linquite, celica querite, queso, uenite.
Not in Walther.
- p. 98 150. Vita beata Deus mortem gustauit ad horam
Vt miser eternum uiuere posset homo.
Walther 20654 (A). Cited in *Distinctiones monasticae* 2. 82 (ed. J. B. Pitra, *Spicilegium Solesmense* 3 [Paris, 1855], p. 465).

Part II: pp. 99-114

Simon Chèvre d'Or and others

- p. 99 151. Diuiciis ortu specie uirtute triumphis
Walther 4645 (N¹). Simon Chèvre d'Or, *Ylias*, 'Trojan Extract', ending at 'Fraude Sinon partu ligneus egit equus'. Ed. from Rg by A. Boutemy, *Le moyen âge* 52 (1946) 243-56; for other studies and editions, see on Tx No. 28. According to Dr. M. M. Parrott the Rg text (her G¹) is closest to that of the Leipzig ms. and TxRb. For an acephalous text of the continuation of the poem, see Part III below, and above, p. 476. **VtTx +**
- p. 104 152. Viribus arte minis danaum data troia ruinis
Walther 20582 (A, N¹, N²). Pierre de Saintes (cf. No. 125). Often printed, e.g., PL 171. 1451 (from Leyser). See on No. 153. **FLIDs +**
- p. 108 153. <P> ergama flere uolo fato danais data solo
Walther 13985 (A, N¹⁻³). *Carmina Burana* No. 101 (1/2. 139-60) (with discussion of relationship between this poem and 'Viribus arte'). This is also in two other anthologies described in this series (BdD). **FZEDbVtDs +**
- p. 111 154. Sol iubar emittens occasum fecit in ortu
Walther 18379a. Simon Chèvre d'Or: epitaph of Prince Philippe of France (?). Ed. A. Boutemy, 'Quatre poèmes nouveaux de Simon Chèvre d'Or', *Revue du moyen âge latin* 3 (1947) 141-52. Unique.

- p. 111 155. Hic iacet ille Petrus pater et decus urbis et orbis
Walther 7970a. Simon Chèvre d'Or: epitaph of a churchman Peter. Ed. Boutemy, 'Quatre poèmes'. Unique.
- p. 112 156. Transiit a regno Constancia gloria regni
Walther 19356a. Simon Chèvre d'Or: epitaph of Constance, queen of France. Ed. Boutemy, 'Quatre poèmes'. Unique.
- p. 112 157. Ecce latet Clareuallis clarissimus abbas
Walther 5105 (A). Simon Chèvre d'Or: epitaph of St. Bernard. See Boutemy, 'Quatre poèmes'; PL 185. 1251. **F +**
- p. 112 158. Sol nebula premitur flos turbine peste serenum
Walther 18380a. Simon Chèvre d'Or: conflict over the papacy between Alexander III and Victor IV. Ed. Boutemy, 'Quatre poèmes'. Unique.
- p. 114 159. Decidit ecclesie flos gemma colu < m > pna corona
Walther 4202 (A). Simon Chèvre d'Or: epitaph of Suger. Often printed: e.g., **Misc** 42 (PL 171. 1397). **FZ +**
- p. 114 160. (a) Labitur ex animo benefactum iniuria durat
(b) < A > bsentum causas contra male < di > cta tuere
(a) Walther 10059a, *Sprichw.* 13358; (b) *Sprichw.* 161. Not from the *Disticha Catonis*, as reported by Boutemy, 'Quatre poèmes', 144.

Part III: pp. 115-124

Simon Chèvre d'Or

- p. 115 161. ... Ne ita stet urbis honos populentur cetera queque
p. 124 EXPLICIT AUREA CAPRA SUPER YLIADAE ROGATU COMITIS HENRICI
Simon Chèvre d'Or, *Ylias* A-text (Middle Version), from 159 to the end. See above on No. 151, Tx No. 28, and above, p. 476. According to Dr. M. M. Parrott, this text (her G²) is a version of the A-text contaminated by B.

Part IV: pp. 125-142

Bernard Silvester: Megacosmus book I, metra i-ii

- p. 125 (i) Congeries informis adhuc cum silua teneret
P. 127 (ii) Ergo sideribus leuis ether sidera celo
Walther 3161 (A). Ed. C. S. Barach and J. Wrobel (Innsbruck, 1876; rpt. Frankfurt, 1964), pp. 7-9 (ending at line 65), pp. 15-29 (ending at line 480); new critical edition by P. Dronke (Leiden, 1978). Extracts from the *Megacosmus* are found in other anthologies, e.g., Reims 1275, Trinity College, Cambridge 0.7.7, Oxford, Bodleian Library Laud Lat. 86; single verses in London, British Library Royal 13 A. iv and Oxford, Bodleian Library Laud Misc. 707; a complete text is in Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 3245 (see 'MLPA (III)', 474-75). **LiRe +**

Part V: pp. 143-200

Ovid: Remedia amoris; Ex Ponto

p. 143 Legerat huius amor titulum nomenque libelli

Ends on p. 165; glosses on pp. 151-153. For the text, see E. J. Kenney, 'The MS Tradition of Ovid's *Amores*, *Ars Amatoria*, and *Remedia Amoris*', *Classical Quarterly* N.S. 12 (1962) 1-31, especially 4.

p. 166 Naso tomitane iam non nouus incola terre

Ends on p. 198 (after 6 lines of writing) at 2. 7. 73; the leaf pp. 199-200 should follow p. 190, but after p. 200 2. 3. 3-75 are missing. Glosses on pp. 166-167.

Part VI: pp. 201-250

Glanville: De legibus Anglie

p. 201 INCIPIT TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUEUDINIBUS REGNI ANGLIE ... DE
GLAUILLA IURIS REGNI ET ANTIQUARUM CONSUEUDINUM EO TEMPORE
POTISSIMO Regiam potestatem non solum ...

p. 250 ... quod sine dilacione ueniat in curiam (9. 12, p. 115)

Ed. G. D. G. Hall (Nelson's Medieval Texts; London, 1965). Hall describes this as 'a careless text with many gaps and corrections'. The text breaks off incomplete at the foot of the page. There are some pencil annotations.

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AN EDITION OF THE LIST OF NINETY-NINE BOOKS
ACQUIRED AT GLASTONBURY ABBEY
DURING THE ABBACY OF WALTER DE MONINGTON

James P. Carley and John F. R. Coughlan

WHEN John Leland visited Glastonbury Abbey shortly before the Dissolution, he noted that its library had a collection of ancient books not easily paralleled elsewhere in Britain.¹ Our information about this library is considerable for some periods but very scanty for others, especially for the last centuries of the abbey's existence. The most thorough description of the abbey manuscripts is contained in Cambridge, Trinity College ms. R. 5. 33, fols. 102-104, where there is a complete catalogue of manuscripts owned by the monastery in the mid-thirteenth century.² This catalogue was begun in 1247; it was revised, however, in 1248 when a number of new items were inserted and certain classifications corrected. The titles of nearly 500 manuscripts bound in about 340 volumes are preserved. The volumes are arranged either according to their contents – *bibliotheca, omeliae, decreta, epistolae, historiae, libri de Sancta Maria, passionalia, mensalia, vita sanctorum, regulae, physica, logica, gramatica* – or by author's name.

There is no other catalogue of the library as such. There are, however, a number of statements about books acquired by the monastery at various

¹ 'Eram aliquot abhinc annis *Glessoburgi Somurotrigum*, ubi antiquissimum simul et famosissimum est totius insulae nostrae coenobium, animumque longo studiorum labore fessum, favente *Richardo Whitingo* ejusdem loci abbate, recreabam; donec novus quidam cum legendi tum discendi ardor me inflammaret. Supervenit autem ardor ille citius opinione itaque statim me contuli ad bibliothecam, non omnibus perviam, ut sacrosanctae vetustatis reliquias, quarum tantus ibi numerus, quantus nullo alio facile *Britanniae* loco, diligentissime evolverem. Vix certe limen intraveram, cum antiquissimorum librorum vel solus conspectus religionem, nescio an stuporem, animo incuteret meo, eaque de causa pedem paululum sistebam. Deinde salutato loci numine, per dies aliquot omneis forulos curiosissime excussi' (*Commentarii de scriptoribus Britannicis auctore Joanne Lelando Londinate*, ed. A. Hall, 2 vols. [Oxford, 1709], 1. 41).

² First printed by Thomas Hearne in *Johannis ... Glastoniensis, Chronica sive Historia de rebus Glastoniensibus*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1726), 2. 423-44; reprinted by T. W. Williams, *Somerset Mediaeval Libraries* (Bristol, 1897), pp. 55-78.

periods. In *Somerset Mediaeval Libraries* T. W. Williams has gathered all printed references to books at Glastonbury Abbey and has arranged them in chronological order: I. a book of the evangelists given by King Ina; II. the books given by St. Dunstan; III. the books given by Britwold and Elnotus, c. 1170; IV. a list of books which Henry of Blois had transcribed c. 1170; V. books transcribed under the prior Thomas, c. 1210; VI. the 1247 list; VII. a list of books given by John of Taunton (d. 1290); VIII. books given by Adam of Sodbury (d. 1335). Williams also includes the references that John Leland made to the books which he saw at Glastonbury Abbey. Finally, he gives lists of possible surviving manuscripts.³

There is one list of books, however, which has not yet been published. This is the list of ninety-nine books acquired by Walter de Monington (abbot from 1342 to 1375). It is found in two separate places in Cambridge, Trinity College ms. R. 5. 16 (hereafter referred to as *C*). This manuscript consists of at least three different booklets which were later joined together. The first and longest section contains an early copy of John of Glastonbury's *Cronica sive Antiquitates Glastoniensis ecclesie*.⁴ It begins imperfectly – judging from the numbering, which is somewhat later than the original date of composition, it appears to be missing thirteen folios – and it ends (on p. 214) with a list of the sixty-three monks who entered the monastery during the abbacy of Monington. This list is not part of the original *Cronica*, but in *C* it is incorporated into the text, directly following the last entry and written in the same hand. The whole booklet is written in two columns of thirty lines per page, in a neat and clean *littera textualis*.

The second booklet begins on p. 215 and ends on p. 232.⁵ The layout of this booklet is visibly different from what comes before and after. Although the booklet is written in a *littera textualis*, the hand is noticeably different from that used in the *Cronica* text. Moreover, the pages here are divided into twenty-eight long lines, and the capitals have a different style of decoration. The booklet contains a detailed list of Monington's benefactions to the abbey, and on pp. 227-229 is found the list of books acquired by Monington.

³ More recently, N. R. Ker has provided a much more definitive list of survivors, and lists forty separate items that can be positively linked with Glastonbury. See *Medieval Libraries of Great Britain*, 2nd edition (London, 1964), pp. 90-91.

⁴ See James P. Carley, ed., *John of Glastonbury, 'Cronica sive Antiquitates Glastoniensis ecclesie'*, 2 vols. (British Archaeological Reports 47; Oxford, 1978), I. ii-iii.

⁵ The pagination was added after the three booklets were bound together. It skips from p. 225 to p. 228 (so the pagination is out by four from p. 229, which is really p. 225). In subsequent references, however, we shall use the marked pagination rather than a corrected form. The booklet has the following heading, which accurately describes its contents: 'Hic sunt osterisa Walteri de Monytona, Que sunt impensa per eum pulcherima dona'.

After this material, at the bottom of p. 232, comes a new heading written in the same hand: 'Sequitur particularis declaracio beneficiorum eiusdem patris uenerabilis'. What follows (pp. 233-264) constitutes yet another booklet, written in quite a different hand, that is, in Anglicana. The layout is also totally distinct: much more closely written (with forty-three lines per page) and less ornate in arrangement. From internal references, however, it can be shown that this material was written at the same time as the preceding *Ostensa*, which it was intended to supplement with more detailed information. The first section of the *Declaracio* covers abbey properties; it is followed by the booklist (pp. 246-250); the last section consists of copies of indentures made between the receiver John Crosse and John Chinnock (subsequently abbot) who was chosen to succeed him as receiver in the thirty-third year of Monington's abbacy (*i.e.*, 1375) when Crosse was elected prior. In sum, this booklet contains a complete record of everything which Monington had lent out or had received during his abbacy.⁶ It ends imperfectly, with a catchword on the last page.

Walter de Monington was elected abbot on 25 October 1342; he died in 1375.⁷ It is not known what offices he held prior to his election and the main sources about his career as abbot still remain unpublished.⁸ It does seem clear, however, that in spite of the ravages of the Black Death Monington maintained good profit from the estates and continued to rebuild estate buildings. He spent more than £ 1,100 on the abbey itself and acquired many valuable possessions for the house. In 1349 Ralph de Salopia, bishop of Bath and Wells, visited the monastery and admonished Monington to be more approachable to the monks and to allow them better food. The account of Monington's abbacy found in *C* and in his register, however, seems to contradict this; in these he emerges as a sympathetic abbot and rather generous. He appears to have been interested in

⁶ It is interesting to speculate on the purposes behind the compilation of these last two booklets. They must have been written after 1375 since they refer to John Chinnock's election taking place 'eodem anno'. On the other hand, the material contained in them has a limited time span of interest, since its relevance is fairly topical – and its contents extremely specific. What seems likely when one examines the political situation within the monastery is that the copy in *C* of all this information was commissioned by John Chinnock at a time when another monk, Thomas Coffyn, as well as other senior monks were first seriously questioning his administration as abbot, *c.* 1380. (See James P. Carley, 'List of Monks Who Entered Glastonbury Abbey during the Abbacy of Walter de Monington', *The Downside Review* 95 [1977] 313.)

⁷ Ian Keil has examined Monington's abbacy in 'The Abbots of Glastonbury in the Early 14th Century', *The Downside Review* 82 (1964) 342-47.

⁸ London, British Library ms. Arundel 2, fols. 1-86 contains a register 'de diversis transcriptis commissionum, procurationum, obligationum, presentationum, acquientiarum, et aliarum diversarum literarum factarum tempore Domini Walteri de Monyngtone'. This register covers 1352-1366. As pointed out above, *C*, pp. 215-264, contains detailed accounts of the practical achievements of Monington's abbacy.

education; at Oxford he built four chambers for Glastonbury monks studying at the University.⁹ The list of books he acquired, moreover, suggests a wide-ranging and well-informed mind.

During the fourteenth century most monastic book collections were built up through the bequests of individual monks and Monington seems to have been a representative collector.¹⁰ He acquired a large number of books, but there are examples in the same period of larger collections.¹¹ The principles of arrangement of the material – theology, canon and civil law, philosophy, medicine, grammar, divine service – follow a fairly common pattern of categories and the contents reflect a more or less standard taste.¹² A great many of the authors represented in the collection wrote in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, and the material is therefore relatively contemporary for the most part. The note beside item 89 ('frater J. Broun habet') shows that the list was used at least once for the recording of loans. The two copies of the books are substantially the same, although there is some variation in ordering, and the copy in the *Declaracio* version includes second folio incipits which the scribe underlines, and which here have been reproduced in italics.¹³

The text of both lists is reproduced below. A certain number of the items in list B have been underlined, probably by a seventeenth-century antiquarian. This underlining has not been noted. We have numbered the items for convenience of reference, have inserted bracketed superscript letters where

⁹ See David Knowles, *The Religious Orders in England*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1948-59), 2, 17, 22-23; also W. A. Pantin, ed., *Documents Illustrating the Activities of the ... English Black Monks*, 3 vols. (London, 1931-37), 3, 29-32, 53-54, 60.

¹⁰ See Knowles, *ibid.* 2, 339-40, for a discussion of individual collections and collectors; also R. B. Dobson, *Durham Priory* (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 373-74; and especially R. W. Hunt, 'The Library at the Abbey of St Albans' in M. B. Parkes and A. G. Watson, eds., *Medieval Scribes, Manuscripts and Libraries: Essays Presented to N. R. Ker* (London, 1978), pp. 263-68. It is not clear that all the books in this list were actually acquired by Monington rather than simply being purchased during his abbacy. See, for example, the eighty-third item in the list, which has an *ex libris* of the prior John Crosse.

¹¹ See Knowles, *ibid.* 2, 342-43. At a number of monasteries there was a significant growth in library activity in the second half of the fourteenth century. See, for example, Hunt, *ibid.*, 263. N. R. Ker relates this new activity to the development of a new 'anglicana' bookhand ('Medieval Manuscripts from Norwich Cathedral Priory', *Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society* 1 [1953] 9).

¹² See R. M. Wilson, 'The Contents of the Medieval Library' in F. Wormald and C. E. Wright, eds., *The English Library before 1700* (London, 1958), pp. 85-111. In the Monington collection there are large numbers of philosophical texts as well as vernacular items. From other sources we know that Monington was interested in university activity and the list suggests a collection with an academic as well as monastic bias.

¹³ Both the variation of order and the context of the two booklets suggest that the two lists represent copies of another, now lost, catalogue. The heading of the list in the *Declaracio*, moreover, states that the list is a copy of another register.

there are multiple items in a given entry, and have labelled the lists A (from the *Declaracio*) and B (from the *Ostensa*). Following each item in the A list we give a cross-reference to the equivalent item in B. Pointed brackets show editorial insertions. The orthography and capitalization of the manuscript have been retained and wherever possible original interpunction has been observed.

I

LIST A. CAMBRIDGE, TRINITY COLLEGE MS. R. 5. 16, PP. 246-250

p. 246 Sequitur copia registri de libris per eundem patrem venerabilem perquisitis, et primo de libris theologie.

1. Libellum continentem sermones de tempore et sanctis. secundo folio incipiente *multi sequuntur*. (B. 2)

2. Item libellum continentem ^[a] sermones diuersorum tractatum. ^[b] sententias de diuersis uoluminibus. ^[c] exposiciones super matheum. lucam et parabolas salomonis. secundo folio incipiente *benedictus qui venit*. (B. 3)

3. Item libellum continentem ^[a] adapciones ad sermones. ^[b] questiones de quolibet thome de alquino. ^[c] tractatum Alexandri Neccam de professione monachorum et ^[d] sermones GWyberti. secundo folio incipiente *gustat quam suauis*. (B. 4)

4. Item libellum continentem diuersos sermones et optimas materias pro religiosis deum querentibus compositus (*sic*) a Roberto grosseteste directum abbati de burgo. secundo folio incipiente *erunt s. in s.* (B. 5)

5. Item libellum continentem diuersos sermones per totum < annum > . secundo folio incipiente *et ascendisset de aqua*. (B. 6)

3. [b] Thomas Aquinas (1225?-74). *Questiones quodlibetales*. Ed. R. M. Spiazzi (Turin, 1949).

[c] Alexander Neckham (1157-1217). Possibly *De vita monachorum*, attributed to Neckham: see Thomas Wright, ed., *The Anglo-Latin Satirical Poets and Epigrammatists*, 2 vols. (RS 59; London, 1872), 2. 175 ff.

[d] *sermones Gwyberti*. Probably the Franciscan preacher Gilbert of Tournai (d. 1284), whose sermons were extremely popular in the fourteenth century. See P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1933-34), 2. 56-59. The most thorough study of his life and career is by L. Baudry, 'Wibert de Tournai', *Revue d'histoire franciscaine* 5 (1928) 23-61.

4. Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln (d. 1253). A collection of sermons and other writings of Robert Grosseteste, probably opening with his letter 57, ed. H. R. Luard, *Roberti Grosseteste ... epistolae* (RS 25; London, 1861), pp. 173-78, where the salutation reads 'Abbati et conventui de Burgo', and which is otherwise known as the *De vita monachorum*. The reference is to the abbot of Peterborough, Walter of St. Edmund, a friend of Grosseteste, who possessed Grosseteste's *Templum dei* before his death in 1246. See S. Harrison Thomson, *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, 1235-1253* (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 70-74, 203.

6. Item volumen continens sententias petri lumbardi. secundo folio incipiente *Sepe secundum*.

7. Item volumen continens sententias petri lumbardi. secundo folio incipiente *Rei propter*. (B. 7-8)

8. Item uolumen continens concordantias super bibliam. secundo folio incipiente *de abissis terre*. (B. 1)

9. Item librum continentem Augustinum de opere monachorum cum aliis viginti tribus tractatibus. secundo folio incipiente *enucliacius autem*. (B. 9) /

p. 247 10. Item volumen continens magistrum historiarum. secundo folio incipiente *pluraliter decem est*.

11. Item volumen continens historias scolasticas. secundo folio incipiente *Cadentes tenebre*.

12. Item volumen continens magistrum historiarum. secundo folio incipiente *deo creata est*. (B. 10-12)

13. Item librum continentem ^[a] tractatum de viciis et virtutibus. ^[b] sermones Petri manducatoris et ^[c] tractatum vocatum paradysus. secundo folio incipiente *Autem extraxit*. (B. 13)

14. Item libellum de septem uiciis et eorum remediis. secundo folio incipiente *Et hominem*. (B. 14)

15. Item volumen continens nouam legendam sanctorum. secundo folio incipiente *de sancto leone*.

6-7. Peter Lombard (d. 1160). *Sententiae*. Ed. *Petri Lombardi Libri IV Sententiarum studio*, 2 vols. (Quaracchi, 1916); *Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis episcopi Sententiae in IV libros distinctae*, books 1 and 2 (Quaracchi-Grottaferrata, 1971), pp. 117*-36* (for manuscripts).

8. *concordantias*. This is almost certainly the so-called 'third concordance' (prologue begins 'Cuilibet volenti requirere'; text begins 'A a a. Jer. I.a., domine deus ecce nescio lo') See R. H. Rouse and M. A. Rouse, 'The Verbal Concordance to the Scriptures', *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 44 (1974) 5-30; the manuscripts are listed on 27-30.

9. St. Augustine, bishop of Hippo (354-430). *De opere monachorum*. Ed. J. Zycha, *Sancti Aureli Augustini opera* (CSEL 41; Vienna, 1900), pp. 531-96.

10-12. Peter Comestor (d. 1178). *Historia scholastica*. PL 198. 1053-1722. For manuscripts, see F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium biblicum medii aevi*, 10 vols. (Madrid, 1950-79), nos. 6543-65.

13. [a] *tractatum de viciis et virtutibus*. The *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* of Guillaume Peyraut (mid-thirteenth century). See A. Dondaine, 'Guillaume Peyraut: vie et œuvres', *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 18 (1948) 162-236; also T. Kaeppli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum medii aevi* 2 (Rome, 1975), no. 1622.

[b] Peter Comestor. *Sermones*. Some of the sermons have been printed in PL 198; see M.-M. Lebreton, 'Recherches sur les manuscrits contenant des sermons de Pierre le Mangeur', *Bulletin d'information de l'Institut de recherche et d'histoire des textes* 2 (1953) 25-44 and 4 (1955) 35-36.

[c] *Paradysus*. Attributed to Heraclitus, bishop of Ephesus. In reality by Palladius (fourth century).

14. *libellum ... remediis*. See S. Wenzel, 'The Source for the "Remedia" of the Parson's Tale', *Traditio* 27 (1971) 433-53.

15-16. *nouam legendam sanctorum*. Probably the *Nova legenda* of Peter Calo (d. 1310). See

16. Item volumen continens legendam sanctorum. secundo folio incipiente *fine cruciatus*. (B. 15-16)

17. Item volumen continens vnam postillam super librum primum paralipomenon. Euangelium sancti marci ordinarie glose. Epistolas Iacobi. Petri Iohannis et Iude glosatas. Et librum ecclesiasticum. secundo folio incipiente *viam domini*. (B. 17)

18. Item volumen continens quatuor euangelia. Epistolas Pauli. Petri. iohannis. Actus apostolorum et apocalipsim. secundo folio incipiente *Est cuius*. (B. 18)

19. Item librum continentem Augustinum super psalmum beati immaculati. secundo folio incipiente *Rior ad interiorem*. (B. 19)

20. Item libellum continentem tullium de senectute. secundo folio incipiente *iam enim ipsius*.^a (B. 71)

21. Item libellum continentem ambrosium de penitencia. secundo folio incipiente *a peccato*. (B. 22)

22. Item libellum continentem ^[a]exposicionem cuiusdam super quatuor libros regum in parte. ^[b]Et tractatus magistri Willelmi Paul ad regem et ministros suos. secundo folio incipiente *Samaritani*. (B. 24)

23. Item quaternum de nouem sextariis continentem ^[a]tractatum ad omne genus hominum Et ^[b]tractatum cur deus homo. secundo folio incipiente *bonum commune*. (B. 25)

^a est de philosophia in marg.

J. Quétif and J. Échard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum recensiti* ..., 2 vols. (Paris, 1719-21), I. 511.

19. St. Augustine, bishop of Hippo. On psalm 118 (CCL 40. 1664-1776; Turnhout, 1956).

20. M. T. Cicero. *De senectute*. Ed. J. G. Baier, *M. Tullii Ciceronis Cato maior de senectute ad T. Pomponium Atticum* (Leipzig, 1864).

21. St. Ambrose, bishop of Milan (c. 339-397). *De paenitentia*. Ed. O. Faller, *Sancti Ambrosii opera* (CSEL 73; Vienna, 1955), pp. 117-206.

22. [b] William of Pagula (d. c. 1332). *Epistula ad regem Edwardum III*. Printed as the work of Simon Islip by J. Moisant, *De speculo regis Edwardi III ... quem ... conscripsit Simon Islip* (Paris, 1891), pp. 83-123; but see L. E. Boyle, 'The *Oculus Sacerdotis* and Some Other Works of William of Pagula', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Ser., 5 (1955) 81-110, and 'William of Pagula and the *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*', *Mediaeval Studies* 32 (1970) 329-36.

23. [a] John of Wales (d. 1303). *Communiloquium siue Summa collationum ad omne genus hominum*. See W. A. Pantin, 'John of Wales and Medieval Humanism' in *Medieval Studies Presented to Aubrey Gwynn, S.J.*, ed. J. A. Watt et al. (Dublin, 1961), pp. 297-315. For editions, see V. Scholderer, 'The Early Editions of Johannes Vallensis', *Cylchgrawn Llfregell Genedlaethol Cymru: The National Library of Wales Journal* 3 (1944) 76-79. See also R. A. Pratt, 'Chaucer and the Hand that Fed Him', *Speculum* 41 (1966) 619-42; B. Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Oxford, 1960), pp. 51-55.

[b] St. Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury (1033-1109). *Cur Deus homo*. Ed. F. S. Schmitt, *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi Opera omnia*, 6 vols. (Edinburgh, 1938-46), 2. 37-133.

24. Item quaternum de septem sextariis continentem epistolas pauli glosatas. secundo folio incipiente *hinc ut vobis*. (B. 26)

25. Item volumen continens enchiridion Augustini cum x. libris eiusdem. secundo folio incipiente *sine fide*. (B. 20)

26. Item volumen continens ^[a] Augustinum lxxxiii. questionibus cum ^[b] xiiii. libris anselmi. secundo folio incipiente *propter forum mortuum*. (B. 21)

27. Item volumen continens ^[a] conclusiones libri ethicorum. ^[b] tabulam super exameron ambrosii. ^[c] tabulam super opus imperfectum Iohannis Crisostomi. ^[d] Sermones losani et ^[e] letturam fratris Iohannis holcote super librum sapiencie incomplete. secundo folio incipiente *neque bouem*. (B. 23)

DE IURE CANONICO ET CIUILI

28. Vnum volumen continens decretales. secundo folio incipiente *non veram firmam in lettura*. A.

29. Item volumen continens decretum. secundo folio incipiente *merita secundum*. (B. 28-29)

30. Item volumen continens decretum. secundo folio incipiente *aliquid ut uir*. (B. 30)

31. Item volumen continens rosarium. secundo folio incipiente *bunt continentur*. (B. 31)

25. St. Augustine, bishop of Hippo. *Enchiridion ad Laurentium seu De fide, spe et caritate*. Ed. O. Scheel (Tübingen, 1903; rpt. Frankfurt, 1968); see *Clavis patrum latinorum*, no. 295. Now Cambridge. Trinity College ms. O. 10. 8.

26. [a] St. Augustine, bishop of Hippo. *De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, ed. A. Mutzenbecher (CCL 44 A; Turnhout, 1975), pp. 11-249; *Clavis patrum latinorum*, no. 289.

[b] See H. Denifle and É. Chatelain, eds., *Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis* 1 (Paris, 1889), p. 644, where there is a collection gathered together of books of Anselm; 'Originalia Anselmi, de Veritate; de Libertate arbitrii; de Casu diaboli; Cur Deus homo; de Conceptu virginali; de Processione Spiritus Sancti; de Predestinatione, gratia et libero arbitrio; de Monologio'. Perhaps this is a similar collection.

27. [a] Aristotle. *Ethica (Conclusiones)*. Abbreviation of or commentary on the *Ethics*.

[b] St. Ambrose, bishop of Milan. *Exameron*. Ed. C. Schenkl, *Sancti Ambrosii opera* (CSEL 32; Vienna, 1896), pp. 3-261; see *Clavis patrum latinorum*, no. 123; Stegmüller, *Repertorium biblicum*, no. 1227.

[c] Pseudo-John Chrysostom. *Opus imperfectum in Matthaem*. Printed PG 56. 611-946.

[d] James of Lausanne, O.P. (d. 1321). See Kaeppli, *Scriptores* 2 (Rome, 1975), nos. 2088-89.

[e] *Iohannis holcot*. Almost certainly a mistake for Robert Holcot, O.P. (d. 1349). For his commentary on the book of Wisdom, see Smalley, *English Friars*, pp. 137 ff. This commentary was probably written after 1334.

28. Pope Gregory IX (c. 1170-1241). Ed. A. Friedberg, *Corpus iuris canonici*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1879-81; rpt. Graz, 1955), 2. 4-927.

29-30. Gratian (fl. 1140). *Decretum siue Concordantia discordantium canonum*. Ed. Friedberg, *ibid.*, 1.

31. Guido de Baysio (d. 1313). *Lectura domini Guidonis de Baysio archidiaconi super decreto quam ipse Rosarium appellavit* (Lyons, 1516).

32. Item volumen continens ostiensem in summa. folio secundo folio incipiente *tam spiritualis*. (B. 32)

33. Item quaternum continentem kalendarium super speculum hystoriale in quatuor volumina consequenter subscripta. secundo folio incipiente *se ipsam*. (B. 37) /

p. 248 34. Item primum volumen speculi hystorialis. secundo folio incipiente *causis utiliter*.

35. Item secundum uolumen speculi historialis. secundo folio incipiente *tunc philetus*.

36. Item tertium uolumen speculi historialis. secundo folio incipiente *lo victos uersa*.

37. Item speculi historialis uolumen quartum. secundo folio incipiente *equum sedentem*. (B. 33-36)

38. Item uolumen continens summam confessorum. secundo folio incipiente *de pignoribus*.

39. Item volumen continens summam confessorum. secundo folio incipiente *Concordie*. (B. 38-39)

40. Item volumen continens summam summarum. secundo folio incipiente *affigi cruci*.

41. Item aliud volumen continens ^[a] summam summarum cum ^[b] constitutionibus ottonis et ottoni et aliis. secundo folio incipiente *et patronos*. (B. 40-41)

32. *Ostiensem in summa*. Hostiensis (Henricus de Segusio, cardinal of Ostia [d. 1271]). *Summa super titulis Decretalium*. Ed. Strasbourg, 1512 etc. See J. F. von Schulte, *Die Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des canonischen Rechts von Gratian bis auf die Gegenwart*, 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1875-80), 2. 123-27.

33. Iohannes Hautfuney. *Tabula in Vincentii Bellovacensis Speculum historiale*, unedited. Alphabetical table of contents. Jean Hautfuney was bishop of Avranches (d. 1358).

34-37. Vincent of Beauvais (1190-1264?). *Speculum historiale* (Strasbourg, 1473 etc.; Douai, 1624, rpt. Graz, 1964). See G. G. Guzman, 'A Growing Tabulation of Vincent of Beauvais' *Speculum Historiale Manuscripts*, *Scriptorium* 29 (1975) 122-25.

38-39. John of Freiburg, lector of the Dominican Order (d. 1314). *Summa confessorum* (c. 1298; ed. Lyons, 1518 etc.). See L. E. Boyle, 'The *Summa Confessorum* of John of Freiburg and the Popularization of the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas and of Some of His Contemporaries' in *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies*, 2 vols., ed. A. A. Maurer et al. (Toronto, 1974), 2. 245-68.

40-41. William of Pagula (d. c. 1332). *Summa summarum*. See L. Boyle, 'The *Summa Summarum* and Some Other English Works of Canon Law' in *Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, ed. S. Kuttner and J. J. Ryan (Vatican City, 1965), pp. 415-56, where the prologue and capitula are edited (440-51), and manuscripts listed (452-54).

41. [b] The legatine constitutions of Otto at the Council of London of 1237 (F. M. Powicke and C. R. Cheney, eds., *Councils and Synods with Other Documents Relating to the English Church II. A. D. 1205-1313*, 2 vols. [Oxford, 1964], 1. 245-59), and the legatine Constitutions of Ottobono Fieschi (later Pope Adrian V) at the Council of London of 1248 (ibid. 2. 747-92).

42. Item volumen continens summam que vocatur pars oculi. secundo folio incipiente *li^o vi^{to}*. (B. 42)
43. Item volumen continens ^[a] dialogum gregorii. ^[b] meditationes anselmi. ^[c] regulam sancti Basilii. secundo folio incipiente *interrumpe*.^b (B. 27)
44. Item libellum institutionum. secundo folio incipiente *grecos egregius*.
45. Item librum institutionum. secundo folio incipiente *videntur posse*. (B. 43-44)
46. Item librum Codicis. secundo folio incipiente *ut sciant tam*.
47. Item librum codicis. secundo folio *nullis concedimus*.^c (B. 45-46)
48. Item librum digesti noui. secundo folio incipiente
49. Item vnum digestum nouum. secundo folio incipiente *ficauerunt non tenebunt*. (B. 47-48)
50. Item librum continentem tractatum super decretales. secundo folio incipiente *vt xxiii*. (B. 49)
51. Item librum continentem concordantiam cum decretalibus. secundo folio incipiente *rionum habere*. (B. 50)
52. Item quaternos diuersorum voluminum continentes ad inuicem xlii. sexternos Iuris ciuilis et canonici. secundo folio incipiente (B. 53)

^b Iste liber est de theologia *in marg.*

^c Item ... concedimus *in marg.*

42. The *Pars oculi* is the first of the three parts of the *Oculus sacerdotis* of William of Pagula. While the whole often took its title from this first part, the *Pars oculi* also enjoyed a minor, independent circulation. See L. E. Boyle, 'The *Oculus Sacerdotis* and Some Other Works of William of Pagula', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Ser., 5 (1955) 81-110.

43. [a] Gregory the Great. *Dialogorum libri iv*. Ed. U. Moricca. *Gregorii Magni Dialogi* ... (Rome, 1924). If the cataloguer intended to note the existence of a single dialogue, it was doubtless the second dialogue, which concerns the life of St. Benedict and which circulated independently.

[b] The collection of meditations which circulated under the name of St. Anselm of Canterbury during the Middle Ages is printed (with much extraneous material) in PL 158. 709-820. After Anselm's death there were added to his original collection any number of anonymous writings; see the numerous studies of A. Wilmart cited in his 'Une prière au saint patron attribuée à saint Anselme' in *Auteurs spirituels et textes dévots du moyen âge latin* (Paris, 1932; rpt. 1971), pp. 147-61.

[c] St. Basil, archbishop of Caesarea (330?-379).

44-45. Justinianus Imperator (483?-565). *Institutiones*. This is the second part of the *Corpus iuris civilis*. Ed. P. Krüger in vol. 1 of *Corpus iuris civilis*, 21st edition (Dublin, 1970).

46-47. Justinianus Imperator. *Codex*. In the Middle Ages, *Codex* referred to books 1-9 of the Code of Justinian, which constitutes the second part of the *Corpus iuris civilis*. Ed. P. Krüger in vol. 2 of *Corpus iuris civilis*, 15th edition (Dublin, 1970). See A. Van Hove, *Prolegomena ad codicem iuris canonici*, 2nd edition (Antwerp-Rome, 1945), p. 214.

48-49. Justinianus Imperator. *Digestum*. In the Middle Ages, books 39-50 of the *Digestum* were known as the *Digestum novum*: see Van Hove, *ibid.* Ed. T. Mommsen in vol. 1 of *Corpus iuris civilis*.

50-52. See von Schulte, *Die Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des canonischen Rechts* 2. 492 ff. for various 'tractatus' on decretals.

53. Item volumen continens henricum Bractone in iuribus et consuetudinibus anglie. secundo folio incipiente *et maiori*.

54. Item volumen continens henricum Bractone de legibus et consuetudinibus anglie. secundo folio incipiente *adiutorium*. (B. 51-52)

55. Item volumen continens omnes copias munimentorum ecclesie Glastoniensis et vocatur secretum abbatis. secundo folio incipiente *et cuius totus*. quod^d uolumen semper remanet in custodia abbatis.^e (B. 54)

56. Item librum continentem cronicam Pheculphi luxouiensis episcopi. secundo folio incipiente *Israelite gentis*. (B. 55)

57. Item librum continentem etates mundi cum aliis. secundo folio incipiente *Genuit Jareth*. (B. 57)

58. Item vnum quaternum de ix. sexternis continentem cronicam martini. secundo folio incipiente *federati*. (B. 56)

59. Item volumen continens gesta Ay de verbona in gallico rimitico. secundo folio incipiente *et de vitaille*. (B. 59)

60. Item volumen continens x. precepta in gallico. secundo folio incipiente *et ordina*. (B. 58)

61. Item volumen continens gesta infancium GWyllelmi de curto naso cum aliis xii. gestis. secundo folio incipiente *oil Biay fitz*. (B. 60)

^d In the text quod is underlined, but this is clearly a scribal error.

^e Nota hic in marg.

53-54. Henry Bracton (c. 1210-68). *De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae*. Ed. G. E. Woodbine, 4 vols. (New Haven, 1915-42). Now London, British Library ms. Addit. 21614.

55. The Secretum abbatis (vel domini) is a 'fair abbatial copy' of the Great Cartulary of Glastonbury, ed. A. Watkin, *The Great Cartulary of Glastonbury* (Somerset Record Society 59, 63, 64; Frome, 1944-50). Now Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Wood empt. 1.

56. Freculph, bishop of Lisieux (ninth century). *Chronica*. PL 106. 917-1258.

58. Martin of Poland (or of Troppau) (d. 1278). *Chronicon pontificum et imperatorum*. Extracts edited by L. Weiland (MGH *Scriptorum* 22; Hanover, 1872. rpt. Stuttgart-New York, 1963), pp. 397-475. See also W. Matthews, 'Martinus Polonus and Some Later Chroniclers' in D. A. Pearsall and R. A. Waldron, eds., *Medieval Literature and Civilization: Studies in Memory of G. N. Garmonsway* (London, 1969), pp. 275-88. In *Medieval Libraries of Great Britain*, p. 91, Ker lists a surviving fifteenth-century copy of this manuscript from Glastonbury.

59. This is probably an abbreviation and misreading which represents the work of Bertrand de Dar-sur-Aube (thirteenth century), *Aimeri de Narbonne*. Ed. L. Demaison, *Aymeri de Narbonne, Chanson de geste*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1887). See R. Bossuat, *Manuel bibliographique de la littérature française du moyen âge* (Melun, 1951), nos. 154-62.

60. Possibly the *Somme le roi* of Laurent d'Orléans (fl. 1279). See Quétiif-Échard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum* 1. 386-88. Also *An Illuminated Manuscript of 'La somme le roy'*, ed. E. G. Millar (Oxford, 1953).

61. *Enfances Guillaume*. Ed. J. L. Perrier, *Les enfances Guillaume: chanson de geste du XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1933). There exists an unedited prose version, which may in fact be indicated here. See Bossuat, *Manuel bibliographique*, nos. 329-34.

DE PHILOSOPHIA

62. Textum physicorum aristotelis de noua translacione. secundo folio incipiente (B. 61)

63. Commentatorem super libros physicorum. secundo folio incipiente (B. 62) /

p. 249 64. Egidium super libros physicorum. secundo folio incipiente (B. 63)

65. Thomam de alquino super libros physicorum. secundo folio incipiente (B. 64)

66. Textum metaphysice cum expositione magistri iohannis Rous in vno volumine. secundo folio incipiente (B. 65)

67. Commentatorem super libros de anima. secundo folio incipiente (B. 67)

68. Commentatorem super libros celi et mundi. secundo folio (B. 66)

69. Textum veteris logice. secundo folio incipiente *duo ut socrates*.

70. Item alium textum veteris logice. secundo folio incipiente *quod sit*. (B. 69-70)

71. Item volumen continens librum topicorum. secundo folio incipiente *quicquid non*.^f (B. 68)

^f *The next entry* Item vndecim volumina quorum quodlibet habent W. et M. signatum cancelled.

62. Aristoteles. *Physica. Translatio nova*. On manuscripts, see G. Lacombe et al., *Aristoteles latinus ... pars posterior* (Cambridge, 1955), p. 1340. Ed. A. Mansion, *Physica, translatio vaticana* (Aristoteles latinus 7. 2; Bruges-Paris, 1957).

63. Averroes (1126-98). See *Averrois commentaria et introductiones in omnes libros Aristotelis*, 12 vols. (Venice, 1562-74), vol. 4.

64. Giles of Rome, archbishop of Bourges (d. 1316). *Commentarii in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis* (Padua, 1483 etc.).

65. Thomas Aquinas. *Sententia libri Physicorum*. Ed. M. Maggiolo, *S. Thomae Aquinatis In octo libros physicorum expositio* (Turin, 1954); trans. R. J. Blackwell et al. as *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* (New Haven, 1963). See C. H. Lohr, 'Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Robertus-Wilhelmus', *Traditio* 29 (1973) 165.

66. Aristoteles. *Metaphysica*. There are several Latin translations of this work. See G. Lacombe et al., *Aristoteles latinus ... pars prior* (Rome, 1939), pp. 61-66; G. Diem, 'Les traductions gréco-latines de la *Métaphysique* au moyen âge: le problème de la *Metaphysica Vetus*', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 49 (1967) 7-71. John Rous is not listed in A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500* (Oxford, 1958). In a letter of 19 October 1979, Professor Charles H. Lohr kindly informed me that he knows of no other reference to John Rous or his commentary. See Glorieux, *Répertoire* 2. 366, for references to commentaries on this text by Paris masters.

67-68. Averroes = Commentator. See above, no. 63 [vol. 6].

69-70. Aristoteles. *Vetus logica*. See *Aristoteles latinus ... pars prior*, pp. 44-45 and *pars posterior*, p. 787.

71. Aristoteles. *Topica*. Ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Aristoteles latinus 5. 1-3; Leiden, 1969).

DE MEDICINA

72. Vnum libellum continentem summam Galteri de Aquila. secundo folio incipiente *tempus et sexum*. (B. 72)

73. Item volumen continens ^[a]librum de animalibus. ^[b]secretum secretorum aristotelis et ^[c]tractatum de sensu et sensato. secundo folio incipiente *et eciam quedam*. (B. 74)

74. Item volumen continens librum secundum canonis auicenne. secundo folio incipiente *rubificans aut*. (B. 73)

75. Item vnum quaternum de nouem sexternis continentem questiones magistri Petri hispanici super viaticum asaac. secundo folio incipiente *calor*. (B. 75)

76. Item quaternum de decem sexternis qui sic incipit cum tota medicina. secundo folio incipiente *non potest supra duo*. (B. 76)

GRAMATICA

77. Vnum volumen continens papiam. secundo folio incipiente *abel*. (B. 77)

78. Item volumen continens hugucionem. secundo folio incipiente *s. tibicen*. (B. 78)

72. Walter Agilon (thirteenth century). *Summa medicinalis*. Ed. P. Diepgen, *Gualteri Agiloni Summa medicinalis* (Leipzig, 1911). See E. Wickersheimer, *Dictionnaire biographique des médecins en France au moyen âge* (Paris, 1936), pp. 170-73.

73. [a] Aristoteles. *De generatione animalium*. Ed. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, 2 vols. (Aristoteles latinus 17; Bruges-Paris, 1966). See *Aristoteles latinus ... pars prior*, pp. 80-85.

[b] Pseudo-Aristoteles. *Secretum secretorum*. Ed. R. Steele, *Opera hactenus inedita fratris Rogeri Baconis*, 16 vols. (Oxford, 1909-40), 5. 25-172.

[c] Aristoteles. *De sensu et sensato*. See *Aristoteles latinus ... pars prior*, pp. 59-61.

74. Avicenna (980?-1037). Ed. *Liber canonis* (Venice, 1507; rpt. Hildesheim, 1964). See O. Cameron Gruner, *A Treatise on the Canon of Medicine of Avicenna ...* (London, 1930; rpt. New York, 1970).

75. Peter of Spain (c. 1213-77) = Pope John XXI. Probably his questions on the works of Isaac Israeli on universal diets and particular diets, although I am unable to find either of these works listed under the generic title *viaticum*. See, however, M. Alonso, *Pedro Hispano: obras filosóficas*, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1949-52), vol. 2: *Comentario al 'De Anima' de Aristóteles*, pp. 17-18, where he discusses Isaac Israeli. On p. 16 (no. 11) Alonso lists 'Comentarios a Abū Yazzār Aḥmad: Viaticum'. This suggests that there may be a confusion of names or authors. Ed. *Opera omnia Isaaci* (Lyons, 1515 etc.). See also Lynn Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*, 6 vols. (New York, 1923-41), 2. 488-516; on pp. 504 ff. Thorndike gives a representative selection of the questions.

77, 82. Papias. Pseudonym of an Italian grammarian of the eleventh century. *Elementarium doctrinae rudimentum*. Ed. Milan, 1476 etc. See G. Goetz, *Papias und seine Quellen* (Munich, 1903); also Stegmüller, *Repertorium biblicum*, no. 6259.

78. Huguccio of Pisa, bishop of Ferrara (d. 1210). *Liber derivationum*. See C. Riessner, *Die 'Magnae Derivationes' des Uguccione da Pisa und ihre Bedeutung für die romanische Philologie* (Rome, 1965); C. Leonardi, 'La vita e l'opera di Uguccio da Pisa decretista', *Studia gratiana* 4 (1956-57) 37-120.

79. Item volumen continens prohemium catholicon cum a.b.c. litteris eiusdem. secundo folio incipiente *pellantur*.

80. Item volumen continens d.e.f.g.h.j.k.l.m. litteras de chatholicon. secundo folio incipiente *uero sic dicit*.

81. Item continens n.o.p.q.r.s.t.v.x.y.z. litteras de catholicon. secundo folio incipiente *dedi*. (B. 79-81)

82. Item elementarium papie cum aliis. secundo folio incipiente *dico per interempcionem*.^g (B. 82)

83. Item volumen continens litteras papales pro instructione dictandi qui liber incipit nouiciorum studia. secundo folio incipiente *seretur*. (B. 83) /

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DE SERUICIO DIUINO

84. Volumen continens que ad missam pertinent de tempore a pascha usque ad aduentum domini et de sanctis a festo sancti cuthberti usque festum sancti andree. secundo folio incipiente *in azimis*.

85. Item volumen continens que ad missam pertinent de tempore ab aduentu domini^h vsque ad vigiliam pasche et de sanctis a vigilia andree usque ad festum sancti cuthberti. secundo folio incipiente *ad te domine*. (B. 84-87. See nos. 87 and 88 below.)

86. Item volumen continens missale pro magno altari. secundo folio incipiente *sanctorum custodiat*. (B. 88)

87. Item volumen continens que ad missas pertinent de tempore ab aduentu domini usque ad vigiliam Pasche et de sanctis a vigilia sancti andree usque ad festum sancti cuthberti. secundo folio incipiente *rursum ysaias*.

88. Item volumen continens que ad missas pertinent de tempore a vigilia pasche usque ad aduentum domini et de sanctis a festo sancti cuthberti usque vigiliam sancti andree. secundo folio incipiente *sumat effectum*. (B. 84-87. See nos. 84 and 85 above.)

89. Item volumen continens seruicium de tempore. secundo folio incipiente *ne ne*.ⁱ

^g *The next entry* De theologia. Volumen continens dialogum gregorii. meditationes anselmi. regulam sancti Basilii. secundo folio incipiente interrupte *cancelled*; continetur supra *added above the line*.

^h domini *added above the line by a later hand*.

ⁱ frater J. Broun habet *in marg*.

79-81. John Balbi of Genoa. *Catholicon* (appeared in 1286). Ed. *Summa que vocatur Catholicon* ... (Venice, 1483 etc.). See Stegmüller, *Repertorium biblicum*, no. 4220. This is an alphabetical dictionary partly based on the *Liber derivationum* of Huguccio of Pisa.

83. Now Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale ms. lat 4176 A. For a study of these collections of letters, see W. A. Pantin, 'English Monastic Letter-books' in J. G. Edwards, V. H. Galbraith, E. F. Jacob, eds., *Historical Essays in Honour of James Tait* (Manchester, 1933), pp. 201-22.

90. Item uolumen continens seruicium de sanctis. secundo folio incipiente *velles*. (B. 89-92. See nos. 92 and 93 below.)

91. Item volumen continens psalterium cum ymnario. canticarium cum officio defunctorum. secundo folio incipiente *usquequo gratiam*. (B. 93-97. See nos. 94, 95, 96 and 97 below.)

92. Item volumen continens seruicium sanctorum per annum cum communi sanctorum. secundo folio incipiente *abhominatur dominus*.

93. Item volumen continens seruicium de tempore per totum annum. secundo folio incipiente *sicut ciuitas*. (B. 89-92. See nos. 89 and 90 above.)

94. Item volumen continens psalterium cum officio duplici defunctorum de vsu seculari. secundo folio incipiente *seruite domino*.

95. Item volumen continens psalterium cum officio defunctorum notato et ymnario. secundo folio incipiente *leucie*.

96. Item vnum psalterium cum ymnario, officio defunctorum et psalterio beate marie edito a stephano cantuariense archiepiscopo. secundo folio incipiente *et nunc reges*.

97. Item vnum libellum continentem psalterium in gallico. secundo folio incipiente *Adresse*. (B. 93-97. See no. 91 above.)

98. Item volumen continens ordinem processionum per totum annum. secundo folio incipiente *eiusdem*. (B. 99)

99. Item volumen continens sequencias notatas per totum annum in choro cantandas. secundo folio incipiente *seu ne pereant*. (B. 98).

96. Stephen Langton, archbishop of Canterbury (d. 1228). His rhymed psalter. Ed. G. M. Dreves, *Psalteria rhythmica: Gereimte Psalterien des Mittelalters in Analecta hymnica medii aevi* 35-36 (Leipzig, 1900-1901), 35. 153-71. See also F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 46-47.

99. Identified in B. 98 as Troparium.

II

LIST B. CAMBRIDGE, TRINITY COLLEGE MS. R. 5. 16, PP. 227-229

p. 227 Librario dedit hos libros de Theologia. ^[1] Concordancias biblie. ^[2] Libellum continentem sermones de tempore et sanctis. ^[3] Libellum continentem sermones diuersorum tractatum cum expositione super matheum et parabolas salomonis. ^[4] Libellum continentem adaptaciones ad sermones cum quolibeto thome de alquino. ^[5] Libellum continentem diuersos sermones magistri Roberti Grosetest Lincolniensis episcopi. ^[6] Libellum continentem diuersos sermones per totum. ^[7-8] Sentenciarum Petri lumbardi uolumina duo. ^[9] Augustinum de opere monachorum cum processu armachani contra mendicantes. ^[10-12] Histo-

riarum scolasticarum uolumina tria. ^[13] Tractatum de uirtutibus et uiciis.

^[14] Libellum de septem uiciis et eorum remediis. ^[15-16] Noue legende sanctorum uolumina duo. ^[17] Postillas super primum paralipomenon et librum ecclesiasticum in uno uolumine. ^[18] Nouum testamentum preter epistolas iacobi et iude.

. 228 ^[19] Augustinum super psalmum beati immaculati. ^[20] Enchiridion Augustini. /

^[21] Augustinum octaginta trium questionum et libros anselmi in uno uolumine.

^[22] Ambrosium de penitencia. ^[23] Conclusiones libri ethicorum. sermones losani. et lecturam holcote super librum sapiencie in uno uolumine. ^[24] Expositionem super quatuor libros regum et tractatum magistri Willelmi Paul ad regem et ministros suos in uno uolumine. ^[25] Tractatum ad omne genus hominum in quaternis. ^[26] Epistolas pauli glosatas in quaternis. ^[27] Dialogum gregorii et meditationes anselmi in uno uolumine.

De iure Canonico et Ciuili. ^[28-29] Decretalium uolumina duo. ^[30] Decreta.

^[31] Rosarium. ^[32] Ostiensem in summa. ^[33-36] Speculi historialis uolumina quatuor. ^[37] Tabulam super specula in quaternis. ^[38-39] Summe confessorum

uolumina duo. ^[40-41] Summe summarum uolumina duo. ^[42] Summam que uocatur pars oculi. ^[43-44] Institutionum uolumina duo. ^[45-46] Codicis uolumina

duo. ^[47-48] Digesti noui uolumina duo. ^[49] Tractatum super decretales.

^[50] Concordancias iuris canonici et ciuilis. ^[51-52] Bractone de iuribus et consuetudinibus anglie uolumina duo. ^[53] Tractatum iuris canonici et ciuilis in quaternis. ^[54] Librum qui uocatur secretum domini continens copias munimentorum istius ecclesie. ^[55] Cronicam Pheculphi. ^[56] Cronicam Martini diminute.

^[57] Libellum de etatibus mundi. ^[58] Volumen continens tractatum de decem preceptis in gallico. ^[59] Gesta Ay de uerbona in gallico. ^[60] Gesta Willelmi de

curto naso in gallico cum aliis gestis duodecim.

. 229 De philosophia. ^[61] Textum physicorum aristo < ti > lis / de noua translatione.

^[62] Commentatorem super eosdem. ^[63] Egidium super eosdem. ^[64] Thomam de alquino super eosdem. ^[65] Methaphysicam aristotilis cum expositione

super eandem in uno uolumine. ^[66] Commentatorem super libros celi et mundi.

^[67] Commentatorem super libros de anima. ^[68] Librum topicorum aristotilis.

^[69-70] Veteris logice uolumina duo. ^[71] Tullium de senectute.

De medicina. ^[72] Summam Galteri de aquila. ^[73] Secundum librum canonis

Auicenne. ^[74] Librum de animalibus. ^[75] Questiones super uiaticum ysaac.

^[76] Tractatum de tota medicina in quaternis.

De gramatica. ^[77] Papiam. ^[78] Hugucionem. ^[79-81] Catholicon in tribus uoluminibus condistinctum. ^[82] Elementarium papie. ^[83] Libellum continentem

litteras papales pro instructione dictandi.

De seruicio diuino. ^[84-87] Missalia duo in quatuor uoluminibus condistincta.

^[88] Item unum missale perpulchrum pro magno altari. ^[89-92] Duo antiphonaria

in quatuor uoluminibus condistincta. ^[93-97] Quinque psalteria quorum unum est

in gallico. ^[98] Troparium continens sequencias notatas per annum. ^[99] Ordinale agendorum in processionibus per annum.

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Surviving Glastonbury Manuscripts from the Monington Lists

Cambridge, Trinity College ms. 0. 10. 8: Augustini quaedam.

= A. 25 (B. 20)

Fol. 1: A surmounted by a mitre; below W. M.

Fly-leaf: Liber Sancte Marie Glaston' de dono Reuerendi patris Walteri Monyton eiusdem loci Abbatis, Et appreciatus in xx. s.

London, British Library ms. Addit. 21614: Bracton.

= A. 53 (B. 51-52)

Fol. 1v: Liber monasterii glastoniensis de perquisito bone memorie Walteri de Moniton. quondam abbatis ibidem. in quo continetur videlicet <H>enricus brattoniensis de iuribus et consuetudinibus Anglie. secundo folio. *Et maiori*.

Fol. 2v: W. M. Surmounted by an abbot's mitre.

Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Wood empt. 1: Secretum domini.

= A. 55 (B. 54)

Fol. 14v: Liber monasterii Glastonie de perquisito bone memorie Walteri de Mointon quondam abbatis ibidem, in quo continentur videlicet omnes copie munimentorum ecclesie Glastoniensis et vocatur secretum abbatis, secundo folio *Et cuius totus*.

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale ms. lat 4176 A.

= A. 83 (B. 83)

There were two men called John Crosse who were priors at Glastonbury Abbey, the first in the late fourteenth century, the second in the mid-fifteenth. Ker, *Medieval Libraries of Great Britain*, p. 264 suggests that the second John Crosse owned this manuscript, which consists of three separate items bound together in the fourteenth century with the following ex-libris: 'Liber monasterii Glastoniensis. de perquisito ffratris Johannis Crosse. Prioris ibidem. in quo continentur. videlicet. Quoddam registrum. pape. quod. incipit. nouitiorum studia. Cronica. Nicholai Triuet. Constitutiones benedictine ad nigros monachos'. Since the first item can be identified from Monington's list it seems that the reference in the ex libris is also to the first rather than the second John Crosse.

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SIGER OF BRABANT ON FABLES AND FALSEHOODS IN RELIGION

Armand Maurer, C.S.B.

WHILE Siger of Brabant was teaching philosophy at the University of Paris in the early 1270's, it was obligatory for him to lecture on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. Reading and commenting on book 2, he had to deal with a subject warmly debated since antiquity by both pagan and Christian writers – the role of fables or myths in religion and philosophy.¹ His comments on this topic are of interest not only for the general interpretation of his views on the relation between philosophy and religion, but also as a possible background for several propositions condemned by the bishop of Paris in 1277 as attacking the Christian religion and theology on the ground that they contain fables and falsehoods. In a wider context, Siger's remarks on the value of *fabulae* in philosophy and religion are an important contribution to the history of this topic in the Middle Ages. The first part of this paper deals with Siger's commentary on *fabulae*, the second with the possible link between his commentary and the condemnation of 1277.

I

The general theme of book 2 of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is the difficulty of arriving at the truth and the hindrances that stand in the way of its achieve-

¹ For the history of the place and value of fables in the early Middle Ages, see H. de Lubac, *Exégèse médiévale. Les quatre sens de l'écriture*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1959-64); B. Stock, *Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century. A Study of Bernard Silvester* (Princeton, 1972); P. Demats, *Fabula. Trois études de mythographie antique et médiévale* (Geneva, 1973); P. Dronke, *Fabula. Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism* (Leiden-Cologne, 1974); J. Pépin, *Mythe et allégorie. Les origines grecques et les contestations judéo-chrétiennes*, 2nd edition (Paris, 1976); M.-D. Chenu, "'Involucrum': le mythe selon les théologiens médiévaux", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 23 (1955) 75-79; E. Jeuneau, 'Lectio philosophorum'. *Recherches sur l'École de Chartres* (Amsterdam, 1973), pp. 127-92.

In the Middle Ages *fabula* was used to translate the Greek *μῦθος*; see Augustine, *De civitate dei* 6. 5 (CCL 47. 170-71; Turnhout, 1955). *Fabula* meant not only myth but also fable or any fictitious story; see Dronke, p. 5.

ment. The book opens with the observation that the investigation of truth is in one way hard and in another easy. 'An indication of this', Aristotle writes, 'is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not collectively fail, but every one says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed.'² Among the difficulties blocking the inquiry into truth is the custom of hearing statements repeated and the consequent formation of the habit of believing them to be true. What we are accustomed to hear is intelligible to us; the unfamiliar, even if it be true, is foreign and unintelligible. Thus the force of custom and habit can stand in the way of the scientific knowledge of truth.³

Aristotle illustrates these general remarks through the popular belief in the mythical and childish elements of the laws (*οἱ νόμοι*), by which he means the traditional customs, regulations and religious ideas of the community.⁴ In his view the traditional lore contains a great deal of wisdom and truth, besides being extremely useful in giving order and cohesion to the state, but its legendary and puerile elements must be weeded out in order to find its solid core of wisdom. Writing specifically of the religious content of the laws in book 12, Aristotle says:

Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth, that [the celestial] bodies are gods and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form with a view to the persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency; they say these gods are in the form of men or like some of the other animals, and they say other things consequent on and similar to these which we have mentioned. But if one were to separate the first point from these additions and take it alone – that they thought the first substances to be gods, one must regard this as an inspired utterance.⁵

Clearly Aristotle did not intend to abandon the religion of his people; indeed he regarded it in a way as divinely revealed. His will shows his piety towards the gods.⁶ But as a philosopher he wanted to separate the legendary and crude form in which his religion was handed down by the poets, who appealed to the

² Aristotle, *Metaph.* 2. 1 (993a31-b4); Oxford translation, ed. W. D. Ross, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1928) cited here and elsewhere.

³ *ibid.* 2.3 (994b32-995a3).

⁴ *ibid.* (995a3-6). For the Greek notion of law, see W. Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture* 1 (New York, 1939), pp. 106-107.

⁵ Aristotle, *Metaph.* 12.8 (1074a38-b10).

⁶ In his will Aristotle directed that life-size statues of Zeus and Athena be erected. See W. Jaeger, *Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of His Development*, trans. R. Robinson, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1948), p. 323.

popular imagination, from the rationally demonstrated truth that there are primary substances which are the first causes of terrestrial events.

Though Aristotle carefully separated philosophy from poetry and its myths, he saw a close connection between them. The lover of myths, he says, is in a sense a lover of wisdom, i.e., a philosopher, for a myth is composed of wonders, and wonder is the origin of all philosophy. In fact, he himself confessed to be a lover of myths.⁷ But, like Plato, he did not expect pure truth from the myths of poetry; this is the province and goal of philosophy.⁸

Such is the Aristotelian background against which we should read Siger's comments on the place of *fabulae* in philosophy and religion. These comments are preserved in two manuscripts: Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm 9559, edited by C. Graiff,⁹ and Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, currently being edited by the present writer.¹⁰ Since these two versions of Siger's commentary are somewhat different, it will be well to consider them separately.

The Munich manuscript contains a literal commentary on Aristotle's statement that custom can impede the inquiry into truth, followed by a formally organized *quaestio*: 'Utrum consuetudo audiendi falsa faciat ea credere esse vera'. The literal commentary is more significant for our topic because here Siger raises the subject of religion.

Aristotle's purpose at the beginning of book 2, Siger explains, is to show the right way to reach the truth and to eliminate false methods and other impediments to learning. The first of these impediments is to take as true what we are accustomed to hear. This is wrong, because slavish reliance on what we are used to hearing leads us to believe it to be true and its opposite to be false. Aristotle finds proof of this – continues Siger – in human laws (*in legibus humanis*). It is a fact that the law (*lex*), taken as a practical guide of action, contains many erroneous notions. For example, the religion of Pythagoras (*lex Pythagorae*) claimed that the soul of a man would enter the body of a beast unless it behaved well in the human body. Similarly the ancient poets amuse us with many fabulous tales (*fabulosis*) about the punishment of souls after death.

⁷ In fragment 668 Aristotle says, 'The more solitary and isolated I am, the more I have come to love myths'. See Jaeger, *ibid.*, p. 321 n. 1. There is a close connection between myth and philosophy: 'And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of Wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders) ...' (Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1.2 [982b17-19]).

⁸ '... poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth' (Plato, *Republic* 10. 608A; trans. B. Jowett [New York, 1937]).

⁹ *Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la métaphysique*, ed. C. Graiff (Louvain, 1948), pp. 73-76.

¹⁰ This manuscript of Siger's *Metaphysics* will be published at Louvain in the series *Philosophes médiévaux*. The *quaestio* is printed below, Appendix A.

Men come to believe these stories because they are used to hearing them, and they are more familiar with crude ideas than with the opposite.¹¹

The term *lex* in this passage translates the Greek νόμος in Aristotle's text. From Siger's use of the word it is clear that, like νόμος, it is meant to include the rules, customs, and religious teachings devised to promote the common good of society. By qualifying these laws as human (*leges humanae*), he implies their distinction from divine laws (*leges divinae*), the former having their origin in men and the latter originating in divine revelation. When St. Thomas commented on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* at this point, he made a clear distinction between the two laws.¹² Siger does not, but at least he implies the distinction. We shall have to return to this later for its possible significance.

Why does the law contain erroneous ideas? Siger finds the explanation in the passage of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, book 12, quoted above. The purpose of law (*lex*) is to make men good. So the laws of the legislator do not express what he really believes about the primary causes, but what he takes to be more advantageous in leading men to virtue. And does not Aristotle remind us in book 10 of the *Ethics* that, although some men are good by nature and others by instruction, still others become virtuous only by childish tales and punishments? Men fear punishment and pain and seek pleasure. By punishing their bad conduct men gradually become good. If we keep in mind the practical purpose of law, we will not be surprised that it expresses childish and even erroneous ideas. This is proof from experience that it is a mistake to believe what we are accustomed to hear.¹³

Siger makes the same point in the *quaestio* that follows the literal commentary on Aristotle's text, though here religion is not mentioned. The argument centers around the possibility of denying self-evident first principles as a result of hearing them frequently and authoritatively contradicted. Siger contends that this is possible, for if something is said, especially by someone famous and in authority, an opinion of its truth is created in the listener. The statement acquires a certain probability in his mind, and, if it is repeated many times, the opinion is strengthened to the point that he might believe it to be true even though it is false. The first principles are no exception to the rule, for even though they are known naturally and with self-evidence, they can be believed to be false. This happens because, as Aristotle explains, custom has the force of nature, and a false habit, produced in the mind by custom, becomes as it were

¹¹ Siger de Brabant, p. 74, ll. 16-27.

¹² St. Thomas, *Sententia super Metaphysicam* 2.5 (995a4) 333, ed. Cathala-Spiazzi (Rome, 1971).

¹³ Siger de Brabant, p. 74, ll. 27-39. See Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.* 10.9 (1179b20-1080a4). The reference in the Graiff edition (l. 32) is wrong.

second nature to us. So the false habit, acting as a kind of second nature in the mind, can make us deny first principles, as the nature of the mind itself inclines it to affirm their truth.¹⁴

The same ideas appear in the Cambridge version of Siger's *Metaphysics*, though arranged and expressed somewhat differently. The literal commentary on Aristotle's text is eliminated and the role of myths and errors in the law and religion is placed at the beginning of the solution of the *quaestio*: 'Utrum consuetudo audiendi falsa faciat credere ea'. This rearrangement and tightening up of the text may have been done by Siger himself in a later lecture course on the *Metaphysics*, though it is conceivably the work of a student recording his lectures. However this may be, the result is to give greater prominence in the Cambridge commentary to the treatment of fables and errors in the law and religion. More significant still, the words *fabulosa et falsa* occur three times in the Cambridge text, recalling the phrase *fabulae et falsa* in the proposition condemned in 1277: 'Quod fabulae et falsa sunt in lege christiana, sicut in aliis'.¹⁵ Is this a mere coincidence or does it indicate some relation of Siger's text to the condemned proposition? We shall return to the question in the second part of this paper.

Siger takes up the role of fables in philosophy and religion again when commenting on book 3 of the *Metaphysics*. Aristotle here shows impatience with mythologists like Hesiod who speak of the gods in metaphorical terms, for example as tasting nectar and ambrosia for their pleasure. He dismisses such language with the comment '... into the subtleties of the mythologists it is not worth our while to inquire seriously'.¹⁶ But this does not deter Siger from commenting briefly on the value of metaphorical and mythical language about the deity. In the Munich manuscript this is part of the literal commentary on Aristotle's text;¹⁷ in the Cambridge manuscript it occupies a formal *quaestio*: 'Utrum philosophantibus competat loqui de divinis fabulose'.¹⁸ He begins with a critique of mythical and metaphorical language about God but ends on the positive note of its limited value for conveying the truth.

The language of myth and metaphor, Siger explains, is sometimes used of God because the speaker cannot raise his mind to a purely intelligible reality, but uses his imagination to depict it. This is how the gods came to be pictured as animals in mythical stories. Others use such language, not because of their mental inability, but in order to conceal the truth. Plato, for one, may have been

¹⁴ *Siger de Brabant*, pp. 74-76.

¹⁵ See below, Appendix A.

¹⁶ Aristotle, *Metaph.* 3.4 (1000a18-19).

¹⁷ *Siger de Brabant* 3, pp. 146-48.

¹⁸ See below, Appendix B.

guilty of this. But the philosopher should avoid myths and metaphors for three reasons. First, they are the meanest and least persuasive ways of teaching truth, being appropriate to poets but hardly to philosophers. Their persuasive power is even less than that of dialectic, which produces an opinion of the truth. At best myths and metaphors give but a slight suspicion of it. The best method is that of philosophy. The second reason for avoiding myths and metaphors is that the truth is hidden in them, whereas it is the business of the philosopher to reveal and not to conceal the truth. Third, teaching the truth in metaphors and myths can sometimes lead students into error, making them believe that divine and intelligible realities are in fact such as they are mythically described.

Despite the caveats, Siger concludes that for two reasons it is permissible to teach the truth in myths and metaphors (*sub fabulis et metaphoris*). Some intelligible realities so transcend our mind that we cannot fully grasp them. This is the case with the Primary Cause, which, as the *Liber de causis* says, is beyond all language and must be explained by its effects which are most similar to it. Another reason for resorting to myths and metaphors is that sometimes the audience is mentally incapable of grasping the literal truth, though it is perfectly known to the teacher. He can then legitimately propose it in metaphorical language.

II

In 1277 Stephen Tempier, the bishop of Paris, was directed by Pope John XXI to send him information about certain errors allegedly being taught by masters of arts and theologians at Paris. The bishop responded with the condemnation of 219 propositions, among which were several attacking the Christian religion and theology on the grounds that they contain myths and falsehoods and hence are a hindrance to learning. These propositions are: that there are fables and errors in the Christian religion just as there are in other religions ('Quod fabulae et falsa sunt in lege christiana, sicut in aliis'), that the Christian religion is an impediment to learning ('Quod lex christiana impedit addiscere'), that the statements of the theologian are based on fables ('Quod sermones theologi fundati sunt in fabulis'), and that one does not know more for knowing theology ('Quod nihil plus scitur propter scire theologiam').¹⁹

¹⁹ For the text of the condemnation, see *Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. Denifle and É. Chatelain, 1 (Paris, 1889), pp. 543-55. The four propositions are numbered respectively 174, 175, 152, 153. Mandonnet rearranged and renumbered them in logical order. In his new listing of the propositions the four are numbered respectively 181, 180, 183, 182. See P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII^e siècle* 2 (Louvain, 1908), p. 189.

For the history of the condemnation, see E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955), pp. 405-408; F. Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*

Up to the present the source or sources of these bold assertions have not been identified. In his recent study of the condemnation of 1277, Roland Hissette, following Gilson, sees them as expressing a kind of naturalism and rationalism that was creeping into Christian circles through the newly translated works of Aristotle and Averroes, but he throws no further light on their origin.²⁰

Regarding the proposition that there are fables and falsehoods in the Christian religion just as there are in other religions, it should be pointed out that the idea of fables in Christianity, as in other religions, was not new in the thirteenth century. Twelfth-century writers, like William of Conches, thought there were fables in scripture which express the truth by way of fictional devices, e.g., the creation of the body of Eve from Adam's rib.²¹ Stories such as this, he believed, should not be taken literally but interpreted in order to reach the truth they contain. They were seen as ways of both concealing and asserting the truth with beauty and dignity.²² The involvement of truth in fables or myths was expressed by the notion of *integumentum*, literally a 'covering', that must be unveiled in order to reach its underlying truth. Taken literally, it presents a false appearance to the reader, but it has an inner truth.²³ The notion of *involucrum*, or 'wrapping', was often used as almost synonymous with *integumentum*.²⁴ St. Augustine gave positive value to these concepts as early as the fourth century, and they were adopted and elaborated by later Christian writers.²⁵

As for the linking of falsehood with fables, this goes back to antiquity. Cicero thought that fables contain what is neither true nor probable.²⁶ Macrobius, commenting on Cicero in the fifth century, connected fables with falsity in his classic statement: 'Fables – the name itself proclaims their falsity – are invented either for delight alone, to please the ear, or also to encourage men to moral

(Louvain-Paris, 1966), pp. 483-88 and *Maitre Siger de Brabant* (Louvain-Paris, 1977), pp. 139-58; J. F. Wippel, 'The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris', *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 7 (1977) 169-201.

²⁰ R. Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277* (Louvain-Paris, 1977), pp. 274-75. See Gilson, *ibid.*, p. 406.

²¹ See Dronke, *Fabula*, p. 19.

²² *ibid.*, p. 55.

²³ For the notion of *integumentum*, see Stock, *Myth and Science*, pp. 49-62; Dronke, *ibid.*, pp. 25-32; Jeaneau, 'Lectio philosophorum', pp. 127-92.

²⁴ See Stock, *ibid.*; Dronke, *ibid.*, pp. 56-57, 61-64; Chenu, "'Involucrum'", 75-79.

²⁵ See Dronke, *ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁶ 'Fabula est, in qua nec verae nec veri similes res continentur' (Cicero, *De inventione* 1.19.27, ed. J. G. Baiter-C. L. Kayser [Leipzig, 1860]). Cicero thought that fables about the gods were foolish and absurd, yet he claimed it was the duty of a Roman to revere and worship them; see Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.28.70, ed. A. S. Pease (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 2. 734-37.

worth.²⁷ The association of fables and falsehood is echoed in the condemned proposition we have been considering and also in Siger of Brabant's triple use of the expression *fabulosa et falsa* in his treatment of fables in religion.²⁸ It is possible, therefore, that the condemned proposition was expressed either orally or in writing by some master of arts at Paris commenting on a classical text dealing with fables.

There seems to be no precedent, however, for saying that theology is based on fables or that theology is worthless and the Christian religion impedes learning. These statements reveal a definite naturalist and rationalist spirit that was new in medieval intellectual circles. The obvious place to look for their source is the faculty of arts at Paris in the 1270's in the circle of Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. Many of the condemned propositions derived from their teaching, or they were suspected to derive from it. Hissette has been able to trace thirty of the condemned propositions directly to Siger, fourteen probably to him, and fifty-six plausibly to him. Boethius of Dacia is credited with thirteen, probably with three, and plausibly with twenty-six.²⁹ Several manuscripts of the condemnation name these men as the principal proponents of the propositions.³⁰ The propositions may not have been written down but asserted orally. St. Thomas implies that some Parisian masters were teaching clandestinely heterodox doctrines that they feared to teach openly. In his *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*, written against Siger and his followers, he accuses a certain unnamed master or masters of teaching boys in corners, and he challenges them to write openly so that their errors can be refuted.³¹

²⁷ 'Fabulae, quarum nomen indicat falsi professionem, aut tantum conciliandae auribus voluptatis, aut adhortationis quoque in bonam frugem gratia repertae sunt ...' (Macrobius, *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis* 1.2.7, ed. J. Willis [Leipzig, 1963], p. 5). See Pépin, *Mythe et allégorie*, pp. 210-14; Dronke, *Fabula*, p. 16. Macrobius, however, thought that a fictitious narrative (*narratio fabulosa*) could express the truth though hidden and covered by the story (see *ibid.*). Macrobius' distinction between *fabula* and *narratio fabulosa* was disregarded in the twelfth century when the cognitive function and value of fables were emphasized. On *narratio fabulosa*, see Stock, *Myth and Science*, chap. 2.

²⁸ See below, Appendix A.

²⁹ See Hissette, *Enquête*, pp. 314-15. Little is known about this associate of Siger. For the latest information about his life and works, see Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, pp. 402-12. There is solid evidence that he was born in Denmark, not in Sweden, as previously thought: see S. Skovgaard Jensen, 'On the National Origin of the Philosopher Boetius de Dacia', *Classica et mediaevalia* 24 (1963) 232-41. Unfortunately his commentary on the *Metaphysics* has not been found. The commentary would be of great interest for the subject of this paper. See J. J. Duin, 'À la recherche du commentaire de Boèce de Dacie sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote' in *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter* (Miscellanea mediaevalia 2; Berlin, 1963), pp. 446-53.

³⁰ See Hissette, *ibid.*, pp. 11-12; Van Steenberghen, *Maître Siger de Brabant*, p. 155 and *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, p. 485.

³¹ 'Si quis autem gloriabundus de falsi nominis scientia, velit contra haec quae scripsimus aliquid dicere, non loquatur in angulis nec coram pueris qui nesciunt de tam arduis iudicare; sed

Mandonnet suggests that the propositions may reflect student discussions, but it does not seem likely that the authorities would take the remarks of students so seriously.³²

Mandonnet's other suggestion is more plausible, that the propositions against the Christian religion and theology were never taught literally but were 'inductions made by the judges of 1277'.³³ It is possible that the censors thought they could find in Siger's *Metaphysics*, especially as it is preserved in the Cambridge manuscript, at least the proposition that there are fables and falsehoods in the Christian religion as there are in other religions. Implied in this statement are the other propositions: that the Christian religion is an impediment to learning, that theology is based on fables, and that one does not know more for knowing theology.

It should be emphasized that none of these statements can be found in the extant works of Siger, indeed that his views on Christian faith and theology, as expressed in his works, are incompatible with them. He never taught that there are fables and errors in the Christian faith or that it is a hindrance to learning. Quite the opposite. In cases of conflict between faith and reason he always placed truth on the side of faith.³⁴ As for theology, far from reducing it to a legendary or mythical account of the truth, he expressly praises it as a higher kind of wisdom than metaphysics. Like St. Thomas, he claimed that the theology based on sacred scripture is more certain than metaphysics because it is grounded in divine revelation which, unlike human reason, cannot err. It is also a superior kind of wisdom because it leads to a knowledge of God and creatures inaccessible to human reason left to itself.³⁵ As they stand, therefore, the four condemned propositions we have been considering do not express the mind of Siger.

It is possible, however, that at least the proposition that there are fables and falsehoods in the Christian religion just as there are in other religions was formulated with Siger in mind. It is well known that the theologians who drew up the 219 propositions condemned by the bishop of Paris worked hastily and

contra hoc scriptum rescribat, si audeat' (St. Thomas, *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*, ed. L. W. Keeler [Rome, 1936], p. 80). See Van Steenberghen, *Maître Siger de Brabant*, pp. 58-59.

³² P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII^e siècle* 1 (Louvain, 1911), p. 193.

³³ *ibid.*

³⁴ See Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, pp. 398-99; Van Steenberghen, *Maître Siger de Brabant*, pp. 242-43. B. Bazán, 'La réconciliation de la foi et la raison était-elle possible pour les aristotéliciens radicaux?', *Dialogue* 19 (1980) 235-54.

³⁵ See Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*: Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, fol. 90v and Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 2330, fol. 102v, published in W. Dunphy-A. Maurer, 'A Promising New Discovery for Sigerian Studies', *Mediaeval Studies* 29 (1967) 364-69. See St. Thomas, *ST* 1.1. 5-6.

not always with great insight into the meaning of the works they read. Hissette calculates that sixteen times they misunderstood the text they censored, nine times they hardened the author's thought, ten times they isolated a phrase from its context and stretched its meaning, and sixty-four times they ascribed to an author doctrines taught only from a limited point of view, for example that of the philosopher of nature, or proposed *secundum intentionem philosophorum* and subsequently rejected by the author.³⁶ Examples of the latter doctrines are the eternity of the world and the myth of the eternal recurrence of historical events. These can be found in the writings of Siger and Boethius of Dacia, presented not as true but only as conclusions of the philosophy of nature or as the teaching of Aristotle.³⁷ In his *De aeternitate mundi* Siger argues for the eternity of the world in opposition to 'theologians and poets' who teach that the universe came into existence from nothing. He also contends that world history is cyclical, with the same events recurring eternally, including ideas, laws and religions (*leges et religiones*). He is careful to add that he is teaching this, not as true, but as the doctrine of Aristotle.³⁸ But this disclaimer did not prevent the theologians from censoring his work.

May not these theologians have acted in the same way when they read Siger's discussion of fables and falsehoods in religion? He makes it clear that, as a philosopher and commentator on Aristotle, he is concerned only with human laws (*leges humanae*), which are the product of human reason; he does not mention the Christian religion or the divine law (*lex divina*). The human laws and religion Siger has in mind are within the sphere of human reason and nature; they do not include divine laws or a divinely revealed religion. Writing as a philosopher, not as a theologian, he does not go out of his way to discuss the law or religion whose origin is above nature and human reason.

But this may be exactly why the theologians were disquieted by his commentary on Aristotle. He does not explicitly exempt the Christian religion from contamination by childish tales and errors. St. Thomas was more cautious in his own commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Though he was writing a philosophical work, he thought it prudent when addressing a Christian audience to point out the difference between the laws Aristotle knew and the divinely revealed religion of Christianity. Aristotle, St. Thomas remarks,

... is speaking here of the laws devised by men, which have as their ultimate end the preservation of the political community. Therefore the men who established

³⁶ See Hissette, *Enquête*, pp. 316-17.

³⁷ Propositions 83-92 in the numbering of Mandonnet; see Hissette, *ibid.*, pp. 147-60.

³⁸ Siger of Brabant, *De aeternitate mundi*, ed. B. Bazán, *Siger de Brabant, Quaestiones in tertium De anima, De anima intellectiva, De aeternitate mundi* (Louvain-Paris, 1972), pp. 131-32.

these laws have handed down in them, in keeping with the diversity of peoples and nations, certain directives by which human souls might be drawn away from evil and persuaded to do good, although many of them, which men have heard from childhood and of which they approved more readily than of what they knew to be true, were empty and foolish. But the law given by God directs men to that true happiness to which everything false is opposed. Therefore there is nothing false in the divine law.³⁹

The absence of a similar cautionary statement by Siger might have led his critics to believe that his treatment of this subject was suspect; that he really thought, or could at least make his audience believe, that there are errors and childish tales in the Christian religion as there are in others, even though he did not expressly say this.

This suspicion might have been strengthened by Siger's proof that the habit of hearing falsehoods makes a person believe them to be true. When we hear a statement – so the argument runs – especially by someone famous or in authority, it is a reason for thinking it is probably true. Authority is a *locus dialecticus*, that is to say, a ground for forming a probable opinion. When the statement is repeated, a habit of believing it to be true is formed, and this is strengthened and multiplied with the repetition of the statement. In this way it comes to be believed, even though it may be false. Children are especially prone to believe falsehoods they hear repeated because of their mental incapacity to judge the truth.⁴⁰

This is sound Aristotelian doctrine and quite unobjectionable in its philosophical context. But we must remember that Siger was lecturing in the University of Paris at a time when the ecclesiastical authorities and the theologians were combating the rise of naturalism and rationalism. They were bound to be disturbed by the unqualified statement that authority is a *locus dialecticus*, inducing opinions which may be false. Is this true if the person 'famous and in authority' mentioned by Siger is Christ or one of his earthly representatives, like the bishop of Paris? In Christian circles must one not

³⁹ 'Loquitur autem hic Philosophus de legibus ab hominibus adinventis, quae ad conservationem civilem sicut ad ultimum finem ordinantur; et ideo quicumque invenerunt eas, aliqua quibus hominum animi retraherentur a malis et provocarentur ad bona secundum diversitatem gentium et nationum in suis legibus tradiderunt, quamvis multa eorum essent vana et frivola, quae homines a pueritia audientes magis approbabant quam veritatis cognitionem. Sed lex divinitus data ordinat hominem ad veram felicitatem cui omnis falsitas repugnat. Unde in lege Dei nulla falsitas continetur' (St. Thomas, *Sent. super Metaph.* 2.5 (995a4) 333, ed. Cathala-Spiazzi [Rome, 1971]). See *ST* 1-2.99.3 Resp.

⁴⁰ See below, Appendix A. For authority as the *primus locus* of probable arguments, see Cicero, *De inventione* 1.53.101. See also Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2. 25 (1402b9) and *Topics* 1. 10 (104a3-37).

distinguish between human and divine authority, as well as between human and divine law? Siger would no doubt reply that he was only doing the work of a philosopher, which is to pursue natural truths by natural means; what transcends reason and nature is not within the scope of philosophy but of faith and theology.⁴¹ This is true, and no less a theologian than St. Albert the Great said the same thing in almost the same words as Siger.⁴² But in the troubled atmosphere of the 1270's in Paris the separation (and not only the distinction) of reason and faith practiced by Siger and his circle made them an object of suspicion to the ecclesiastical authorities and open to misunderstanding and misrepresentation.

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Whoever the author or authors of the four propositions we have been considering might have been, it is practically certain that they are connected with book 2 of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. As we have seen, Aristotle at this point discusses wrong approaches to scientific knowledge and other hindrances to learning. Among them is reliance on customary and familiar sayings, such as the legendary tales of popular religion. This would be the natural place for a master of arts at Paris, lecturing on the *Metaphysics* and reflecting on his own Christian religion, to have made these statements. If their authorship is ever discovered, it will no doubt be among the commentators on book 2 of the *Metaphysics*. The evidence presented in this paper does not lead with certainty to their author. It only allows the conjecture that the condemnation of the proposition that there are fables and falsehoods in the Christian religion, just as there are in other religions, was directed, however erroneously, against Siger of Brabant.

⁴¹ 'Sed nihil ad nos nunc de Dei miraculis, cum de naturalibus naturaliter disseramus' (Siger of Brabant, *De anima intellectiva* 3, ed. Bazán, *Siger de Brabant*, p. 84, ll. 47-48). For Siger's ideal as a philosopher, see Van Steenberghen, *Maître Siger de Brabant*, pp. 222-57.

⁴² '... dico quod nihil ad me de Dei miraculis, cum ego de naturalibus disseram' (St. Albert, *De generatione et corruptione* 1. 1. 22, ed. Borgnet [Paris, 1890], 4. 363).

Appendix

A

Utrum consuetudo audiendi falsa faciat credere ea¹

< 1 > (f. 57va) De primo videtur quod non, quia Aristoteles II^o *De anima*,² dans differentiam inter opinari et imaginari, dicit quod in nobis est imaginari sic vel sic, non autem opinari. Si tamen consuetudo audiendi falsa faceret nos opinari ea, in nobis esset sic vel sic opinari. Quare etc.

< 2 > Item, consuetudo non tollit aliquid naturale, ut dicit Aristoteles³ quod natura non assuescitur in contrarium. Nunc autem principia prima naturaliter sunt nobis nota, ut voluit Commentator superius.⁴ Ergo consuetudo audiendi opposita principiorum non facit credere ea.

< 3 > Item, opinionem accipimus de re ex his quae nobis apparent de ea, et semper nobis apparent eadem de re. Quare consuetudo in oppositis eorum quae apparent de re non facit nos^a ipsa opinari.

Oppositum vult Aristoteles in littera.⁵ Dicit enim quod 'sicut consuevimus, ita dignamur dici', etc.

Dico ad hoc quod consuetudo audiendi falsa, etiam opposita eorum quae sunt per se nota, facit credere ea; quod per effectum probat hic Aristoteles. Illa enim quae in legibus humanis consueta sunt audiri, quamvis fabulosa et falsa, magis applicabilia sunt animo quam suae veritates. Ratio quare in legibus humanis traduntur aliquando falsa et fabulosa est quia legislator non semper ponit secundum quod opinatur de primis principiis, sed secundum quod magis potest aptare cives ad mores bonos. Falsis autem et fabulosis possunt quandoque homines aptari ad bonum, quia secundum Aristotelem X^o *Ethicorum*⁶ quidam ex natura apti sunt ad bonitatem, alii autem doctrina fiunt boni, et alii verberibus et comminationibus, eo quod sicut sensus prosequitur delectabile, ita et fugit tristabile. Et ideo in lege Pythagorae⁷ tradebatur sub comminatione quod anima hominis boni post mortem intraret aliud corpus bonum, mali autem corpus alterius bestiae; quod non fuit verum, sed propter terrorem positum.

^a nos] nobis *ms.*

¹ Sigeri de Brabantia *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* 2, q. 23; Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, fol. 57va-b. See Graiff, *Siger de Brabant*, pp. 73-76. Punctuation and spelling have been modernized. Deletions and marginal corrections in the *ms.* have not been noted.

² Arist., *De anima* 3.3.(427b14-21). The *ms.* erroneously refers to II^o *De anima*.

³ Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 2. 1 (1103a20).

⁴ Averroes, *In 2 Metaph.* (993a30), c. 1 text. 1 (Venice, 1574), 8. 29A.

⁵ Arist., *Metaph.* 2.3 (994b32-995a1).

⁶ Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 10. 9 (1079b20-1080a4).

⁷ See Arist., *De anima* 1. 3 (407b21); St. Thomas, *Sententia super De anima* 1. 8. 131, ed. A. M. Pirotta (Turin-Rome, 1948); Diogenes Laertius, *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* 8. 36, ed. R. D. Hicks (London-New York, 1925), 2. 353.

Ratio autem quare consuetudo audiendi falsa facit credere ea haec est, quoniam audire aliquid, et maxime a famoso, est quaedam ratio probabilis; unde et locus quidam dialecticus est auctoritas. Ex qua^b igitur auctoritate sive audiendo ab aliquo famoso, tamquam per rationem probabilem, generatur habitus qui est opinio; et, multiplicatis rationibus probabilibus, multiplicatur opinio. Cum consuetudine audiendi aliqua falsa multiplicentur quasi actus rationis probabilis, rationabile est opinionem de illis falsis in audiente confirmari et multiplicari. Maxime autem consuetudo audiendi talia a pueritia facit credere ea, quia pueri propter impotentiam intellectus non possunt diiudicare veritatem. Et secundum Commentatorem hic,⁸ assuetudo in talibus facit credere opposita principiorum et per se notorum, sicut accipiebat de Avicenna, qui ex consuetudine in tantum fuit inductus ut negaret formas appropriari materiis, et concederet hominem posse generari ex terra. Ratio autem quare consuetudo audiendi (f. 57vb) falsa facit credere opposita principiorum est quoniam universaliter habens habitum intellectus disponitur ad proportionalia illi habitui. Intellectui autem habituato ex consuetudine audiendi falsa proportionalia sunt opposita principiorum. Principia enim prima aliquo modo sunt a nobis naturaliter habita, et consuetudo vim habet naturae; propter quod consuetudo audiendi falsa quasi naturaliter facit nos credere opposita eorum quae sunt per se nota.

< 1 > Ad primam rationem dicitur quod Aristoteles ibi⁹ intelligit quod opinio non omnino oboedit imperio voluntatis, sicut et phantasia. Nihil tamen prohibet voluntatem operari aliquo modo ad opinandum aliqua consueta audiri.

< 2 > Ad aliud dicitur quod intellectus noster magis natus est recipere cognitionem primorum principiorum quam oppositorum; non tamen sic determinatur ad principia quin possibilis sit ad errorem. Unde quaedam sunt naturalia quae aequaliter sunt apta nata in utroque oppositorum, ut quae sunt naturalia secundum materiam solum eo quod materia aequaliter est < in > potentia ad duo contraria. In talibus autem natura assuescit ad contraria.^c Alia autem sunt naturalia quae nata sunt ad unam partem nisi impediuntur; vel quae sunt naturalia secundum agens, et in talibus natura non assuescit ad contraria. Primo autem modo prima principia sunt a nobis naturaliter habita.

< 3 > Ad aliud dicitur quod opinionem accipimus de re ex his quae apparent nobis de ea, et non solum ex his quae essentialia sunt rei, sed etiam ex his quae accidunt rei. Accidit autem rei quod de ea dicantur falsa. Et ideo eo quod apparet nobis de re dici falsa, per consuetudinem opinionem talem de re accipimus.

^b qua] quo *ms.*

^c ad contraria] in contrarium *ms.*, vel ad contraria *in marg.*

⁸ Averroes, *In 2 Metaph.* (994b33), c. 3 text. 15, 8. 35C-E. See Avicenna, *Tractatus de diluviis*, ed. M. Alonso, 'Homenaje a Avicenna en su milenario. Las traducciones de Juan González de Burgos y Salomón', *Al-Andalus* 14 (1949) 306-308. This tractate is the last chapter of Avicenna's *De meteorologicis*.

⁹ See above, p. 527 n. 2.

B

Utrum philosophantibus competat loqui de divinis fabulose¹

(f. 64ra) Quaeritur autem, gratia praedictorum, utrum philosophantibus competat de divinis loqui fabulose.

Et quod sic videtur, ex hoc quod Plato et multi aliorum sub metaphoris et fabulis veritates suas tradiderunt.²

Oppositum videtur Aristoteles dicere in littera.³ Dicit enim quod de fabulose sophisticantibus non est dignum cum studio intendere.

Verum est quod de divinis loqui fabulose contingit aliquibus vel propter impotentiam intellectus; cum enim non possint intellectum elevare ad ea quae sunt intellectualis naturae, depressi ad phantasmata, intellectualia speculantur tamquam sensibilia. Aliis autem contingit hoc non quia intellectum ad ea quae sunt intellectualis naturae non possint elevare, sed quia veritatem voluerunt obumbrare, ut forte contingebat Platoni et aliis.⁴

Sed convenitne hoc philosophanti? Dico quod non. Et huius triplex est ratio. Primo, quia persuadere per metaphoras et fabulas infimus modus persuadendi est. Est enim proprius modus poetis, aliquam levem suspicionem inducens, quae minor est quam opinio, quam inducit dialectica per suasiones. Et hoc apparet ex *Poetria* Aristotelis.⁵ Philosophi autem non est infimum modum persuadendi tenere, sed magis supremum. Secundo, quia sub fabulis et metaphoris obumbratur veritas. Et ideo dixit hic Aristoteles⁶ quod loquentes sub metaphora praedicta nos neglexerunt. Philosophantis autem non est veritatem occultare, sed magis aliis manifestare; est enim opus sapientis non mentiri de quibus novit. Tertio, quia docentes veritatem sub metaphoris et fabulis addiscentes quandoque possunt ducere in errorem, faciendo eos credere divina et intellectualia esse sicut eis fabulose et apologice sunt dicta.

Intellige tamen quod propter duo licitum est quandoque docere veritatem sub fabulis et metaphoris. Quando enim intellectus noster non potest ad plenum capere aliqua (f. 64rb) intelligibilia propter eorum excellentiam et improprietatem intellectus nostri ad ea, sicut causam primam dicit auctor *De causis*⁷ esse superiorem omni narratione, tunc licet in simili ea declarare; sed simillimo utendum est, sicut in commento *De causis*⁸

¹ Sigeri de Brabantia *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* 3, q. 17; Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, fol. 64ra-b. See Graiff, *Siger de Brabant*, pp. 147-48.

² See St. Thomas, *Sententia de caelo et mundo* 1. 22 (279b12) 7-8 (Rome, 1886), 3. 90-91; *Sententia super De anima* 1. 8 (407b21) 107. Pythagoras is also said to have hidden the truth from strangers. See Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1. 26. 74, ed. Pease, 1. 388.

³ Arist., *Metaph.* 3. 4 (1000a18).

⁴ See n. 2 (directly above).

⁵ This seems to be a general interpretation of Aristotle's *Poetics* and not a reference to a specific passage in it.

⁶ Arist., *Metaph.* 3. 4 (1000a9-11).

⁷ *Liber de causis* 5, ed. O. Bardenhewer (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1882), p. 168.

⁸ *ibid.*, p. 169, ll. 19-22.

dicitur quod causa prima narratur in eo quod immediate procedit ab eo, quod est ei simillimum.

Item, quandoque veritas nota est complete intellectui docentis; audientes tamen, propter impotentiam intellectus, eam secundum se contemplari non possunt: tunc licet eis sub metaphora veritatem proponere.⁹

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⁹ See St. Thomas' treatment of the use of metaphors in theology, *ST* 1. 1. 9 Resp.

AN UNKNOWN LETTER BY JOHN WYCLYF
IN MANCHESTER, JOHN RYLANDS
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY MS. ENG. 86

Williell R. Thomson

FOR fully a century now it has been established that the small (158 × 108 mm.) vellum ms. Eng. 86 (olim Ashburnham xxvii C) contains a mixed selection of Latin and English works, which subsequent scholarship has uniformly – with one ambiguous exception¹ – and confidently ascribed to the great philosopher and reformer, John Wyclyf (d. 1384).² That Wyclyf's name should appear nowhere in the ms. is not remarkable; many mss. of English provenance omitted the heresiarch's name in the interests of escaping destruction.³

¹ The English version of the *De officio pastoralis* (fols. 1r-21v) is ascribed to Wyclyf's associate John Purvey by Ernest W. Talbot in J. Burke Severs, ed., *A Manual of the Writings in Middle English 1050-1500*, 6 vols. (Hamden, Conn., 1967-80), 2, 368, 528, and edited from this unique ms. in F. D. Matthew, ed., *The English Works of Wyclif Hitherto Unprinted*, 2nd rev. edition (EETS OS 74; London, 1902, rpt. New York, 1973), pp. 405-57. Wyclyf's work of the same title, upon which this loose translation is based, was edited by Gotthard Lechler, *Johannis de Wiclif Tractatus de officio pastoralis* (Leipzig, 1863).

² The best biography remains Herbert B. Workman, *John Wyclif. A Study of the English Medieval Church*, 2 vols. (London, 1924). K. B. McFarlane, *John Wycliffe and the Beginnings of English Nonconformity* (New York, 1953), adopts a more severe tone. Two more recent studies are James Crompton, 'John Wyclif. A Study in Mythology', *Transactions of the Leicestershire Archaeological and Historical Society* 42 (1966-67) 5-34; and S. Harrison Thomson, 'John Wyclif' in B. A. Gerrish, ed., *Reformers in Profile. Advocates of Reform 1300-1600* (Philadelphia, 1967), pp. 12-39. The spelling of the name is that established by the latter authority and most recently confirmed in Vaclav Mudroch (ed. A. C. Reeves), *The Wyclif Tradition* (Athens, Ohio, 1979), p. xi. For additional bibliography and detailed examinations of all the writings of Wyclif mentioned below, see the forthcoming monograph by the author, *The Latin Writings of John Wyclif: An Annotated Catalog*. There also previous lists of his writings, such as those in the Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek mss. 3933, 3935, 4514 and 7980, Bale, Tanner, Baber, Shirley and Loserth, are discussed.

³ Cf., e.g., Cambridge, Corpus Christi Coll. 436, Peterhouse 223, Queen's Coll. 15, Trinity Coll. B.15.28 and O.4.43, Gonville and Caius Coll. 337/565; Lincoln, Cathedral Chap. C.1.15; London, B. L. Add. 5902; Oxford, Magdalen Coll. 38, 55 (one asc. erased), 117, St. John's 171. What is surprising is that perhaps the majority of English mss. are ascribed! But well over half of

It appears nevertheless that, despite separate examinations of this codex by Matthew,⁴ Buddensieg,⁵ Pollard⁶ and Tyson,⁷ one of the eleven Latin *opuscula*⁸ has somehow eluded the critical attention it deserves. Occupying thirty lines (just over two thirds) of fol. 117r (see plate: the verso is blank), it follows the conclusion of chapter 36 of Wyclif's *Dyalogus* (often alternatively titled, as here, *Speculum ecclesie militantis*). From fol. 118r to fol. 121r (the end of the codex) we come upon chapter 29 and most of chapters 30-32 of the *Dyalogus*; our scribe had already noted the omission on fol. 114v. The hand is the same throughout both the English and the Latin texts, though often more compressed than here; it may safely be dated before 1420 but after the turn of the century.

The piece in question fits into that peculiar epistolary format which also characterized Wyclif's extant correspondence with Ralph Strode, the eminent logician and friend of Chaucer;⁹ but it is even more reminiscent of four other authenticated writings: the *Exhortacio novi doctoris* (customarily though erroneously classified as a sermon);¹⁰ the *De octo questionibus pulchris*;¹¹ the *De amore* (or *Ad quinque questiones*);¹² and the *De gradibus cleri ecclesie* (heretofore miscategorized as a polemical piece).¹³ All four address some specific scriptural or ecclesiological issue raised by an unnamed friend, or perhaps student, *in scholis* at Oxford. In at least the first and last mentioned of these, Wyclif actually seized the opportunity of correspondence with the (also!) unnamed recipients of the letters to dilate upon some *third* person's

all extant Wyclif mss. are today in Czech libraries, or by Czech scribes in the Nationalbibliothek in Vienna.

⁴ As cited above, n. 1; comment on p. viii. Matthew was one of the founders of the Wyclif Society in March of 1882, and remained editorially active with that body for thirty years at least.

⁵ Rudolf Buddensieg, ed., *John Wiclif's Polemical Works in Latin*, 2 vols. (Wyclif Society; London, 1883), I. I.vii.

⁶ Alfred W. Pollard, ed., *Iohannis Wycliffe Dialogus sive Speculum ecclesie militantis* (Wyclif Society; London, 1886), p. xxi. Pollard used our ms. as his A-text; it is therefore all the more surprising that he should here have remarked 'The ms. has 121 leaves and contains three English Tracts and eleven in Latin, including a fly-sheet [sic!] on the mystical sense of *Castellum* on f. 117' (emphasis added).

⁷ Moses Tyson, 'Hand-List of the Collection of English Manuscripts in the John Rylands Library, 1928', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester* 13 (1929) 169. He remarks of our piece simply 'f. 117. Part of a treatise (Latin)'.
⁸ All of the Latin pieces are listed in the Index of Manuscripts in Thomson, *The Latin Writings of John Wyclif*; less precisely in Tyson, *ibid*.

⁹ The four letters or *responsiones* are printed in Johann Loserth, ed., *Johannis Wyclif Opera minora* (Wyclif Society; London, 1913), pp. 10-11, 175-200, 258-312, 398-404. The nature of his relationship with Wyclif is canvassed in Thomson, *ibid*.

¹⁰ Ed. Loserth, *ibid.*, pp. 431-35.

¹¹ *ibid.*, pp. 12-15.

¹² *ibid.*, pp. 8-10.

¹³ *ibid.*, pp. 140-44.

observations or queries, exactly as in our piece. This is more than coincidence: it is firm evidence not only of a habitual mode of discourse but, indeed, of the very process whereby Wyclif sought to shape and refine both the substance and the technique of that elaborate argumentation which we discover full-blown in the major setpieces of the *Summa de ente*,¹⁴ the *Summa theologie*,¹⁵ the *De eucharistia*¹⁶ and the *Triologus*.¹⁷ This dimension of insight into the inner evolution of a particular scholastic intellect is quite exceptional.

The ostensible topic of the letter (which lacks both salutation and close – again typical of the Wyclif epistolary *corpus*), an explication of the mystical sense of Matthew 21:2, falls well within the bounds of what we might expect Wyclif to have found of interest. In a general way, we ought to remark that he was one of only two men in the entire fourteenth century to complete a *Postilla* upon the whole Bible (the first, upon whom his dependence was massive, was Nicholas of Lyra, the Franciscan Paris doctor [d. 1340]). Recent scholarship has done much to elucidate the scope of this enormous enterprise, undertaken between the years of 1371 and 1376.¹⁸ His formidable *Opus evangelicum* was in fact a commentary on Matthew 5-7 and 23-25, and on John 13-17, left unfinished at his death.¹⁹ His separate and slightly earlier *exposiciones* on Matthew 23 and 24 reflect further substantial exegetical efforts, though saturated with a polemical, anti-mendicant purpose.²⁰ The *Exhortacio novi doctoris*, cited above, was a cursory gloss on 2 Timothy 2:3. Finally, the whole body of his 245 *sermones*, edited in four volumes by the Wyclif Society, is

¹⁴ A series of thirteen philosophical treatises assembled in the later 1360's. See J. A. Robson, *Wyclif and the Oxford Schools. The Relation of the 'Summa de ente' to Scholastic Debates at Oxford in the Later Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, N.S. 8; Cambridge, 1961, rpt. 1966); Thomson, *The Latin Writings of John Wyclif*. Not all yet edited.

¹⁵ All twelve of the component treatises were edited by the Wyclif Society; among them are the massive *De civili dominio*, the *De ecclesia* and the *De potestate pape*. See Thomson, *ibid*.

¹⁶ Ed. by Johann Loserth for the Wyclif Society in 1908. The Eucharist was an issue of enormous moment for Wyclif, and was a major cause of his bitter split with the mendicants in 1379-80.

¹⁷ First edition, 1525; most recent edition by Gotthard Lechler, *Joannis Wiclif Trialogus cum supplemento Trialogi* (Oxford, 1869). It offers the most convenient summary of Wyclif's thought on most of the issues that engaged him.

¹⁸ Cf. Beryl Smalley, 'John Wyclif's *Postilla super totam Bibliam*', *The Bodleian Library Record* 4 (1953) 186-205 and 'Wyclif's *Postilla* on the Old Testament and His *Principium*' in *Oxford Studies Presented to Daniel Callus* (Oxford Historical Society, N. S. 16; Oxford, 1964), pp. 253-96; Gustav Adolf Benrath, *Wyclifs Bibelkommentar* (Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 36; Berlin, 1966); Thomson, *The Latin Writings of John Wyclif*.

¹⁹ Ed. by Johann Loserth for the Wyclif Society, 2 vols. (London, 1895-96). At the end of the Cambridge and Dublin mss.: 'Auctoris vita finitur et hoc opus ita'.

²⁰ Ed. Loserth, *Johannis Wyclif Opera minora*, pp. 313-82.

heavily laced with interpretations of the lectionary scriptures that always provided his initial text, as well as a multitude of *obiter dicta* upon other apposite citations that came to mind along the way. His facility in recall and deployment was unmatched in his time; the respectful sobriquet *doctor evangelicus* was a contemporary one, and it became universal among Lollard and Hussite sympathizers alike in the following decades.

More specifically, we know of at least five separate occasions when Wyclif touched upon this passage in the course of his career. The first known to us was in his postill on Matthew, written around 1375. No distinction among the interpretive modes is made there; in any case only a gloss was intended.²¹ In the *De veritate sacre scripture*, sometime in 1377, he reverted to his standard sources, Augustine and Chrysostom, for illumination of the mystical sense of this verse.²² The passage, again in its mystical aspect, is made to support an anti-curial charge in the *Dyalogus* itself, which dates probably from 1379.²³ A sermon from very nearly the same time construes the two disciples as priests and secular lords; there is some slight parallelism with the language of our letter.²⁴ Finally, in the *Trialogus* (late 1382 or early 1383), he discerns in this text a weapon against the friars' doctrine that Jesus begged.²⁵

The tenor and orientation of our new addition to this catena places it sometime in 1378 or 1379; the key phrases are in lines 13-14, 'quod iste quattuor secte non cessant usque hodie agere contra Christum',²⁶ and at the end, on the hypocritical introduction of 'ceremonies'.

In the absence of any title – again not uncommon in the shorter works – we offer *Epistola ad quendam socium de sensu mistico Matt 21^o*. No such title appears in any of the standard catalogs, but that in itself does not militate against its inclusion in the *corpus Wyclifianum*. It is an eminently reasonable proposition that at some point in Wyclif's lectures on the Bible or the

²¹ Oxford, Magdalen Coll. ms. 55, fol. 92vb and Bodleian Lib. ms. Bodley 716, fol. 15va.

²² Ed. Rudolf Buddensieg, *John Wyclif's De veritate sacrae scripture*, 3 vols. (Wyclif Society; London, 1905-1907), I, 98-99.

²³ Ed. Pollard (n. 6 above), p. 7.

²⁴ Ed. Johann Loserth, *Johannis Wyclif Sermones*, vol. 1: *Super evangelia dominicalia* (Wyclif Society; London, 1887), p. 2. Part of the exposition reads 'Duo discipuli missi Jerusalem sunt coordinati presbyteri et seculares domini qui debent in castellum quod est Jerusalem contraire. Jerusalem enim fuit murata tribus muris ac propugnaculis sicut castrum, et ipsa secundum suos incolas fuit contra Christum ac suos apostolos.'

²⁵ Ed. Lechler (n. 17 above), p. 347.

²⁶ The 'four sects', in Wyclif's parlance, were the 'Caesarian' (i.e., secular) clergy; the monks; regular canons; and mendicants. On the development of the term (of which this would appear to be one of the earliest uses, if it is not actually a later insert) see Thomson, *The Latin Writings of John Wyclif*, sec. F.

Sententiae of Peter Lombard²⁷ he would have been approached by a student or – more probably – a colleague to amplify just those observations which we know he did make in the *De veritate sacre scripture* and the *Dyalogus*.

While absolute positive confirmation is wanting, the circumstantial case for Wyclyf's authorship is founded on a considerable variety of sources and internal indications, and is certainly not diminished by one other fact concerning the array of writings in the ms. itself: the *Purgatorium secte Christi* is unique to it (fols. 49r-54r), and the *De contrarietate duorum dominorum* (fols. 41r-48v) was thought to be unique until discovered again by I. H. Stein in a Florence ms. in 1930.²⁸ The English *De papa* (fols. 25r-34v) is also known only from this precious codex.

In the edition of the letter given below there is a line-by-line correspondence with the text as found in the ms. Scribal orthography has been preserved; capitalization and punctuation conform to modern usage.

< *Epistola ad quendam socium de sensu mistico Matt 21^o* >

- Vnus amicus fidelis in domino quesivit sensum misti-
cum huius euangelii Matt 21^o: *Ite in castellum quod*
contra vos est. Nec debet fidelis ambigere quin
preter sensum literalem verborum Christi sensus mysticus huius regis
5 sapientissimi sit sensu multiplici onustatus. Quod autem Christus
misit duos discipulos, hoc videtur posse notare generaliter
duas maneries discipulorum Christi, scilicet activos et contemplativos,
qui in Christi causa contra eius aduersarios debent fideliter laborare.
Quod autem Ierusalem murata vocatur 'castellum contra' apostolos, fi-
10 gurat quod incole huius ville, scilicet summi pontifices, Pharisei,
Saducei et scribe, sunt contra veritatem euangelicam et sic contra

2-3 Mt 21:2

²⁷ Certainly the *De verbi incarnatione*, c. 1372, was indisputably a sententiary commentary: ed. Edward Harris, *Johannis Wyclif Tractatus de benedicta incarnatione* (Wyclif Society: London, 1886). But it now seems likely that two *libri* of the *Summa de ente*, the *De trinitate* and the *De ydeis* were parts of an earlier attempt in that direction (Robson, *Wyclif and the Oxford Schools*, p. 134; cf. Thomson, *The Latin Writings of John Wyclif*).

²⁸ 'The Wyclif Manuscript in Florence', *Speculum* 5 (1930) 95. (The ms. in question is Biblioteca Laurenziana 19. 33.) Wyclyf's *De servitute civili et dominio seculari* is also found only in these two codices; it appears in ours at fols. 82v-89v: ed. Loserth, *Johannis Wyclif Opera minora*, pp. 145-64. (The other two pieces appear in Buddensieg, ed., *John Wiclif's Polemical Works in Latin* 1. 298-316 and 2. 698-713.)

Christi discipulos ipsam veritatem fideliter predicantes. Et sic notatur per istud verbum allegorice quod iste quattuor secte non cessant usque hodie agere contra Christum. Et quod Christus misit hos
 15 duos in istud castellum contra ipsos, notatur quod iste due maneries hominum debent viriliter agere ad sensum tropologicum ex autoritate domini contra istos. Et quod isti duo discipuli secure et fideliter euaserunt, notat ad sensum anagogicum quomodo
 20 beati in patria de istis hostibus sunt securi. Sensum autem alium de verbis istis et aliis verbis euangelii nouit vestra discrecio fideliter dilatare. Quoad illud euangelii Io 2^o, dicitur communiter a fidelibus orthodoxis quod ille nupcie figurant innouacionem desponsacionis Christi cum sua ecclesia et quod ille sex idrie figurant sex maneries in lege veteri
 25 et iam currentes in lege gracie, per quas tanquam per aquas infrigidantes Christi gratiam caritas euangelica est tardata. Quod autem iste sex idrie continent metretas binas uel ternas, significat quod iste cerimonie sunt ab ipocritis introducte ut satrapis et populo placeatur, uel ut fingatur quod lex
 30 domini compleatur.²⁹

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21-22 Jn 2:1-10

²⁹ I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Ruth J. Dean at a few crucial points in this transcription. — The ancillary, and evidently quite unrelated, commentary on John 2:1-10 (especially verses 6 and 7) is likewise not without analogs elsewhere in Wyclif's writings: cf. his postill on John (Oxford, Magdalen Coll. ms. 55, fol. 133rb and Bodleian Lib. ms. Bodley 716, fol. 53rb); *De veritate sacre scripture* 1. 176; *De verbi incarnatione* 5; *Sermones* ... 1. 72-75, 4. 232-33; on the latter page, an exact duplication of wording (here emphasized): 'Nupcie quidem sunt sponsacio Christi atque ecclesie seu figurant innovacionem desponsacionis Christi cum sua ecclesia, que est virgo ex Judeis et gentibus aggregata [5 lines], per quos tamquam per aquas infrigidantes Christi gratiam caritas evangelica est tardata. Quod autem sunt sex ydrie lapidee, signat duriciem superbie Judeorum, et quod continent aliqua metretas binas et alia ternas signat quod iste cerimonie sunt ab ypocritis introducte, ut satrapis et populo placeatur vel ut fingatur quod lex Domini compleatur.' This sermon (the fifth of the *sermones quadraginta*) has very tentatively been dated by William Mallard, 'Dating the *Sermones Quadraginta* of John Wyclif', *Medievalia et humanistica* 17 (1966) 102, to 21 January 1375. In view of the extremely close connection between it and the latter half of our piece, some second Sunday after the Octave of Epiphany in 1378 or 1379 seems more probable. While I would not categorically assert that such verbatim dependence automatically clinches our argument for Wyclif's authorship, it certainly adds weight to that side of the scale. He often reworked earlier lines of thought without bothering to specify his own previous discussion of the question.

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